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


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CHAPTER CCLXXXVIII.


FIRST RENT IN GERMAN ALLIANCE: SURRENDER OF BULGARIA.

FALL OF MONASTIR (Nov., 1916), FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD OF QUIESCENCE ON SALONIKA FRONT—GENERAL MILNE'S WINTER PROBLEMS—OFFENSIVE IN DOIRAN SECTOR OF APRIL, 1917—KORITZA—ALLIED SUCCESS IN ALBANIA—THE GREEK IMPASSE—JONNART'S MISSION AND THE COUP D'ETAT OF ATHENS, JUNE, 1917—TRIUMPH OF VENIZELOS AND THE POLICY OF GREEK REINTEGRATION AND MOBILIZATION IN ALLIED INTEREST—INTERNAL SITUATION IN BULGARIA—ZENITH AND ANTICLIMAX OF PRO-GERMAN SOLIDARITY—SOFIA AND THE PRESS—SERIOUS MISGIVINGS AND DIPLOMATIC DISGUSTS UNITE TO EFFECT THE FALL OF THE RADOSLAVOFF MINISTRY—BALANCE OF PARTIES AND LEADERS—SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION, 1917-18—PROSPECTS OF SUMMER CAMPAIGN 1918—TOPOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF BRITISH FRONT AND COMMUNICATIONS—REARRANGEMENT OF FRONT—STEADY INFLUX OF HELLENIC REINFORCEMENTS—COMBINED ADVANCE OF SEPTEMBER—THE GREAT DAYS OF SEPTEMBER 14-28—BULGARIAN ENVOÏS AT SALONIKA—ARMISTICE OF SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1918—SUMMARY OF TERMS—PERCUSSION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD—OMENS NOT TO BE DISGUISED—BULGARIA AS A BELLIGERENT—VANISHED DREAM OF BULGAR HEGEMONY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE.

ON New Year's Day, 1917, as a result of Monastir regained by the Allies and Bukarest held by the Central Powers with a promise of Avlona and a permanent linking up with King Tino, the Bulgarians were promised peace in a fortnight. Germany had proclaimed her willingness to enter on peace negotiations. That the Allies were equally ready to come to terms was assumed as a matter of course. The undue prolongation of the war, the disconcerting loss of Monastir (Nov. 20, 1916), and the chronic inactivity of the stormy season provoked among the parties and pressmen of Bulgaria a severe epidemic of lying and false prophecy. In fact, during the four winter months 1916-17 following the Serbian victory at Monastir, positions lay virtually unchanged. Lack of reserve support kept the Serbs from penetrating to Prilep (*en route* for Uskub). The west part of this line from the Vardar to near

Avlona (Vodena-Monastir-Koritza) was held against the Bulgarian First Army by the Italian, Russian, French and Serbian forces, and about Christmas, 1916, a small but increasing Greek contingent was added.* The British Salonika force, commanded since November 26, 1916, by Lieut.-General G. F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O., faced the Bulgarian Second Army, from the mouth of the Struna along the Tabinos-Butkova-Doiran lakes to the River Vardar, a distance of approximately 90 miles. The necessity of holding this long line placed a strain on the endurance of the troops during the winter months when, owing to the unprecedented rainfall, the mountain roads became almost impassable. The chief operation, it must be remembered, was the containing of

* The gap between Avlona and Koritza, by way of Liaskovici was finally linked up by the close of February, 1917. This gap represented the last loophole for German intrigue and for the percolation of correspondence through the Allied Balkan line.



DOIRAN TO USKUB.

an enemy superior in numbers along the whole line of front during the operations which culminated in the capture of Monastir. After that the lack of metalled roads and the heavy rain and snow storms precluded extensive or continuous activities. During this winter a Deeaerville, light railway from Sarigeul to Gramatna (Dump), laid by French engineers, was strengthened and extended by the British to Snevee, and a road was run up to the line.

In the Struma valley, on the extreme right of our operating area, our front line was gradually and persistently sent forward and across to the left bank of the river. The mounted troops, Middlesex and other Yeomanry in a Yeomanry Cavalry Brigade, pushed their reconnaissances between Seres and Lake Tahinos, and in places crossed the Demirhissar-Seres-Drama railway. On the last day of October, 1916, a new Bulgarian defensive position in the large village of Barakli-Djuma, on the low ground near Butkova Lake, was successfully carried and 350 prisoners were taken, special credit being earned by the bridge-work of the Royal Engineers, without which the operation would have been impossible. The whole country was waterlogged and the streams

inordinately swollen. On the Struma front during the same period successful raids were carried through by the Welsh and 12th Cheshire Regiments; Kumli and Barakli villages were taken; the Dublin Fusiliers captured the whole garrison at Prosenik. On the left bank of the Vardar and south of Doiran successful raids were made by Suffolk and Devonshire Battalions, also the Welsh and Lancashire Fusiliers (all Kitchener Army battalions of 22nd and 26th Divisions), which also included S.W. Borderers, Scots Rifles and Scots Fusiliers. The Devons, whose battalions seemed ever in the fiercest fighting, in an attack on the Petit Couronné Hill (Feb., 1917), inflicted severe loss on the enemy and captured 27 prisoners. This hill remained our unachieved objective down to June 14, 1917—the end of the spring campaigning season.

In the meanwhile, what was taking place on the Allied left, the western front of the combined force based upon Salonica? All through the winter, Monastir had been shelled, not so severely as to reduce it to ruins, but regularly enough to prevent its use as a military base. The Serbs, who had levered the Germans and Bulgarians out of the town in November,

1916, by their constant pressure among the mountains from Lake Ostrovo and Florina, were now exhausted, their troops having had to fight for weeks, day and night, in the front line without being relieved.

The one exploit of importance after Monastir's capture on that front had been the capture by the Zouaves on November 27 of the hill marked 1050 between Makovo and Teherna. This was a valuable post which, in the hands of Prussian riflemen, would have been a very serious obstacle to the safe tenure of Monastir. When the Italians took over the position they established an important observation post. Early in March, 1917, the Germans launched an attack with flame throwers and so drove the Italians from the crest and some way down the south-western side. By dint of repeated counter-attacks the Italians regained most of the captured trenches, but the Germans retained the crest and the observatory for artillery fire. The ridge, now thoroughly undermined, remained a disputed territory between the two lines.

A little later, in mid-March, the French, in two days' fighting, captured over 1,000 Bulgars and took a mile of trenches north-east of Monastir and also the village of Snegovo (3½ miles north of the town); next day the

French, following up their advantage, captured Hill 1248, due north of Monastir, greatly increasing their bag of prisoners.

The main offensive was postponed by Sarrail—suspected always of being haunted by political considerations—from the first to the last week in April, 1917. The delay was due in part to the weather, which was appalling until the very end of March, and in part no doubt to the great natural and artificial strength of the objective—the town of Doiran and the western flanks of the lake. The enemy's nests of machine guns were cleverly contrived and shifted from time to time in a most perplexing manner. But the nature of the ground made the terrible deep and narrow Jumeaux ravine and the Petit Couronné the two most formidable allies the Bulgars ever had. The precise object of this particular offensive is so obscure as to suggest a "political" motive, but at any rate it materialized five days before the end of the month.

At 5.30 on the morning of April 25, more than 1,300 yards of the enemy's first system of trenches were occupied by our troops (22nd Division mainly), who, along the western part of the captured position, advanced beyond it and dug themselves in on a new line on the other side of a ravine 300 yards long. The



IN MONASTIR: DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD BY THE MILITARY.



DOIRAN.

splendid efforts made along this sector by our infantry, composed of representative battalions of English county regiments, among whom the Devonshire and Berkshire regiments were especially conspicuous—were by no means wasted. Their determined advance through a barrage of trench mortars and 8 in. howitzers put the enemy's strength to a test.

In order to understand the arduous conditions under which this move was made, it is necessary to realize that the Doiran sector of the Bulgarian front was one which the nature of the ground had made particularly strong. At that point the enemy's trenches consisted of three distinct systems about a thousand yards apart, each position higher up the steep slopes than those in front of it, and consequently commanding them.

If you look at a good large scale contour map of this corner by Lake Doiran your eye will be confused by a tangle of abrupt slopes divided by deep precipitous ravines, which twist in and out among a bewildering number of hillocks, spurs and underfeatures. As you look at this position from the front you are strongly reminded of an old mediæval citadel. In one corner of the whole enceinte you usually find a concentrated group of towers and bastions that were the main stronghold of defence. Over-topping everything is the keep, but all around are lesser towers and turrets, each supporting but at the same time dominating the other. The configuration of the ground in this corner by Lake Doiran is an exact parallel to such a mediæval fortress. Hill 535 is like the keep of the enemy's citadel, towering over the other hills he holds. For eight months after we took over this sector from the French, the

"Dub," as it was called, haunted the British army. Wherever they went, that blunt, bald-browed hill looked down upon them. The Dub was the strongest point of the enemy's third and main line of defence. The twin height in the same trench system was the Grand Couronné, a mile nearer the lake, only less conspicuous—a steep barren, conical hill, ringed round with trenches. From the Dub ran down in the direction of our line a long rampart-like ridge known as "The Pips," so called (for ranging purposes) from its five humps. "Pip" 3 was the bastion of the second line of defence; "Pip" 4½, which we captured on the night of the 24th, and which was still in our possession, was the most westerly point of our attack, and a strong feature on the Bulgarian first line.

We now come to the foremost line of all. It had been captured entirely by the English on the 24th, but they had been thrust back from the right-hand sector by a series of desperate counter-attacks. This system of trenches also had its principal bastion, a bare round-topped hill known as the Petit Couronné. But a more formidable feature still was a deep and forbidding nullah, like a mediæval moat, running along its whole front, called the Jumeaux ravine.

When the infantry attacking this particularly difficult sector went over their parapets at 9.45 p.m., they had first to clamber down into Jumeaux ravine under a hail of machine-gun bullets, to ford the cascade at the bottom, in places waist deep, and then to scale the steep slope on the other side with the Bulgarians waiting for them in their trenches along the top.

In addition to all this, as soon as the first

wave of the British went over, the Bulgarian trench mortars and medium artillery started dropping a barrage into the ravine with deadly accuracy. It was like pitching pebbles into a trough, or to use the simile of an officer present, "like standing in a well and having bricks pitched at you." To this trench mortar barrage was added a bombardment by 8 in. howitzers upon our front line trenches and the ground in front of them.

Soaring Very lights and two powerful enemy searchlights kept the bare ground under a ghastly illumination. Heavily though we had shelled the Bulgar front line his men had found secure shelter in the ravines close behind, and they were now rushed up to the trenches, where they fought with true Bulgar *sang froid*.

On the left all objectives were gained and the enemy's front trenches occupied on a front of nearly a mile from Hill "380", five hundred yards north of the ruins of Doldjeli village (60th Division front), to the enemy's work of Hill Pip 4½. During the next four days these gains were consolidated in spite of repeated counter-attacks, during which the Manchester Regiment and the Shropshire L.I. distinguished themselves. But now a long wait was found indispensable both left and right of our line, and it was not until May 8 that the effort on Doiran was followed up. On this occasion the attack was restricted to the section lying between the Lake and the Petit Couronné Hill. Rush tactics enabled

the Argyll and Sutherland, Oxford and Bucks L.I. and Berkshire Regiment to hold some slopes beyond the Bulgar trenches all night and until about midday on the 9th. Force of numbers in the counter-attacks then drove them back after hand-to-hand fighting. Small successes were won on Horseshoe Hill (Goldie's Hill), south of Dovedjeli, and eastwards on the Struma front, the village of Kjudri was seized and held (100 prisoners), but on May 24 offensive operations were arrested by Sarrail's order. Summer was beginning, and the advent of malaria and dysentery prescribed the removal of the bulk of the army from the low-lying areas to higher and more salubrious positions. The net result was that at the expense of heavy casualties we held a considerable part of the first Bulgarian line, our front running along the ridge from the south of Krastali (just below the Dub and three miles south west of Doiran) to the village of Sedjelly. Nothing very substantial or tangible had been achieved: nothing to put by the side of the capture of Monastir. The country was too difficult, the enemy too numerous, too well equipped, too alert. But the Bulgarian tension had been maintained. Disaffection was spreading from one country townlet to another. The Venizelists had come into the fighting line, had done good service on the Allied left, and had won the special commendation of General Sarrail.

Another result achieved during this spring may perhaps be described as significant. It



GERMANS IN DOIRAN.



[French official photograph.]

**GENERAL SARRAIL AND ESSAD PASHA
AT A REVIEW IN SALONIKA.**

was the starting point of an Albanian restoration, and the movement radiated from Koritza (Goritza). Before December 1916 this town had been the centre of anti-Venizelist influence, German espionage and correspondence. While komitadjis had ranged over the whole district, one of these banditti was won over completely by the French and reproclaimed the independence of this section of the country with Koritza as capital. The Royalist, the Greek and Austrian irregulars were expelled, and a council was formed to raise money by taxation, three-quarters of this being devoted to defray the expenses of an Albanian gendarmerie which fought side by side with the French in their own district. No Albanian unit, it would seem, can be extended with success beyond the limits of a local clan. The Conference of London in 1913 made the mistake of forming one undivided, independent Albania

under the control of a German prince (Wied). He was driven out in May 1914 by a revolution, and his supplanter was Essad Pasha, President of the Albanian Republic, now a strong Ententophil and directing a brigade of fellow Albanians in the French interests from his base at Salonika. South of Koritza, the Albanian city of Yanina (the capture of which by the Greeks caused such intense joy to King George just before his murder in 1913) was occupied early in June by Italian troops, who advanced from Avlona into this southern vilayet, under the suspicious and protesting observation of the Greeks, who not unnaturally claimed Yanina* as a chief city of Epirus.

The recovery of Albania was a slight thing, perhaps, but the transformation in Greece during the summer of 1917 was indeed significant, and the *coup d'état* of Constantine's dethronement was in a way decisive to the history of the war. It enabled the Greeks, like the Serbs, to develop the virtue of self-help and to play a self-respecting part in the deliverance of September 1918. Greece by that time had gone round full circle since the first retirement of Venizelos in March, 1915. The country was then fairly united and fairly enthusiastic on the side of the Entente. Interest, policy, sentiment, left her people no choice, it seemed, but to join the Allies and to adopt the policy of the great Cretan. It would have seemed madness for one of the small-power factions, such as Greece, to fly in the face of the protecting Powers. And yet, since 1915, no so-called neutral had given the Allies greater anxiety than Greece, which is saying a great deal. As so often happens in history, the political party to initiate a great policy and the political party to reap the benefit are not one and the same. Venizelos had sown for his country the great harvest which was reaped by the Balkan Alliance in 1912. Constantine, however, as the ostensible military leader, had reaped most of the prestige, and that naturally not in the interests of parliamentary but of arbitrary Government. Yet up to 1915 the Greeks in the main had two idols—Constantine and Venizelos. Hitherto the same shrine had served for both. But in 1915 the divergence became marked. Venizelos stood for traditional Liberal policy, the old attachments and engagements, and Magna Græcia. Constantine

* Yanina, with Adrianople and Skutari, had formed the Turkish Triangle, correspondent to the Austrian Quadrilateral of 60 years since.

was in favour of a policy of hedging, of repudiating old and embarrassing commitments, of avoiding the fate of Belgium at all hazards in the interests of a "sacred," but intensely narrow and selfish, egoism. One of the great sayings of Venizelos was that Greece was too small a nation to commit so big an infamy as the desertion of her ally, Serbia. Yet many Greeks, deaf to the idea of racial expansion and to the interests of the Greeks in Asia Minor, rallied to the exclusivist and eouen-

the most vulnerable to sea power of any capital in the world. But diplomatic considerations precluded our playing the decisive card. The Greek Government, suborned by Constantine, failed us by breaking their engagements at every turn. The glamour of German prosperity had hypnotized them completely. From passive acts of ill-faith, such as their failure to observe the treaty, with Serbia, to assist us in the Dardanelles enterprise, or to resist the encroachments of the Bulgarians, they proceeded in



[French official photograph.]

IN KORITZA: ALBANIAN VOLUNTEERS EXERCISING.

trative ideas of Constantine, and their views were assisted in every possible way by the propagandist energy of Berlin. Constantine had several excellent cards to play in his duel with Venizelos for the soul of Greece. One was the dynastic tenderness of two of the Allied Courts towards his dynasty and its pretensions; another, the reluctance of the Allies to appear in the light of violators of national independence; the third, doubt among certain of the Allies about the real worth of Venizelos as a national asset. Our diplomacy was thus more or less forced into manoeuvres of the common and habitual dupe. Plainly, sea-power could be decisive here, for Athens, which took the lead in supporting Constantine in his refractory attitude, was

December, 1916, to active steps of hostility. Greek irregulars and reservists threatened our communications in Salonika; British and French naval contingents were attacked in the streets of Athens and many lives were lost.

The limits of endurance on the part of the Allies might now, it would seem, have been reached, but it is somewhat doubtful if they would have found even then a common basis of action but for the substitution of America for Russia as one of the Associated Powers. This substitution gave free scope to the policy of France. M. Ribot had long wished to make a clean sweep of Constantine and his Germanophil *entourage*. The conference held at London during the spring of 1917, by mutual concessions, arrived at a common course of

action. The British representatives consented to displace Constantine, but not to upset the dynasty. In effect we looked to the influence of Venizelos to re-establish the unity of the Greek people. Full powers as commissioner of the Allies were given to the French senator, M. Jonnart, ex-Governor of Algeria, and Foreign Minister in Briand's Cabinet of 1913. He



[H. W. Barnett.]

M. VENIZELOS.
Liberator of Greece.

arrived at Salonika in early June and had long conferences with Sarraïl and Venizelos. On June 10 he arrived at Athens supported by a strong cruiser squadron, and explained to the Greek Government that the course of events since 1915 had compelled the Powers to demand fuller guarantees for the security of the army of the Orient (the Salonika force), for the control of the food supply in Greece, and the proper working of the Constitution. On the following day the abdication of Constantine and of the Crown Prince was formally demanded. M. Zaimis, the Prime Minister, had to inform the King of this decision as his father had in 1863, upon the instance of Lord Palmerston, to announce a similar decision to King Otho. After a despairing appeal to the German legions which his wife's brother had promised him, Constantine left the coast of Eubœa for Lugano on June 13, and was succeeded on the throne by his younger son Alexander, a lively subaltern, known hitherto by his taste for the opera and as a connoisseur of motor-cars. Venizelos arrived at the Piræus a week later, formed a Cabinet, and set about the laborious

task of reorganizing and mobilizing a re-united Greece. Hitherto barely 70,000 of his supporters had joined up with the Salonika force of the Allies. In a little more than a year these numbers were more than quadrupled.

The last week of June, 1917, is to be counted one of the greatest landmarks in the war, and the pivot upon which the destinies of the Salonika expedition entirely turned. The forces of reaction had to be uprooted; but at the same time the odium of coercing a free and independent nation in the name of liberty had to be avoided. The success achieved was largely due to the diplomatic judgment of M. Jonnart. The greatest merit of his action after its firmness was its celerity. The *coup d'état* was over in 25 days. Venizelos, greatly matured and mellowed from the Venizelos of the Balkan Alliance, came, saw, conquered. "We can now leave the destiny of Greece in his steady hands. In my long career as a parliamentarian," said Jonnart before his departure on July 7, "I have met no statesman of more vivid foresight or with a surer grip of the essentials bearing upon the progress of his country. One of the greatest results of these happenings here is that Greece gains her old place in our affections and finds her natural leader. But a greater thing still is the fact that the Allies find available for their general councils the genius of M. Venizelos. None, rest assured, will take a higher place in those councils." In one short month the Greek regular forces had been purged of disaffection by the immediate removal of about sixty of the higher officers. Relations were formally broken off with the Central Powers (June 30), Greek interests in Germany being entrusted to Holland. Allied contingents keeping guard in Old Greece were released and their place was taken by Greek regular battalions. The Greek Fleet was restored to its proper control, and Greece was admitted as a regular member of the Balkan Conference in Paris. A commission was appointed to investigate the betrayal of Greek troops at Kavala, Rupe! and Seres, the wrongs done in Thrace, and the atrocities perpetrated upon Greeks in Eastern Macedonia. The komitadjis, the banditti, the *rois des montagnes* vanished like a Walpurgis night at sunrise. To the new Greek Chamber of 300, just 220 Venizelists were returned. No amount of bluffing could conceal the disconcerting effect of this intelligence at Berlin. The prospect of better things was symbolized in a remarkable way by the Parade of July 1

and by the celebrations held in honour of the French National Fête a fortnight later.

The ceremony at which the troops and officers in Athens took the oath of fidelity to their "country, the constitutional King of the Hellenes, and obedience to the Greek Constitution," was the climax of an extraordinary three weeks, and marked, as all present appreciated, the end of the pact between Germany and their ex-King. The moment he came to the parade ground M. Venizelos was surrounded by elcering crowds, through which a way could hardly be made for him

He took his stand with his Ministers and a group of generals, among whom were the commanders from the Peloponnese, the troops forming a hollow square. The bishop held up a silver Bible in the sun, and word for word after him 5,000 soldiers and officers repeated the oath. The general commanding the First Army Corps then spoke in soldierly fashion to the troops, and cheers were raised for the King, for M. Venizelos, and for the "protecting Powers," the Allied armies and their great leaders. Immediately after, to the strains of a march from the military bands, a large group of officers marched past M. Venizelos at

the rigid salute with swords bent low. These were officers of the Athens and other garrisons in Old Greece who had supported the ex-King, but they gave the salute loyally and without restraint of any obvious kind. Then came the Cretans from the front, who were cheered as heroes. The splendid bearing of this Cretan regiment was a revelation to the city and had a profound effect on the ex-King's officers, whose respect turned naturally to M. Venizelos as the founder and organizer of these troops, who had, moreover, fought for their country.

Later in the morning there was a service for fallen officers and men of the National Defence Forces, at which the Allied officers were present. Extraordinary scenes took place in and outside the cathedral, the people shouting with frenzy "Zito Gallia" as General Regnault passed. Inside the cathedral even, loud cries were raised for M. Venizelos, the people struggling to get merely a glimpse of him, and when his troops defiled through the chief streets they were covered with flowers.

The prognostics of the Allies' campaign against Bulgaria were certainly not specially



(French official photograph.)

PRESENTATION OF GREEK COLOURS BY GENERAL ALIOTIS TO COLONEL PANGALOS, COMMANDING THE CRETAN FORCE,

In the crowded Stadium at Athens.

favourable in the spring, or indeed in the summer, of 1918. There was nothing that seemed immediately to portend the transformation scene that was so rapidly about to be disclosed. The champions of Sarrail and the Salonika force had to content themselves with a most frugal ration. Some held that to deny submarine bases to Germany might be regarded as the limit of the Salonika force's ambition. Since Monastir (November, 1916), through the whole of 1917, and down to August, 1918, the Allies based upon Salonika seemed to the European eye to have been storing water with a sieve. Our infantry advanced two or three hundred yards and dug what the officers frankly called "a political trench"; but they made no pretence of holding it. The movements they made were directed largely to the circumvention of dysentery, and in this, during 1917, they were in a great measure successful, though with the mosquito-pest and consequent dissemination of the fell malaria (sand fly fever) and Vardar fever they found themselves beating the air. Raids by land and raids by water (on Lake Doiran) filled pages in dispatches, but led to very inconclusive results. Despite the details of hand-to-hand encounters, it was generally thought that our airmen were out-matched. The Germans had better ma-

chines and often brought over "aces" from the Western Front who wrought great damage in our hutment areas within a 10 mile area from Salonika and Headquarters itself. Enemy dispatches flew over the Allied lines to Athens. The Germans superintended the machine-gun warfare, the cupolas, the pepper boxes and the heavy artillery of the Bulgar forces. The Bulgars had numerous field batteries and fought in familiar surroundings with a desperate tenacity. Of all the countries of the Central Alliance, Bulgaria, it seemed, had been least affected by the war. Not only had her soil escaped invasion, but her armies occupied and were holding territories which the most extreme of Bulgarian Chauvinists and megalomaniacs had never thought of claiming. If it were true that participation in the European War had never been popular, it must be admitted that the occupation of the whole of Macedonia had done much to dispel the serious misgivings of the people about King Ferdinand's policy. Their ardour found a further incentive in the war against Rumania, which was exceedingly popular, for the Bulgarians had not forgotten the attitude of their Rumanian neighbours during 1913.

The peasant population of Bulgaria—80 per cent. of the total—had undergone few priva-



ENTRY OF VENIZELIST TROOPS INTO ATHENS, JUNE, 1917.




[Official photograph.]

DRAINING THE MARSHES TO PREVENT MALARIA.

tions, while, on the other hand, it had profited greatly by the increase in the price of agricultural produce. Representatives of the German Food Bureau overran the country and bought up all foodstuffs at prices unheard of before the war, and the thrifty Bulgarian took full advantage of these unique opportunities. The ensuing prosperity can be gauged from the returns of the savings banks during 1916. Deposits reached 55 million francs, a figure far surpassing all records. Although the export of foodstuffs was prohibited, smuggling was carried on to such an extent that even the cereal stocks became depleted, and the Government had to order a search of all farmsteads and the requisition of hidden stocks of grain in order to assure the subsistence of the military and civil population. The Germans had conciliated the peasant population also by helping to build light railways in outlying districts, constructing roads, furnishing motor ploughs, and tilling, free of cost, the farms of those peasant families whose men were at the front. Of course, all these things were not done for the purpose of placating the Bulgarians, but for military reasons that can be readily understood. Nevertheless they contributed to allay the hatred of the "Schwaba" common to all Slav people, the Bulgars not excepted,

Another serious grievance that might have brewed trouble for the Government was avoided by the granting of adequate assistance to the families of mobilized soldiers. During the Balkan wars little help had been given owing to the lack of funds, and this had caused widespread suffering among the poor and discontent among the mobilized men. The Germans, anxious to remove every source of vexation, opened a large credit to the Bulgarian Government, and the latter could then afford to be much more generous than in ordinary circumstances. It should not be thought that the munificence displayed by the Germans cost them much. No money was sent to Bulgaria, a credit was simply opened at Berlin, and on that guarantee the Bulgarian State Bank issued a corresponding amount of bank notes. The balance sheet of the Bulgarian National Bank published during March, disclosed some edifying figures:—Gold reserves, 70 million francs; funds abroad, 745 million francs; fiduciary circulation nearly 1,000 million francs. The peasants had suffered from a shortage of salt, sugar, petroleum, and hides, but complaints were rare, although the scarcity of salt was proving a great drawback to cattle raising. But the occupation of Rumania, where some of these commodities were abundantly found,



A MASS MEETING IN THE CATHEDRAL SQUARE, SOFIA.

and the resulting increase in the transport facilities with Austria and Germany, were likely to improve the situation gradually. So far, then, as the *ordre intérieur* was concerned in the summer of 1918, when the oldest War Ministry in Europe fell at Sofia, there was no very ostensible reason, it might seem, for violent or seething discontent. There was, however, a strong irredentist movement in regard to the Dobrudja. This region had been snatched from Bulgaria by Rumania in 1913, and now instead of a complete restoration—at least so far as North Dobrudja was concerned, an Austro-German *condominium* had been set up. The governmental revolution was interpreted by some as a victimization of Radoslavoff as a popular scapegoat on this particular account. He had come in after Gueshoff's and Daneff's resignations in June-July, 1913, after the failure of Malinoff to rally an adequate party, expressly as an Austrophile. Austria was now unpopular—so good bye Radoslavoff! But was the explanation so simple as this? It is necessary to look on the other side of the picture. It can be seen, but in a glass darkly. Nevertheless, it suggested premonitions of the entire impending *débâcle*, and it ended in an Armistice which strangely prefigured that of November 11, 1918.

The Bulgarian Army had been in the field for nearly three years and had suffered heavily on more than one front; part of it had had to fight and die on a front where no direct Bulgarian interest was involved, and was still so fighting. It had occupied more than all the territory it went out to win, yet the end of its labours and its sacrifices did not seem to be in sight. The Bulgarians are a shrewd enough people, and they recognized that "National Union" was as far off from actual achievement as ever. They held Macedonia, it is true, and more of the Dobrudja than they had expected to gain, but they knew that they held these lands only so long as their manhood remained in the trenches, and they were desperately tired of having their manhood in the trenches. They had realized in short, when it was too late, that their great ally was not going to be greatly victorious, that a permanent settlement, therefore, could only be obtained by the consent of their present enemies, and that this consent would never be given to the Allies of Germany. Meanwhile voices, more or less pro-Serbian, were being heard in Germany, proposing a compromise in the Balkans which would be fatal to the

Bulgarian interests in Macedonia. These voices may not have been officially inspired, but Bulgarians tended to regard it as a most sinister circumstance that they had not been silenced by the German censor. Was not this probably another instance of the German Government using its Socialists to put out "feelers"? And what, moreover, was the meaning of Germany's un concealed efforts to conciliate Rumania, combined with her steady refusal to permit Bulgarian administration of the conquered Dobrudja? Was it once more to be Bulgaria's fate to be deprived of the fruits of her military sacrifices? Radoslavoff visited Berlin, and returned with the most explicit reassurances—as to Germany's loyalty to her faithful ally. Who could say what would have happened with a drawn war and that "peace by agreement" which was then the utmost hope of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But the Allies were resolute that they would have no "peace by agreement," nothing but "a victory peace." What were Bulgaria's prospects when it was won.

To these profound misgivings and dissatisfaction as to the results of the Radoslavoff policy there was added the still deeper exasperation caused by the notorious corruption of the Government. Many persons in Bulgaria believed that Radoslavoff and Tontcheff, his Finance Minister, had made very large fortunes out of the war. They had, it was suspected, taken their price from Germany, and in so doing had reduced Bulgaria to the level of an Oriental State where policy is determined by "baksheesh." The Bulgarian people were too near the East, had too recently escaped from Turkish rule for rumours of such relapses into Orientalism not to find willing hearers. Several of their best-known Ministers, such as Ghenadieff, had been convicted felons. It was the strongest, perhaps, of all the weapons which Radoslavoff had put into the hands of the Opposition. It had opened the people's eyes not only to the present disadvantages, but to the future dangers of association with Germany. For it was apparent that such an association meant vassalage for Bulgaria; and having been freed by Russia from Turkish tyranny, and having repudiated Russian tutelage, she had no mind to be the vassal of Germany.

The consequences of all this were evident enough. The men in the streets and in the trenches were asking the same question. Bulgaria had fought and won her war: why

should she not then negotiate, come to terms—generous terms, possibly—with her enemies, and call back her men to their homes? Why should she continue to fight under German leaders and spend precious lives at Germany's behest for the sake of German ambitions in Poland or Belgium or Alsace, with the certainty of obtaining worse terms at the end of it all than she might have got then if only she had been free to negotiate? But she was not free. This was the answer to all such questions. She was Germany's vassal; and had *Mittel-Europa* ever become more than a dream, she would have become Germany's vassal for ever. Instead of being a great independent State, possessing the hegemony of the Balkans, which had been her idea when she entered the war, she would have become merely a "bride" for German soldiers and German merchants. Her economic and political destruction would have been complete. How such a prospect, once realized, was bound to affect the minds of the Bulgarian people, those who knew anything of them could guess without much difficulty. And a good many were clearly beginning to realize it, as the increasing restiveness of the Opposition showed. This Opposition, composed of Radicals, Conservatives, Democrats, Socialists, and above all

Agrarians, was now united and claimed to have behind it an unanimous Bulgaria apart from the tainted pro-German groups of court and capital. A writing on the wall was perceived by many in Ghenadieff's rupture with the party of Radoslavoff. Ghenadieff had become the chief of the Stambulovist Austrophils, and as such the Premier would have been his natural chief. But Ghenadieff broke away in 1915, declared himself to have developed pro-Entente sympathies, and was in October, 1916, sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, on a trumped-up charge; his fellow Stambulovists shared his fate and were evicted from the Sobranje. Another danger-signal was the formation of a decidedly critical society of authors and professors in Sofia for the purpose of carrying on a national propaganda—against which society the Government had to carry on a propaganda of its own. Russophilism seemed rampant. Radoslavoff made an express visit to Berlin—a compliment returned by the Kaiser in October, 1917. All these things may be regarded as symptomatic. The fact is that discontent and alarm had been growing for some time, while prices of food had become intolerable to the bourgeois, and suspicions as to food export were becoming an incentive to civil war. It was questionable how far this



ON THE HIGHROAD TO THE EAST.

A straight stretch in Bulgaria of the Vienna-Constantinople Railway.

malaise in the body politic would find expression in such a very imperfect representative organ as the Bulgarian Sobranje. But in May, 1918, Ferdinand apparently thought that a change in the Cabinet might have the effect of letting off some superfluous steam. The state of parties facilitated the manœuvre. Roughly speaking, the 245 seats in the House were thus approximately sorted among the parties: Liberals, roughly 90 in number, with a few King's men, under two somewhat divergent sub-leaders, Tontcheff and Ghenadieff. The second of these posed as an Ententophil, but had lost the confidence of the chief, and was generally distrusted, and then, as we have seen, disgraced. National Liberals numbered only 10 or 12 seats, but gained distinction from their leader, Gueshoff, the collaborator of Venizelos in 1912, the man behind the *Mir* newspaper and one of the most respected (but not for his strength) of Balkan politicians; the Democrats mustered 31 seats, and had been led since 1908 by Malinoff, an essential opportunist. As a Russophil he had tried without success to form a Ministry during the crisis of July, 1913. The Radical idealists followed Tsanoff with five supporters; the Agrarians rose to 45 under Draghieff (largely anti-war in sympathy); Socialists ("Broad" and "Narrow") to 21; Stambulovists, a flying squadron, supporting frequently the insecure majority of Radoslavoff, the Liberal chief, to 32; and the Russophil Progressives, under Daneff, 4. Daneff had represented all the talents of Bulgaria in the London Conference, held in The Picture Gallery, St. James's Palace (May 30, 1913).

"Liberals" ruling by the cudgel, traditional Russophiles transforming themselves, in a twinkling, into Germanophiles; Democrats kneeling before Coburg; Socialists annexationists and admirers of Hindenburg—these were the Bulgarian parties. Elections which had never given a majority except to those who hold power: the play of personal ambitions and cabals: facings round and sudden changes: all party activity concentrated in the seeking of stratagems apt to gain for them power, no matter how, or to hinder at all costs the rival party from attaining it—that was Bulgarian parliamentarism. The same absence of principle; a feeble faith in a national idea always arbitrary, improvised, and subject to occasional fluctuations of policy—going, at need, as far as the disavowal of the character of the race

—this was the Bulgarian national conscience. And this chaos of political purpose and *moral* finds a faithful portrait in the Bulgarian Press, noisy, cynical, intriguing, thoroughly venal, censored by Germans, and often in the direct pay of Berlin or Vienna. But early in 1918 there was serious division in the Bulgar camp. *Mir* and *Narod* (organ of the Social Democ-



M. TONTCHEFF,
Bulgarian Ambassador at Vienna.

crats) assailed Radoslavoff and his *camarilla* with increasing intensity. Bulgaria, it was said, had obtained no guarantees of sea to sea expansion; Kavala was not secure, the Dobrudja was not placed unreservedly in Bulgarian hands as promised; above all, new enemies were unmistakably on the horizon. Nothing was known accurately of our British success in Mesopotamia and Syria against the Turks, but the rapid growth of the Venizelist party and its battalions in the field was unmistakable. Bulgaria had a new enemy to reckon with, and the reckoning would soon take place on the frontier or even within it. These reflections and those on prices and food supply brought matters to a head. On May 30, 1918, the two Stambulovist Ministers, Petkoff (Public Works) and Koznitchky (Railways), tendered their resignation, ostensibly on the ground of their disapproval of the way in which Radoslavoff had handled the Dobrudja question. Hampered at every turn by ingratitude and corrup-

tion, Radoslavoff had to resign, and the selection of the pliable Malinoff as Prime Minister was apparently inevitable. A Bessarabian by birth, an astute Sofia lawyer by profession, Malinoff had married a well-to-do Jewess who had practised dentistry in Odessa. He was patentee of the courtly phrase, "For you, with you, and always by you," and his amenability to Court influence had gained him the style of "The Lackey." But he failed in his efforts to form a broad Coalition Cabinet. The Agrarians condemned him as Pro-German, the Socialists as "bourgeois," the Nationals as reactionary. The more advanced members of the Opposition already demanded a peace with the Entente based on Nationality and the necessity of creating a "League of Nations"! But Malinoff was nothing if not a time-server, and the time seemed to him hardly ripe for the "Bread and Peace" propaganda. The *Kreuz Zeitung* refused to conceal the fact that the change in the Bulgarian Ministry was a regrettable circumstance for Germany, but found comfort in the loyalty of King Ferdinand, "who holds the threads of foreign policy in his own hands." How far this confidence was justifiable has now to be seen. We are now in a position to summarise the prevailing sentiments of the directing class of Bulgarians during the 20 months that

followed the fall of Monastir in November, 1916.

The success of the Greeks in their movement towards reintegration caused a steadily growing apprehension among the instructed classes in Bulgaria. Bulgarian severities in Thessaly and Eastern Macedonia had become generally known. Their brutalities towards the Serbs lost nothing in the telling. The atrocities of Nigrita, Serres, Doxato, and Demir Hissar would take a century to efface. Yet now in 1916-17 forty thousand Greeks were asserted to have been starved to death owing to Bulgarian action. The European War, which was to have concluded in 1915, seemed interminable, and as the winter of 1917 approached, the Bulgarians began to yearn to extricate themselves. A great deal of pro-Serb Socialist sentiment was being disseminated in Germany and Austria. At Stockholm Hungarian Socialists proposed a compromise on the Macedonian question which would have been fatal to Bulgarian hopes. The Serbs were invited to conclude a separate peace with Austria. All this was most distasteful to Bulgarian stalwarts, and on the top of it came a dispute concerning the Dobrudja question. The Bulgarians felt it a serious grievance that they had not been allowed to establish their own administration



KING FERDINAND DRIVING WITH THE KAISER.

in that province. Their annexationist policy was execrated by all the Slav population in the Balkans. Unrest in Bulgaria was undermining the stability of the Radoslavoff Government. Hence the Kaiser's visit to Sofia early in October, 1917, must be ascribed largely to a sense that the smooth working of the alliance was endangered, and a desire to soothe this feeling by Hohenzollern flattery. The attention of a special visit gratified the *amour propre* of the people of Sofia. They saw in it a mark of appreciation on the part of their ally, all the more since it was the first visit the head of a powerful State had ever paid to the Bulgarian capital. The Kaiser asserted that the present war after a glorious struggle had brought Bulgaria to the fulfilment of her historical ambition, and much to a similar purpose. Such declarations were not as explicit as the Bulgarians would have liked, but they helped to recapture recalcitrant opinion and to muzzle the opposition. But dissension was not long in raising its head. The integrity of the Debrudja as a Bulgarian province was lost by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Bulgaria was, apparently, to receive no pickings from Rumania. Turkey was actually clamouring for some territory (along the banks of the Maritsa) at present held by Bulgaria. Their country, like God, was intolerant of partnership. Bulgarian chauvinism and megalomania had received a shrewd shock. Were not Rumania, Serbia and Greece after all to pay the cost of a Greater Bulgaria? Ferdinand had hitherto been regarded as the guarantee of this by his subjects, just as he had been regarded as a guarantee of loyalty and fidelity by the Kaiser. The situation was thus fairly electric when in August, 1918, just two months after the change in the cabinet, the success of the Allies on the Western Front began insensibly to have a emulative influence. In the meanwhile, the very typical official *aperçu* on the situation was communicated to a listening world through the medium of the *Echo de Bulgarie*.

"Dr. Radoslavoff is resigning because the length of the war, which demands a constant and sustained effort, has somewhat strained the government machine. He is retiring because the necessity of continuing this effort, especially now the conduct of the war is being complicated by the conduct of diplomatic operations, imposes a still greater concentration of national desires and energies, and that is why the coalition which has gone will give place to a

new homogeneous coalition in respect to the political programme to be followed at home as well as abroad.

"This programme is simple. It is a matter of organizing the economic life of the country and of assuring the food supply of the army and of the people, so as to be able to wage still



M. ALEXANDER MALINOFF.
Bulgarian Prime Minister.

more vigorously the struggle for national unity, and everything will be subordinated to this great aim. If as regards the internal *régime* changes are inevitable, nothing will be changed as regards Bulgaria's position. The aims of Bulgaria's policy are too clear and too simple to be conceived in a different fashion, and as to the means to achieve them, they are all indicated by the enormous successes attained since the entry of Bulgaria into the world-war on the side of the Central Powers."

Perhaps the most eloquent commentary on this is contained in the French statistics of desertions from the Bulgarian Armies during the first six months of 1918: January, 54; February, 30; March, 39; April, 59; May,

170; June, 210. The numbers would have been higher but for the excessively uncompromising attitude of the Allied sentries on outpost. Our motor boats caught spies on Lake Tahinos. Few of them proved intractable.

"The deserters all agree in stating that the conditions of life in Bulgaria are unbearable, and hopes of ultimate victory have vanished from the people. There is great and increasing



GENERAL JEKOFF.
Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief.

insubordination in the army, many units having lately refused orders to attack. They also state that numerous soldiers, unwilling to desert to the enemy, have taken advantage of home leave to desert to the mountains, where they remain in hiding."

In October, 1917, while the Greeks were beginning to filter in slowly, the British troops, under General Milne, were still mainly responsible for the eastern sector of the Balkan front. This sector of the Allied line ran north-west from the mouth of the Struma River past Lake Tahinos and its marshes up the broad valley to the junction of the Butkova and Struma Rivers. On this right part of the line, in a land of flats, lakes and marshes, trenches were few and far between. Floods profoundly influenced tactics. As soon as the floods came down heavy guns had to be moved back to the south side of the river. The virtual lack of cavalry was practically a severe handicap

in this part of the front. Farther west on the Vardar sector, where trenches abounded as in France, amidst the ganglion of hills round about the beautiful but inhospitable Lake Doiran region, cavalry would have been useless. From Butkova the line turned westward, along the slopes of the Krusha Balkans, to Lake Doiran, and then to near Doiran town, and swept south-south-west to the Vardar Valley. The whole sector was about 100 miles long, and distant about 48 to 54 miles north from the city of Salonika. It barred the way against an attack from Seres and the Rupel Pass (N.E.), while it both guarded and threatened the Vardar Valley, the enemy's main line of communication and his shortest and easiest road to Salonika. Salonika itself was relatively at least as remote a base as Havre on the Western Front. The vertex of the line was bounded to the north by a railway from Doiran to Demir Hissar and Seres (thence to Drama and Dedeagatch), but this line was too much exposed to gun and rifle fire to be used by either belligerent. Our front roughly made the shape of a bow from Tahinos Lake (east) to just north of Karasuli (west). The railway links were all on the west. The main line to Uskub went up through Dudular and Topchin (dumps) (whence due east the Bird Cage and lakes prolonged a stiff line of defence right away to Stavros) to Karasuli (south of our front), to Gevgheli (north of the enemy front). From Karasuli, where the French constructed a duplicate bridge to link up with their aerodrome at Bohemitz, a branch line linked the Salonika-Uskub with the Salonika-Doiran line. And this branch road, though under shell fire, was constantly used by night. A few miles south of the junction at Kilindir was our 12th Corps Headquarters (22nd, 26th, and later, 60th Divisions, mostly of Kitchener's Army troops) at Yanesh (Janes), south of which again was our giant dump at Sarigol (Sarigol), and from Sarigol through Kukush (Kilkie) (a place with a landmark church quartered in numbers since 1913) we made a V-shaped deviation and eventually a light railroad to Gramatna-Snevce, whence stores were transmitted on mule pack to the greater part of our high-pitched front (Krusha Balkan). As the rail was inadequate, we built a first-class road from Sarigol to Salamanli, and so right into Salonika. Before this, in summer, a good deal of our motor transport had to wend its way up the bed of the Galiko River. The whole of this region between

Langaza Lake and the Struma Valley is a tangled mass of troublous and cheerless mountains of the highest Cumberland elevation, snow-crested for months in the year. To serve our north-eastern front and the lower Struma, we had to build another wide causeway through Langaza, Likovan and Lahana, passing on its way near by the Headquarters of the 16th Corps (28th and 27th Divisions, mostly regular troops, and Irish regiments of the 10th Division).

A summary of the military happenings during the year preceding the collapse of Bulgaria in September, 1918, will not occupy much space. Nothing in the way of tactical achievement had approached the brilliant assault upon Monastir by the veteran Serbs in November, 1916. The Bulgarian had proved a formidable opponent. He had no routine which could be circumvented like that of the German. He attacked night and day, and was as ready with the bayonet and the butt as with long range artillery and machine-gun fire. His Generalissimo was still Jekoff, who, like Savoff and Dimitrieff, had distinguished himself in the war of 1912, but the higher command and the technical branches were all under the close tutelage of the Germans. In October, 1917, the troops which had been withdrawn from the valleys of the Struma and Butkova at the beginning of the summer were

replaced on the lower ground, and minor operations, in which 250 prisoners were taken, were successfully carried on by the 16th Corps, mainly of 27th and 28th Divisions, against the villages of the valley. Meanwhile among the broken hills of the 12th Corps front (22nd and 26th Divisions) between Doiran Lake and the Vardar, our raiding parties incessantly harried the enemy and returned with prisoners. Near Matchukovo in a raid against Boyau Hill, the 12th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders broke through the strong hostile out post position 500 yards in front of their main objective, entered the enemy trenches, and having destroyed three machine-guns and inflicted heavy casualties, returned bringing all their wounded with them. In October also General Milne drew another brigade into reserve, this being simplified by the extension of the French front from Florina to the left bank of the Vardar. Towards the end of December, 1917, the chief command of the Allied Armies on this front was transferred from General Sarrail to General Guillaumat. The latter set about greatly strengthening the defences of Salonika, where the chief Headquarters were located. The need for this had been emphasized by German air raids. Impregnable against infantry, the "Bird Cage" was vulnerable to aeroplanes, and nearly a thousand casualties resulted near Summer-



A GORGE ON THE VARDAR.

hill Camp as late as March, 1917. The 29th General Hospital also suffered severely. Venizelist troops had already reinforced the French on the left. In March, 1918, the First Hellenic Larissa Division was put at General Milne's disposal, and was attached to the 16th Army Corps on the Struma River front, where it took over a sector to the north of Lake Tahinos. Unfortunately, this reinforcement was almost immediately counter-balanced by an extension of front. The Russian troops deserted General Guillaumat on the left, and the British had to resume their responsibility for the whole of the Vardar line. In the second week of April local operations were intensified on both Struma and Doiran fronts. Ten villages were occupied temporarily in the Struma Valley, the Hellenic troops, who were being steadily reinforced, bearing a conspicuous part. During the same period in April Serbs on the left, with some aid from Yugoslav volunteers, captured the important ridge of Vetrenik and improved their position north-east of Monastir. At the end of May the Greek troops made a fine advance near the Skra di Legen, between Vodena and the Vardar, and captured over 1,000 Bulgars and Germans. But for impetuously overrunning their own

barrage they would have got farther. On June 10-11 the French, with the aid of Albanian contingents, captured the villages and over 300 prisoners west of Lake Ochrida. All these gains, culminating in some successful small raids on the British front, were neutralized somewhat by the reduction of our infantry from 13 to 10 battalions per division, the balance being transferred to France. No open crevices were yet seen on the enemy front, but there is no doubt that the internal front of Bulgaria was very seriously shaken about this time. The Emperor of Austria made a flying visit to Sofia, in the course of which his train was stoned and other hostile demonstrations made. Discontent was developing rapidly in some of the best regiments; desertion increased steadily during June, and in the middle of the month the resignation of the four-year-old Radoslavoff Cabinet came about suddenly, to the serious disquietude of the Berlin and Vienna politicians. During this month, wrote Sir George Milne, our commander-in-chief, the first indications of a lowering in *moral* of the Bulgarian Army became noticeable. A mutinous spirit was gaining ground. Early in this month (June 8) General Guillaumat, who had won golden



(French official photograph.)
A FRENCH OFFICER EXAMINING A BULGARIAN PRISONER.

opinions from all the Allied forces under his command, was succeeded by General Franchet d'Esperey, who was destined to bring about a cyclonic change in the long stagnant Balkan situation. On June 27 Greece celebrated with an elation and an unanimity which would have seemed impossible three months, and fantastic nine months, before the anniversary of her entry into the war. Towards the end of July d'Esperey let it be known that a general offensive of the Allied Armies might be expected during the first fortnight of September. In this movement the British troops, reinforced by two Greek divisions with heavy artillery and cavalry, were to hold and improve the position east and west of Lake Doiran, but at any rate to hold up as many Bulgarian troops as possible and prevent them diverting reserves to their centre, where, unknown to them, the impending blow was to fall. The infantry intended for this attack were gradually withdrawn from the front line and carefully prepared for the rôle they were to fulfil. During August attention was diverted from the front line and the Vardar valley. The Austrians, after a short spurt, had to give ground before the efforts of the Italians in Albania and the hinterland of Avlona. In the first week of August the King of Bulgaria, pleading ill-health and war-weariness, sought a refuge at Bad-Nauheim, where he was visited at the end of the month by the Kaiser. The King of Bavaria simultaneously planned a visit to Sofia. Talaat Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier, paid a visit to Bulgaria about the same time, and made some egregious predictions. The war, he said, had exhausted itself. Everything that could be got out of the war had been got out of it. All their enemies were coming to agree that there was no sense in continuing it, its futility was proved, and it would give out before winter. Bulgaria and Turkey must mutually support one another and favourable conditions for peace negotiations would thus be created. Artillery operations began before the middle of the month. The Germans had a few guns of over 20,000 yards range and of great accuracy. The British, on the other hand, had been provided since April with additional artillery and effective 9.2 howitzers. A feint attack to deceive the enemy as to the Allies' objective was made by our troops of the 27th Division (Gloucesters and Hants) on the right bank of the Vardar Valley quite early in September. The general attack began on the



GENERAL MILNE (right) AND VOIVODE MISHITCH.

morning of September 14. The attack was made not far from the centre of the line between Monastir and Doiran. Mr. Balfour announced the brilliant success of the opening offensive on September 16. On Sunday morning, after a strong preparation with big guns, Serbian and French troops attacked the Bulgar works in the mountainous zone of the Dobropolye, the whole of the first Bulgarian position being carried on a front of seven miles, notwithstanding the great difficulties of the terrain. The front pierced was shortly widened to nearly 13 miles. All along the 80 mile front, from Doiran to Monastir, the artillery bombardment became intense. Within 24 hours the Franco-Serbian troops under the command of the Voivode Mishitch, stormed the Bulgar trenches on the mountain heights from Sokol to Vetrenik. These heights are due north, about 14 miles, of Lake Ostrovo. The attacks were aimed westwards in the direction of the Tchernia Bend and Monastir. The cavalry sought to cut the Bulgars off from Prilep. Beyond the Prilep is the Babuna Pass, and that forced, Uskub is exposed, Uskub, the key to any serious

offensive against Bulgaria. Over 4,000 prisoners and 30 guns were taken and the Yugo-Slav Division carried with magnificent dash the Kosyak massif, the second enemy position and the highest point in the district. From these lofty nests the Bulgars for over two years had looked down upon the Serbian Army, patiently



COLONEL GANTCHEFF.

Bulgarian representative at Brest-Litovsk, and at German Headquarters.

abiding its time. That time had now come. The Bulgars in the Tcherna Bend mountains were threatened with encirclement, and every day seemed to emphasize the importance of the gap which the valour of the Serbians had cut in the Bulgarian front. The condition precedent to our attack in the Doiran region was now achieved. This Anglo-Hellenic attack surpassed all the others in hazard, but was of supreme and primary importance as pinning down the Bulgarian reserves attached to this front and so preventing the enemy from sending reinforcements to the aid of the troops beaten by the Serbians. The trenches, pillboxes, and emplacements had all been most diligently graven in the rock here, and the resistance was sure to be most tenacious. The main operations began on Wednesday, the 18th, and were directed against the formidable "Pip" ridge and the accompanying heights. Here were our 22nd and 26th Divisions, as already described, together with the Seres (Hellenic) Division and a battery of Greek heavy guns. The total number of Greeks available at this time along the whole fighting line was something near 130,000, and well by this time did they justify the exhilarating forecasts of M. Venizelos. The Greeks are notoriously good

winners. A new national spirit animated them, their officers had recovered from the *malaise* of December, 1916, their spirits were inexhaustible and irrepressible. The whole of this composite force, reinforced by a regiment of French infantry, was entrusted to the command of Lieut.-General Sir H. F. M. Wilson, K.C.B. Hand in hand with the main attack, a secondary and surprise attack was prepared round the east and northern sides of the pear-shaped Lake Doiran (5 by 4½ miles) against the Bulgar trenches on the slopes of the Belesh range. If successful this action would turn the Doiran-Vardar front on its left, and in any case would prevent reinforcements moving to the west. But the operation was exceptionally difficult, for it involved a large concentration by night and an advance without artillery preparation across the plain between the Krusha Balkans and the Belesh. The Cretan Division of the Greek Army of National Defence sustained the responsibility, but were assigned in support the troops of the 28th Division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. H. L. Croker. Our effectives, it must be remembered, at this time of year had fallen below one half of the normal owing to the fever and the influenza. Fortunately the same influences were by no means without their effect on the enemy. The Vardar wind and the Vardar fever will be remembered in execration alike by friend and foe. The Bulgarian front between the Doiran Lake and the Vardar was one of exceptional strength. There were steep hillsides and rounded hills. There was little soil. Climbing was often embarrassed by the lack of handgrip and purchase. The hard, rocky ground made consolidation of a newly-won position difficult, and gave an overwhelming advantage to the defender, well dug into trenches that had been the deliberate work of three years. Deep-cut ravines diverted progress and afforded unlimited opportunity for enfilading fire. (The Juneaux Ravine was a paralysing instance of this.) In all this complexity of natural features the humps of the "Pip" Ridge and the Grand Couronné stood out conspicuous. The former from a height of over 2,000 feet sloped southwards towards our lines, overlooking our trenches and the whole 50 miles south to Salonika. To its right the country dipped and rose to a less sharp but no less intricate maze of hills mounting tier upon tier from Petit Couronné, with its steep and rugged sides, above Doiran Lake to Grand Couronné, itself



(Official photograph.)

NIGHT ON LAKE DOIRAN DURING THE FIGHTING.

little lower than the summit of the Pip Ridge. The enemy had taken full advantage of his ground. He was strongly entrenched in three successive lines, with communication trenches deeply cut into the rock, and roomy, well-timbered dug-outs with concrete machine-gun emplacements, and on the crest between Pip Ridge and Grand Couronné, with gun pits. It was the key position of the Vardar-Doiran defences, and the enemy held it with his best troops.

Shortly before dawn on September 18, the bombardment of four days was intensified, and west of the lake the attack was launched. Soon after 6 o'clock the two regiments of the Hellenic Division on the right had stormed the enemy position up to the neighbourhood of Doiran Hill, which rose above the ruins of the town, and had taken a large number of prisoners. On the left the 66th Infantry Brigade, which had been detailed to lead the attack on the "P" Ridge, advanced with consummate self-sacrifice and gallantry. Here the enemy had established three strong lines of defence, teeming with concrete machine-gun emplacements from which they could sweep and enfilade the whole front. After severe fighting the 12th Battalion, Cheshire Regiment, and the 9th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, supported by the 8th Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry, succeeded in reaching the third line of trenches. At this point they came under devastating machine-gun fire and, unable to make further progress, were eventually compelled to fall back to their original position. In their heroic attempt they had lost about 65 per cent. of their strength, including Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. A. R. Clegg-Hill, D.S.O., and Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Bishop, M.C., who fell at the

head of their battalions. In the centre, Hellenic and Welsh troops together assaulted the network of hills and trenches between the "P" Ridge and Grand Couronné and penetrated to a depth of about one mile. Severe loss was inflicted on the enemy, who offered a desperate resistance, supported by a heavy machine-gun fire from immensely strong emplacements blasted in the solid rock. In spite of this the lower slopes of Grand Couronné were reached. But the lack of success on the "P" Ridge made it impossible to retain the ground so hardly won, and the battalions gradually fell back to their former lines, the last to leave being the survivors of the 7th Battalion South Wales Borderers, 19 un wounded men and one wounded officer.

Meanwhile, on the east of the lake the Cretan Division, supported by troops of the 28th Division, had advanced across the gradually narrowing plain to attack the enemy's positions on the Blaga Planina, to the north of the lake. In difficult country they had assembled during the night behind the dismantled railway embankment below the village of Popovo. At dawn they carried the enemy's outpost line and pressed forward to his main line near Nikolitch. This they penetrated in two places on a narrow front, but a permanent hold could not be maintained. It was a difficult operation, carried out in its early stages in darkness and later under a blazing sun, across open country to a line six miles from the starting point, without artillery preparation, against an enemy who knew every yard of the ground and had perfect observation from the steep slopes to the south. Our troops therefore returned to the line of railway. The main aim was that none of the enemy reserves which had been attracted to the Doiran-Vardar

front should be diverted elsewhere. For this purpose orders were issued that all the ground won was to be retained. A Greek regiment of the 14th Hellenic Division was sent up as a reserve in support from Naresh (25 miles back from the front line) where it had been training.

During the night of the 18-19th a heavy bombardment was maintained. At 5 a.m. Greek and Scottish troops moved forward against the enemy's positions on the lower slopes of Grand Couronné. Again, in spite of

were consolidated on the afternoon of the 19th. The "Pip" Ridge and Grand Couronné had not been taken, our losses were very heavy, and progress inconsiderable so far; but the enemy had been severely shaken, and had lost 1,200 in prisoners alone. The whole of his reserves had been pinned down to this front and had suffered so severely that they were now ineffective.

In the meantime what was taking place on the main line of attack north of the Tchernia Bend? On Saturday, 21st, the French entered Prilep; the retreating enemy with fresh German troops kept up a rearguard battle, falling back on Veles. On the 26th it was known that the Serbs had captured the whole of the Babuna Pass together with Veles and Ishtip, thus severing the Bulgarian forces into two groups. The so-called Eleventh German Army (Bulgarians commanded by a German general and staff and stiffened with German battalions) was driven west towards Kalkandelen. The eastern armies were forced to retire to the north and by way of Strumnitza. The Serbs were pressing on with furious zeal to Uskub, and the Bulgars could not spare a man from the Doiran front to stem their onset. Much booty was obtained on the Prilep-Gradsko road. An immense dump of supplies fell into the hands of the Serbs at Gradsko Station on the 24th. Next day the Serbians entered Ishtip while their cavalry pushed northwards 20 miles north-east to Kotshana. Their cavalry since the commencement of the sweep had advanced nearly 80 miles in a straight line.

By this time there was no doubt that the Allied advance in the Balkans was developing into a victory of great importance. The enemy's retreat had extended to the wings, the pocket created by the deep thrust of the French and Serbian wings had spread into a great arc, and the Allies were marching forward on a front of nearly 100 miles. No fewer than six Allied forces were taking part in the movement. On the west the Italians and Yugo-Slavs had swept forward and redeemed 16 villages from the enemy; in the centre were the French and Serbians; and on the east, on both sides of the Vardar, the British and Hellenic troops were now beginning to press on the heels of the Bulgarians, who were burning stations and ammunition dumps.

The largest aggregate of Bulgar troops by far was that contained in the so-called Eleventh German Army, 2 German, 121 Bulgar battalions,



DOIRAN TO THE STRUMA.

the intense machine-gun fire, they succeeded in reaching their objective at many points. Several of the intermediate works were captured and held against determined counter-attacks. Unfortunately, on the left the Allied troops at their position of assembly had come under heavy barrage, and could make no further progress. In spite of this the 65th Infantry Brigade, which had moved up rapidly during the night from an influenza observation camp, twice gallantly tried alone to capture the "P" Ridge, but was driven back by overwhelming fire from the enemy's machine guns. The effect was that the troops in the centre found their left flank exposed. Their right was also threatened, and they were compelled to fall back, stubbornly fighting the whole way. The 12th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 8th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 11th Battalion Scottish Rifles, covered the retirement in spite of the severe casualties, including loss of all their commanding officers, killed or wounded.

Petit Couronné, Teton Hill and Doiran Town

and a German command. This held the Serbian territory in the west from Ochrida Lake to Malarupa, including the sector on our left from Teherna to Malarupa, which the Allies had chosen (early in August, 1918) for their main offensive operations in order that thus the main line of communications and revictualling of the greater part of the enemy front toward Demir Kapu and Krivolak—that is the Uskub-Salonika railway—might be threatened and, in case of success, taken. At the same time it was aimed to facilitate the work of the main attack by organizing attacks on the whole of the remaining front. This would mislead the enemy and

towards Radovishta. The main attack, as we have seen, was carried out by Serbian and French forces between Dzena and the River Teherna the enemy being pursued towards Ishtip, and the Uskub-Salonika line cut. Their left flank was guarded by the 3rd Greek Division. The Second and Fourth Bulgarian Armies operating along the Struma down to the Aegean coast, and consisting largely of reserve or second line battalions (between 50 and 60 in number), were contained mainly by the 1st, 2nd and 13th Greek Divisions.

To return now to the British Front on the morning of Saturday, the 24th, on which the



BULGARIAN TROOPS MARCHING OUT OF KRUSHEVO.

prevent him from conveying forces from the other sectors for the purpose of reinforcing that sector in which the main attack was to proceed. The chief rôle here fell upon General Milne and the British Army, who with two Greek divisions (Serres and Crete) under his command, had to take on the First Bulgarian Army, of 77 nominal and 62 active strength in battalions, ranged between Malarupa and Mount Belesh. After a violent struggle in which the Greeks bore a conspicuous part, they eventually broke through the defence on the mountainous line of Belessi, and captured the Strumnitza plain. Two other Greek Divisions (IV. and Archipelago) crossed the Vardar from the west, and joined in the pursuit

Franco-Serbian Army had reached the line Gradishta-Boshava-Dragojil, thus turning the right flank of the enemy, and cutting his communications down the Vardar Valley. By noon it was plain that a hurried retirement on the Doiran front had begun. The depots at Hudova, Tcheshtovo, and other places behind the lines were observed to be in flames, and numerous explosions showed that ammunition depots were being everywhere blown up. Our fliers now, with such assistance as was possible from the Yeomanry, served the infantry supremely. For seven months they had attained, after many struggles, the mastery in the air—now quite complete. The observers of the Royal



STRUMNITZA.

Air Force reported that the Kosturino Pass on the Strumnitza road, the only good line of retreat now open to the enemy, was blocked by masses of men and transports moving northwards. The pilots of the Royal Air Force, flying low, took full advantage of this opportunity. They bombed the Bulgar columns and shot down men and animals with their machine guns, causing heavy casualties and a confusion that bordered on panic.

During the evening patrols reported that the advanced trenches of the enemy were empty. Before dawn on the 22nd, the whole of the British force was on the move. By nightfall the foremost troops, greatly hampered by broken bridges and hard tracts of no-man's land, had reached the line Kara-Ogular-Hamzali-Bogdantzi. Close touch was kept with the hostile rearguards, which, well supplied with mountain and machine guns, did all they could to delay our pursuit. West of the Vardar the 27th Division advanced with the Archipelago Division of the Franco-Hellenic Corps on their immediate left.

The first of the Allies to enter Bulgaria, at Kosturino, were units of the 26th Division, overnight, followed by the Derbyshire Yeomanry, early on the morning of September 25. These were the leading troops of the XVI. Corps under Lieutenant-General C. J. Briggs, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., who had been brought round from the right to the left of the army. They were followed shortly after by the 14th Hellenic, which had replaced the Seres Division in the Anglo-Hellenic Army

At the same time the 22nd Division from the west, and the Cretan Division from the east, of Lake Doiran, began to climb the steep slopes of the Belashitsa Range on the north of the lake. In the centre the 28th Division, which had made forced marches across from the extreme right reached the heights of Djuma Obasi. On September 26, the 16th Corps descended to the Strumnitza Valley and gained the Strumnitza-Petritch road. During the night French, Hellenic and British troops stormed and captured the towering summits of the Belashitsa. This range is over 4,000 feet above the lake, the ascents are severe, there are practically no paths, and communication was necessarily most irregular. In this operation the 8th Battalion, South Wales Borderers, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Dobbs, D.S.O., specially distinguished themselves.

Up to this date, 30 guns, large quantities of ammunition, and three hospitals had been captured, while many of our wounded prisoners had been recovered; considerable quantities of guns, motor cars and stores had been found abandoned all along the line of retreat and in the mountains.

At eight o'clock on the morning of September 26, a Bulgarian *parlementaire*, under a white flag and bearing a proposal to conclude an armistice, approached the British lines, and was immediately conducted to Sir G. Milne's Headquarters and thence to the Allied Headquarters at Salonika. Two days later the Bulgarian Plenipotentiaries, including General Lukoff, commander of the Second Bulgarian Army,

passed through the British lines on their way to Salonika. Our 16th Corps now swung eastwards, with two Hellenic Divisions, down the Butkova Valley against Rupel and Demir Hissar. The Royal Air Force found the Kresna Pass choked by the retreating enemy, whose Struma Army was now in danger. Our pilots, as subsequent reports showed, did enormous execution. Slowly, but surely, our men were fighting their way forward, when at 2 a.m. on September 30 (15 miles from Rupel Pass), the news came that a military convention had been signed at the Allied Headquarters.

By September 26-27 the French, Serbs, and Italians had completely broken the enemy's resistance on the front between the Vardar and Monastir, and were seriously threatening the enemy's line of retreat along the Vardar and between Prilep and Veles. The least showy part was assigned to our troops, but much of the credit for the victory is due to the British, whose persistent attacks on the Doiran front, the pivot on which we had been held up for two days, in face of the heaviest opposition, prevented the enemy from transferring his reserves westward to meet the main attack.

Of all the fighting fronts that of Salonika had long been the Cinderella. Men asked could any

good thing come out of Salonika! Yet from this front came the first glimmer of victory. Germany had been sorely stricken, wounded in a vital spot. Austria-Hungary was crumbling, and we were now in a position to assist the process. The most sensitive and mortal spot of the Central Alliance was in the South-East, and the Germans could no longer conceal the damage by whitewashing. The demand upon the Supreme Army Command for reserves was stark, categorical, imperative. Yet it was clear, among the tornado of lies, that it could not possibly be met. The last fortnight had more than justified the so called "long loaf," the interminable mark-time of three years duration, known to the West as "Salonika." The long preparation of General Guillaumat, which d'Esperey had known so well how to interpret, was most brilliantly vindicated. The French and British Armies had maintained the position and held the ring with a superb toughness and sangfroid, but the spear-point had been supplied in the last rush by two armies virtually resurrected from the dead—the Serbs and the Greeks. To the Serbs was allocated the agreeable and most welcome task of going for the ball, whilst the Anglo-Hellenic force on the right-centre went for the man. They drew upon themselves



THE BAZAAR AT STRUMNITZA.

the weight of the enemy's reserves, and gripped fast his powerful left arm while the Franco-Serbs struck up the other and got round at the back. The Bulgars knew that they were beaten, and hastened to follow the course dictated by elementary self interest. They regarded their king's alliance as a three years' compact with the Evil One. Three things had frankly astonished them: the duration of the struggle; our mule transport; the prowess of our men as promiscuous raiders.

The gist of the whole campaign is comprised in these impressions. It had to be envisaged as Wellington envisaged that of Spain, as a problem of transport, and the conversion of our transport and ambulance from wheel to pack was a miracle of organization. Progress was not straight but zigzag, until suddenly a turn came and the enemy could stand no more. The German Army had developed a Spanish ulcer.

The Greeks sacrificed the idea of fighting in a single block; eight divisions fought in different sectors, and fought well, while another division, the 14th, came up on the 22nd, and

joined in the pursuit with our Derbyshire Yeomanry over very hilly country, entering Bulgaria at Kosturino on the 25th. As for the British contribution, the grit and endurance of the Kitchener or New Army man, in a dour, lonesome, ill-provided country, with an invisible and truculent enemy; his never-ending toil, whether as fighter or road-builder, with no hope of leave and very little of recreation of any kind, except a surprise bombing: his native quality—these have seldom been seen in a stronger light than during the three years' sojourn on the Salonika front.

The Armistice, pending the final peace settlement, was signed by the Bulgarian Envoys, who passed through General Milne's lines on Thursday, the 26th, and General Franchet d'Esperey, the French Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Orient, at Salonika, on Sunday, September 29, 1918. The Agreement, essentially military, dealt cursorily or not at all with political issues, and left frontier questions in suspense. For the moment the south and western boundaries of Bulgaria were to be those of 1913. Broadly



GENERAL PROTOGEROFF (X) BULGARIAN MINISTER OF WAR.
Photographed in Berlin shortly before the Armistice.



A BULGARIAN OFFICER ANNOUNCING THE ARMISTICE TO HIS MEN IN AN OCCUPIED SERBIAN TOWN.

speaking, the most important effects of the armistice were that the direct German route to Constantinople was cut and placed under Allied control. The lower Danube ceased to be available for enemy traffic, and it became impossible for Germany or Austria-Hungary to reinforce or supply Turkey save through the Rumanian or Russian Black Sea ports. The following is an outline in summary: (1) Immediate demobilization; Bulgaria henceforth ceasing to be a belligerent. (2) Immediate evacuation of the territories still occupied by Bulgarians in Greece and Serbia; no cattle, cereals or provisions to be exported from such territories, which had to be left undamaged. (3) Surrender of arms, munitions and vehicles, which were to be stored under control of the Allies, and of horses which were to be handed over to the Allies. (4) Restitution to Greece of the material of the Fourth Army Corps taken when the Bulgarians occupied Eastern Macedonia. (5) The elements of Bulgarian troops to the north and west of Uskub belonging to the 11th German Army to lay down their arms (65,000 became prisoners of war under this clause). (6) Bulgarian transport, railways, ships, Danube craft, to be placed at disposal of Allies. (7) Bulgar territory to be available

for Allied operations—certain strategic points to be occupied by British, French or Italian troops. (8) Bulgarian prisoners to be in Allies' employ; Allied prisoners in Bulgaria to be forthwith released.

"Henceforth," said a Bulgar envoy jauntily to d'Esperey, "you may consider us as neutrals." "No, gentlemen," replied the Generalissimo, "you are not neutrals, but vanquished enemies who have surrendered at discretion." The word capitulation was taboo in Sofia. Cries of dismay arose in Berlin and Spa. Ferdinand and Jekoff were virtuously indignant. But a secret session of the Sobranje unanimously, and at every point, approved the Armistice. Ferdinand, on the way to Coburg, resigned his tsardom in favour of his son Boris, whose first official signature was affixed to the decree of demobilization (October 6). This same week Sofia saw the last of her Pro-German triumvirate Radoslavoff, Jekoff, and the German Minister. By mid-October the Bulgars had been cleared effectively out of Greece, and the Germans out of Bulgaria, our prisoners had all been released, and British representatives had entered Sofia. Malinoff held on in power for two weeks longer. Then on November 1, King Boris resigned, and retired to Vienna. A Republic was proclaimed



PRINCE BORIS.

Nominated by Ferdinand as his successor.

with Todoroff (a follower of Gueshoff in 1912) as Premier, and Daneff as Chancellor.

The collapse of Bulgaria, which led to the Armistice, was a thunderclap to Europe, and the detonation was loudest where opinion was most sensitive. A series of abrupt falls took place on the Berlin Stock Exchange. A terrible meeting took place at the German Headquarters Staff on the last day of September. The size of the fissure was not perceived in England by October 1. America hailed it as a trumpet-call to redouble effort for winning the war quickly. "The backbone of *Mittel-Europa* is broken," wrote King Albert of Belgium. The death of Pan-Germanism was now assured. Turkey's capitulation was anticipated, and a separate peace with Austria Hungary if the war survived the winter. At the least a new front—a southern front—was added to Germany's responsibilities. The southern frontier of Austria was menaced directly. Turkey was cut off from German aid. It was in fact hardly possible to exaggerate the gravity of the blow to Germany's war aims. Of late she had relied on the East to compensate her for prospective

failure in the West. Now the East was slipping away, and only prospective failure remained in the West. Many thought that the *débâcle* on the Macedonian front was seized as a pretext by the Bulgars for leaving a sinking ship. Attempts to prove that nothing was lost, that the situation had been anticipated, and that Germany was coming to the rescue with numerous legions drawn from Ukraine and the Far East were discounted by frantic appeals to close the ranks by the German Press and the Kaiser. "Imperialism is bankrupt" *per contra*, wrote the *Vorwärts*. "What we have now to think about is our own hearths and homes." The German rot had begun. The pedestal of one of the Kaiser's many statues was inscribed in red ink "Bon Voyage." The Pillar of Real Politik (Berlin to Baghdad) had already crumbled to dust. The abruptness of the news greatly enhanced the emotion experienced in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. One or two Dutch papers alleged a panic among the Hohenzollerns. In pointed reference to the Crown Prince and Ludendorff, the Kaiser was said to have exclaimed, "This is the merited reward of the booby and his advisers." The shadow of Nicholas seemed to be pointing in his direction. The Kaiser, unsaluted in the streets of Berlin, was said to have taken to his beads and to be consuming long hours in intensive devotion,



GENERAL TODOROFF.

Commanded the Bulgarian Army which surrendered to the Allies.

praying for his dynasty and the crown. These legends evidently had a substratum of truth.

The war adventure of Bulgaria had lasted almost exactly three years. It was on October 3, 1915, that Russia, representing the Entente, sent the ultimatum to Sofia which led to war within three days. On October 5 the Entente Ministers in Bulgaria asked for their passports. Two days later Austro-German troops began the invasion of Serbia. On October 11 the Bulgars crossed the borders, and in two days more were well on their way to Nish. It is significant that, as at the outset of the war, the beginning was heralded by bloodshed and strife in the Balkans, so the beginning of the end was indicated by the sudden and unlooked-for gesture of Bulgaria to throw in her hand. The Bulgars had fought with a pig-headed obstinacy entirely befitting their reputation. We had no ostensible successes to boast of against them, and they were wholly unmoved by the prestige or potential resources of their European opponents. Like the Boers, they justified the rôle of embattled farmers and the imperturbability ascribed to a peasant nation. But the Allies had done well for themselves in nursing up against them the earned hostility of their Balkan neighbours. Without the local intrepidity and the just hate of Serbians and Greeks it is somewhat doubtful if we should ever have earved that gap in the Bulgar flank. Mutinous symptoms in the Bulgarian Army were apparent to the naked eye early in June 1918. Six weeks later the Commander-in-Chief Jekoff, left Bulgaria to undergo an operation. In September the exploits of the fighting Serbs had begun to cause a genuine consternation among the stalwart veterans of Lule Burgas and Kirk Kilisse. The idiosyncrasies responsible for the atrocities of Balkan history were about to dree their weird to the end. The stern, almost miraculous renaissance of Greek and Serbian militarism convinced the Bulgars, so long irrepressible, that at last the flint was at their throats. A people of less than six millions, occupying under 50,000 English square miles, with a strong anti-foreign disposition, they had assimilated Prussian ideas at a great pace—the reality of compulsory service and the semblance of constitutional government.

That Bulgaria was capable, at least to some extent, of co-operation in a good cause and of that moderation of national aims which is the essence of such co-operation, was shown in 1912. The first Balkan War was, at least



BULGARIAN INFANTRYMAN

in its beginning, a real war of Liberation, fought for the freedom of the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula from the misrule of Turkey.

For years the rival claims of Serbia and Bulgaria, to say nothing of other clashing Balkan interests, had balked effective combination against the Turk. The Balkan League was founded on an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, provisionally settling the vexed question of the partition of Macedonia, followed by the conclusion of a treaty between Bulgaria and Greece and by other accessory arrangements. But the quick triumph of the Allied Balkan States against the Turk exposed the hollowness of their unity, and it was Bulgaria that played false with the Allies. The blame had by common consent been laid at the door of her king. Was it really all Ferdinand's fault? Is it true that he gambled



SOFIA: THE COMMERCIAL QUARTER

so heartlessly, not merely with the blood and fortunes, but with the very soul of a people worthy of better things? In any case, it was a bad day for Bulgaria when Ferdinand was elected to fill the vacant throne that was going a-begging. The fate of Alexander of Battenberg had daunted most of the would-be competitors. Ferdinand applied for it in the spirit of an adventurer answering an advertisement. He combined the brains and the vices of the worst type of the Italian *condottieri* of the Middle Ages, without the one redeeming feature of personal courage which they usually possessed. Affection or respect he was incapable of inspiring, but with malign ingenuity he set to work deliberately and systematically to debauch and corrupt the small governing class in order to secure the black-mailer's hold upon them. During his reign Sofia developed from a mere overgrown village of Oriental type into a fine modern city, with spacious boulevards, lovely parks, well-paved streets, and public buildings of notable grandeur. The pretentious Court of Sofia imitated at once the pompous ceremony of the Habsburgs and the Oriental ostentation of a rajah. Decorations, sleeve links, scarf pins, gold snuff-boxes with the initials of Ferdinand, were scattered broadcast all over Europe. The Court extended and ramified into a vast *camarilla*, thanks to which it could spread a complicated network of influence, intrigue, corruption and espionage over Sofia and the whole country. Ferdinand had a great belief in manœuvring a

large personal phalanx of press adherents, largely Jewish, through an extensive political wire entanglement. He may not have initiated the system, but he certainly extended it. He served public interests in Bulgaria as they had been served before him by converting all kinds of base passions and individual appetites to the public good—such as Ferdinand conceived it. An ex-lieutenant of Hussars under Franz-Joseph, he was always a devoted and grateful champion of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, of Pan-Germanism in the East. It must be remembered, however, that the Germanophil current in Bulgarian policy not only preceded the election of Coburg, but was a determining cause of it. In remaining Austrophil Ferdinand of Coburg was faithful to the opinions of his electors, who doubtless saw in his Austrophil sentiments his chief title to become Prince of Bulgaria. It was Austria, no doubt, that prompted him in the crisis of 1913. The very failure of his treachery to the Balkan League at this time enabled him to bait with a specious appeal to Bulgarian nationalism, still smarting under defeat, the fatal bargain he had struck with Berlin; whilst the Bulgarian Army, which he had saturated with the spirit of Prussian militarism, was only too ready to believe with him that in following the German War Lord they were treading the path to easy victory and assured revenge.

But Ferdinand's duplicity may have been overrated. He was probably more steadfast to his German ideals and less omnipotent



FERDINAND, TSAR OF BULGARIA.

Photographed in October 1915.

than has been generally supposed. The advent of Malinoff in the summer of 1918 indicated, we may now be sure, some definite intention of making peace in the autumn, with or without Ferdinand's concurrence; and Ferdinand's interchange with the Kaiser was

undertaken with a view of reassuring the uneasiness of Berlin on this head. For the moment solidarity seemed assured. In the selfsame August, however, the Kings of Saxony and Bavaria visited Sofia with the object of personally influencing Ferdinand to remain true



SOFIA: THE ROYAL PALACE.

to his allies. The visit taught them that the real power in Bulgaria no longer rested in the King's hands, and that unless something was done to give Bulgaria material support and recreate the fighting spirit in the army, the Tsar Ferdinand could not prevent the threatened defection. The whole Government set out from Sofia and visited the front, using every endeavour to encourage the army, but without apparent success. As Germany and Austria were unable to spare troops, the only alternative was to induce Turkey to send reinforcements to the Salonika front. Talaat's price was high, and he made an unconscionable bargain. Enver, however, through whose hands the transaction had to pass, had unlearned the Prussian precept of promptitude, and when the Allied blow fell it need hardly be said that not a single Turk had crossed the frontier.

If ever the policy of a country was decided after cold and calculated balancing of relative advantages, with a complete absence of any redeeming motive of altruism, without a tinge of generous emotion, it was the intervention of Bulgaria in the war. To the very last moment, Sofia was playing off one group of belligerents against the other. If, as some think, the real

decision had been taken long before, if the moment when Bulgaria really turned towards Germany is marked by the advance to her of £3,000,000 by German banks in January, 1915, it is yet certain that the Entente Powers were deceived for months afterwards, and it is more than likely that "Anglophil" Bulgarian elements were successfully involved in that deception.

Nor can it be said with any certainty that Bulgaria was committed irrevocably to Germany for some months after the beginning of 1915. Report credits King Ferdinand with having said in the spring of 1915 that he would intervene on behalf of the Allies when they began to hammer at the gates of Constantinople. It was when the Dardanelles Expedition showed clear signs of failure, and when the Germanic conquest of Galicia had averted the fear of any intermediate intervention by Rumania, that Bulgaria threw off the mask and appeared as the open ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Even then the pretence of non-intervention would have been kept up if pretence had been possible any longer. As late as September 24 M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, had officially assured the British and Russian

Ministers at Sofia that the Bulgarian mobilization, which had begun already, was not directed against Serbia. On September 28 Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons that :—

“My official information from the Bulgarian Government is that they have taken up a position of armed neutrality to defend their rights and independence, and that they have no aggressive intentions whatever against Bulgaria's neighbours.”

He referred to the “warm feeling of sympathy for the Bulgarian people” which was current in Great Britain, and added :—

“As long as Bulgaria does not side with the enemies of Great Britain and her Allies there can be no question of British influence or forces being used in a sense hostile to Bulgarian interests.”

The time has not yet come to discuss or criticize Entente policy towards Bulgaria in 1914 and 1915. But it should not be forgotten that that policy had involved demands for concessions from Serbia which ran counter to the dearest traditions of Serbian national feeling, and that these concessions were endorsed by

the Serbian Skupshtina, at the end of August, after three secret sittings as “indispensable for the protection of the vital interests of our people” and as the price of Serbia's determination to continue side by side with Serbia's Allies the struggle for the liberation of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene people.

Thus Serbia's self-sacrifice was set in a bright contrast with Bulgarian rapacity; but for a time it seemed that the reward of greed was to be success almost unlimited, and the price of self-abnegation total ruin. Within two months of Bulgaria's entry into the war, the whole of Serbia had been overrun, the Serbian people were subject or fugitive, and the small Allied force, that had come too late to their assistance by way of Salonika, was forced back on to Greek territory. This was by no means the sum of the gains that Bulgaria seemed to have acquired by joining Germany. Aggression on Greek soil went unresented by King and Government of Greece. When Rumania joined the Entente Powers at the end of August, 1916, Bulgarian troops took part in the invasion of that autumn, which crushed her, and Bulgaria



PRINCE CYRIL OF BULGARIA IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

Left to right : (1) Fuad Savset Bey (First Secretary to the Sultan); (2) Bulgarian General Petroff; (3) Prince Cyril; (4) General Jekoff (Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief); (5) M. Golontscheff (Bulgarian Ambassador in Constantinople); (6) Turkish General Hilmi Pasha.

received at the Peace of Bukarest a larger share of the Dobrudja than she had lost by the Peace of Bukarest in 1913. But already there were signs that the limits set Bulgarian acquisitions by the rival desires of Turkey and Germany were narrower than Bulgaria liked. The Peace of Bukarest placed Constanza and the greater part of the Dobrudja under an "Allied" *condominium*. This question of the Dobrudja grew to be a perpetual source of irritation between Germany and Bulgaria, and the irritation was not made less by Germany's attempts to settle outstanding points of difference between Bulgaria and Turkey.

The Turks joined the Central Alliance in November, 1914, eleven months before the Bulgarians; but they found it all they could do to outstay them by a single month. They threw in their hand at the end of October. Ferdinand can hardly be made responsible for the final Bulgar treachery. His people probably calculated more cunningly for themselves than he could have done for them. The number of Bulgarians who claimed to have been all along, secretly, friends of the Entente, was found to be legion—from the Prime Minister downwards. If this bear a semblance to the truth it can only be said that their Press singularly belied them. Neither peasants nor town profiteers had suffered comparably with their neighbours, but they had lost faith in the invincibility of Prussia; and they thought no doubt that some negotiable benefit would surely accrue to the first raiser of the white flag, however stained by atrocities the hand that raised it. The nearer the retribution, the more inexorable seemed the Armistice. Hence the bitter cry of the stunted Serbians, with the human nature of which it is hard not to sympathize.

"You will see," said a Serbian observer, "that the Bulgars, if they escape invasion, will now and forever claim that they were not coerced, but that they desisted from

the war of their own free will. They will say that the principles for which the Allies were fighting, having undergone modifications, were acceptable to them, and that they spontaneously determined to trust to the justice of the Anti-German Alliance for the realization of their war aims. They will hold up their heads as proudly as if they were guiltless of the crimes which they have committed against our nation. Their own tribulations in this war will soon be forgotten by them, and they will be ready for fresh aggressions in the near future. Retaliatory invasion of their country could alone have taught them an abiding lesson. But now the path is being smoothed for them to elude the punishment they could no longer hope to avert by force of arms, and which was manifestly their due."

In the meantime the Bulgarian Republic fell to the guidance of statesmen of experience. Todoroff was the Bulgarian Clemenceau—"The Tiger," familiar as such in the street cartoons. An inexhaustible orator with a strong crescendo, he was unrivalled as a Budgeteer and Minister of Finance at 40 in 1894. He was a stout admirer of the peasant, but a shrewd business man, with a strong leaning to expansion in Thrace. Dr. Daneff, a student of Prague, Heidelberg and Paris, was a skilled diplomat. He had been everywhere, was a prudent opportunist, a Nationalist and had once been regarded as a possible successor to Gueshoff. Both seemed to be convinced that the military prestige of their country could have suffered no diminution. Economically they had probably suffered more on the balance than they calculated. But the Bulgarians were the thriftiest and closest of peoples, and might hope for important friendships in Rome and London, if not in Paris. A strong Bulgaria might be reckoned a necessary makeweight in the Peninsula, and there would always be a stability about a peasant republic in the hands of a race so stolid and so canny as the modern Bulgar.

CHAPTER CCLXXXIX.

THE AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPE.

AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTION—MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS—CONSCRIPTION OF THE NATION—THE AMERICAN DIVISIONS—TRANSPORT OF THE ARMY—THE FIRST TROOPS IN FRANCE—REORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH PORTS—VAST WORK OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY—HORSES, STAFFS, ARTILLERY, AEROPLANES, TRAINING—FIRST OPERATIONS—CANTIGNY—CHATEAU-THIERRY—THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE—THE MARNE—JULY 18, 1918—ST. MIHIEL—ADVANCE IN THE ARGONNE—MARCH ON SEDAN—THE ARMISTICE—AMERICA'S ACHIEVEMENT.

AMERICA'S contribution to the winning of the war is not to be measured merely by the performance of her armies on the Western front. Finely as those armies bore themselves on all occasions when they were engaged, and great though the influence of American troops was in the final battles, the actual share borne by American troops in the war, judged either by the number of those troops which came to be engaged or by their losses in comparison to those of the other chief belligerents, was comparatively small. America's chief contribution was a moral one. Her chief effort was financial and industrial. In the course of another year the United States would have had in the field the greatest army of any nation, and her power would have been preponderant; but, as it stands, her military effort must be judged as an incomplete but splendid fragment.

It would be idle and out of place here to discuss the motives which impelled Germany wilfully not only to provoke, but to compel, the United States to come into the war against her. It may be that the German leaders really were blind and did not believe that all the power of the United States could ever be mobilized for war. If so, it was far from being the only mistake of the kind which

Germany made. Certainly German public men and the German Press set themselves from the outset resolutely to belittle America's importance, and to deride her capacity as a military Power.

In the early years of the war all Germany had sneered at Great Britain. Not only was her original army contemptible, but when Lord Kitchener made his first demand for half a million men the German Press, as a unit, and German public speakers united in ridiculing the idea that Great Britain could ever raise, equip, or send to France an army of such magnitude. Did Englishmen know, they asked, what it meant to enlist this number of men; to build camps for them and train them; furnish them with arms, and put them into a remote field of action while the war was already in progress? Judging by their own laborious 40-year-long preparation, they seemed honestly to believe that any such improvization of mighty armies as England projected was impossible.

Precisely so did they now make light of American interference. The American people would never act harmoniously in support of a war policy. The German, Austrian, and Irish elements in the population alone were enough to prevent that. Even if great masses of men



CALLING UP THE MILITIA IN NEW YORK:

The First Battalion, Naval Militia, marching down Fifth Avenue.

were conscripted it was obviously impossible to equip them and put them across 3,000 miles of ocean with all the enormous bulk of supplies which a modern army in the field demanded. Whether the writers and leaders of German thought believed what they wrote and said or not, they seem to have succeeded in deluding the mass of the German people and the German army. All prisoners captured on the Western front during 1917 and the early part of 1918 were completely sceptical as to American troops ever taking any serious part in the war. Their disillusion was to be speedy and complete.

There were leading Americans, including some of the chief commanders in the field in France, who recorded their opinion that the greatest factor in America's participation in the war was not the mere raising and equipping of armies, or even the stupendous industrial effort which was made, but that it was the disciplined unanimity of the American people. Almost without a murmur and with no friction, the entire population of the United States, to the complete obliteration of distinctions of nationality, whether Irish, German, or anything else, threw itself into support of the war policy when once war had been declared. They accepted conscription, they accepted the censor-

ship, they accepted the nationalisation of essential industries, they accepted heavy taxation and immense national expenditure, they accepted the imposition of rigorous food control and voluntarily denied themselves beyond the imposed limits. Ultimately, though not entirely as a war measure, they accepted the prohibition of the manufacture or sale of liquors. Any one of these things would seem on the face of it to have been in complete violation of all the traditions and instincts of a people so saturated with the doctrine and principles of individual freedom, and that they accepted all these things with the readiness and unanimity which they displayed was indeed perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon manifested in any country during the war. They may be right who place it first among the factors in the American effort.

Observers from other countries who knew the United States well had not seldom pointed out that, in case a great national cause should appeal to the people, actual military unpreparedness would count for less in the United States than it might be expected to do in other countries. The individual American is accustomed, and has always been accustomed, to turn his hand to anything with a readiness of

resource not common among the older peoples of Europe. The doctrine that any American is capable without special training of any task which may be set him is as old in the United States as President Andrew Jackson, and presumably older. Once before also, it has to be remembered, the United States had been called upon to fight with all its strength, as, for instance, England has never been called upon in recent centuries. In the Civil War nearly all the man-power of the North was mobilized; and in the South not the manhood only but the boyhood and much of the womanhood as well.

sort of State Militia, with a paper strength of approximately 200,000. The quality of the organization, however, differed widely in the different States, and recent mobilization on the Mexican border had shown how extremely faulty were the discipline and equipment of many of the regiments. The actual military strength was very much under the figures on paper. It served, however, as an admirable nucleus for the National Guard Divisions, which afterwards bore so distinguished a part in the operations in France.

Happily the United States was not under the



**IN CASE OF NEED:
VOLUNTEERS IN TRAINING BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF WAR.**

There were, therefore, good reasons for believing that, when the emergency came, the United States might be more ready to throw in her whole strength, in spite of her unmilitary traditions, than any other nation.

When the United States came into the war early in 1917 it was seemingly even more unprepared than Great Britain had been two and a half years before. The American regular army consisted of about 80,000 effectives with 6,000 officers, who were largely scattered not only over the West of the United States to the Pacific and the Mexican border; but large numbers were also in the Philippines, Porto Rico and elsewhere. In addition, there was the National Guard, a

same necessity as had confronted Great Britain of getting into action at once. The Americans did not have to create their armies and fight them simultaneously, but could take, within reasonable limit, what time was necessary for organization on the most advantageous lines. They did not have to throw in all the splendid material of their regular army, as Great Britain had been compelled to do, within a few days, or weeks at most, of their entrance into the war. It was possible for them to economize that fine material and employ it to the best advantage. The first streams of volunteers were used to expand the regular army and to fill up the establishment of the National Guard. Then, selected men from the former were used

both as officers and non-commissioned officers in the training and command of the great draft army, officially to be known as the National Army, which was to follow.

In the American Armies in France, then, as finally organized, there were divisions of these three classes, viz., the Regular Army Divisions,



AMERICAN INFANTRYMAN.
Heavy marching order.

numbered from 1 up to, if necessary, 25; the National Guard Divisions, numbered from 26 up to, if necessary, 75, and the National Army Divisions, numbered from 76 upwards. The actual number of Divisions which, either in whole or part, had arrived in France up to the signing of the armistice was 42, but it must be remembered that an American Division was a much larger unit than was the case in the armies of any other of the belligerents. An American

infantry regiment consisted of three battalions, of four companies of 250 men, or a regimental strength of 3,000. In addition, each regiment had a machine-gun company, a supply company, and a headquarters company. Two infantry regiments composed a brigade, and two brigades composed a division. Besides the rifle strength of 12,000 men, made up of the four regiments, there was also a machine-gun battalion attached to each brigade, as well as a third divisional machine-gun battalion, making three full machine-gun battalions to a division. The actual composition of a division, including all units, was as follows :

One Divisional Headquarters	164
One Machine Gun Batt. of four Companies ...	768
Two Infantry Brigades, each composed of two Infantry Regiments and one Machine Gun Batt. of three Companies	16,420
One Field Artillery Brigade of three Regiments and one Trench Mortar Battery	5,060
One Field Signal Battery	262
One Regiment of Engineers	1,666
One Train Headquarters and Military Police...	337
One Ammunition Train	962
One Supply Train	472
One Engineering Train	81
One Sanitary Train of four Field Hospital Com- panies and four Ambulance Companies ...	949
	<hr/> 27,144

In theory a corps consisted of six divisions, four of which were to be fighting or combat divisions, one of the others being in *depôt* and one to furnish drafts or replacements to the combat divisions.

While the American Army had more time than France or England had been able to spare, and could proceed more methodically to work in making itself into the great fighting force which it ultimately came to be, it was also under obvious disadvantages. The United States was 3,000 miles away from the scene of action; and after it had reached France the area at its disposal for purposes of lines of communication and so forth, was limited by the presence in the field of the French and British Armies. It was obvious from the first that it could make no use of the Northern Ports of France. Calais, Boulogne, Havre, Dieppe, were all loaded and overloaded with the enormous transport of troops and material for the British Army, and with the import of material for the French. All lines of railways and all roads in the northern part of France were similarly overworked; only the southern ports from Brest downwards were at American disposal. Here it was possible to create the facilities for disembarkation where they did not

exist, and from here, that is, from Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux, roads and railway lines running east and north-east were in existence which with a certain amount of extension could be made adequate to American need.

In large measure this necessity of using the southern ports and the channels of communication running inland from them also determined the sector of the battle front on which the American Army must operate. Probably the front on which the chief American operations took place would in any case have been selected as the most advantageous. Isolated divisions, or parts of divisions, took part in operations on almost all sectors of the front. There were at one time no fewer than 10 American divisions behind the British front alone, though only four (and some of these only in comparatively small proportion) actually fought with the British Army. From the Argonne downwards, however, was from the first marked out as the main theatre for American action, and the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, although the course of events somewhat modified the plan, was fixed upon as the first operation which they would undertake.

The United States declared war on April 2, 1917. The first troops to leave America for France were a detachment of 280 men who sailed on May 8, and reached Liverpool on the 17th. General Pershing himself left the United States on May 20, and reached Liverpool on June 8. The first American troops actually to land in France were part of the 1st Division of the Regular Army, numbering 5,625 men, which arrived at St. Nazaire on June 26. By the end of 1917, 194,000 American troops, including units of all sorts, had arrived in France. By the end of the first quarter of 1918 the number had increased to 375,000. Up to that time the movement had been fairly deliberate. The month of March 1918, however, saw the great German offensive, and by the end of that month the situation of the Allies was more critical than it had been since the beginning of 1915.

It would be useless to deny that at this time there was great impatience among the Allies over what seemed like American slowness in taking an effective part in the struggle. It was now practically a year since the United States had entered the war. Somehow, whether with official sanction or not, the belief in 1917 had been that 30 American divisions would

be ready to fight on the Western front in the spring, with a probability of twice that number by the time the summer was advanced. There had been too much loose and inexpert talk of America's enormous preparations for securing mastery of the air. No one had doubted that the great German offensive would begin as



AMERICAN INFANTRYMAN.
Heavy marching order.

soon as the weather and conditions of the ground made it possible, in the beginning of 1918. Now the crisis was come, and the Allies were fighting veritably, as Sir Douglas Haig said, with their backs to the wall. Now was the time when American help in the form of fighting men was urgently needed, and where were those 30 Divisions?

That there were many Americans in France was well known, but the reasons for the delay,

in the huge scope of the preparation which the United States was making, were never fully explained to the Allied peoples. For lack of men the British Army had been compelled to reduce the strength of all its divisions by the deduction of a brigade. The French for all their gallantry, and though they had larger reserves than the British, owing to their comparative immunity from severe fighting in the latter half of 1917, were sorely enough tried. It was known exactly how many new men Great Britain could hope to put in the field, enough to make up all losses in that terrible spring fighting, but very little beyond that. If any material reserve of manhood was to come it could come only from the United States. There was talk at the time of using the Americans now in France, but not yet formed into fighting units as divisions, to fill up the depleted British ranks by drafting an American battalion into each British brigade, so enabling the division to resume its old strength. Happily, dangerous though the situation was, the Allied line somehow never quite broke. The Germans in Flanders, on the Lys, at Amiens or farther south, were never able to hit beyond their reach. As the spring wore to summer the crisis, though still acute, grew gradually less terrifying, and meanwhile the United States had awakened to the urgency of the moment, and men were at last pouring across the Atlantic in never-ending streams.

By June 30, 1918, there were over 1,000,000 Americans in France, and the following four months saw another 1,000,000 arrive. The actual figures were on June 30, 1,018,000, and on November 11, when the Armistice was signed, 2,063,000. These figures, however, include the total arrivals without any deduction for casualties or other shrinkage. The actual number of living American troops in France never quite reached the two millions.

In the month of July, 1918, 307,000 men left the shores of the United States for Europe and 313,000 arrived in France. The largest number of troops landed in any single day was on September 21, 1918, when 50,000 men were disembarked. The transport across the Atlantic was performed by a great number of vessels of all sizes drawn from every possible quarter, and it is unnecessary to say that the Germans made every effort with their submarines to hamper and obstruct the operations. No one has been more ready than Americans

of prominence to acknowledge the preponderating share which the British Navy took in protecting the troopships on their passage. Admiral Sims was very emphatic on the subject. Speaking in London on October 11, 1918, he said:—

An idea was sometimes in American minds that the American Navy had been doing the bulk of the business over here: at least a half. That is not correct. There were about 5,000 anti-submarine craft operating day and night, and the American craft numbered 160, or 3 per cent. The figures were about the same in the Mediterranean. Americans seemed to regard it as a miracle of their navy that they had got the million and a half troops here and had protected them on the way. We did not do that, Great Britain did. She brought over two-thirds of them and escorted a half. We escort only one-third of the merchant vessels that come here.

Continuing, Admiral Sims explained specifically why it was above all things the British Grand Fleet which made the ocean roads across the Atlantic safe.


The reason is because up in the North Sea somewhere, lying at anchor, is the great British Grand Fleet. The British Grand Fleet is so powerful that the German High Seas Fleet has to stay at home. If a catastrophe should happen to the British Grand Fleet there is no power on earth that could save us, for then the German High Seas Fleet could come out and sweep the seas. The British Grand Fleet is the foundation-stone of the cause of the whole of the Allies.

The American Admiral thus gave credit, as it deserved, to the British Grand Fleet; and there was nothing finer in the war than the whole-hearted cooperation between the British and American Naval Forces. Long before the war, whatever the political relations might be at any moment between the two nations, or however much the cordiality between the two peoples might fall short of perfection, there had always been a traditional comradeship and friendship between the officers and the men of the British and American Navies wherever they met in all parts of the world. In the present war the two Fleets coalesced, without the smallest sign of friction, to operate as one. "For more than a year," Admiral Sims had said on July 4, 1918, "all of the American Naval Forces in European waters had been actually 'brigaded' with the British Fleet, and with the other Naval Forces of the Allies. The majority of the American destroyers had been operating under the military direction of a British Vice-Admiral since May, 1917. Others were operating under the British in the Mediterranean . . . and their Dreadnoughts had similarly been serving under the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. These have adopted all British signals and British methods of tactics, and have made

themselves as nearly as possible an actual unit of the Grand Fleet." Admiral Sims concluded by saying that the friendship and cordiality between the British and American Navies could not possibly be greater.

In considering, therefore, the war effort of the United States as a whole, credit must be given for the fact that by voluntarily submerging their fleet for the common good in the

British Fleet the Americans resigned all chance, as it were, of making an individual national reputation at sea. It was what the Allied Armies on land did at a later date when they subordinated themselves for the common good to the supreme command of Marshal Foch. But if the American Admiral was generously outspoken in giving overwhelming credit to the British Fleet, posterity should be no less



OBSERVATION BALLOON ABOUT TO BE LAUNCHED FROM AN AMERICAN WARSHIP.

generous in recognizing the self-denial with which the American Fleet under that Admiral's command placed itself immediately and without reserve in a subordinate position. As a matter of fact the cooperation of the American Fleet on the Atlantic was of enormous value, and it gave just that additional strength to the Allied Navies which was necessary to turn the balance at sea against the submarine campaign, and to secure the safety of the highways of the ocean. The futility of the German efforts to obstruct the transport of troops and supplies from America to Europe was one of the most striking incidents of the war. Most of the movement was accomplished by adopting the system of convoys, but many ships made the crossing alone and without protection. Of the various vessels employed for the transport of troops four of the great passenger liners were conspicuous for the share which they took in the gigantic operation :

The *Leviathan* (formerly *Vaterland*) made 10 trips, and carried 94,000 men, the largest number carried at any voyage being 10,864.


The *Olympic* made 10 trips, and carried 54,000 men, the largest number on one trip being 6,255.

The *Aquitania* made eight trips, and carried 47,000 men, the largest number on one voyage being 6,172.

The *Mauretania* made seven trips, and carried over 33,000 men, the largest number at one voyage being 5,161.

These four ships among them, therefore, brought over altogether about 230,000 men.

The most formidable element in the problem, however, was not the mere transport of men—great as that was—it was the bringing over of supplies ; the creation of port facilities sufficient to handle them ; and the organization of lines of communication, with the establishment of depôts and so forth, for the transport of material to the front. Here again the Americans were able to take the necessary time, although it had to be as short as possible, for the stupendous task ; and from the first, with that largeness of vision which is characteristic of the people, they laid down the plans of an organization for handling, equipping and feeding an army which might grow to include 4,000,000 men. The first essential was enormously to increase the facilities at the ports. At the port of Bordeaux in the spring of 1917 only two ships could be berthed for unloading at a time. A



AMERICANS ON BOARD THE LEVIATHAN, FORMERLY THE VATERLAND.



AMERICAN ARMY DOCKS AND WAREHOUSES AT BASSENS, BORDEAUX.

year later there was accommodation for 15, and it was almost continuously strained to its utmost capacity. Whereas in November, 1917, it had only been possible to handle some 26,000 tons of freight a day, in November, 1918, over 236,000 tons were being handled here daily. The illustration on this page gives a bird's-eye view of the works created by the Americans in the course of about five months at Bassens, which is about six miles from Bordeaux itself, on the east bank of the Garonne. In ordinary circumstances the creation of such a plant would be the work of years. The first pile, however, was driven on November 12, 1917, and, as has been said, five months later the first ships were being unloaded. Practically all the material used was brought from the United States, including 6,000,000 feet of timber, 25,000 cubic yards of concrete, and the material for the 50 miles of railway track, the whole series of wharves having three parallel lines of railway along their entire length. Besides the actual wharfage, all the cranes and light railway material (as well as that for standard gauge lines) with engines were brought from America, and motor parks, rest camps, huge refrigerating plants,

and great railway yards were constructed and artesian wells sunk. By the end of 1918 a force of 6,000 negro stevedores was employed in unloading here. At St. Suplice, nine miles from Bassens and 15 from Bordeaux, great storage yards were built, three miles in length and three-quarters of a mile wide. The work began here on March 5, 1918, and by November 107 great warehouses had been completed, with 2,500,000 square feet of floor space. Besides the wharves at Bordeaux and the great yards at St. Suplice, large docks for handling ammunition alone were built at St. Loubes, eight miles from Bordeaux, and the improvements at St. Nazaire were scarcely less extensive. Owing to the distance from the United States and the difficulties of transport, as a consequence of the submarine menace—it took on the average about 30 days for goods to come from port to port—it was necessary to carry in France very much larger stocks of all supplies than was the case with the British Army. At first it was proposed to have 90 days' supplies of all material in the depôts in France, but it was later decided that 45 days would be sufficient, and this figure was adhered to in practice.

Each of the ports had great base depôts, or storage yards, similar to those at St. Suplice, in the immediate neighbourhood, and situated at strategic positions on the lines of railway running towards the front were a further series first of intermediate depôts, or regulating stations, and then of advance depôts for immediate provision for the troops in front.

The existing French railway lines, after a considerable amount of siding and additional yard facilities had been built, were fairly adequate for the rail transport. Over the main line of railway which ran by Nantes, Tour and Dijon, 25,000 tons a day could be handled. An additional 15,000 tons a day could be sent by way of Orleans, Chaumont, and Neufchateau, while in emergency, a third route by way of Blois and Troyes could take another 10,000 tons. Later, when the British ceased to make full use of Marseilles as a port, a considerable quantity of American material also came by that route. In fact every possible channel was used to its utmost and improved in every possible way.

At La Rochelle great railway wagon shops and erecting plant were built, and a vast light railway plant was established at Ebenville, near Gondrecourt. At Is-sur-Tille immense mechanical bakeries were built which could turn out 2,000,000 rations of bread a day, and the American Army never had anything but the whitest of white bread made from patent flour. At Nantes a large printing and map publishing plant was established at a cost of some 2,000,000 dollars. Some 1,500 American railway locomotives were imported from the United States, and nearly 20,000 goods wagons of large capacity. In addition, either at the railway shops at La Rochelle or in various French shops to which American labour was furnished, some 60,000 French wagons and 2,000 locomotives were repaired and kept in running order. The coal, both for the railway use and other purposes of the Army, was all British, and as far as possible in order to save tonnage, of which there was never enough, materials of all sorts were bought in Europe. Up to the end of 1918 the Quartermasters Department had spent \$382,000,000 for supplies of various sorts purchased chiefly in France and England, but also in Switzerland, Spain and Italy. All markets within reach were ransacked for all sorts of material, and it was an operation which had to be done without interfering with the ordinary market

channels or disturbing the purchases of the Allied Governments. Throughout there was very cordial cooperation with the French Government and Army, and in many cases arrangements were made by which existing French stocks could be drawn upon to be supplied later by import from the United States. Thus the French put at the army's disposal quantities of rice flour which were to be repaid as shipments of rice came in; so metal goods of various kinds were turned over and replaced by bulk metal imported later from America. Coal was loaned in large quantities and repaid as the American imports came in from Great Britain, whence, in all, the American Army drew 1,016,622 tons in the course of a year. At one time the French lent the American Army 2,000 wagons to help out with their horse transport. Arrangements were also made by which raw material for foodstuffs, such as flour, chocolate, sugar, and so forth, were furnished to French manufacturers, who turned out finished products for American canteens or "commissaries." The fuel problem was always a serious one, and in the summer of 1918, some 15,000 woodsmen from the United States were at work in French forests cutting and turning out fuel; but when it was cut the handling and hauling of it was a matter of great difficulty. The cold storage plants, either built, as that mentioned at Bassens, or taken over from the French and enlarged, had, by the summer of 1918, a capacity of 26,000,000 lb. The supply of petrol, again, was a huge problem, and at the date of the Armistice there were storage tanks in existence with a capacity of 11,000,000 gallons, and for its transport 600 railway tank cars and 500 motor tank cars for use on the road were imported from the United States. The whole of the vast organization with the base, intermediate and advance depôts, including all the Quartermasters' Departments, was under command of what was known in the American Army as the "S.O.S.," meaning Service of Supply.

The main object kept in view in placing the depôts at their various points was flexibility, so that supplies of all kinds, rations, equipment or ammunition, or whatever they might be, could be sent up from the bases to the intermediate depôts, and thence pushed forward through the advanced stations so as to supply any particular section of the wide front where troops might be concentrated at the moment. The whole scheme worked excellently in the

severe test of the operations of 1918, when the centre of operations sometimes changed with great rapidity, and troops in great numbers were moved at very short notice from one part of the front to another.

The chief of the intermediate dépôts was situated at Gièvres, where there were built over 100 miles of railway sidings, which at one time had to care for nearly 800,000 men, who were chiefly supplied through the advance dépôt at

the question of transport, the difficulty not only with ships but with the transport inland from the ports. It has been said that the railway lines at the disposal of the Americans were fairly adequate. There was, however, great difficulty in getting locomotive engines and wagons sufficient in spite of all that could be done by importing from America and by building and repairing on the spot. Even more difficult was the problem of horse transport.



U.S.S. MELVILLE (FLAGSHIP) AND FLOTILLA OF DESTROYERS AND MOTOR-BOATS AT QUEENSTOWN.

St. Dizier. Later again from Gièvres an almost equal number of men of the Third Army were supplied through the advance station at Liffol-le-Grand. In the month of June, when troops were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Paris, and in preparation for the St. Mihiel operation, large French dépôts at Le Bourget and Noisy were taken over and used as advance stations supplied from Gièvres. The largest of the purely advance dépôts was at Is-sur-Tille, with about 1,000,000 square feet of storage floor, covered and uncovered, which again had to supply something like 700,000 men in the Toul groups.

Cumbering all endeavour and obstructing all results in this mighty effort was always

Horses were scarce enough in Europe before the United States' demands arose. It was now necessary to ransack every possible market. Nearly 70,000 horses or mules were brought across the ocean from America; 21,000 were bought in Great Britain; nearly 19,000 came from Spain; but France itself had to be the main reservoir. The French Government had at first undertaken to supply 7,000 animals per month, but difficulties arose over the supply and over the question of veterinary inspection. Altogether, the American Army managed to secure about 243,000 horses and mules, of which 135,000 were found in France. This, however, was so far short of meeting the needs that in the summer of 1918

the Army considered itself 125,000 horses short, and it was begging the Government in America to send over at least 40,000 a month. Transport difficulties made this impossible, and though the Army reduced its demands to 30,000 a month, it was never practicable to send over more than half that number. At the time of the Armistice, when, after the shrinkage in service, the Army had about 193,000 horses in hand, the deficiency was estimated at over 160,000.

Forage was if anything a more difficult problem. It was scarce everywhere in France, where its purchase was almost impossible, and though the French did what they could to help by giving loans of forage to be replaced as stocks arrived from America, hay, oats and bran to the value of over \$64,000,000 had to be imported from America, throwing an additional burden on the already heavily strained ocean transport.

In mechanical road transport the Motor Transport Corps had under its command 119,928 motor vehicles and a force of 26,000 men. In the year 1918 it used 48,000,000 gallons of petrol, the difficulties in the supply of which have already been referred to. In addition to petrol, the Corps used over 4,000,000 gallons of lubricating oil and 2,400,000 lb.

of grease, practically all of which had to be imported from the United States.

If in the matter of numbers of men, again, the American Army was unprepared for war on a great scale it was even less prepared in its organization. In General Pershing's report of operations of November 20, 1918, he said: "A General Staff, broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto existed in our Army." As a matter of fact there had nominally been a General Staff since soon after the Spanish War, but, as Major Frederick Palmer (*America and France*, page 82) says: "It had remained a nucleus only, which was consulted but little considered." As a matter of fact, the evil reputation of the German General Staff among the peace-loving people of the United States created sufficient prejudice against the mere name to have made it difficult for a General Staff to have operated effectively, and in the report already quoted General Pershing finds it necessary to explain what the functions of a General Staff are, and why they are essential to a modern army in war.

The American General Staff, then, was organized after the Army, or part of it, was already in France with Major-General J. G. Harbord as Chief of Staff, to be succeeded later by Major-General James W. McAndrew. General Pershing



FRENCH WOMEN REPAIRING AMERICAN UNIFORMS.



A "LIBERTY" AEROPLANE.

himself says that the organization was based partly on the French and partly on the British model "by selecting from each the features best adapted to our basic organization and fortified by our own early experience in the war." He thus describes the organization :

The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its Chief, who is an Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. "G.1" (General Staff 1) is in charge of the organization and equipment of troops, replacements, tonnage, priority of overseas shipment, the auxiliary welfare associations, and cognate subjects; "G.2" has censorship, enemy intelligence, gathering and disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar subjects; "G.3" is charged with all strategic studies and plans, movement of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; "G.4" co-ordinates important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for combat and the operations of the service of supply and of hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; "G.5" supervises the various schools and has general direction and co-ordination of education and training.

In various other matters the American Army was quite unequipped for such a war as it was now called upon to take part in. It had no adequate artillery, and while efforts were at once begun on a large scale to produce a field gun which would be the superior of the French '75 it was necessary meanwhile to employ French guns; and the offer of the French was accepted to furnish not only '75's but also the 155 mm. howitzers and long guns, sufficient to equip 20 divisions. Difficulties of manufacture and, subsequently, difficulties of transport so far delayed the output of American-made weapons that, as a matter of

fact, at the time of the Armistice only 109 field guns had been received in France from the United States. To all intents and purposes the American Army used French guns entirely, and one of our illustrations shows a long French gun in action being operated by American artillerymen.

Nor had the Americans any military Air Service on a scale commensurate to the requirements of such a war. From the day of their entry into the war they made plans for the manufacture of aeroplanes with the much-talked-of Liberty engine and the training of aviators in numbers far beyond anything which any of the other belligerents had been able to attempt. Individual Americans had shown themselves extremely competent pilots and splendid fighting men, in both the French and British Air Services; and the Lafayette Squadron, manned entirely by Americans, did most admirable service with the French. Again, however, difficulties of manufacture delayed the arrival of American-made machines in France, and it was not until May, 1918, that the first Liberty aeroplane, of which an illustration is given, arrived in France. The first American squadron "completely equipped by American production" made its first crossing of the German lines on August 7 of the same year, and at the time of the Armistice some 1,300 aeroplanes from the United States had arrived in France, giving promise of the

enormous power in the air which the United States would undoubtedly have exercised if the war had continued for another year.

In the final Allied advance 45 American air squadrons took part with 740 aeroplanes. Twelve of these 45 were entirely equipped with American machines and the Liberty engine, and the rest of the squadrons flew French, or in some cases, British machines, though the *personnel*, consisting of 740 pilots and over 450 observers and gunners, was entirely American. At Issoudun the Americans had the



A FRENCH WHIPPET TANK WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY.

largest aerodrome and flying school in the world, with 11 separate aviation fields covering about 50 square miles of area. In addition, there were large air-training schools at Tours and Clermont-Ferrand. In *personnel* the American Air Force was always well ahead of the demands of the Service, which were limited by the supply of machines, so that very large numbers of men who had been trained in England were never called to France. The American Air Service, at the time of the Armistice, consisted of 7,726 officers and 70,769 other ranks. Of these, 765 officers and 20,000 men were still in England, and some were in Italy.

In the course of the war the Americans shot down 755 enemy aeroplanes and destroyed 71 balloons, losing themselves 357 aeroplanes and 34 balloons. In another way, however, the magnitude of which it is not easy to estimate, America contributed to the united Allied effort in the air. Apart from the Lafayette Squadron a great number of individual American pilots and observers were scattered through both the British and French Air Services. Moreover, an immense number of American mechanics were

employed as fitters and riggers in Allied aerodromes. Up to 1917 it had been even more difficult for the Allies to find the necessary number of skilled mechanics for this work than it was to find pilots and observers, or even machines. The Americans were a nation of mechanics, and the numbers of highly competent men who took their places in British aerodromes were of the greatest value.

Naturally, again, the Americans had no Tanks of their own manufacture. Two of the illustrations in this chapter show respectively a French light Tank and a British heavy Tank, the latter accompanied by American infantry working with it. Neither Great Britain nor France, however, was able to furnish the United States with any large number of these machines. Only a small part of the American infantry had the opportunity to be trained to fight in company with tanks; and though, as in the Meuse-Argonne battle, tanks sometimes rendered most valuable service, and American crews showed that they could fight them with as much gallantry as either the British or French, the American operations in the war were practically conducted without any material assistance from them.

As far back as 1915 there had been an energetic "preparedness campaign" in the United States, in which ex-President Roosevelt, and other far-sighted members of what may be called the War Party in America, had endeavoured to rouse the people to a sense of their national defencelessness and unreadiness for war. One practical outcome of this agitation had been the organization of what was known as the National Security League, and later of the National Defence Council. Mr. Joseph H. Choate, formerly Ambassador in London, was President of the National Security League, and General Leonard Wood, as well as Mr. Roosevelt, was among its active supporters. By the influence of the League a camp was established at Plattsburg in the State of New York, for voluntary military training to which any civilian who wished could go and get elementary training and drill. Here competent instructors were at work through 1915 and 1916; and the service which the Plattsburg Camp rendered was undoubtedly very great.

After the declaration of war in 1917 a number of Officers Training Camps were opened at various places throughout the country from New York to as far west as the Presidio, in San Francisco. Into these camps young men,

chiefly college graduates, were taken and given what was practically a tabloid West Point course; that is to say, that what would have been a two-years' course of West Point was crowded into three months of extremely intensive training. Two such courses were given in the summer of 1917, in the first under instructors drawn from the Regular Army, while in the second promising men from the earlier course were used as instructors under general direction of Regular Army officers. After the summer of 1917 the camps continued to work, kneading the drafts of the new army; and they were invaluable.

With all that could be done, however, the troops as they arrived in France were but half-trained; even the first detachment of 5,000 men of the Regular Army which landed at St. Nazaire was obviously only indifferently trained and drilled. The great bulk of the training had to be done after the men arrived in France, and for this purpose every possible assistance was given both by the French and British Armies, while an extensive system of Training Schools was established in the American zone, grouped round a great school centre



MAJOR-GENERAL J. G. HARBORD.
General Pershing's Chief-of-Staff in 1917.

at Langres. Two of the illustrations with this chapter show incidents at the training grounds.

After the men had been drilled and trained, so far as it could be done in Training Camps individually, as platoons, companies or battalions, they were then put into the line with more veteran troops of the Allies. A battalion, for instance, would be put into the



GENERAL PERSHING.

Commanded the American forces in France.

line in a fairly quiet sector with French battalions on either side of it, with a French liaison officer at its headquarters and a French officer with each company. They were practically under French command, no patrols being sent out or other action taken except under French advice, and in the same way each American battery was at first paired with a French battery, and a French officer regulated its fire and designated its targets. In this way battalions got their experience in the front line until such time as they could take over first a brigade and finally a divisional front. Much the same plan had been followed with the early Dominion troops; and there is no doubt that, in consenting to it for their own men, the United States Administration and military authorities rendered one of their greatest services to the Allies.

The same was done with the troops which were trained with the British Army, where the IIInd American Corps under Maj.-Gen. G. W. Read, was located with Headquarters at Fruges. In some cases individual American divisions were linked with an individual British division which was out in rest, the British division acting as a schoolmaster to



MAJOR-GENERAL C. B. EDWARDS.
Commanded the 26th Division.

their Allies. For example, the 77th, or Metropolitan, Division of New York was for some time under the tutelage of the British 39th Division in the area west of St. Omer. When the troops began to go into the trenches they were in some cases put in a platoon at a time mixed with a British platoon, the men alternating, British and American, in the trenches. Then the Americans went in as platoon units, then as companies, and then as battalions to hold a battalion front.

Afterwards one might hear discussions at American Headquarters—discussions which were quite free from any rancour—as to whether the French or the British training had been the more useful. The general conclusion was that while French-trained officers were likely to have more of the traditional air of soldiers, with more gesture and more demonstrativeness in doing their work, the British grounding, more silent, was just as thorough. The community of language was, of course,

of great assistance, and an American officer has recorded that what he learnt from his companionship with the British was more by absorption than instruction. He did not know how much he had learned until he came to apply the fruits of his teaching in actual warfare. In certain particulars it was generally accepted the British training was the better, notably in the care of horses and in the sympathetic looking after the comfort of the men. There is something in the ideal relationship between a perfect platoon commander and the individual men under his command, which is not a matter of didactics, but can only be acquired by example and contact. This relationship, as found in the best battalions of the British Army, is perhaps more in accord with the genius of the Americans, and more easily understood and absorbed by them, than is the similar, yet very diverse, relationship which exists between the French officer and his men, and is part of the French temperament and political constitution.

In the training, one point which proved of



MAJOR-GENERAL W. A. MANN.
Commanded the 42nd Division.

great importance was the almost passionate insistence of General Pershing himself on the pre-eminent importance of rifle fire. It is matter of history that at the outbreak of the War the British Regular Army was enormously superior to the Germans in musketry and to that superiority was largely due the supreme excellence of the first British Divisions

in France. Later in the war there was a considerable school in the British Army which began to talk as if the rifle was becoming an obsolete weapon. Three years of trench fighting had made the hand grenade and the trench mortar more important than rifle fire. The effects of this began to be visible even in good British regiments. If troops were held up by enemy machine-gun or rifle fire, cases were reported where men, taking cover themselves, would wait and call for the snipers to

went into the trenches on October 23, and the first American soldiers to lose their lives in the war were killed in a raid which the Germans made on the night of November 3, 1917. The burial of these first American dead, a corporal and two privates, at Bathlemont, was conducted with great ceremony, and, at the request of the French, it was arranged that, while other American dead to fall later in the war might either be collected in cemeteries in France or transported to America, as the



A BRITISH TANK WITH THE AMERICANS ON THE CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN FRONT.

come along instead of trying to use their own rifles. British troops in trenches were known to let Germans come over the open towards them almost untouched by rifle fire, every man waiting until they got near enough for the use of hand grenades. The result in 1917 was a sudden revival of instruction in musketry in the training of British troops, and it had General Pershing's enthusiastic support. In American history the most conspicuous excellence of American troops, often quite undisciplined volunteers, was their expertness with the rifle. General Pershing was determined that this quality should not be lost, and it was owing to their confidence in their rifles and the steadiness with which they held their positions and used them that the American troops were able to accomplish some of their most brilliant achievements in the war.

The earliest American division to go into the line as a whole was the 1st, consisting of the 16th, 18th, 26th and 28th Regiments of the Regular Army. The sector which they took over was near Einville, in Lorraine, which at that time was very quiet. They

ease might be, these three should remain always at Bathlemont as a perpetual memorial to the French people of America's participation in the great war of liberty. "We ask," said General Bordeaux, "that the mortal remains of these young men be left here: be left to us forever. We will inscribe on their tombs, 'Here lie the first soldiers of the United States to fall on the soil of France for justice and liberty'; and the passer-by will uncover his head. . . . Corporal Gresham, Private Enright, Private Hay, in the name of France, I thank you!"

The next American Division to go into the line as a whole after the 1st was the 26th, being a New England National Guard Division, then under command of Major-General Clarence B. Edwards, consisting of the 101st, 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Regiments. The division was put in in the Chemin des Dames sector which, it is needless to say, was never very quiet. They beat off a determined German raid successfully, and then in reply made an entirely successful raid themselves.

The third division to have front line ex-

perience was the 42nd, or Rainbow, Division, composed of National Guard troops from all parts of the United States, comprising the 165th, 166th, 167th and 168th Regiments. The division, which was under command of Major-General W. A. Mann, went into the trenches in the Lunéville sector, where it might, had it wished, have had a fairly peaceful time. But it did not so wish; and by frequent raiding, continual sniping and harassing machine-gun fire it made the enemy life very tiresome and



MAJOR-GENERAL OMAR BUNDY.
Commanded the 2nd Division.

effectively obtained the mastery of No Man's Land.

The fourth division to go into the line was the 2nd, also a Regular Army Division, composed of the 9th and 23rd Regiments, and the 5th and 6th Marines, under command of Major-General Omar Bundy. They were put in east of Verdun, where the enemy was always active, and the German guns were persistent in harassing both forward positions and lines of communication.

These four divisions were always thereafter grouped together in the minds of Americans in France as being the first four units which had battle experience, and each of them had shown fine fighting qualities as well as steadfastness under attack and ability to withstand the prolonged shelling which is so tiring to the nerves of inexperienced troops.

Then came the great German offensive of March 21. It had, of course, been the universal

American hope to have a great American Army on the Western front, holding its own wide sector of the trenches and able to advance, when advance came, as an all-American force under American command. So far the nucleus of that army was represented by these four divisions constituting the 1st Corps, which was placed under the command of Major-General Hunter Liggett. The extremely critical situation created by the German attack put an end to the hopes, at least for the present, of the great unified American Army. Everything now had to be subordinated to checking the enemy's advance. Troops of all kinds had to be used where they were urgently needed without regard to national inclinations. General Pershing did not hesitate. General Foch had now been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, and on March 28 a conference was held between him and the Commanders of each of the Allied Armies. On meeting General Foch, General Pershing said to him:

I have come to tell you that America would feel itself greatly honoured if its troops were engaged in the present battle. I ask that it may be so in its behalf as well as in my own. There can be no other question now than that of fighting. Infantry, artillery, air service—everything that we have is yours. Dispose of us as you



U.S. MACHINE-GUN POST IN CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.

wish. Further men will come, as many as may be necessary. I have come on purpose to tell you that the American people will be proud to take part in the greatest and finest battle in history.

General Pershing's words were reported next day in the Press of all countries, and in their simplicity and directness made a profound impression. The United States was proud of them; England was deeply moved, and in Paris they were received with the greatest enthusiasm.



LIEUT.-GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT.

Commanded the American 1st Army Corps in France.

From this time on, then, until the immediate emergency was passed, the American divisions were treated merely as units of the great Allied Command, and, for the moment, their national individuality was sunk in defence of the common cause. It was not, however, long before an American division was entrusted with the making of an attack, if not on a very large scale, on its own account without outside command. Early in May plans had been made for a joint French and American attack on the nose of the German salient at Montdidier. This plan, however, was abandoned, and in place of it the American 1st Division was instructed to attack single-handed and re-take the village of Cantigny. It was not an operation of great magnitude, but it was the first independent American offensive action. The attack was delivered early in the morning of May 28, after heavy bombardment, and was immediately successful. The village was captured, together with 350 prisoners (some of whom are shown in an accompanying illustration) at the cost of a total casualty list of less than 100 men.

Stern work was now close at hand. The day before the capture of Cantigny, that is on May 27, the Germans had opened their

Marne offensive, involving the threat on Paris: and the American 2nd Division was called upon to throw itself across the Paris road. The division at the time was training in the area by Chaumont-en-Vixen, whence it was to have moved to relieve the 1st Division, after the latter had done its work at Cantigny. Orders came from Marshal Foch on May 30 to move at daybreak next morning, and at 5.30 on the 31st the division entrained for Meaux. On arrival there further orders were received to move at once to positions between Gandelu and Montigny, where the Germans were expected to attack that night. They arrived there at 11 o'clock at night, but at 12 o'clock new orders came to move to Montreuil, south-east of Gandelu, where the first troops of the division arrived at daybreak. The Germans were now reported to be pushing along the Château-Thierry road to Paris. Partly on foot and partly in lorries the men were hurried to form a barrier across the road. By 9 a.m. a force of 13,000 infantry was on the spot, the 4th, or Marine, Brigade being on the north side of the road, and the 3rd Brigade south of it. By the afternoon of that day all divisional infantry was in its position with two days' rations and a million and a half rounds of



PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS AT CANTIGNY.

ammunition immediately behind them. Machine guns came up that evening. With the 2nd Division elements of the 3rd also cooperated, especially the Motor Machine-Gun Battalion, which was pushed up very speedily along the road; while the 28th Infantry Regiment, with a Battalion of Marines, was hastily thrust in to fill a gap in the French lines near Gandelu. They were in position there by daylight of June 2, but on arrival of the French reserves, were relieved and brought back to the main American positions on the night of June 4-5.

On the morning of June 5 the Americans were in contact with the enemy, who made successive determined attacks against the 4th Brigade, which, however, were beaten off without much trouble. On that night the remnants of a scattered screen of French troops, which had been falling back fighting before the enemy's advance, withdrew through the United States lines, and the Americans were now in complete command of the sector. On June 6 the Americans counter-attacked in the direction of Bouresches. It has been worth while to give the details of this movement with some fullness because it was a testing operation

carried out with marked success. To quote the report of Maj.-Gen. Bundy:

When it is remembered that a command of approximately 28,000 men and 7,000 horses started at 12 hours' notice for an unknown destination, debouched to take up two successive positions during the night, then marched till daylight, and went into position across the Château-Thierry road, and in less than six days repelled three attacks against them, and then counter-attacked with great success, driving the enemy before them, and that no man was without rations and ammunitions supplied to him, it must be admitted that the United States Regular has conformed to his best traditions.

General Bundy was probably also right in his opinion that "it was only the timely arrival of this United States division which prevented the German Army from a successful advance towards Meaux along the Paris road."

Some really stiff fighting was to follow. The American counter-attack was directed primarily against the village of Bouresches, and a forbidding wooded area, known as Belleau Wood. The village was taken without great difficulty, but the wood, into which the enemy pushed up strong reserves with a number of machine-guns, saw a bitter struggle. The enemy had got his guns up quickly, and the Americans suffered from heavy shelling. Parts of the 3rd Division cooperated with, and for a time relieved, units of the 2nd, but it was the Marine Brigade which

boro the burden of the fighting in the wood, and finally captured it on June 23, and in recognition of their gallantry the French officially changed the name of the wood to that of The Marine Brigade Wood. Over 700 prisoners were captured in the wood and the casualties on both sides were heavy, but that the balance was against the Germans is certain from the fact that the Americans killed were less than the number of prisoners taken.

Carrying on its good work the 2nd Division on July 1 captured the village of Vaux. It was now the turn of the 3rd Brigade, which, in the operations of the last fortnight, while the Marne Brigade was attacking, had been holding its position under continuous shell fire and beating off minor enemy attacks. The capture of Vaux was a very cleanly executed affair, carried out with little loss, while some hundreds of prisoners were taken from the dugouts and cellars of the place. The whole performance of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions was excellent, and served a most useful purpose, not only by stemming the triumphant advance of the Germans towards Paris, but also because it proved the quality of the

American troops in difficult fighting, giving them confidence in themselves, and also creating confidence in the Allies.

Immediately after this, American troops, though on a small scale, cooperated with the British in attack. The action took place on July 4, and the fact that British and American soldiers had fought shoulder to shoulder on Independence Day sent a thrill through the people of both countries. The British troops with whom the Americans fought were Australians, the Americans belonging to the 33rd Division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Bell. It had originally been planned, or so the American troops had been given to understand, that something like a battalion of them were to be used. At the last, however, it was decided to employ only two companies, which were put in with the Australians in units of platoons. There was keen disappointment among the Americans, who had expected to take part, when they learned that they were to be left out, and many of them found satisfaction for their disappointment by borrowing Australian uniform, or at least Australian hats, and going into action without authority, a proceeding



WRECKED BRIDGE AT CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.

which it is said the Australian Commanders, who must have been surprised at the strength of their companies, benevolently winked at. Australians and Americans that day gained great respect each for the fighting qualities of the other, and it was the beginning of a brotherhood which continued unabated between the two until the end of the war.

Nothing could well have been more different than the behaviour of the Australians and the Americans in action. The Australians were veterans who did their work cunningly and with a peculiar lounging carelessness which was characteristic of them: the Americans, on the other hand, were novices, immensely eager, who fought with a gripping earnestness and an intense desire to get to close quarters with the enemy. The Australians had not the reputation of being gentle fighters, but they themselves after the affair said they had never seen anything like the determined ferocity of the "Yanks." Before going into action the Americans had been told in a speech by General Bell that they were alongside of about the best fighting men in Europe, and it was their business to see that on the Fourth of July the

national reputation was upheld. It was upheld. There were no two opinions as to the gallantry shown by the American troops. The impression created by this, the first occasion when they had fought in the British sector, fully confirmed that which the other divisions had already made on the French front.

Later, American troops were to cooperate with British battalions on a larger scale, notably on September 29, 1918, when the 27th New York Division and the 30th, composed of men from the Carolinas and Tennessee, had their place in the famous and critical attack on the Hindenburg line in its formidable tunnel sector on the St. Quentin canal. Both divisions behaved with the greatest gallantry. The 30th Division, on the right, went through all obstacles and reached its final objective. The 27th Division, on the left, also attacked with the utmost impetuosity. On the extreme left detachments seemed to have reached almost to the village of Bony: on the right other detachments were in touch on the advanced objective with the 30th Division. How far the centre succeeded in advancing is uncertain. Apparently the advanced assaulting wave



FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND MAJOR-GENERAL BELL, U.S. ARMY.



THE KING DECORATING PRIVATE HARRY SHELLY, AUGUST 12, 1918, WITH THE D.C.M.

Private Shelly was the first American to receive a British decoration at the hands of a British monarch.

pushed on across the tunnel and over the trenches without giving sufficient attention to cleaning up the enemy hiding places in their rear. It was the same gallant mistake as other fine fighting troops had made, in their excessive eagerness to go on, before they became familiar with German tactics. The result was that scattered units of American troops found themselves taken in the rear by the enemy whom they had passed by, and fighting of a very savage and extraordinarily mixed character went on for some time. The Australians coming up in support, found the German defences still apparently fully held, while the confused intermingling of friend and enemy and the uncertainty as to the exact situation beyond, made use of artillery impossible. The 27th Division suffered severely, but it suffered only by reason of its excessive gallantry and eagerness to get on.

In the first week of October, again, two American Divisions, the 2nd and 36th, also fought with the French in the attack in the Reims area, when both divisions were highly complimented by the French Commander for

their gallantry. The 2nd Division captured the heights of Mont Blanc and the town of St. Etienne. They were severely counter-attacked more than once, and beat off all attempts to break their line. The 36th, which relieved the 2nd Division, had its first experience in battle. It withstood with great steadfastness very heavy shelling in its positions, and then took up the advance, and drove the enemy before it.

To conclude the mention of operations in which Americans took part outside their proper front, even though we are anticipating events, yet two other Divisions, viz., the 37th and 91st, shared in the triumphant final advance of the Belgian Army in Flanders in the last days of October and early November. They were hurried north and thrown into the line almost at the last moment when they joined in the great sweep to and across the Scheldt, taking part in the capture of Audenarde. As on all other occasions when American troops fought in conjunction with any of the Allies, they won golden opinions from the Belgians for their dash and intense keenness in attack, and they

were warmly complimented by the Corps Commander.

The final German offensive was begun on July 15. In anticipation of its failure, Marshal Foch, in collaboration with the British and American Commanders, had already decided on the plans for the Allied counter-offensive which was to take the form of a series of operations calculated to extend through the autumn. It has already been said that the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was an operation reserved for the Americans. That now, however, had become only one item in a programme which involved a succession of attacks from right to left of the line, each local in itself but all combining into a complete offensive along almost the entire front. Before the objectionable salient at St. Mihiel could be attended to, a more urgent matter was to attack the larger and newly created Marne salient which finally reached to Château-Thierry.

It was calculated that after the Germans had made their impending and last attack, the moment would have come when they would be exhausted, and counter-attack on the ground they had recently over-run would have the best chances of success. Moreover, the railway lines which the German advance had broken were most desirable for inter-Allied communication, and it was necessary to free them. What was, perhaps, even more important was that if the enemy's last push should succeed in carrying him any material distance, Paris would be under fire of the German heavy guns. Whatever the effect of that might be on the French *morale*, it was on all grounds extremely desirable to avoid it. Then the successive Allied offensives were to pass northwards, recovering in turn the ground recently lost in the Amiens area, and then the large section over-run by the enemy in his advance on the Lys and north of Armentières.

There is no evidence that at this time there was any real expectation of ending the war that year. Marshal Foch and others may have had pious, but distant, aspirations. What was really aimed at was to take back the ground which the Germans had won in the course of the year, so nullifying the effects of the spring and summer campaign; and thereafter, if that was successfully accomplished, to continue the attack against the original German front, and drive the enemy back as far as feasible, so as to deliver as much as might be possible

of France and Belgium from the enemy yoke. It is sufficient justification of Marshal Foch's clearness of vision and his military ability that he saw clearly that the next German attack must be the enemy's last effort: that it would then be safe for the Allies, however reduced they might be, to pass to the offensive with certainty of being able to maintain it. It was thereafter only a question of how long, as the American Army waxed in strength, the final humiliation of Germany would take.

The complete failure of the German attack of July 15 was in no small measure due to the behaviour of the three American Divisions which cooperated with the French, viz., the 3rd, 42nd, both of which, as we have seen, were already tried and almost veteran divisions, and the 28th, which as yet had had no experience in battle. Only four companies of the 28th Division were engaged. They had to withstand attack by overwhelming enemy forces, but fought most valiantly. It was, however, to troops of another division that the great glory of the action went. In his official dispatch of November 20, 1918, General Pershing, referring to this operation, said:

A single regiment of the 3rd Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front while, on either flank, the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points, and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

This regiment was the 38th Infantry Regiment of the United States Regular Army. The regiment was holding the banks of the Marne at its juncture with the Surnelin just east of Mézy. It was of pre-eminent importance to the Germans to force a crossing here and get command of the Surnelin Valley, running southwards; by which the enemy could have reached the region of Montmirail and the main road to Paris. An attempt to cross was made in boats covered by thick smoke screens after prolonged bombardment, and behind heavy barrage. The artillery of the 3rd American Division had not previously been in actual action, and it arrived only at the last moment: none the less, it did effective work in breaking up German formations as they approached the river bank. The whole incident, however, has been well described by Colonel Frederick Palmer (*America in France*, p. 257):

Our artillery . . . had concentrated on the valleys and ravines which the Germans would probably use to approach the river from the north bank. This of

course, was the obvious thing to do. The point is that the results were singularly successful. Units marching in close order and units assembled awaiting the word to march were caught in a furious storm which cut holes in the boats they were carrying and caused many casualties. A prisoner who told of this interference with the schedule said that it was a tragic surprise, for the German troops had been assured that they would cross the Marne with little opposition. Other shells burst into boats already afloat, and left their passengers who were not killed to swim ashore. . . .

Our men realised the meaning of the smoke screen, and also of the intensified bombardment of their positions which accompanied it with a view to keeping them to

crossing both higher up and lower down the river, and desperate hand-to-hand fighting went on along the river and railroad embankment which ran parallel to it. Again and again the Germans charged the railway embankment, but they never crossed it. On the left the Germans had got into the village of Mézy, and on that side endeavoured to force back the left flank of the American Regiment, but it refused to move. On their right the Germans



EXPLOSION OF AN ILLUMINATING BOMB IN NO-MAN'S LAND.

the cover of their rifle pits. They were too keen on getting a chance at a target not to expose themselves in the midst of the bursting shells. The place to stop the Germans was on the river. They were tacticians enough to appreciate this, and the preoccupation of the marksman possessed them. The smoke screen was thin enough in places to reveal masses of the crossing party on the surface of the Marne. In the bend of the river at the mouth of the Surlélin not a German was able to land; packed together 20 men to a boat, the results at close range can be imagined. Boats capsized as dead and wounded men dropped over the gunwales and survivors jumped overboard into water which was ripped by rifle and machine-gun fire.

It is estimated that in all 20 boats were sunk or sent drifting harmlessly down the stream, and all this because men who had been taught to shoot as General Pershing had insisted had such confidence in their rifles that they exposed themselves contrary to German expectations.

Meanwhile, other boat loads had forced a

were also round the 38th on the flank, so that, as General Pershing says, the Americans were firing in three directions; but they absolutely refused to give ground. Had they broken, the German object would have been attained, and the valley of the Surlélin would have been at their disposal.

As happened on many occasions in German attacks on the British front, the Americans fought every man they had, down to cooks, headquarters' clerks and orderlies. In the narrow area between the railway embankment and river alone over 400 prisoners were taken, and the ground was strewn with German dead. Colonel Palmer records the fact, however, that there was no single German found killed on the

south side of the embankment. When General Pershing spoke of the performance of the 38th Regiment as being "one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals," he was awarding temperate and none too extravagant praise.



LIEUT.-GENERAL ROBERT L. BULLARD.
Commanded the IIIrd Army Corps.

Meanwhile, the 42nd Division, on the left of the German attack, near Perthes, had also held its ground magnificently. One battalion is said to have beaten off six separate attacks in succession. At one point only the Germans, under cover of a wood, succeeded in pushing their machine-guns through the American front line: they did not reach the second line, and, after the attack elsewhere had been beaten off, the men of the 42nd turned to and cleaned out the wood. If less conspicuous and dramatic than the achievement of the 3rd Division, the performance of the 42nd was altogether admirable. All three American divisions engaged earned the thanks and praise of the French Commander, and they had the satisfaction of knowing that they had contributed materially to the breaking of the last German offensive.

With the failure of that offensive came the turning point of the fortunes of the war on the Western front. It is known to have been largely on General Pershing's initiative that

the immediate counter-attack was undertaken against the Marne salient which came with such swiftness on July 18. Nearly a month before, at a conference on June 22, General Pershing is said to have urged upon Marshal Foch the adoption of the plan for the immediate riposte to the German assault which was so admirably successful. General Pershing had faith in his army, and not only in the veteran divisions, but also in the other divisions which had not yet had the chance to prove themselves. It was the seasoned 1st and 2nd Divisions which, with the French Morocco Division between them, were to be the spearhead of the first operation in the great offensive. The 1st Division, now under command of Major-General C. T. Summerall, had moved up into a position on the night of July 16, and was ready; with the 2nd Division, now commanded by Major-General Harbord, it was otherwise. General



MAJOR-GENERAL J. T. DICKMAN.
Commanded the IVth Army Corps.

Fox Connor, in a speech on October 22, 1918, said that the division "was embussed on 30 minutes notice, carried a long distance, debussed, and then double-timed into line." The attack was to start at 4.35 in the morning. At 4 o'clock the battalions which were to lead in the attack had not arrived. They were groping their way in the mazes of the Bois de Retz, through which, for purposes of secrecy, they were being hurried up. The roads were blocked with transport; night in the wood was

intensely dark, and a drizzling rain was falling. It was not until the barrage was actually starting that the leading units came up breathlessly on the run, and they had to gather breath after they had gone over the top, when their pace slackened to the orthodox speed of a "charge" in modern battle, which averages, perhaps, 100 yards in six minutes.

It has been said that the troops were brought up secretly; for it was intended that the essence of the attack should be its surprise. There was no preliminary bombardment, and the bursting of the barrage was the first intimation that the enemy had that the attack was coming. The Germans were taken completely unaware. Both the 1st and 2nd Divisions went forward with a rush. The 2nd Division by that evening had taken all its objectives except the village of Vierzy, which was on its ultimate line; it had forced an entrance into the village, but heavy machine-gun opposition still continued. It was not until half-past six that evening in a second attack, in which French troops cooperated and tanks assisted, that the village was cleared. The 1st Division, as well as the French Colonials, had extremely savage fighting at a deep cleft in the ground known as the Missy ravine. During that night the Germans brought up strong reinforcements, but the Allies attacked again with new ardour on the morning of the 19th. Heavy fighting continued for the next three days, and by the 22nd of the month the two American divisions had made a clear advance of about seven miles and had taken between them over 7,000 prisoners and 100 guns. Their casualties had been heavy. Among the officers of the two divisions about 60 per cent. were killed or wounded, and a somewhat smaller proportion of the men. The losses, however, were nothing in comparison to the moral effect of the victory.

Meanwhile, the well-tried 26th New England Division which, until July 20, had been acting as a pivot on which the attack swung, had come into action north-west of Château-Thierry, and the 3rd Division, whose heroic defence of the Marne will be remembered, now pushed across that stream east of Château-Thierry, and joined in the advance. In later stages of the battle other divisions came in. The 42nd Rainbow Division relieved the 26th on July 24, and by the 27th had fought its way on to the river Oureq. Similarly the 3rd Division on the 29th was relieved by the 32nd, a National

Guard Division from Michigan and Wisconsin, commanded by Major-General W. G. Haan.

The 32nd was nominally a re-placement division, and had furnished large drafts to the 1st and other units. In pursuance of General Pershing's doctrine of faith in his new troops, however, the 32nd was now promoted to become a "temporary combat" division. Before the battle was over the word "temporary" had been dropped. It had very hard fighting over broken ground and through a series of woods, and bore itself extremely well. Alternating with the 28th Division, part of which it will be remembered had shared in the glorious defence of the Marne, it continued in the battle until on the night of August 3 it had reached the heights on the south of the river Vesle. Three days of very hard fighting followed before the 32nd was across that river, and had occupied Fismes. In these last stages of the fighting it had for its neighbour the 4th Regular Army Division, which also was in action for the first time, and did extremely well.

In addition to these the 77th Division (which, with the 28th and 32nd comprised the IIrd Corps, under command of Major-General R. L. Bullard) also took part in the later stages of the advance. The 77th was the first National Army Division to see fighting, and, coming as it did from New York City, it contained the most heterogeneous collection of elements of any division in the American Army. Reference has already been made to it as having been associated with the British 39th Division in training in the Flanders area. Apparently the training was good. Under command of Major-General Duncan the 77th—composed of every nationality which is to be found in the population of New York, including a great number of Jews, German and otherwise, Italians, Irish-Americans, Greeks, Poles, Scandinavians, and almost every known people on earth—behaved like veterans.

Though the advance in the latter stages slackened, more or less continuous fighting went on throughout the month of August and until September 9, when the French took over entire command of the front; but long before this the offensives in their order of sequence had begun farther north. The great British attack in the Amiens area had started on August 8, and, though as yet few people realized it, the last act in the great drama was being played. History will probably recall that it was Marshal Foch's brilliant counter-

stroke on the Marne salient, taken on General Pershing's initiative, and in which American divisions bore so conspicuous a part, that marked the definite turn in the tide and assured the final defeat of Germany.

So far, except in the minor operation of Cantigny, the American troops, whether in the British or French areas, had fought only as units in an Allied attack, and under either French or British Army and Corps Commanders. The time had come when the dream of an all-American Army could be realized, and the first theatre of its action was to be the long-deferred attack on St. Mihiel. The First American Army therefore was organized on August 10 at La-Ferté-sous-Jouarre, with General Pershing himself in command. It was still, however, not, nor was it ever to be, possible to use all the American strength unitedly on one objective.

As already explained, the St. Mihiel operation, if successful, was to be quickly followed by the Allied drive of Americans and French together against the original German front line, the appointed American scene of attack being between the Meuse and the Argonne.

So far, American divisions, or parts of divisions, had been scattered along the whole Allied front almost from Switzerland to the sea. It is said that at one time there was no stretch of 20 kilometres on the entire front where some American units were not either in the line or in immediate support behind. Nearly all these scattered elements were now assembled: five of the 10 divisions with the British Army had been called south, much to the disappointment of the British themselves, who had hoped for American cooperation on a large scale in their impending advance. The necessities of the situation, however, overruled all other considerations. Practically all the American divisions were now, therefore, called into the one area, but all were not put into the First Army, some having to be reserved for the Meuse-Argonne attack.

The plan for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was to make two thrusts on the south and northern sides, leaving the nose of the salient itself to be pinched out. The chief attack was to be delivered on the southern side, where the 1st Corps on the right, with Major-General Hunter Liggett in command, had the 82nd, 90th, 5th and 2nd Divisions, and, on their left, the IVth Corps, under Major-General J. T. Dickman, had the 89th, 42nd and 1st

Divisions. In addition, the 78th Division was in reserve in the 1st Corps, and the 3rd Division in reserve of the IVth, while four more divisions, the 35th, 91st, 80th and 33rd, were also available as an Army reserve. On the north, or western base of the salient, Major-General G. H. Cameron, of the Vth Corps, had the 26th and 4th American Divisions, with the 15th French Colonial Division between them. The remainder of the salient from near Mouilly in the north, round by St. Mihiel itself to the neighbourhood of Xivray, was held by French Colonial troops, who were expected to make demonstrations



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. DUNCAN.
Commanded the 77th Division.

as for an attack, but without actually advancing. The success of the operations would rest chiefly on the rapidity with which the IVth Corps and the left hand divisions of the 1st Corps could make ground in the direction of Thiaucourt and Vigneulles. The Vth Corps on the north had a series of very difficult ridges to capture at the outset of its attack, before it could hope to join hands with the troops of the IVth, attacking from the south.

The whole operation which was set for September 12, went with unexpected success and ease. The Germans did not fight. Even German gunners who were well in the rear, it is said, made no effort either to fire or to get away. In all directions the story was the same of unexpectedly rapid advance and of the enemy's surrendering in numbers with little resistance. Not only was the St. Mihiel salient,



MACHINE GUNNERS OF THE 3rd DIVISION GOING FORWARD TO MONTSEC,
IN THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT.

They are crossing a supply train of the 42nd Division.

which had been for so long such a sore spot in the Allied line, wiped out in a day but the Americans took 13,751 prisoners with 443 guns and a great quantity of other material at a cost of only 7,000 casualties, which were mostly light wounds from rifle and machine-gun fire.

The operation resembled the British battle of Messines in the rapidity and completeness of its success. It must be remembered that the salient had resisted determined French attacks upon it earlier in the war. The present plan of attack, against the two sides of the base, was a departure from the tactics of the French, who had driven straight at the whole front of the salient. Doubtless the German Army was not now what it had been; but this does not detract from the brilliance of the American victory. The whole plan worked with admirable precision. The accompanying map shows, better than could any description, both the general plan of the battle and the perfection of the junction made by the converging forces from either side. There was a race between men of the 26th Division, approaching from the north, and men of the 1st Division, coming from the south, to reach Vignécules, the former winning by a narrow margin at daybreak of September 13. The first independent operation of an American Army on a grand scale was a conspicuous and magnificent success.

No attempt was made to follow up the attack on the St. Mihiel salient by trying to drive farther into enemy territory, though this could undoubtedly have been done. It was not on the programme of the Allied Command. Practically

all the salients of the German line had now been wiped out, and the enemy had lost all the fruits of the spring and summer campaign. What was more, every man in the German Army knew it. They knew that their effort had exhausted itself and that the tide was turning against them. The next step on the part of the Allies was obvious. The time had come to throw all their weight in a general attack on the German front, taking advantage of the weakening *moral* of the enemy troops, and to break through their long-established lines of defence.

The sector of the front where the Americans were to attack was that west of the river Meuse to, and including, the forest of the Argonne. Much of this ground had already been desperately fought over in the battles which had raged around Verdun, and in many places the ground was as shell-torn and as difficult to attack over as in Flanders itself. The Argonne forest itself was extremely formidable, and the whole region was broken and wooded and commanded from the German side from the heights of Montfaucon and other hills. On no part of the front, moreover, was the German defence more strongly organized, if only for the reason that penetration of the line here to any depth would break the main lateral line of railway communication by Mézières and Sedan, which was vital to the fighting capacity of the German Army and also would immediately endanger control of the great Briey basin with its ore fields, on which Germany largely depended for its supplies of iron and steel. That the Germans understood the critical importance

of this sector of the line and apprehended an attack somewhere in this area is shown by a secret order of General von der Marwitz, commanding the Fifth German Army, which bears date September 15, 1918. It runs:

According to information in our hands the enemy intends to attack the Fifth Army east of the Meuse in order to reach Longuyon. The object of this attack is the cutting of the railroad lines from Longuyon to Sedan, which is the main line of communication of the Western Army. Furthermore, the enemy hopes to compel us to discontinue the exploitation of the iron mines of Briey. . . . The Fifth Army once again may have to bear the brunt of the fighting of the coming week on which the security of the Fatherland may depend. The fate of a large portion of the Western Front, perhaps of our nation, depends on the firm holding of the Verdun front. The Fatherland believes that every commander and every soldier realizes the greatness of his task and that everyone will fulfil his duty to the utmost. If this is done, the enemy's attack will be shattered.

The attack, we have seen, was not to be delivered east of the Meuse, but just west of it. The St. Mihiel operation had been to the eastward, but on the very day after that attack American troops were already slipping west, and on September 15, when General Marwitz issued his order, the concentration in the Argonne area was already well advanced. The successful movement of the troops from

St. Mihiel to the new scene of operation was in itself no small achievement. In all, the Americans were employing some 300,000 men in the initial stage of the new operation, and in just fourteen days after the attack on the St. Mihiel salient the new and greater offensive was launched, that is on September 26.

It is impossible here to follow in detail the course of what is known as the Meuse-Argonne battle through the three successive phases, which lasted, in almost continuous fighting, with only occasional intervals of semi-activity, until the date of the armistice, six weeks later. The full story of the battle is the subject of another chapter. It is possible here only briefly to summarize the main points in what was undoubtedly the crowning achievement of the American Armies in France. Though the number of American troops engaged in the opening attack was about 300,000, before the 47 days of battle were over some 630,000 Americans had been engaged, as well as 138,000 French troops. Twenty-two American Divisions were employed, several of them more than once, with four French Divisions, and 46 German Divisions in whole or part. By their



[U.S. official photograph.]

STONE DUG-OUT BUILT BY GERMANS IN 1914 IN THE SIDE OF MONTSEC.

numbers the American Divisions were as follows :

REGULAR ARMY.

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th.

NATIONAL GUARD.

26th (New England), 28th (Pennsylvania), 29th (Maryland and Virginia), 32nd (Wisconsin and Michigan), 33rd (Illinois), 35th (Kansas and Missouri), 37th (Ohio), and 42nd (Rainbow Division).

NATIONAL ARMY.

77th (New York City), 78th (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), 79th (Virginia and Maryland), 80th (Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Virginia), 81st (Tennessee and North and South Carolina), 82nd (Georgia and Alabama), 89th (Kansas and Missouri), 90th (Texas and Oklahoma), 91st (Pacific Coast).

The French Divisions engaged were the 10th and 15th Colonial Divisions and the 18th and 26th Divisions of Infantry.

The 46 German Divisions are estimated to have represented about 397,000 men ; but these figures, which are taken from the official American sources, are in one way misleading. The American figures include the total divisional strength of each unit, including divisional artillery, engineer, medical units, and other items as set forth earlier in this chapter, so that several of the divisions show the full strength of over 27,000 men, while, with drafts, the 5th Division employed in the course of the battle no less than 30,539 men. The German figures seem to be based only on the rifle strength of the infantry (being an average of 7,500 to the division, including all drafts and reinforcements received during the battle), with 15 per cent. added to include all other divisional units, including artillery, and so forth, as well as the heavy artillery. This addition is probably inadequate, and it is likely that the combative strength of the two sides was more nearly equal than these figures would indicate.

The wisdom of the American policy of using divisions of such a size was much discussed during the war. The practice was not adopted by any of the other belligerents in the west, and would not have been even if there had been unlimited man-power. The drawbacks to the large units were the difficulty of movement and the great congestion which occurred on roads. In their two largest operations the Americans were much hampered by the confusion on the lines of communication, which at one time in the Meuse-Argonne battle

threatened to have serious results. When the troops had advanced across No Man's Land over broken and shell-torn country exposed to enemy shelling, the difficulty of getting rations and supplies up to so many men in a narrow area was very great. Also under shell fire and sometimes under machine-gun fire the losses where men were packed so closely were often much heavier than they would have been in a corresponding British or French unit. Against these drawbacks the American formation, with its four full companies of 250 men each to a battalion and, including machine gunners, over 16,000 to a division, had the advantage of weight in a massed attack. In many cases, moreover, the division still had strength to carry on after heavy casualties and to continue pushing when a division which had started with a rifle strength of only 6,000 or 7,000 would have found itself too weak for further attack. If there were times when the disadvantages were most obvious, there were also times when results were achieved which would have been impossible with a smaller weight of men.

The attacking troops were supported by a very heavy concentration of guns, both French and American, and in the various air squadrons attached to the Army 508 aeroplanes were available for service. In addition there were 142 American tanks, composing the 344th and 345th Battalions, and 73 French tanks. As a whole it was undoubtedly the greatest concentration of fighting power which the American Army had ever put into the field. The American order of battle from right to left was first the IIIrd Corps (Major-General Bullard) from the Meuse to Malincourt, with the 33rd, 80th and 4th Divisions in the line, and the 3rd Division in reserve ; then the Vth Corps (Major-General Cameron) from Malincourt to Vauquois, with the 79th, 37th and 91st Divisions in the line, and 32nd Division in reserve ; then the Ist Corps (Major-General Hunter-Liggett) from Vauquois to Vienne le Château, with the 35th, 28th and 77th Divisions in the line, and the 92nd in reserve. In addition, the 1st, 29th and 82nd Divisions were in Army reserve. The actual strength of the nine divisions in the front line which attacked on the morning of September 26 was 193,329.

The attack was immediately successful, and the German first-line defences were overrun on the whole front. On the following two days the advance was continued in the face of heavy

machine-gun fire and against the resistance of new troops thrown in in the hope of stopping the American advance. By the evening of September 28 the advance had reached at some places a distance of seven miles, and the commanding position of Montfaucon, as well as a number of other villages and countless defended woods, fortified farms, and so forth, had been taken, together with about 10,000 prisoners. From September 28 to October 4 little advance was made, the time being occupied in getting up the artillery, relieving some troops and preparing for the new advance.

On October 4 the attack was resumed, the Germans now holding what was known as the Kriemhilde line, the fourth line of the enemy defence, which ran along the heights by Beffin, Landres, and Bantheville. There was no artillery preparation for the second attack, but it was made under heavy barrage. German resistance was very stiff, especially in the centre, where the 32nd Division in particular had extremely heavy fighting. Another division which also met with very hard work was the 80th, which had a formidable obstacle to overcome in a wood known as the Bois des Ogons, in the final reduction of which, late on the evening of October 5, tanks were useful. On October 6 and 7 a boldly-planned operation by troops of the 1st Corps, including part of the 28th Division with a Brigade of the 82nd Division, gave the Americans possession of Chatel-Chéhéry, with the heights known as Hills 223 and 244, and the village of Cornay. The crossing of the river by the infantry, partly by wading and partly over a hastily built footbridge, all under heavy fire, was a brilliant operation. The whole of this manoeuvre was finely assisted by the 1st Division, which pushed due northward and protected the flank of the attack. Throughout these days the Germans fought stubbornly, continually thrusting in new divisions, and in the centre of the attack especially progress was slow. It was not until October 14 that the Kriemhilde line was finally penetrated by troops of the 5th Division, which had been pushed up through the tired 3rd Division to make a new attack that morning. The attacking troops suffered severely, both from artillery and machine-gun fire, and it was only by determined and hard continuous driving that the formidable German line was finally pierced. On the same day the 32nd Division took the village of Romagne and, on their left, the 42nd captured Hill 288.

The advance continued to be pushed on the morning of October 15 and met with the same obstinate resistance. Before the end of the day the 5th Division was reduced to a strength of 175 officers and 3,333 other ranks. On the 15th the Division had attempted the capture of the Bois des Rappes, but the machine-gun defence was impregnable. Part of a battalion, however, got into the wood, and remained there unsus-



ON HILL 240 IN ARGONNE.

ported until the following evening, when its presence there was discovered by a patrol. It endeavoured to fight its way out, and a remnant got back to the American lines. Thereafter the Bois des Rappes formed an insurmountable obstacle to advance for the next six days. Successive attacks were made on it by parts of the 5th and 3rd Divisions, but it was not until the evening of October 21 that the gallant remainder of the 5th was able to send back word that the wood was finally taken and held.

Meanwhile the 77th and 78th Divisions had crossed the Aire on the left and were working slowly forward around Grandpré. In the centre the 42nd had hard work at Chatillon Hill, which was held by the 3rd German Guard Division. The hill was finally stormed brilliantly by the 42nd on October 16. On the same day the 78th, which had relieved the 77th, captured Grandpré. By October 20 the Americans held a line which was everywhere north of the Aire to the ridges south of Landres and thence running in a fairly straight line to the Meuse above Brioules.

Through the last 10 days of the month of October there was again a lull before the new advance, but desultory fighting went on all along the line; the enemy attempted various counter-attacks and at one time forced an entry into Grandpré, but was again thrown out. The American line remained firm, while once more

preparations for the next advance were in progress. The third phase of the battle opened on November 1. Not only was the German resistance now weakened in a purely military sense, but everywhere the *moral* of the German Army was shaken, as the British and French were discovering no less than the Americans. The Germans were talking of large retirement, and they were also talking of an armistice. Their fighting spirit was broken.

The new attack was delivered at 5.30 in the morning, the divisions in the front line from right to left being the 5th, 89th, 2nd, 80th, 77th and 78th. The advance now was much quicker, and significant of the demoralization of the enemy was the fact that it was even more rapid on the second day than on the first. On the first day the advance in the centre reached a distance between five and six kilometres and the prisoners taken numbered 3,603. On the second day the right of the line advanced 11 kilometres, and the important railway point of Buzancy was occupied by the 80th Division. Probably the hardest fighting experienced in this stage of the battle was that of the 89th Division in the neighbourhood of Banthevillie Wood and at the small town of Barricourt, which was finally captured on November 3.

The 89th then continued its advance, refusing to be relieved, forced a crossing of the river and captured the town of Beaufort on November 4 and 5.

An extraordinary feat was performed by the 9th and 23rd Regiments of the 2nd Division, which, after the enemy's positions had been penetrated, marched in the darkness of night in column of route along the Beaumont road, straight through the enemy lines for a distance of some eight kilometres. There was nothing to prevent the column from being cut off; but the enemy was taken completely unawares. Machine-gunners were found asleep at their guns and German officers were caught sitting round tables with lights burning. The column passed between German batteries in action, but met with no resistance, and in the morning the appearance of the Americans in their rear threw all this section of line into confusion, so that it broke into disorderly flight.

On the night of November 3-4 two companies of the 5th Division got across the Meuse at Briulles, and other troops of the 60th Infantry Regiment also made a crossing a little lower down. By the night of the 5th the line of the river here was in American hands. On the 6th, the 1st and 42nd Divisions came into line in



NEGRO TROOPS AT BAYONET PRACTICE IN A TRAINING CAMP.



ENGINEERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION AT WIRGES,
Eleven miles north-east of Cobleoz, during the Armistice.

relief of the 80th and 78th, and that afternoon the order was given for the 1st Division to march at once on Sedan. It pushed on, and marching two nights and part of the third, covered a distance of 53 kilometres, fighting most of the days. The 42nd Division took Bulson, and on November 6 the 5th Division took Murvaux. On the morning of the 9th it was evident that the enemy was in general retreat. The whole line went forward. The forest of Wocuvre was cleaned up. The 90th Division, on the left of the 5th, crossed the river and occupied Stenay, while on the right of the 5th the 32nd Division moved up on November 10 and took over the sector hitherto held by the French Colonials, and all was ready for a new attack on the morning of the 11th, if anything had interfered with the signing of the armistice.

In the course of the fighting the Americans had taken prisoner 316 officers and 15,743 other ranks, together with 468 guns, nearly 3,000 machine-guns, and 177 trench mortars. The American casualties were 115,529, of whom 15,599 were reported as killed, and 8,805 as missing. The German casualties were estimated at 100,000, in addition to the prisoners taken; adding something less than 10,000 for the French casualties, the total losses to the two armies, including prisoners, were approximately 240,000, out of, possibly, 1,300,000 engaged. These figures are sufficient to show the character of the fighting. In mere magni-

tude the Mouse-Argonne battle was one of the great engagements of the war. As being one of the chief factors in the final breaking of the German Army, it must be regarded as an operation of the very first importance. The Americans were right in looking on it as the crowning achievement of their effort in France, and it was an achievement of which the nation had every right to be proud, and which justified all the great preparations and expenditure.

This chapter gives a rough survey of the chief aspects of the American effort on the Western front; but it should be added that other American units were also fighting elsewhere. The 339th Regiment of the 85th Minnesota Division sailed from England on August 25, 1918, for the Murman Coast, where it shared all the hardships and dangers of the gallant little Allied force there through the following winter. It was accompanied by a battalion of the 310th Regiment of Engineers. The 83rd Ohio Division also had units far scattered. A battalion of the 332nd Regiment was in the line in November near Treviso, in Italy, while a battalion was at Cattaro, in Dalmatia, and another battalion at Fiume; at all of which places the moral effect of the presence of American troops was even greater than their military value.

The total casualties of the American Armies on the Western front up to November 10, 1918, were 246,657, of whom 53,169 were killed in action, 179,625 wounded, 11,660 missing, and 2,163 taken prisoner. To the number of

killed in action, however, as given above, must be added all those who died of disease (nearly 24,000) or other causes (nearly 4,000). The total sacrifice of American life to the great cause by the end of March, 1919, had been nearly 85,000, of whom 3,353 were officers and 81,258 other ranks.

After the signing of the armistice and the cessation of active hostilities on November 11, the Americans advanced and occupied the bridgehead on the Rhine at Coblenz. One of the illustrations with this chapter shows the American column on the march through Germany.

On October 10 General Pershing had organized the American Second Army, which was placed under command of Lieutenant-General Robert L. Bullard. At the same time General Pershing resigned command of the First Army in favour of Lieutenant-General Hunter-Liggett. When the armistice was signed the Third Army was organized to act as an Army of Occupation and the command was given to Major-General (now promoted Lieutenant-General) Dickman, formerly commanding the 1st Corps, while General Pershing, with American General Headquarters, remained at Chaumont. Advanced General Headquarters were established at Trèves, General Dickman, with the Headquarters of the Third Army, being at Coblenz.

The Third Army was made up of the IIIrd, IVth and VIIth Corps, and the component divisions were selected (subject to the desire of some divisions to return home at once) from those which had seen most active service, so that it was an honour to be included in the Army of Occupation. The divisions which originally comprised the Army were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th of the Regular Army, the 32nd and 42nd of the National Guard, and the 89th and 90th of the National Army. Later, the 6th and 7th Divisions of the Regular Army relieved the National Guard Divisions. Thus constituted, the American Army of Occupation was numerically considerably stronger than the army of any of the other Allies upon the Rhine; and in the spring of 1919 visitors to the respective zones could not fail to be impressed with the much greater evidences of organization and consolidation in the American area than were visible in the areas of either the British or the French. The American Army was still full of youth and vigour, just coming to its strength, and the great and elaborate organization behind it, as it carried on to the work of occupation, was singularly impressive, demonstrating what an overwhelming factor the United States must have been had the war been prolonged to another fighting season.



CHAPTER CCXC.

END OF NEAR EAST CAMPAIGNS.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE COLLAPSE OF TURKEY—LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE RUSSIAN CAUCASIAN ARMY—EFFECT OF BOLSHIEVIST REVOLUTION—RIVALRY OF GEORGIANS, ARMENIANS AND TARTARS—TURKS PAN-TURANIAN AMBITIONS—GERMANY'S "NEW ROUTE TO INDIA"—TURKS AT ERZERUM, KARS, BATUM AND TABRIZ—GERMANS AT TIFLIS—NURI'S ADVANCE ON BAKU—BRITISH INTERVENTION—EVENTS IN MESOPOTAMIA—REPLACING RUSSIANS ON THE ROAD TO THE CASPIAN—DUNSTERVILLE'S DEFENCE OF BAKU—HELPING THE NESTORIANS—BAKU RE-OCCUPIED—SIR PERCY SYKES'S GREAT MARCH—GERMAN INTRIGUES AT KABUL—BRITISH AT MERV—PERSIA'S DEBT TO GREAT BRITAIN—TURKS SUE FOR TERMS—ENVER AND TAALAT RESIGN—ARMISTICE SIGNED—THROUGH THE DARDANELLES TO CONSTANTINOPLE—RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET SURRENDERED—PLIGHT OF THE ARMENIANS.


DURING 1918 the Turks, compelled on the Palestine and Mesopotamian fronts to stand on the defensive, conducted an offensive in Trans-Caucasia, which resulted in their becoming virtual masters of the greater part of that region. They also reinvaded north-west Persia, captured Tabriz, and made an advance towards Teheran. The Trans-Caucasian campaign, which fitted exactly the Turanian policy of Enver and Talaat Pashas, was rendered possible by the collapse of Russia, and was conducted largely in disregard of German ambitions. The resistance offered to the Turkish advance by the Georgians and Armenians was not effective, while the Tartars treated them as allies. The campaign was brought to a conclusion by the capture of Baku in September.

The British force in Mesopotamia had done what it could to check the progress of the Turks. Forces sent from Baghdad kept in play the enemy troops in Persia, and a detachment which crossed the Caspian from Enzeli to Baku prolonged the defence of that place for six weeks. The Turks did not hold Trans-Caucasia for long. After the defeat of the Bulgarians had exposed their flank in Europe and General Allenby had destroyed their armies in Syria, the Ottoman Government was obliged

to sue for terms, and one of the terms was the evacuation of Trans-Caucasia. The railway from Baku to Batum was thereafter occupied by the British.

Immediately on the fall of Damascus (October 1, 1918), which occurred only two days after the Bulgarians had given up the struggle, the Turks determined to make such terms as they could with the Entente. Formal negotiations were opened, Vice-Admiral Calthorpe, commander of the Allied Fleets in the Eastern Mediterranean, being empowered to treat with the Ottoman plenipotentiaries. An armistice, to last until peace was made, was signed on October 30, and came into force the next day. In accordance with its provisions the Dardanelles were opened, Constantinople was occupied by the Allies, the Turkish fleet surrendered, the army demobilized, and the supervision of the affairs of the Empire was largely taken over by British and French High Commissioners. Turkey was out of the war, and definitely shorn of her Arabic vilayets. The ultimate disposal of the rest of the Empire was left to the decision of the Peace Conference.

The access to the Black Sea gained by the Allies through the collapse of Turkey was taken advantage of in the terms imposed upon Germany. By Clause XXIX. of the



FROM BATUM TO QUETTA.



A CAMP OF THE BRITISH ARMoured CAR DIVISION IN THE CAUCASUS.

Armistice signed on November 11, 1918, it was agreed that Germany should evacuate all the Black Sea ports she held, and should hand over to the Allies all the Russian warships she had seized in that sea. The warships were taken over by the Allies before the month was ended. At the same time Odessa, Sebastopol, and other ports in the Black Sea were occupied by Allied forces.

Russia had never been able to develop the advantages gained by the conquest of Turkish Armenia, either by an advance into Anatolia or through Kurdistan into Upper Mesopotamia. But up to the time when the Bolsheviks seized power, early in November 1917, the Russian Armies had maintained substantially the conquests made earlier in the war.

In Vol. X., Chap. CLIX., the story of the campaign was brought to the close of August, 1916, when the Turkish counter-offensive on the southern border of the Armenian plateau had definitely checked the endeavour of General Yudenitch to break through the Anti-Taurus Mountains into Mesopotamia. The autumn of 1916 and the early part of the following winter passed without any great offensive on the Armenian front. It was at this period, the autumn of 1916, that Yudenitch's army was joined by a British Naval Armoured Car Division under Lieut.-Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson (Unionist M.P. for North Huntingdon). The cars had been frozen up for weeks in the

White Sea before being able to land at Archangel. Thence the Division made a triumphal progress through Russia to Caucasia and so to the Armenian vilayets. The achievements of the men in getting the cars across high mountain passes was a manifestation of their indomitable spirit, and they gave the Russians most valuable support. They won the unstinted admiration of their Russian colleagues, and it is worth noting, in view of later occurrences, that Commander Locker-Lampson publicly stated that the trait of the Russian soldier which had most impressed him was his humanity.*

In the early part of 1917, and still in the depth of winter, the Russians were again on the offensive on the southern Armenian and Perso-Turkish frontiers. On the Persian side General Baratoff had two or three columns at work. From Sakiz, south of Lake Urumia (in which district a squadron of the British Armoured Car Division had operated), one column endeavoured to break through the mountains by way of Bana, and threaten the flank of the Turks at Mosul. The column was not of great strength, but had it won through it would have been able to raid the enemy lines of communications. It did not succeed in piercing the mountain barrier, but it made a very gallant effort to cooperate with Sir

* This Armoured Car Division was subsequently sent to the Russo-Rumanian front, where it again gained great distinction.

Stanley Maude, who was then advancing on Baghdad. Some idea of the natural difficulties with which the Sakiz column had to contend is afforded by the Russian *communiqués*, of which one, dated March 18, 1917, may be quoted :

The forward movement of our troops proceeds in exceedingly difficult conditions. Passages cut through the snow, often higher than a man on horseback, are frequently filled up again by the furious snow storms and owing to the absence of villages our troops have to shelter during the night in caverns made in the snow.



GENERAL YUDENITCH.

Commanded the Russian Forces in Caucasia

But General Maude's advance brought about what General Baratoff had been unable to accomplish. The victory gained by Maude at Kut in February, 1917, caused a general retreat of the Turkish forces in Persia. They were immediately followed up by Baratoff's principal column along the main Teheran-Baghdad road. Hamadan and Kermanshah were occupied and on April 2, on the Diala river, north-east of Baghdad, a junction was effected between the British and Russians.* Here the Turks fell right back, but in the Urumia district they still clung to the passes guarding the routes to Mosul. The Russians never penetrated into the plains.

Farther north-west, in the Lake Van area, there was constant and fluctuating fighting. The Russians met both with success and reverses. They had reoccupied Mush, but lost it again in May, 1917, in which month the Turks also retook Oghnut, 60 miles south-west of Erzerum. As compensation the Russians (March 18) had recaptured the town of Van, which they continued to hold for over a year. In the summer of 1917 the Turks under-

took an offensive on the Armenian front, and in August gained some successes, which they were unable fully to develop. They were indeed compelled, a few months later, to withdraw divisions from the Caucasus to strengthen their forces in Palestine, where General Allenby opened his Beersheba-Gaza offensive on the last day of October. Substantially, therefore, as has been said, when the Bolshevik revolution came about in November, 1917, the position of the Russian Caucasian Army was much the same as it had been in the summer of 1916.

The March revolution in Petrograd had had, however, a very marked and immediate political effect in Trans-Caucasia. The most noteworthy result was to quicken the spirit of nationality and the desire for autonomy among the various races of Caucasia. For a while all alike—Russians, Georgians, Armenians and Tartars—worked together in new-found harmony and apparent equality. A Trans-Caucasian Council was formed, and it soon developed separatist tendencies. These tendencies were stoutly opposed by the Provisional Government, as much by M. Kerensky as by Prince Lvoff. But when MM. Lenin and Trotsky overthrew the Provisional Government the barriers against separatism no longer had force. The right of nationalities to self-determination was a cardinal point—then—in the Bolshevik creed. One of the first acts of M. Trotsky, as Foreign Minister, was to proclaim the intention to abandon Armenia; therein going against the desires of the Armenians, who regarded the conquered Armenian vilayets as joined to the Armenian districts of what was still nominally, at least, the Russian Viceroyalty of the Caucasus. And in all subsequent developments the Armenians looked upon their country as a single entity; though they were more willing than the Georgians or Tartars to preserve the unity of Trans-Caucasia, seeing in union the best chance of maintaining freedom from the Ottoman and of making a satisfactory arrangement with Russia.

As soon as Lenin's territorial policy became apparent the Trans-Caucasian Council took independent action. The Bolsheviks had not been more than a fortnight in power before the Tiflis Government had opened negotiations with the Turks at Trebizond. One of the objects aimed at was the preservation for Trans-Caucasia of the conquests of the Grand Duke

* See further Vol. XVII., Chapter CCLVI.

Nicholas and General Yudenitch. But the views of the Russian colonists counted for little and the three native races were not in real agreement. If both Georgians and Armenians hated the Turk, they showed little inclination to work whole-heartedly with one another, while the Tartars had distinct leanings towards the Ottomans. However, for the time the Tartars acted with their Christian neighbours, and some impulse towards solidarity led the three races in January, 1918, to establish "The Trans-Caucasian Republic."

When the terms of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was signed on March 3, became known, the capacity of the *Seim* (Diet) of the new Republic for united action was put to a severe test. By that treaty Russia not only abandoned the Armenian vilayets conquered in the war, but the districts of Kars, Batum and Ardahan, the fruit of former wars with the Turks. Georgians and Armenians were for not acknowledging the treaty, and they agreed to armed resistance, but even had their cooperation been more cordial than it was, they could hardly be expected to make a successful defence. Bolshevik Russia had deserted them. The Russian soldiers, as early as November, had begun to abandon their trenches and leave the country. Their discipline and moral had largely gone. Many of the soldiers, as they

marched wearily to the railways which should take them home, had been plundered by the country-folk. In particular the Tartars, whose ancient hatred of the Russians flamed out anew, slew many of the soldiery; 2,000 had perished at their hands in February. Some Russian troops remained, and of these a few gave their services to the Georgians and Armenians. But they were not enough to affect the issue.

If, however, Trans-Caucasia could not stand alone, there appeared to be to one of its races an alternative which should give them security. This race was the Georgian and it was taught to look to Germany for help. By their treaty with the Ukraine the Germans had obtained control of Odessa and thus had gained a base for a new line of penetration to the East, in lieu of the lost Baghdad route. And it must be remembered that even when the Germans were at the height of their successes in the West in 1918, many of their soldiers and statesmen looked for ultimate victory by a triumph in the East. Instead of "Berlin to Baghdad" they crystallized their ambitions in the phrase "Hamburg to Herat." For the realization of this project possession of Trans-Caucasia was almost a vital point, for it was necessary to get control of the railway, which, starting from the eastern shores of the Caspian, ran to the Central



VAN.

Asian Khanates, and gave access to northern Persia and Afghanistan.

Definitely by the summer of 1918 the B.B.B. (Berlin, Byzantium, Baghdad) scheme had been filed and shelved, and the B.B.B.B. (Berlin, Batum, Baku, Bokhara) scheme was laid on the table (wrote a special correspondent of *The Times* from Merv). Had it succeeded, as it might well have done but for the *débâcle* in the West, it would have carried the Hun a great deal nearer the Indian frontier than Baghdad. The Central Asian Railway from Krasnovodsk, the port on the Caspian, follows the North Persian border for 430 miles to a point near Kaakha, where the line is less than 90 miles by mule-track from Meshed. Askhabad, 346 miles from the Caspian, is connected with Meshed, 176 miles, by a carriage road. From Merv, 215 miles east of Askhabad, a branch line runs down to Kushk, on the Afghan frontier. It is unnecessary to emphasize the danger that would have lain in a German strategical railway established here—a menace not so much of armed invasion, as of political penetration, propaganda, agitation, Jihadism, diminution of prestige, and general trouble on our border.

This very pretty project would be facilitated by the friendship of one of the leading races in the Caucasus, and the Georgians might be expected to respond to German wooing. The wooing was hot, and successful. A German mission went to Tiflis as early as January, 1918, a Georgian delegation came to Berlin in May, and the matter was settled.

The Turkish Government witnessed these manoeuvres with misgiving and suppressed anger. To the Young Turks the Caucasian adventure was to compensate them for their losses in the Hedjaz, in Syria, and in Meso-

potamia. It was a racial enterprise intended to bring them prestige and glory in Central Asia as the leaders in a great Pan-Turanian movement.

The collapse of the Russian Empire had given free rein to Pan-Turanian dreams (wrote a British officer, who was at the time a prisoner of war in Turkey). The Ottoman Empire was not indeed to extend its direct sway eastwards, except over the reconquered vilayets of the Caucasus; but the near future was to see the rise of a number of Moslem States independent in form but owning the moral suzerainty of Turkey, which were to form a solid block reaching from Thrace to the Indian frontier.

The first step towards the realization of these Pan-Turanian dreams would be the conquest of Armenia and Georgia and an alliance with the Tartars of Trans-Caucasia—those Tartars whose lands were separated only by the Caspian from the Central Asian steppes, the original home of the Osmanli and still the dwelling-place of the Turkoman; who, however, showed no Pan-Turanian leanings.

Obviously German and Turkish interests in Central Asia clashed, and in the spring of 1918 Ottoman and Teuton were at cross purposes. These cross-purposes were not at first very obvious, and in the early months of 1918 the Turks were taking every advantage of the *débâcle* on the Russian Caucasian front. Lenin had issued in January a decree declaring the right of the Armenians in Russia and



GERMAN AND GEORGIAN OFFICERS AT TIFLIS.

Turkey to "complete independence," and urging "the immediate organization of a militia of the Armenian people in order to assure personal security and the property of inhabitants of Turkish Armenia." Decrees of this kind were appraised by Constantinople at their real value, and as they witnessed the withdrawal of the Russian troops the Turks knew that the Armenians had been left by Lenin very much at their mercy. There appeared indeed to be collusion between the Turks and the Bolsheviks to despoil the Armenians. The Turks made it a matter of complaint, as a violation of the Armistice terms, that the Russian troops were withdrawn from Armenia before the Peace treaty was signed, and that in consequence the peaceful Kurds and other Moslems in Armenia suffered much persecution: an ingenious variation on the familiar methods by which the Turks sought to justify intended massacres of races they hated—Armenian, Greek or Arab. The design of Enver and Talaat* can be traced clearly in a semi-official *communiqué* published in Constantinople on February 4. After a violent attack on the Bolsheviks for allowing troops from the Caucasian Armies to melt away into the interior, the *communiqué* added:

Making use of this commencement of the evacuation of the occupied territories by the Russian troops, the native Armenians and the Armenians who belonged to the Russian units have taken flight, carrying their arms with them, with the intention of remaining behind in the occupied territories. They are beginning to persecute the inhabitants of Ottoman descent, and especially the Musulman element. These facts have been definitely confirmed by Turkish prisoners of war who have been able to reach our lines, and also by those of the native population who have succeeded in escaping from the claws of the Armenians. They have also been confirmed by a deputation which has been sent to us with a request for help from the population which has not yet been able to escape from the Armenian persecutions and is still exposed to all its terrors.

Naturally the humane and sensitive Turk had to go to the help of those "under the claws of the Armenians." Accordingly Enver Pasha at once sent troops into the Armenian vilayets, with instructions to massacre as many Armenians as they could lay hands upon. Trebizond the Turks reoccupied without difficulty on February 24. The bulk of the Russian garrison, which was largely composed of Ukrainian

* Talaat had succeeded the Egyptian prince Said Halim Pasha as Grand Vizier in February, 1917. Said Halim had been found too moderate by the Committee of Union and Progress, and Enver Pasha, Minister of War, and then virtual ruler of Turkey, caused Talaat to be promoted Grand Vizier. Talaat, however adopted a somewhat independent line.

troops, had left the place weeks before, and the Georgians, in whose guardianship the port was, could offer little opposition. The re-entry of the Turks was marked by acts of customary savagery. Russian stragglers were hunted down and shot or drowned. Armenian children



TALAAAT PASHA.
Grand Vizier, 1917-18.

were tied up in sacks and thrown into the Black Sea; old men and women were crucified, and the young women and girls deported.

The capture of Trebizond—where the Turks got considerable booty in guns and army stores left behind by the Russians—gave Marshal Vehib Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman forces, a valuable base for further operations. With the Russian Black Sea fleet out of action the bulk of the Turkish supplies for Caucasia, Persia, and Mesopotamia were henceforth brought by ship to Trebizond and the long march through Anatolia avoided. By the time the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed Vehib Pasha was ready to advance on Erzerum. There the Armenians, by a gallant resistance



THE ALEXANDROPOL-KARS MILITARY ROAD NEAR THE FORMER TOWN.

held up the enemy for nearly a week. However, by March 12 the Turks were in possession of the city, and with it secured more military stores, besides some 170 guns. Vehib Pasha then marched on Sarikamish, the scene of a great victory by General Yudenitch in January, 1915. The Armenians again offered resistance and fought fairly well, and it was not until April 5 that the Turks succeeded in taking the place. They had already captured Ardahan and now advanced on Kars, a fortress chiefly famous in Britain for its splendid defence by General Sir Frederick Williams and a Turkish garrison during the Crimean War. It had passed to Russia as one result of the war of 1877-78, but had now been retroceded. There was some fighting on the road from Sarikamish, but at Kars itself the Armenians offered no opposition. The town was occupied by Vehib about April 25. There the Turks claimed to have captured 860 undamaged guns.

Another Turkish force marched parallel to the coast from Trebizond and entered Lazaristan in the beginning of April. The Chorok valley again became the scene of fighting, the Georgians holding up the Turks for some time. There was stouter fighting in the immediate outskirts of Batum, though the Turkish accounts of great battles for possession of the outer forts may be discounted. These forts were captured on April 13; at the same time a Turkish detachment, about a battalion strong,

was landed in the harbour without opposition. A Turkish *communiqué* of April 17 stated that "600 men in officer's uniform and 2,500 men in ordinary military uniform, including the commander of the fortress and many high officers" had fallen into their hands at Batum. They also noted the presence among the defenders of "hostile foreign elements"—and in fact besides Russians a good many Greeks, volunteers from South-East Russia, had joined the Caucasian Army—if army it could be called. Its equipment was obtained from the stores left behind by the Russians.

Batum was a very considerable prize for the Turks. The chief port of Caucasia on the Black Sea, it is connected by railway (*via* Tiflis) with the Caspian at Baku, the great centre of the petroleum industry. There are also pipe lines for the conveyance of the oil between the two cities. With the capture of the port the Turks had possession of all the territory to which they were entitled under the treaty of Brest-Litovsk; for in the previous week they had reoccupied Van—not without sharp fighting—and were now, in mid-April, up to the Persian frontier. Any simple souls who expected the Turks to stop at the frontiers assigned them and leave their Turanian aspirations unsatisfied were speedily undeceived. As Boghos Pasha Nubar, president of the Armenian National Delegation in Europe, had predicted, when first the Ottomans began to

occupy the Armenian vilayets, they hoped to fight their way forward to the Caspian and stretch out a hand to Turkestan, their ancestral land.

Striking east and south-east from Van the Turks early in May entered north-west Persia, and in June they occupied Tabriz, a place with some 200,000 inhabitants, the second in size among the cities of Persia. The advanced party of Turks reached Tabriz on June 7; it was not until three days later that the British consul and colony left. On occupying the city the Turks seized the British and American consulates and the American hospital, plundering the buildings. The United States, with which Turkey was not at war, entered a strong protest and eventually extorted an apology from the Porte.

The commander of the force which entered Tabriz, who superseded Vehib Pasha as Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish-Caucasian Armies, was Nuri Pasha, a half-brother of Enver Pasha. Nuri had spent several years in Cyrenaica, and was with the Senussi when they invaded western Egypt.* Later on, when some sort of agreement was reached between the Senussi and Italy, Nuri found

* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXLV. *passim*.

means—probably by submarine—of returning to Turkey. Nuri's invasion of Persia, as will be seen, had a direct bearing on the situation in Trans-Caucasia. In that theatre, after the capture of Kars, the Turks struck north-east, in the direction of Tiflis, the seat of the very uneasy and disunited republic of Trans-Caucasia. There were recriminations between Armenians and Georgians, and between both of them and the Tartars, who had secured control of the railway between Tiflis and Baku and were leaning more and more to the Ottoman side as the Turks drew nearer to their territory.

By the middle of May the Turks had occupied Alexandropol, a railway junction of importance. Here the railway from Tiflis divides, one branch going on to Kars; the other, turning south-east and passing Erivan, ends at Julfa, just north of the Persian border and 80 miles from Tabriz. The Turks before advancing to Alexandropol appear to have asked the Trans-Caucasian Government for a free passage of troops to Julfa; these troops to be used against the British in Persia. The request, if made, was refused, and after the capture of Alexandropol the Turks were compelled to fight their way to Erivan and Julfa. They suffered



ARMENIANS WHO ESCAPED BY DISGUIISING THEMSELVES AS KURDS.

several reverses at the hands of the Armenians, who right up to the end of October harassed the Turks' line of communications, thus indirectly helping the British.

The Turks also pushed north from Alexandropol towards Tiflis. They did not occupy that city, and on June 10 it was announced that in this direction the Turks had withdrawn to the Kars line.

To understand this abrupt abandonment of part of the Turkish plan it is necessary to chronicle the fate of the Trans-Caucasian Republic and the birth of three "independent republics" in its place. While Lenin had been willing to recognize an independent Armenia if it could survive Turkish attacks, he was distinctly unwilling to see the Tartars and Georgians form themselves into separate States. The Turks, on their part, immediately after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, had declared through the mouth of Enver Pasha that "the Ottoman Government would not fail to recognize the autonomous governments already established in the Caucasus." They had chiefly recognized them by fighting them, but in the intervals of fighting there were negotiations. In answer to the request of the Trans-Caucasian *Seim* to open peace conversations the Turks replied that first they must have an assurance that all ties

with Russia had been broken, and that Trans-Caucasia must agree to the retention of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan by Turkey. These points were hotly debated by the *Seim*, where a federative union with Russia seems to have found supporters among the Armenians. However, the Turkish terms were accepted and the formal declaration of Trans-Caucasian independence made on April 27. To another suggestion made by the Georgian and Tartar deputies, that the Trans-Caucasian Republic should be dissolved and each nation form its own republic, the Armenians were stoutly opposed. Their deputies declared that splitting up would be a suicidal policy for Trans-Caucasia, and finding the other parties bent on such action left the *Seim*.

The *Seim* and the Trans-Caucasian Republic were formally dissolved on May 26, 1918, and on the same day in the Viceregal Palace, Tiflis, the Georgians proclaimed Georgia "a sovereign independent State and a Democratic Republic." The Tartars, too, set up a separate government, naming their territory the Republic of Azerbaijan, and placing their capital at Baku. Azerbaijan was the name of the Persian province immediately to the south, and the choice of that name for the Tartar republic was purposeful. For their part the Armenians called their new State the Republic of Ararat, and



BAKU.



[From a German photograph.]

TARTARS CAPTURED BY THE GERMANS AND BROUGHT INTO TIFLIS.

named as capital Erivan, a town which lies north of Mount Ararat.

This splitting up of Trans-Caucasia suited the Turks in various ways; it isolated Armenia and it left them freer to make arrangements with the Tartars. But the splitting up served likewise German policy, and German policy precisely where it clashed with Turkish ambitions. Whatever support the Germans might be prepared to give the Pan-Turanian movement, they set much more store on their own "new route to India," and the establishment of an independent republic of Georgia gave them the opportunity of reaping a reward for the assiduity with which they had cultivated Georgian friendship. For their part the Georgians no doubt preferred Germans to Turks, and an intimation was made at Berlin that German troops would be welcomed in Georgia. Accordingly, at the end of May, 3,000 German troops, under Major-General von Lossow, sailed from Odessa. They did not go to Batum—the Germans would not inconvenience their Turkish friends. Georgia has another port, Poti, 40 miles north of Batum, and, like it, connected with Tiflis by rail. At Poti, therefore, von Lossow and his troops landed and took over control of the railway as far as Tiflis. The Turks were greatly chagrined, but an open quarrel with the Germans was not possible. So they gave up their own advance to Tiflis and concluded peace with Georgia,

getting some compensation for shattered hopes by the cession to them of the Akhalkalaki district of the Tiflis Government. Negotiations followed at Constantinople with the Armenians, and the Turks recognized the Republic of Ararat, at least nominally, for peace lasted only so long as it suited either side.

For both Germany and Turkey Baku now became the immediate objective. The Tartars called it their capital, and had they held it would willingly have let in their friends the Turks. But they did not hold it. It so happened that it was the one place in Trans-Caucasia where the Bolshevists had retained power. The oil interests had brought a large Russian colony to Baku, and being on the Caspian it could be reached from Russia by water. Also it was, of course, just as accessible from the Persian shores of the Caspian. Now the Bolshevists of Baku liked neither Turk nor Tartar. Equally strong was the dislike of the Armenians to both, and Bolshevists and Armenians combined together to keep the city from the Turks.

It was about the beginning of July that Turkish forces reached the neighbourhood of Baku, acting, as they avowed, on behalf of the Tartar Republic of Azerbaijan. Meantime a German column was also being pushed forward towards Baku by the railway from Tiflis. But the Turks had no desire for German help, or

interference, as they regarded it, and their friends the Tartars continually cut the railway line, so that German progress was very slow. Meanwhile Nuri Pasha coming up from Tabriz was, by the end of July, pressing hard on the Russians and Armenians at Baku. The fate of the city seemed sealed, when, on August 4, a small British detachment coming from Persia landed at Baku.



[Elliott & Fry.

MAJOR-GENERAL L. C. DUNSTERVILLE,
C.B.

Commanded the expedition to Baku.

Britain's intervention at this critical juncture was the sequel to the operations in Mesopotamia and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia. In April-May, 1918, Lieut.-General Sir R. G. Egerton, on General Marshall's instructions, had carried out difficult operations, with conspicuous success, on the Baghdad—Mosul road. Sir R. Egerton's operations, as far as was allowed to be publicly known at the time, were a threat to Mosul, and indeed they were continued in that direction by direct instruction from London. General Marshall's object in arranging them was, however, simply to gain possession of Kifri and Tuz Kermatli and thus "make the Persian line of communication more secure." It had become clear that to meet the Turkish threat at Teheran Sir William Marshall would have to take over the lines which the Russians were abandoning in Persia. As to the British going

on to Baku, that, in May, 1918, hardly seemed worth consideration.

This extension of the field of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force was a sequel to the Persian policy of Lenin and Trotsky. In the armistice agreement concluded at Brest-Litovsk in December, 1917, it was laid down that "starting from the principle of the freedom, independence, and territorial inviolability of the neutral Persian Empire the Turkish and Russian High Commands are both prepared to withdraw their troops from Persia": and in January, 1918, Trotsky declared his intention "to terminate with all speed the acts of violence which Tsarism and the *bourgeois* governments of Russia have committed against the Persian people." What he actually did was to withdraw the Russian troops, regardless of consequences, which included the Turkish reoccupation of large areas and the massacre of very many thousands of people. The Russian troops, too, suffered a good deal in their retirement.

Communicate discreetly to the Kurdish chiefs (wrote Major Drufell, a German Staff officer, to the Turkish commanders on the Persian front) that according to Army orders received by me they are to accelerate the Russian withdrawal by continuing their robberies and ambushes, in spite of the Armistice. . . . Explain to the tribes the precarious position of the Russians and tell them how easy success will be. Their withdrawal from Persia is imminent, and whilst it is in progress the greatest possible loss must be inflicted upon them.*

"Accelerated" by Kurdish attacks the Russian troops left Persia, taking the great highway to the Caspian. This road goes from Baghdad up the valley of the Diala to Khanikin and then ascends, at the gap called Tak-i-Girra, the mountain range which forms the buttress of the plateau land of Persia. Going from the Mesopotamian plain the track through the "gap"—actually a bluff along which the road zigzags—is a formidable climb of over 1,000 feet. The road, which continues by Kermanshah and Hamadan to Kazvin, has no other equally stiff ascent. "This road, which from the [Mesopotamian] frontier to Kermanshah is in the nature of a bottle-neck, is the natural line of invasion of Persia from the west and has been so used from time immemorial. Except for a slight realignment over the Asadabad Pass, north-west of Hamadan, the road is the identical

* This agrees well with German policy in Persia, where German agents deliberately arranged the murder of British officials as part of their day's work. Documentary proof of one such murder plot was published in *The Times*, of January 3, 1918.

track of the Royal Road of Darius."* The Russians for a short time, April-June, 1917, had been along the road to the plains beyond Khanikin; since then they had kept to the hills, and few of their men were west of Kermanshah, which is by the road 223 miles from Baghdad.

In January, 1918, largely to help the famine-stricken people, Sir William Marshall had sent a British mission along the road as far as Kermanshah.† It was under Lieut.-Col. (temporary Major-General) L. C. Dunsterville, C.B., Indian Army, who was said to be the original of Kipling's Stalky.

When it was decided that the British lines should be extended to the Caspian it was necessary to strengthen the force under General Dunsterville. In particular the services of officers and sergeants were required—men who could take charge of isolated posts, help to raise and train tribal levies, and at need turn to administrative duties. The ease or difficulty

of the task devolving on the force in Persia would to a considerable extent depend upon its ability to win the confidence of the people; that the attitude of the Persian Government would not be cordial was certain. It is indeed on record that one British post, some 60 strong, officers and men, received a formal command from the Shah to leave the country. Part of Dunsterville's officers and N.C.O.'s came from France, where there was a call for 100 officers and 250 sergeants to volunteer for service in Persia. Those chosen were taken from almost every nationality represented in the Army; there were Englishmen and Scots, Irish, Canadians and South Africans, while Australia furnished the largest national unit (18 officers and 20 sergeants). They were men to whom adventure appealed, and not for the first time; one of them had acted as chief staff officer to the Mexican pretender Villa. This party from France did excellent work under Dunsterville, though some of them appeared to regret that the Persian expedition was not as dangerous as they had anticipated. That was largely the result of British methods. The Russians had had constant trouble with the Kurd tribes along the Kasr-i-Shirin-Hamadani road, especially round Kermanshah, where disturbances occurred almost nightly, up to the time of the Russian withdrawal early in February, 1919. Colonel Napier, who passed

* From an article in the *Geographical Journal*, January, 1919, on "The Road from Baghdad to Baku," by Lieut.-Colonel G. S. F. Napier, lately British Military Attaché at Teheran. Colonel Napier traversed the road in 1917 and again in 1918, and gives much valuable information concerning it and the people who inhabit the region.

† See Vol. XVII., pp. 271-272. Particular attention was called by General Marshall to the relief work of Mr. and Mrs. Stead (American missionaries), who, in the neighbourhood of Kermanshah, saved the lives of many hundreds of Kurds.



KURDISH PRISONERS.

through Kermanshah on the last day of March and spent the night at a place 13 miles farther on, testifies to the difference he found in that short time.

A skull in the yard of the wretched caravanserai here [Hassanabad], which one of the chauffeurs told me was the head of a Russian the last time he passed through, was illustrative (he writes) of the endless misunderstandings between the Russians and the Kurds, arising from the murder of stragglers followed by punitive expeditions which exasperated without deterring. It speaks well for Colonel Kennion, our consul at Kermanshah, that within some eight weeks of the Russian evacuation the whilom hostile Kurd was overjoyed at the chance of earning a small coin by helping to extract my cars from the mud!

Most of the tribes proved friendly, but not all, and in April (while Sir R. Egerton was advancing on the Mosul road) a section of the Sinjabi, who had received heavy bribes from German agents to make raids, were dealt with. They had offended the Guran—the chief Kurd tribe of the Kermanshah region—and General Marshall put a small British column of all arms at the disposal of the Guran. The Sinjabi had a severe lesson and the German agents were thoroughly discredited. A more troublesome factor was the weather. Not till April was the Asadabad Pass free from snow, and late rains so affected the surface that up to the middle of May only a few additional units had been sent on to Kermanshah, though the first stage of the journey was rendered easier by a railway being built from Baghdad to the foot of the Tak-i-Girra.

At this time most of the Russian soldiers had already left Persia and their rearguard was at

Kazvin, over 200 miles from the nearest British outposts at Kermanshah. The Russian rearguard, which for two months now had been covering the withdrawal of the main body, was under Lieut.-Col. Bicharakoff. Both he and his men had a great local reputation and many friends among the British and Indian troops, with whom they had cooperated in the Jebel Hamrin in December, 1917. Since then they had not been far from the Turco-Persian border.

At Kasr-i-Shirin in April (wrote a correspondent of *The Times*) I met the Cossack Partizanski on the road to the Caspian. Bicharakoff, who commands them, was on the western front early in the war, and has been wounded six times in six different actions. He has lost the use of his right hand, retains only partial use of his left, carries a bullet near his spine, and limps. All the same he is a hard rider, and when mounted you could not tell he was not sound.

His detachment of picked regulars, volunteers from the different regiments on the Caucasian front were for carrying on. . . . It was good to see the black flag of the Partizanski again, and the skull and crossbones on the pennants of the squadron commanders, white on a black field with maroon edges—the diehard, war à outrance sign. On the Partizanski flag the Scottish thistle and English rose were embroidered with the Russian bear—a design of the English ladies of Kermanshah—and the motto, in Russian, "Nemo me impune lacessit."

The thistle was for Leslie and his cadet son, and the Scottish adjutant, Gowans. Leslie . . . had been an exile, as he put it, for over 300 years. An ancestor came over in Queen Mary's time to train Ivan's Cavalry, and his family had been in Russia ever since.

At Kasr-i-Shirin Bicharakoff rode at the head of his Cossacks in black. His staff wore the varied uniforms of the different regiments from which they were drawn. The sotnias followed singing; then the infantry, and after it the ambulance, the sick in doolies with long poles attached to ponies fore and aft, and the three hospital ladies, one a Russian princess, riding behind.



KERMANSHAH

The transport, hired Persian mules and ponies, lent colour to the column; nearly every beast had a large brass bell hanging from its neck, and a broad necklace of cowries and beads. And, as if there were some outlandish element lacking in the procession, as if the Kurdish drivers, with their apple-red cheeks, variegated cloths, round coal-scuttle felt hats tilted backwards and bound with bright scarves, did not lend colour enough, there must needs enter in the saffron-canopied palanquin of some Christian bishop from Urumia way. I forget

Sir William Marshall, "I sent forward troops in Ford vans as far as Kazvin to take over that place from Col. Bicharakoff. We were now embarked on an operation of great difficulty."

From railhead to the Caspian and Enzeli is by the road, nearly 700 miles, and this road, west of Hamadan, is unmetalled and traverses rocky passes, swift-running streams, and broad alluvial valleys—bridges had been



PONTOON BRIDGE OVER THE DIALA
AT BAKUBA.

his episcopal title, and whether he was Armenian, Nestorian, Chaldean or what. He was known in the force that night as "the Archimandrake," and in the morning he disappeared, his errand a mystery.

Bicharakoff's force was about 1,200-1,500 strong; for the Persian front no inconsiderable unit. General Marshall was anxious to regain touch with it before it left Kazvin. With Kazvin unoccupied, the Russians all embarked on the Caspian, and the British no nearer than Kernanshah, there would be nothing to prevent the Turks marching down rapidly from Tabriz to Teheran and seizing the Persian Government, which was practically incapable of self-defence and had hitherto, in the north, owed its safety to the presence of the Russians.

It was near the end of May, the rains had at length ceased and the surface was drying. Therefore "the matter being urgent," wrote



broken and blown up, so that temporary expedients for crossing had to be devised. One at least of the passes is over 7,000 feet [the Sultan Bulagh, between Hamadan and Kazvin, is 7,400 ft. high], and the rocky nature of the ground encountered on many stretches of the road wore out tyres with alarming rapidity. The country in the immediate neighbourhood of the road was famine stricken, and not only was the food situation an anxious one, but much transport was required for the supply of petrol, oil, spare parts, ordnance stores, and the many and varied articles of equipment necessary for maintaining a force in the field.

On June 1 General Dunsterville's Mission reached Kazvin, and on June 8 Colonel Bicharakoff's partizans left for Enzeli, where they



A BRITISH COLUMN ON THE MARCH THROUGH PERSIA.



ASSYRIAN REFUGEES AT THE BRITISH CAMP AT HARUNABAD, BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND ENZELI ON THE CASPIAN SEA.

intended to take ship for Baku. A small British detachment accompanied them.

On reaching Mandjil three days later this force found the bridge at that place held by a Gilan tribe named the Jangalis, with whom were several German officers. After a vain attempt to parley on the part of the Germans, the Russians attacked, and after capturing the Mandjil bridge pushed on to Resht and Enzeli, assisted by our light armoured cars.

The moral effect of this small action was out of all proportion to its military importance, and for a time kept in order the Jangali leaders, who had previously been bolstered up by a fictitious prestige.* The closely-wooded nature of the country round Resht which they inhabit gives them a sense of security which they endeavoured to turn to account by sniping at our convoys which were being sent to Enzeli, but no serious trouble arose until July 20, when they attacked a small British detachment at Resht, together with the British Consulate and Bank at that place. After some hand-to-hand street fighting the attack was beaten off and over 100 Jangalis were killed. Our Hampshire and Gurkha troops fought extremely well, and the Jangalis have not only given no more trouble but have made an agreement not to assist the Turks any further. (General Marshall was writing a month before the Armistice.)

Colonel Bicharakoff waited a fortnight or more at Enzeli while negotiating with the Bolsheviks at Baku. But on July 3, having accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief of "the Red Army of the Caucasus," he sailed, landed at Alynt (35 miles south-west of Baku) and presently took over the defence of that city. The Turks and Tartars had not so far pressed the attack with great ardour and they were not always successful in the small actions fought near the place. However, Bicharakoff found the internal situation grave, and his partisans the only troops he could trust. The Bolsheviks in the town were strongly opposed to British intervention. There came a sudden change; on July 26 a *coup d'état* deposed the Bolshevik Council and set up a "Centro-Caspian Dictatorship." This new Government, whose authority was practically confined to Baku town, at once asked for British aid and sent transports to Enzeli to bring back British troops. It was rather late in the day for any such enterprise, but the Turks dallied—Nuri Pasha had the reputation of being a keener archæologist than soldier—and so a few British officers, with one platoon as escort, were sent to make a report. They landed at Baku on August 4, to find that Bicharakoff, disgusted by repeated acts of treachery on the part of the Red Guards, had gone, having moved north along the coast of the Caspian.

The arrival of the first small party of British

* Not altogether fictitious: Kuchik Khan, the leader of the Jangali band and virtual ruler of the province of Gilan, played with adroitness the part of a modern Robin Hood.

at Baku had an electrical effect on the citizens, who cheered and cheered again as the soldiers marched through the streets. They did more than cheer; they had been given new hope, and, for the time at least, new unity, and a Turkish attack on August 5 was gallantly repelled. What followed is succinctly told in General Marshall's despatch of October 1, 1918:

Further British reinforcements were sent during the remainder of August, but their numbers were restricted by the limitation imposed by the great length and difficulties of the Persian line of communication. On arrival they took over portions of the defended perimeter of the town, and every effort was made by General Dunsterforce and his staff to instil order into existing chaos.

The inhabitants of Baku seemed, however, to think that it was no longer necessary for them to fight now that the British had arrived, and they gave our troops little or no assistance. On August 26 the Turks attacked with considerable determination a pronounced salient in the line; they were well supported by their artillery and charged home with the bayonet. This point was most gallantly held by a British company against odds of five to one, unsupported by local Baku troops who should have been there in reserve. The company suffered heavy casualties before being obliged to withdraw. On August 31 the Turks made two further attacks, which were beaten off with heavy loss by British and Russian troops, who were, however, subsequently compelled to give ground owing to the exposure of their flank resultant on the withdrawal of some Armenian battalions. On September 1 further ground was lost, our troops being forced back fighting against heavy odds without any efficient support from our local Allies.

During all these attacks the Turks lost heavily, and it was not till September 14 that they again attacked, after receiving large reinforcements. On this date they succeeded in scaling the heights, driving out the Armenian troops opposed to them with little difficulty, and thereby causing a readjustment of the British line to save a menaced flank. On this flank three very weak British companies held out all day on the last ridge on the outskirts of the town under heavy shell fire and against repeated attacks by the main strength of the Turks. From this ridge the town and harbour are completely dominated, and its possession was of great importance.

An attack by the enemy on the centre was brought to a standstill by rifle fire. A counter-attack by British, Russians and Armenians in this vicinity failed through the British and Russians losing all their officers as well as sustaining heavy casualties in the ranks, while Turkish artillery fire arrested the advance of the Armenian troops at an early stage. Throughout the day the North Staffordshire Regiment had fought with great gallantry, and were ably supported by the men from the Royal Warwick and Worcester Regiments, as well as by the Dunsterforce armoured cars, which were boldly handled and accounted for large numbers of the enemy.

At 4 p.m. it became evident that the Turks, who had been attacking since dawn, were fought to a standstill, and could do no more than occupy the positions they had gained. Had an effective counter-attack now been possible, it is more than doubtful if the Turks could have withstood it, but every British rifle was in the line, and the Russian and Armenian troops were by this time incapable of any further effective action. The town was at the mercy of the enemy, who occupied all the high ground, and could shell the shipping in the port at ranges of 3,000–5,000 yards.

It was decided, therefore, to evacuate the British detachment. This decision was communicated to the

Baku Government. By 8 p.m. all sick and wounded had been carried on board. Troops and guns were then embarked, and by 10 p.m. all were on board the three ships which had, since our arrival at Baku, been earmarked for our use. These three ships sailed without lights, closely followed by another in which it had been possible to collect explosives and ammunition. This latter ship was hit by gunfire from the guardship at the mouth of the harbour [an act of treachery], but the others slipped away unscathed, and all four arrived safely at Enzeli.

For six weeks the "Dunsters," as this British force was called, had kept the enemy out of Baku and denied them its valuable oil fields, besides causing heavy casualties to the Turks, who had to bring up a force of considerable numerical superiority before they could capture the place.



NESTORIAN TEACHERS.

General Dunsterville and his force, the detachments in Baku and those guarding the road to Baghdad, had accomplished much more than could have been expected of them. The spirit which animated the whole command can be seen from the General's farewell address:—

I am prouder of my command [and] of the gallant officers and N.C.O.'s than of any other command I have held or am likely to hold. Brought together from every corner of the Empire, all have vied with each other to show the absolute unity of our national aspirations. . . .

The work has varied from valuable administrative

tasks to daring achievements in the battlefield, and all have striven to do their utmost even in spheres for which they were never prepared, and which they would never have chosen for themselves.

Apart from any military results achieved, the members of the force have had the proud privilege of showing the various races in the lands through which they passed the pattern of the finest army of the present times; the effect of their demeanour and behaviour has been such as to enhance the reputation of the British race in the eyes of all with whom they had dealings.

The leader of the Gilanis with whom we fought at Resht has stated that he fears the British more than any other European race, because their methods are such as to call forth the admiration even of their enemies. Amongst other foes he can rely upon stirring up some desire for vengeance or retaliation, but against the British he fails to rouse any feeling at all.

All this was true, nevertheless in Trans-Caucasia for the time being Turkey had triumphed, and it seemed that very soon they would gain touch with their kindred in Turkestan.

The rejoicings of the Turkish Press were loud but shortlived. It was suddenly announced (says the British officer prisoner of war already quoted) that by certain secret additional terms, made without the knowledge of Constantinople, to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty Baku had been given by Germany to the new South Russian Republic. This was indeed a bitter pill to swallow. The Turkish Press, with a freedom of speech unknown in the earlier days of the war, united in a bitter attack on Germany. "To-day," said one paper, "our allies have sold us for a tin of oil; what will they sell us for to-morrow?"

The impending collapse of Bulgaria, of Austria, and of Germany itself was not then, in mid-September, as clear as it became a fortnight later, and the Turks determined to act vigorously; they would reach the Turkoman territory through Persia if they could, as well as across the Caspian. The capture of Teheran seemed a feasible project, and in August they had begun to move south from Tabriz. Their immediate objective was Kazvin, the "key" position on General Marshall's communication line between Baghdad and Enzeli. General Marshall took steps to meet this threat both to his own lines and to the Persian capital. He had pushed a small force north as far as Mianah in order to cover both Enzeli and Kazvin, and an advanced post of irregulars was but little south of Tabriz itself. On September 5 the Turks drove in this advanced post, and on the 9th occupied Mianah. They then dug themselves in in a strong position south of Mianah. British reinforcements having arrived the enemy was held up, but he was too near Kazvin for the situation to be comfortable for the British.

In the district between Lakes Urumia and Van, and south of Lake Urumia, Nuri Pasha had met with stout opposition. It was the



A BRITISH CAMP IN PERSIA.

country whence General Baratoff's columns based on Bana and Sakiz had unsuccessfully tried to reach Mesopotamia. The Russians had had the support of the people and had raised from them two battalions of troops. Most of the natives whose territory adjoins Armenia on the north-west are Christians. They are the most compact fragment left of the races who before the coming of the Arabs formed the bulk of the population of Mesopotamia, and the names by which some of them are known—Chaldeans and Assyrians—are indicative of their origin. The most comprehensive name for these people is Nestorians; they are also known as East Syrians. Their territory stretches westward into Kurdistan (where is the seat of their Catholicus) and southward to Mosul. "Forming at once a church and a nation," their chief seat in Persia is the town of Urumia, where British, American and French missionaries are stationed. Sir William Marshall speaks of them as "Assyrians, Nestorians and Jelus," the last a tribal name. Throughout the war these isolated Christians, most of them mountaineers, had been a thorn in the flesh to the Turks in Kurdistan. When in May (1918) Nuri invaded Persia, the Syriac divisions trained by the Russians, aided by other bands, waged a *guerilla* against him, much delaying his progress. General Marshall felt, rightly, that these people should not be left unsupported, but it was no easy task to get at them. Between the British and the Nestorians was a rugged tangle of mountains, the Kurdistan province of

Persia, whose inhabitants, many of whom were neither Moslem nor Christian, had given the Russians much trouble. But, as has been already stated, these Persian Kurds proved responsive to British methods, and in July a convoy taking ammunition, machine-guns and money went across the mountains unmolested. Meantime British airmen had flown ahead, and after some curious adventures got into touch with the Nestorians. It was arranged that they should meet the British convoy at Sain Kala, a place south of Lake Urumia, and on the Hamadan-Tabriz road. The British convoy reached Sain Kala on July 23, "but the Assyrians were 10 days late in meeting it, and their eventual arrival coincided with the occupation of Urumia by the Turks, who drove all the Assyrians out, massacring many and pursuing them along the road to Sain Kala until checked by our advanced troops."

The Nestorians under a Jelu chief called Aga Petros, had held up the Turks at Urumia for nearly two months, and vengeance for this delay may have been one of the causes which led the Turks to wholesale exile or slaughter of the people. More probably the Turk merely acted after his kind. All who survived—men, women and children—poured along the Sain Kala road from August 3 onwards, and eventually over 50,000 arrived at Hamadan. Large numbers had, however, died *en route* from cholera and privations. The way in which these unfortunate people were dealt with by the small British staff on the line of communications was worthy of great praise, while to feed

them the British reserves intended for the winter were used. Eventually, in batches of 3,000 at a time, the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews, etc., were all sent along the Royal Road of Darins into the plains, a great refugee camp being formed at Bakuba, 28 miles from Baghdad. From the men capable of bearing arms a useful fighting force about 3,000 strong was organized, but the armistice with Turkey was signed before occasion arose for their services. The Bakuba camp formed in September, 1918, was quite a model affair, each tribe or sect having its separate area, and some of these primitive Christians had practical demonstration that in the view of the British official cleanliness was no less important than godliness.

There were no further developments in north-west Persia before the signing of the armistice with Turkey, but the immediate effect of General Allenby's great victories in Palestine may be noted. It took from the Turks all power of offensive, and even before the fall of Damascus (October 1) Enver was recalling troops from Trans-Caucasia. In north-west Persia it meant that there would be no more threats to Teheran through Kazvin, and that the long line of communication between Baghdad and the Caspian was at last free from enemy interference.

In Mesopotamia itself, General Marshall in the closing days of October, 1918, totally defeated the Turks on the Tigris south of Mosul. Lieut.-General Sir A. S. Cobbe, V.C., had the conduct of the main operations, while "the daring and brilliant leadership of the Cavalry Brigades under Brig.-Generals Cassels and Norton contributed largely to the final result." Brig.-General Lewin was noted for the "able tactical handling of the detached column" on the Kirkuk road. Altogether the British, who themselves suffered about 1,600 casualties, captured 11,332 prisoners (including 643 officers), 51 guns, 130 machine guns, over 2,000 animals, three paddle steamers, and a complete bridging train, besides large quantities of ammunition and other war material.*

General Marshall did not receive news of the armistice until November 1, by which time his cavalry brigades were only 12 miles south of Mosul. They were then met by a flag of truce, but as there was reason to fear for the safety of the Christian inhabitants of Mosul, General Marshall ordered his cavalry to continue their march on that town. He was thus in a position at once to enforce the terms of the armistice in the area of the Mesopotamian force. One

* See Vol. XIX., pp. 211-213, for an account of these operations.



ASSYRIAN REFUGEES AT WORK AT THE BRITISH CAMP, HARUNABAD.



BRITISH MOUNTED POLICE AND INDIAN DRIVERS IN BAKU.

of his duties was to reoccupy Baku—a shattering blow to Pan-Turanian ambitions. The story of the reoccupation and subsequent developments is excellently told by Sir William Marshall himself in his despatch dated February 1, 1919.*

It should be premised that after capturing Baku the Turks had crossed the Caucasus mountains—at their eastern end a less arduous task than elsewhere—and had occupied part of Daghestan, including the coast of the Caspian as far north as Petrovsk. The redoubtable Bicharakoff and his partizans had retired, fighting, before them, but they, together with some Armenians who joined the Russians, continued the conflict and had greatly harassed the Turks. General Marshall writes :

Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey I received instructions to reoccupy Baku (in cooperation with our Allies), and all available troops of the 39th (British) Infantry Brigade were ordered to concentrate for this purpose at Enzeli. They were joined there on November 9 by Russian and Armenian troops under General Bicharakoff, who had been driven by the Turks out of Petrovsk, where the Turkish Commander, despite representations by both British and French Staff officers, refused to recognize the armistice. At this time Nuri was commanding the Turkish forces in the Caucasus. An envoy had been despatched to him on November 4 asking for a definite date to be fixed by the Turks for the evacuation of Baku, but a procrastinating reply was received, and in consequence the envoy was sent back again to him accompanied by a staff officer to inform him that Baku would be occupied by a British and Russian force on November 17, by which date Turkish troops, with the exception of a small detachment to preserve order, were to be clear of the town.

* *London Gazette*, April 8, 1919

At dawn on November 16 a fleet of 17 transports left Enzeli escorted by three vessels of the Caspian Fleet, which had been armed by the Royal Navy under the supervision of Commodore D. T. Norris and Captain B. G. Washington, R.N.

During the morning of November 17 they were joined off Nargin Island by General Bicharakoff's Russian force, escorted by the Russian Caspian Fleet. The expedition was accompanied by French and American representatives, and the vessel conveying Major-General W. M. Thomson, C.B., M.C., commanding the British troops, entered Baku at the head of the combined fleets flying the flags of Great Britain, France, Russia and America. Our troops landed without opposition, and Baku was taken over from the Turks, who completed their evacuation of the town during the afternoon.

Many and varied were the questions which had to be dealt with in Baku, amongst which I may instance shipping control, feeding the inhabitants numbering a quarter of a million, finance, including the reopening of the Russian State bank, settlement of labour disputes on the oilfields, strikes in the town, payment of overdue wages, reopening the Trans-Caucasus system of railways, getting into working order the oil pipe-line from Baku to Batum, etc., etc. All these questions were most ably and firmly dealt with by General Thomson, who was quite evidently the right man in the right place.

Our efforts had to contend with the mutual jealousy and intolerance of various factions, and it is not too much to say that all arrangements for reorganization were hampered by entirely unnecessary delays in withdrawal on the part of the Turks. After retiring from Petrovsk they made further delays at Elizabetopol and other towns, much of which being due to the excessive amount of baggage (mostly loot) which they attempted to remove, together with a reserve of one month's supplies requisitioned by them from the country. A mission had also to be sent to Tiflis to put an end to the hostilities which had commenced between the Georgians and Armenians.

General Marshall had other Caspian problems besides Baku. If the Turks had been driven from that great inland sea the Bolsheviks were in strength at Astrakhan, they had armed vessels at their disposal, and they



GERMAN REFUGEES. ARRESTED BY THE BRITISH IN SHIRAZ. HANDED OVER TO A RUSSIAN ESCORT.

had designs on Krasnovodsk, the Caspian terminus, opposite Baku, of the railway to Merv and Bokhara, which, as already pointed out, passes by the northern frontier of Persia. Along this railway British troops from India were then operating (see *infra*). General Marshall sent a small force to Krasnovodsk to secure it "as a naval base for shipping working under our orders and to deny it to the Bolsheviks. Portions of this Krasnovodsk detachment were taken to assist in the fighting near Askabad and Merv"—so that the Mesopotamian force had units at work from the Euphrates in the west to Merv in the east, a distance of over 1,700 miles.

The Bolsheviks did not accept defeat on the Caspian without a struggle. From their base at Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga, they sent armed ships to harry the British, but without success. On their side the British ships were active. On December 8, while patrolling the northern waters of the Caspian two British vessels were engaged by three Bolshevik boats. After a smart fight, in which one vessel on each side was hit the Bolsheviks fled. The result was seen in the announcement by the British a week later that "the usual steamer services from and to Persia have been resumed."

As the result of the land and sea operations described, the confidence of the people in the British was gradually gained and Armenians and Russians driven out of Caucasia by the Turks were repatriated. Of the difficulties and jealousies of the three Trans-Caucasian republics, those of the Tartars, Georgians and

Armenians, nothing need here be said save that the presence of General Thomsen's force preserved them from many disasters. Towards the end of 1918 troops from the British Salonika force, coming across the Black Sea, landed at Batum, and on January 1, 1919, General Milne took over from General Marshall the control of Trans-Caucasia and Krasnovodsk.

It was some while before the Turks were completely cleared from Trans-Caucasia. Nuri Pasha gave out that he had left the Ottoman Service and was acting on behalf of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He found it, however, after a time, advisable to leave the country; but on his arrival at Constantinople he was promptly arrested (February 27).

The operations in Persia hitherto described in this chapter formed part of the main campaign against Turkey, but the activity of the Germans, adepts in stirring up mischief by foul means—witness, for example, their campaigns of crime in the United States and Morocco—necessitated British action in almost every part of Persia.

Owing to the weakness of the Persian Government German and Austrian agents had been able to organize unchecked a system of murder and brigandage directed against British officials and merchants * and generally to inflame the people against Britain. It will be recalled that the first object of the M.E.F. was to secure the oilfields in the Ahwaz district, Karum river, a district politically Persian, though geographically part of the border land of lower Mesopotamia. Here

* See Vol. XI, Chapter CLXXVI.

British intervention had been successful, and General Marshall was on cordial terms with the Khans of the Bakhtiari, to whom was entrusted the safeguarding of the oilfields. One incident chronicled by General Marshall may be given.

To coerce the Kuhgalus, a tribe who had been causing the friendly Ilkhani of the Bakhtiari some annoyance, and at the same time restore security along the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, I placed during June and July [1918] a section of mountain artillery at the disposal of the Ilkhani. The results were pre-eminently satisfactory, and it is worthy of record that this section of an Indian mountain battery in the hottest season of the year

Sykes—with the rank of Brigadier-General. Why, at the beginning of the war, Sir Percy should have been posted to Chinese Turkestan is one of those actions with which the Foreign Office puzzles the public; for there was no British official who knew Persia so well as did Sir Percy, nor one in whom Persians had greater confidence.

Sir Percy Sykes reached Bandar Abbas from India in March, 1916, with a very slender escort, his staff consisting of three British officers of the Indian Army, but eventually the military



GERMAN OFFICERS. DEPORTED FROM SHIRAZ, ENTERING ISPAHAN UNDER RUSSIAN ESCORT.

covered a distance of 395 miles in 28 marching days, and returned with men and animals in excellent condition.

Elsewhere in Persia the British operations undertaken were independent of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force. The most noteworthy was the march of Sir Percy Sykes to Ispahan and Shiraz. German gold and German intrigues had so demoralized the Persian gendarmerie that it had been dissolved by the Swedish officer in command, and at the beginning of 1916 the depredation and audacity of robber tribes had rendered nearly the whole of south-west Persia insecure. The life of no European not a German or an Austrian was safe. The Persian Government wanted to replace the gendarmerie by something more trustworthy, and it accepted the offer of the British Government to lend them certain officers who should organize a new force. At the head of the officers sent was Col. Sir Percy

escort from India grew to about 500 men of all arms. The first and a very arduous part of the work of the mission was to recruit and train the nucleus of the new force, which was known as the South Persia Rifles. This was, however, done in a comparatively short time, largely as the result of Sir Percy's gift for organization—more to his understanding of and sympathy with the Persian.

Within three months (wrote a correspondent) of his arrival at Bandar Abbas Sykes had pushed inland 250 miles to his old post at Kerman, where he had a most cordial reception, both from the Persian officials and the public. After setting matters right there, he marched north-westward to Yezd and thence to Ispahan [where Sykes joined hands with the Russians]. The arrival of the force at the latter town was a great relief to the population, which had been threatened with an incursion of robber hands, and Sir Percy Sykes was able to open up the Ahwaz road. From Ispahan the force turned southwards to Shiraz, inspiring more than one robber chieftain with a wholesome awe of its powers on the way. The length of this jig-saw march from Bandar Abbas, via Ispahan, to Shiraz was about 1,100 miles, and it was carried out in circumstances of the

most arduous and, in some places, of a perilous character. All this was accomplished within a period of eight months from arrival in the country.

Shiraz became the headquarters of the South Persia Rifles, which Sir Percy Sykes set himself to make an efficient body of military police. He had the aid of British and Indian officers and of between 70 and 80 British warrant and non-commissioned officers, brought from India. They were picked men and had often to take charge of isolated posts. They proved a great success, giving excellent service of a character altogether undreamt of by the British public.

Sir Percy Sykes had two sorts of work before him: (1) to free the highways from bandits, whether in German pay or out for loot on general principles, and (2) to make



(Official photograph.)

CAMEL TRANSPORT.

the highways worthy of that name. The two things were really one—given good communications a road which light armoured cars can easily patrol, and it is a matter of comparative ease to deal with raiding Persian or Arab tribes. The Sykes Mission remade, or caused to be remade, long stretches of the main caravan routes in the provinces of Fars and Kerman, and the South Persia Rifles showed much smartness in dealing with raiders and robbers on the Shiraz-Ispahan and Shiraz-Kerman roads. Attacks on caravans on the trade routes between Shiraz and Yezd rendered it necessary to carry out punitive measures against the Lashani, Tutaki and Charrahi tribes. The conditions in South Persia became much better than in the north where in the neighbourhood of Ispahan two powerful robber lords, Reza Khan Juzdani and Chiragh Ali,

defeated the efforts of the Persian Cossacks (a semi-military semi-police force under Russian officers) to make the trade routes secure.

What Sir Percy Sykes accomplished in road-making, if it did not rival the exploits of General Marshall's engineers, was not inconsiderable. A practicable motor road was constructed from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz and Ispahan, and the road from Shiraz to Kerman much improved. Work was also done farther east in regions beyond the scope of Sir Percy Sykes's mission, and motor-cars travelled the whole distance from Quetta, in Baluchistan, to Kerman and thence to Shiraz.

Work fully as important as that of the Sykes Mission fell to the forces guarding the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Persia, from Khorassan to the Mekran coast—that is along the borders of Afghanistan and (British) Baluchistan. The inability or indifference of the Persian Government gave scope here for the penetration of enemy agents into Afghanistan—and thence into India. In a despatch dated July 23, 1917, Sir Chas. Monro, Commander-in-Chief in India, writes: "In conjunction with the Russians, a small force was maintained in Eastern Persia to ensure the tranquillity of this region and frustrate the activity of German agents." One of the things for which a strict watch had always to be kept was the gun-runners' caravans, especially in Seistan on the Perso-Afghan-Baluchistan border. Here for years a cordon of British troops was maintained. And on the Mekran border, which was much disturbed, owing largely "to the intrigue of German agents," other measures had to be taken. A small force of Gurkhas and Baluchi had a 10 months' march—April, 1916-Feb., 1917—in very trying circumstances escorting a political mission under Major T. H. Keyes.

During 1915-16 there was, indeed, a real danger from German plots in India, as the report of the Rowlatt Committee (which was not made public till the summer of 1918) abundantly proved. In 1915 a Tureo-German mission had entered Afghanistan near Herat and had gone on to Kabul, where it plotted with Indian renegades an attack on the North-West Frontier. The Germans and Turks, getting no encouragement from the Amir, left Kabul early in 1916. The Indians remained, and, endeavouring to trade on old Anglo-Russian jealousies, wrote to the Governor of Russian Turkestan and to the Tsar Nicholas II. inviting Russia to abandon her alliance with



TRANSPORT OF WATER IN THE TURKISH ARMY.

Great Britain and assist in the overthrow of British rule in India. The letter to the Tsar was on a gold plate.

The "Provisional Government" also proposed to form an alliance with the Turkish Government, and the letters transmitted for this purpose were neatly and clearly written on yellow silk. They discussed the formation of an "Army of God," which was to draw recruits from India and to bring about an alliance among Islamic rulers. The headquarters were to be at Medina, while secondary headquarters under local generals were to be established at Constantinople, Teheran, and Kahul.*

The loyalty and firmness of the Amir, Habibullah Khan, was instrumental in defeating German machinations in Afghanistan, just as the vacillation and weakness of the Shah's ministry and faults in the pre-war policy of Britain at Teheran had made the situation in Persia doubly difficult.

The East Persia command was particularly arduous for the British. The Russians had a good base on the Trans-Caspian railway, which enabled them to send troops easily from Turkestan to Meshed and other parts of north-east Persia. To join up with the Russians the British had, however, to take a roundabout route. They could not send troops through Afghanistan. From Nushki, the railhead in Baluchistan, and a place 90 miles south-west

of Quetta, the force had to march first along the southern Afghan border and then turn north along its western frontier to Seistan and Khorassan. That so much good work was done—far away from the limelight—reflects the highest credit on the troops employed and on the officers in command, successively Brig.-Generals R. E. Dyer, C. O. Tanner and G. A. Dale, C.M.G. In the early part of 1918 the situation was complicated by the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Meshed region. The Bolsheviks, to a large extent, had gained control in Turkestan, where a condition approaching anarchy ensued—a condition of which German agents would be quick to take advantage. It was accordingly decided "to extend the British cordon so as to include the Birjand-Meshed line. Reinforcements were despatched from India, and on Feb. 1 the force was constituted the Eastern Persian Cordon Field Force. The expansion of the Seistan levies was also sanctioned." (Sir C. Monro.) To facilitate the transport and supply of this force the Baluchistan railway was extended westward from Nushki, *via* Dalbandin, to Mirjawa on the Persian frontier, and 350 miles from Quetta. This still left 675 miles to be covered by road before troops from India could reach Meshed. And the road is none of

* *The Times*, September 17, 1918.

the easiest. For the most part it lies across a desert or traverses range after range of barren hills. On one stretch of 100 miles Ford motors could be used, for the rest transport was by pack mules, camels and ponies.

In the middle of 1918, to guard against the danger arising from Bolshevist control on the



A TURKOMAN OF BOKHARA.

Russian side of the frontier, more Indian troops were concentrated at Meshed under the command of General Malleon. Earlier in the year the Bolshevists had gained temporary ascendancy in Trans-Caspia and had established a Soviet at Askhabad, a town on the railway west of Meshed. But the Turkomans of the Trans-Caspian province, mostly nomads and herdsmen, whose allegiance was to their tribal chief, disliked Bolshevism, just as they remained indifferent to the Turanian aspirations of their Osmanli kindred. They helped the Menshevists to overthrow the Bolshevists, who were driven north almost to the Oxus. In July, however, the Bolshevists regained ascendancy at Merv and thence threatened to advance along the railway to the Caspian. The Menshevist Government of

Trans-Caspia thereupon asked the Indian troops stationed on the Persian side of the frontier for help, and this help was given. The object, besides that of aiding the Russian constitutionalists to preserve their country from Bolshevist misrule, was to keep Persia, and thus Afghanistan and India, free from the dangers inherent in the situation should the Bolshevists gain control.

General Malleon's force, or rather a part of it, was in action in Russian territory in August. After a march of more than 100 miles from Meshed they reached the Trans-Caspian railway and, with Russian and Turkoman troops, were stationed at Kaakha, some 200 miles west of Merv, where it was intended to withstand the Bolshevist advance, and, incidentally, to prevent the cotton crop from falling into the hands of the enemy. The special correspondent of *The Times* who visited Trans-Caspia while the campaign was in progress gave the following particulars in a despatch from Merv:—

From the beginning operations on this front have been confined to the railway. The Command works in the train; the troops live in the train, and often fight in the train, which carries water tanks and, to mitigate the rigours of a Trans-Caspian winter, good kitchens and heating apparatus. Three actions were fought at Kaakha in the last week of August, that of August 26 being the most critical. The Turkomans were driven back at daybreak from their position on the flank to the railway; the station was almost captured, but saved by a brilliant counter-attack of the Punjabis.

From Kaakha the Bolshevists fell back on Dushak, where we engaged them on October 14. The offensive this time was ours. The assault was delivered at dawn after a two-days march by a flanking column operating on the left of the railway. The attack was completely successful. The Bolshevists fled from the station. One of their armoured trains, as it drew out of a siding, burst into flames, ignited by a shell. The whole garrison of the train was cut up afterwards by a party of mounted Turkomans, who had made a wide circuit in the rear and destroyed the line behind it.

As soon as the Bolshevists were expelled from the station our Allies, the Russian and Turkoman volunteers, instead of preparing to resist a counter-attack, left the fight and fell to looting. Every British officer in the Punjab regiment had fallen in the assault, and when the Bolshevists came on the Indians were exposed to attack from three sides—frontally down the line, on the right flank by troops who had rallied apparently realizing our inferiority in numbers, and in the rear by a Bolshevist armoured train, which, had the action developed according to plan, should have been cut off. The Indian officer of the Punjabi battalion put up a splendid fight and refused to retire without orders.

The situation was getting desperate, when our cavalry, who had been operating wide on the right of the railway, crossed the line and were returning, came into action. They gave the orders to the Indians to retire, and covered their retreat, the Bolshevists giving them frequent opportunities to get in with the lance. The enemy's casualties were estimated at 1,000, which is perhaps an exaggerated figure. Anyhow, the Bolshevists were shaken, and as a result of the Dushak

action they evacuated Merv and fell back on Charjui, the bridgehead on the Oxus.

From this time until January, 1919, the situation was fairly quiet. In that month the Bolsheviks again advanced in an endeavour to regain the whole of the railway to the Caspian. Meantime General Malleon's command had been joined by the detachments sent by General Marshall from Krasnovodsk, part of which was stationed at Merv, a place which since its capture by the Russians under General Skobleff in 1883 had been jealously guarded from intrusion. In those pre-war days Merv had been a great base for the Russian Army which was, some day, as was supposed, to invade India. Merv was found by the British to be, outwardly at least, disappointing. "It is a modern Russianized town, broad cobbled streets in parallel rows intersecting, and low, two-storeyed houses on either side. The old Merv does not exist. There is not a house of it standing, not a square yard where you can spread a praying carpet."

The "front," where British, Russian and Turkoman troops faced the Bolsheviks, was at Anankovo, a station on the railway 50 miles east of Merv on the way to Bokhara. Here


along the line armoured trains of the Allies and Bolsheviks had faced one another for months. On Jan. 16 a Bolshevik force, which was aided by a heavy mist, in a wide enveloping movement sought to capture Anankovo and advance on Merv. The best of the Bolshevik troops consisted of Austrian and Magyar prisoners, who had been promised a passage home should the attack be successful. Aided by the mist, the enemy succeeded in blowing up the railway at Bairam Ali, between Anankovo and Merv, but the mist also proved his undoing, as his troops who were to make the enveloping movement lost their way and the simultaneous attack on flank and front missed fire. Eventually the Bolsheviks were beaten back, mainly by the gallantry of the Indians and the fine action of the Menshevik artillery, a detachment consisting mostly of ex-Russian officers serving as rank and file. The Bolsheviks left 182 dead on the field, and a larger number were taken prisoners. Their total casualties were estimated at well over 1,000, including some 500 cases of frostbite.

The thing that impressed us most on this far-flung front (writes the correspondent already quoted) was the spirit of the Indians. The Bolsheviks fly like sheep



[Official photograph.]

INDIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH.



THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE.

before them. In the three critical engagements at Kaakha, Dushak, and Anankovo it was their coolness and discipline that turned the tide. It was the handful of men who came up from Quetta that saved Askhabad. The line was drawn against the Bolshevik advance at Kaakha; the enemy had every advantage except that of *moral*, but they never crossed the line. Where two or three thousand have been engaged on either side the presence of a single company of sepoys has more than once turned the scale. One may be sure that these values will be discussed on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan to the increase of honour in the Punjab. The *izzat* of the Sikh and the Punjabi Musulman stands high; and higher still, among the thoughtful, the *izzat* of the British officer who has trained and led them.

After Anankovo there were no important engagements in Trans-Caspia, and in April, 1919, the British and Indian troops were all withdrawn except from Krasnovodsk, which port was held by General Malleon. The Trans-Caspian operations had achieved the main purpose of the East Persia Force—the preservation of India from German activities through Persia and Afghanistan.

Besides the main campaign along the railway line from Askhabad to Merv the British found a good deal of other work to do in Trans-Caspia as in Trans-Caucasia. At Krasnovodsk, for example, the Committee of Public Safety under President Kuhn, who had overthrown the Bolsheviks there in August, 1918, required support, and Kuhn himself early in 1919 only escaped assassination by taking refuge in the British barracks. Then there was the little farce played by Salih-ud-Dowleh, an uncle of the Shah, who laid claim to the throne of Persia and was out on the south-east shores of the Caspian trying to rouse the Turkomans to his side. Salih-ud-Dowleh, who had been instigated to rebellion by the Germans, con-

tinued to play the part of pretender when they could no longer help him. His was not a serious movement, perhaps, but he was in Persian territory and within striking distance of Teheran, should chance favour him. The Persian Government could do nothing. However, a young British subaltern put an end to the revolt by "kidnapping" the pretender.

The subaltern was given a ship, a sergeant, and 25 men, and sent out to arrest him. After following certain false trails (wrote *The Times* correspondent) he tracked Salih-ud-Dowleh down to the port of Ashurada, where he landed at night, keeping his men concealed under hatches all day, like that other party in the belly of the horse at Troy. The surreptitious landing, the stumbling in the dark through fields and orchards, the uncertainty as to the guide, the overpowering and disarming of the guard, the surrender of the courtly prisoner, make up a quite Stevensonian tale. The Shah's uncle embraced my friend when assured by him that his orders were to hand him to the British military authorities and not to the Persian Government. He became very attached to him on the voyage, played at least six games of chess with him every day, which he invariably won, and gave him on parting a silver wrist-watch to wear as a memento.

Salih-ud-Dowleh was taken to Baghdad, where he was interned. It was all part of the effort made to keep order in Persia and to relieve the country from Turkish and German intriguing. To this end also it was found necessary to station a garrison at Bushire, in the Persian Gulf, where, as General Monro said, "the khans of the hinterland maintained a hostile attitude." There was, in short, scarcely any part of Persia not policed by the British, and no neutral people owed more to British intervention than did the Persians. The work, it is true, was undertaken to preserve British interests, to block the "new German route to India," and to dissipate the danger of

the Pan-Turanian movement, but the benefit to Persia was great. At the close of the war Persia was territorially intact and had the best chance she had had for many years of establishing a strong and stable government.

By the end of September, 1918, Bulgaria had capitulated: on October 5 Germany appealed to President Wilson for a cessation of hostilities, and Austria-Hungary took a similar step. The hopelessness of their own position was

at length asserted itself; the loss of Syria deeply affected the ruling classes and the failure of the Pan-Turanian schemes caused bitter disappointment. Constantinople was in a state of great tension, and the desire for peace grew stronger daily. But Germany had still to be reckoned with, and though communication *via* Sofia was severed, Germany had command of the Black Sea and about 100,000 troops still in Turkey. The ex-Russian Black Sea fleet, or the greater part of it, was



GENERAL TOWNSHEND IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

now quite apparent to the rulers of Turkey. The defeat of Bulgaria exposed their flank in Europe and made continued resistance almost impossible, and with Enver and Talaat Pashas the question was whether at once to seek separate terms from the Allies or to associate themselves with the German and Austrian peace move. After some hesitation they, characteristically, took both courses. A Note to the United States on the lines of those of Germany and Austria reached Washington on Oct. 13, but it had been sent simply *pro forma*. At that date the Porte was sounding the Allied Embassies and Legations as to the terms of armistice.

Enver and Talaat and the Union and Progress Party had passed a very anxious fortnight. Public opinion in Constantinople had

brought to the Golden Horn, and the majority of the German troops called to the neighbourhood of Stamboul. German pressure apart, both Enver and Talaat knew that notwithstanding their disagreements with Berlin the maintenance of their position depended mainly on German support, and they would, if they had been able, have continued the alliance. Talaat, however, was aware of the true condition of the Central Empires; he had visited both Vienna and Berlin in September, and he realized the danger of leaning on a staff which gave evidence of breaking into pieces. On his part Count Bernstorff, who after his return from America had been made German Ambassador to Turkey, did his best to mould the policy of Enver and Talaat. But circumstances were too strong for him, and more



BRITISH AND FRENCH FLAGSHIPS IN THE DARDANELLES.

fearful, probably, of the danger arising from the disillusionment of the public than the threats or bribes of the Germans, Enver and Talaat resigned. The way was thus cleared for a definite approach to the Entente.

Ahmed Tewfik Pasha, a former Ambassador at London, was entrusted with the formation of a Cabinet, with Izzet Pasha, an Albanian, a soldier and reputed an honest man, as Minister of War. Tewfik, however, could not get a Ministry together, and Izzet became both Grand Vizier and War Minister. He took office coincident with the opening of the Turkish Parliament (October 13), when, for the last time, in the speech from the Throne, the Sultan was made to speak of Germany and Austria-Hungary as allies. Izzet's "Peace Ministry" was far, however, from being a reformed Cabinet. It included Fethi Bey, Rauf Bey, Djavid Bey, and other members of the Committee of Union and Progress, and, as events proved, that Committee still retained much power. Izzet Pasha, whatever his real views, assumed publicly that Turkey might yet be saved by eleventh-hour concessions. Outlining his policy before the Chamber of Deputies, he promised large internal reforms, including the "sending home those countrymen who in consequence of the necessities arising from the war have been moved from one place to another within the country"—an euphemistic allusion to the "deportation" of the Armenians—and "as to the Arab vilayets we will try to solve this

question, assuring to them self-government corresponding to their national aspirations, on condition that the tie between them and the Khalifate, as well as the Sultan, is maintained."

The Turks, that is, did not mean to acknowledge that the game was lost before the last card had been played. But peace they must get, and that quickly, if they wished to avoid being thrown out "bag and baggage" from Europe. Izzet, it is understood, made a proposal that Constantinople should become a free port and that the fortifications of the Dardanelles should be razed on condition that the Entente guaranteed that the city should remain the capital of Turkey, being aware doubtless of the difficulties which any other disposition of Constantinople would present to the Powers.

On October 25 Turkish officials in Switzerland called at the French Embassy and British Legation at Berne to present Notes formally asking for an armistice. They were, however, informed that the proper course was to make application to the competent naval or military authority—in this case the admiral in command of the British Mediterranean Squadron, whose headquarters were then at Mudros Bay, Lemnos Island, where a large Allied Fleet had assembled, including Italian and Greek ships as well as British and French. The next day it was announced in Constantinople that Turkish plenipotentiaries had already left for Mudros; it might have been added that that

very day (October 26) negotiations had begun. The Berne *démarche* had been simply an additional move on the part of the Turks, a last effort to secure a diplomatic rather than a purely military understanding.

The choice by the Allied Powers of the naval authorities rather than the military as those to conclude the armistice was appropriate; not only were they more accessible from Constantinople than either General Allenby or General Marshall, but it was owing to the work of the Allied navies, and chiefly the British, that the defeat of Turkey had been possible. But for their guardianship of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean the troops which won the victories in Syria and Mesopotamia could never have sailed, while of the blockade of the Turkish coast and the part played by the navy at Gallipoli it is not necessary to write.

When they had made up their minds to open direct negotiations with the Allies the Turks liberated General Townshend, their most distinguished British prisoner, and asked for his good offices in securing an armistice. General Townshend consented, and went to Mudros, where, with Tewfik Pasha, he was received by

Vice-Admiral Sir A. S. Gough-Calthorpe. Admiral Calthorpe, on instructions from London, stated that if fully accredited plenipotentiaries were sent by the Turkish Government "he was empowered to inform them of the conditions on which the Allies would agree to a cessation of hostilities and sign an armistice on these conditions on their (the Allies') behalf." Tewfik agreed, and a cruiser was sent to Mytilene, where the Turkish plenipotentiaries, headed by Rauf Pasha (Minister of Marine), were in waiting. The conferences between Rauf and his colleagues and Admiral Calthorpe began on the *Agamemnon* on October 26, and on October 30 the armistice was signed—hostilities to cease the next day at noon. Any hesitation the Turkish delegates may have felt in accepting the Allied conditions must have been removed by the news they received at Mudros—the landing of strong Allied forces at Deleageh on Oct. 28 and the appearance of British divisions close to Adrianople.

The armistice terms made the military and naval situation of the Allies perfectly secure, but they were less severe than the Turks had reason to expect. Their main clauses were the opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and



ALLIED OFFICERS EXAMINING A GERMAN GUN GUARDING THE BOSPHORUS AT ANATOLI-KAVAK.

secure access to the Black Sea for the Allies, together with the occupation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts; the demobilization of the Turkish Army and surrender of the Turkish Fleet: the complete evacuation by Turkey of all the Arabic vilayets, and the release of all Allied prisoners of war. Constantinople was



[Official photograph.]

**BRITISH TROOPS IN ONE OF THE
DARDANELLES FORTS.**

not mentioned in the armistice, but the clause concerning the Bosphorus implied the presence of Allied warships off that city, and by another clause (No. 7) the Allies obtained the right to occupy any strategic point in the event of a situation arising which threatened their security, while Allied control officers were to be placed on all railways, and the Taurus tunnel system was to be occupied. The weakness of the armistice lay in that it did not bring home to the Turks in Anatolia the completeness of the defeat they had sustained and that no adequate provision was made for the security of the Armenians. It was, indeed, provided that all Turkish troops should be withdrawn from Cilicia, which has a large Armenian population, and clause 24 enacted that "in case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them," but these provisions proved insufficient, and the only effective course would have been

actual occupation of Cilicia and the Armenian vilayets.

Immediately after the armistice had been signed the removal of the minefields in the Dardanelles began. It took several days; meantime, as was fitting, Anzac troops were brought to help to man the Gallipoli forts. Nowhere else than in Australia and New Zealand had the downfall of Turkey created more satisfaction, and that the sacrifices of 1915 had not been in vain there was now proof.

At length, the passage cleared, the Allied fleets passed through the Dardanelles on November 12, having been preceded by some light vessels, including the British destroyer *Shark* and the French destroyer *Mangini*. It was essential before the Allied fleets anchored off Constantinople that the passage to that city from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus should be guarded, in case the Germans should attempt to send in submarines to attack the Allied battleships. So light craft—trawlers and destroyers—preceded the larger vessels. As it was, the passage of the straits was not made till the day after the armistice with Germany took effect, and no mishance happened. The great fleet steamed up the straits, the British, Anzac and Indian troops occupying the forts parading as they went by. One after another the places famous in the 1915 campaign were passed, Lancashire Landing and other beaches where so much heroism had been displayed, and then through the Narrows and by Nagara Point on to Gallipoli and into the Sea of Marmara, where for a time the fleet rested. The weather was fine, the day auspicious. And the people on shore saw ship after ship go by, British Dreadnoughts, French and Italian battleships, a Greek cruiser, squat monitors and a vast array of smaller vessels. Nor did the Turks seem unfriendly; they were prepared to make the best of the situation, and many were glad to be freed from the overbearing Germans.

At eight o'clock in the morning of the next day (November 13) the fleet arrived off Constantinople, where no foreign fleet had been since, in 1878, during the Russo-Turkish war, Admiral Hornby had steamed through the Dardanelles to Constantinople in a snowstorm. Hornby, however, had anchored off Prinkipo Island; Admiral Calthorpe led the Allied vessels to Constantinople itself, and his was the first fleet that had appeared off the city to receive the submission of Turkey. The arrival of the

fleet off Constantinople is thus described by Mr. Ward Price, the representative of the London press :

It was 7.30 in the morning that the flagship *Superb* was sighted in the Sea of Marmara, steaming slowly towards the entrance of the Bosphorus. Behind her came the *Téméraire*, bearing General Sir Henry Wilson, who will command the garrisons of Allied troops in the forts of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The *Lord Nelson* and the *Agamemnon* were next, and then followed, in an imposing procession of line ahead, the cruisers, destroyers, and other craft making up the British squadron. Half an hour's steaming behind them, a distance that was diminished towards the end, came the French squadron in similar formation. Then followed the Italian and the Greek war-ships.

At the entrance to the Bosphorus the fleet divided. The *Superb* and *Téméraire*, followed by two French battleships, came on as a silent line of great grey ships, and anchored close to the European shore of the Straits, within near view of the Sultan's Palace and the Turkish Chamber of Deputies. The two French battleships

cheered by a great crowd. That the Greeks and Armenians of Constantinople should thus express their joy was natural; more curious was the cordiality of the Turkish inhabitants. Sir Henry Wilson had been preceded at Constantinople by Major-General Cory, Chief of Staff of the British Salonika army, and military control in the capital at once passed into the hands of the Allies. General Cory had already received Liman von Sanders, the German generalissimo who had fled from Allenby in Syria, and had discussed plans for the removal of the German troops in Turkey.

Enver and Talaat Pashas had discreetly withdrawn. Early in November, while the Dardanelles were being swept free of mines, they left Constantinople by the other door.



Official photograph.

BRITISH TROOPS IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

dropped anchor astern of them, and then followed the battleships of Italy and Greece.

The rest of the ships remained at the entrance to the Bosphorus, and later in the day nearly the whole fleet weighed anchor and went to its prepared base in the Gulf of Ismid. But before this happened General Wilson had landed, being received by Djeval Pasha, Turkish Chief of Staff, and by a guard of honour composed not of Turkish troops, but of British and Indian prisoners of war. Sir Henry Wilson, as he drove off to the War Office, was loudly

They embarked in a German destroyer which took them through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea. There they parted company. Talaat went on to Odessa and thence to Germany, but Enver sought his Turanian friends—he joined the Tartars in the Caucasus, though his exact whereabouts and his subsequent movements remained undisclosed.

Admiral Calthorpe, invested with large but ill-defined powers as British High Commissioner, took up his residence at the British Embassy on November 14, and engaged in the work of



SEBASTOPOL, WITH SHIPS OF THE RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET.

seeing that Turkey fulfilled the terms of the armistice. It was a work of very considerable difficulty, for political considerations prevented authority being concentrated in one man's hands. Presently Vice-Admiral Amet arrived as French High Commissioner; Italy and

Greece likewise appointed High Commissioners; General Milne came as British Commander-in-Chief and General Franchet d'Esperey as French Commander-in-Chief. Little wonder that the Turks sought to gain advantage out of this divided control. They found, however, that the Allies worked together cordially, and the landing of both British and French troops in the city showed that no precautions would be neglected. True, the troops were not there to occupy Constantinople, but as Embassy Guards, and to provide depôts for the garrisons of the Bosphorus forts—but there they were, much to the chagrin of the Turkish officials.

Immediately after the Allied fleet arrived off Constantinople, the Turkish war vessels were taken over. Apart from the Goeben, not so much damaged as had been supposed, they were not of great value. That done, and the Bosphorus cleared of mines, Allied vessels were sent into the Black Sea (November 20). The northern shores of that sea were held nominally by the Ukrainian Republic, and the Soviet Republic of the Crimea, and the north-east was in dispute between the Kuban Cossacks and the Bolshevists. German troops, however, garrisoned the seaports (or most of them) and controlled the Russian warships. The Bolshevists had been forced by Germany to hand over the vessels—with some vague promise of restoration. It had not been without a struggle that the Bolshevists had themselves gained possession of the fleet. Admiral Koltchak, the officer in command, was a strong constitutionalist; when compelled by the commissioners sent by Lenin to give up his authority, he threw his sword into the Black Sea. (Later on Admiral Koltchak became



IZZET PASHA.

Grand Vizier when the Armistice was signed.

head of the Provisional Government established in Siberia in opposition to the Bolshovists.)

On November 26 a powerful Allied squadron arrived off Sebastopol to take over the Russian warships there, and to both French and British memories of the Crimean war must have been revived. Sebastopol had seen no foreign warships since that date. A correspondent of *The Times*, who was on the fleet, thus describes the scene:—

The Superb preceded, two destroyers leading the way, to the outer harbour, followed by the *Téméraire*, the French battleships *Démocratie* and *Justice*, and the Italian battleship *Roma*.

Volya there are the Dreadnought *Inperatrissa Maria*, which was sunk during the Revolution a year ago, and is now being raised, and one Dreadnought at Nikolaieff, not completed.

The Allied fleet then went to Odessa, where other Russian ships were taken over. Subsequently the Russian Black Sea ports were occupied by the Allies. With the removal of the German garrisons some power was needed to prevent Odessa and the other ports falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks. It was arranged that the ports on the eastern shore of the Black Sea should be controlled by the British; the French, together with



BATUM.

Although the fleet had been preceded by the British cruiser *Canterbury*, and the situation was fairly well known, no chances were taken, and the fleet that steamed slowly in was one very much prepared for action. The inhabitants stood in masses on shore. As we took up our moorings and passed various units of the Black Sea Fleet it was easy to see what Bolshevism and general neglect had done for the Russian ships, which all had a forlorn and untidy appearance. The Allied Fleet, trim and workmanlike, with the *Superb* and *Téméraire* dominating all, are now lying cheek by jowl with these stricken specimens of the inefficiency that comes from anarchy.

The ships, when examined, proved to be in a fair state materially, although very dirty inside, and so far [November 30] the Allies have taken over one Dreadnought, the *Volya*, five Russian destroyers which had been used by the Germans, and four German submarines.

Up to two days before our arrival the Germans were in full command here, but on the 24th, when it was realized that the Allied Fleet was coming, the Russians made bold to hoist their Naval Ensign, and some ships were flying these as we came in. In addition to the

Greek and Rumanian troops, occupied Odessa, Sebastopol, Kherson, and Nikolaieff. However, in the spring of 1919 Bolshevik armies defeated the Ukrainian forces, and approached both Odessa and the Crimea. The French and the Greek and Rumanian troops might have continued to hold the seaports, but they had no force sufficient to prevent them from being beleaguered on the land side, and in April, one after another, these ports were evacuated.

For their part the British, as already stated, took over Batum from the Turks. They also took over Poti from the Germans—the final blow to the Hamburg-Herat dream—and, farther north, occupied Novo Rossisk in the Kuban Cossacks district, as a base of supplies for General Denikin, whose Volunteer Army

was making a bold bid against the Bolsheviks.

It was the collapse of Turkey which allowed of the extension of Allied activity to southern Russia; the opening of the Dardanelles equally enabled Allied warships to keep surveillance over Trebizond, Samsun, Sinope, and other places on the northern shores of Anatolia. Their presence at the ports named helped to promote the movement among the Greek inhabitants for the autonomy of those regions of the Euxine where their ancestors had founded cities centuries before the Christian era. This movement clashed with Armenian claims. But the Armenians had more pressing affairs with which to contend. "We cannot send warships to the mountains of Armenia," said Lord Salisbury on one occasion, when urged to stop Turkish atrocities. In this case it would have been possible to have sent Allied troops into Turkish Armenia, but that course was not taken, and the plight of the Armenians was pitiable. The Turk, true to his character, whatever the professions of his Government, continued to murder, plunder, and abduct Armenians whenever he could, and the country was soon overrun by disbanded, but not disarmed, soldiers. The Armenians suffered even more from famine and isolation, while these repatriated came back to ruined homes. Moreover, a large number of refugees in Trans-Caucasia were prevented by Turks, Kurds, and Tartars from returning, and were held up on the frontier, where thousands perished of hunger and disease.*

If, however, in the six vilayets the situation

* It was not only in Armenia itself that distress prevailed. At the close of 1918, 40,000 Armenians in Syria were totally destitute, and they had to be kept from starvation by the British.

was deplorable, the Armenians obtained some compensation in the arrest and trial at Constantinople of a number of officials responsible for the great massacres of 1915. A few days after the armistice had been signed Izzet Pasha fell, and Tewfik Pasha, who became Grand Vizier, formed a ministry from which all members of the Committee of Union and Progress were excluded. This was followed up by the arrest on the night of January 30-31, 1919, of a large number of Union and Progress pashas and beys charged with organizing the Armenian massacres. They were tried by court-martial, and several were convicted. And early in April Constantinople saw a strange sight—the public hanging of one of these criminals, Kiamil Mahmud Pasha, of Yozghad.

This phenomenon notwithstanding, the situation in Turkey outside the Arabic vilayets, over which Constantinople had lost control, was bad. Throughout Anatolia brigandage was one of the most popular and most profitable professions; Greeks and Turks were in a state of constant tension, varied by massacres, and though the railways had been taken over by the Allies, they exercised little control over the civil administration, and the intrigues of the Union and Progress Party continued. Indian Moslems showed concern about the diminished prestige of the Sultan and his authority as Caliph; the future of Syria presented difficulties, as did that of Palestine; the Armenians claimed a window to the world on the Mediterranean. Of the many problems awaiting solution by the Peace Conference, those concerning Turkey were certainly not the least complex. And six months after the armistice had been signed no decision had been reached.



CHAPTER CCXCI.

THE ALLIED ADVANCE CONTINUED OCTOBER, 1918.

POSITION AT BEGINNING OF OCTOBER, 1918—THE BEAUREVOIR-FONSOMME LINE ATTACKED, OCTOBER 3—AMERICAN PROGRESS IN THE ARGONNE—GOURAUD'S SUCCESS AT MORONVILLERS—REIMS FREED—GREAT BRITISH ATTACK OF OCTOBER 8 BETWEEN CAMBRAI AND ST. QUENTIN—FALL OF CAMBRAI—GERMANS EVACUATE THE ST. GOBAIN SALIENT—GERMAN STAND ON THE SELLE—LE CATEAU STORMED—THE ENEMY DEFEATED IN CHAMPAGNE—LA FÈRE AND LAON TAKEN—AMERICANS REACH GRAND PRÉ—ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS UNDER KING ALBERT—ROULERS TAKEN—THE LYS CROSSED—WAR IN THE AIR.

ON September 25, 1918, Foch had said, "We shall continue our advance without stopping and we shall arrive at the Rhine." The present chapter deals with the events in the Western theatre of war from October 3 to October 16, and describes another stage of the German retreat away from the formidable lines of fortification they had constructed to bar the march of the Allies to the Rhine.

These lines had now been broken in many places. The rupture was complete on the Dixmude-Comines front; it was almost complete between Cambrai and St. Quentin, and between the Moronvillers Heights and the western fringe of the Argonne.

On October 3, at which date this chapter commences, the position of the Germans was becoming grave. They had drawn all the troops they could from their Eastern frontier; the recruits of the 1919 Class had been incorporated in September, 1917; those of the Class 1920 were undergoing training. On the side of their opponents, apart from the manpower still available of the British and French and Italian nations, the American force in Europe had become considerable. By the end

of September two armies from the United States were fighting by the side of the French and British. The German and Austro-Hungarian offensives in France and Italy had failed. The long-cherished plans of gaining the shores of the Persian Gulf and invading India through Persia and Afghanistan, and of expelling the British from Egypt, had been definitely defeated. On October 3 Bulgaria capitulated to France, and Turkey was isolated from the Teutonic Powers. The Turks themselves were on their last legs. Mesopotamia and Arabia were lost, and in Syria they and their German directors were being driven by Allenby towards Aleppo. The Kaiser could count on no army beyond his own troops in France, and these were being compelled by stress of war to retire along their whole front.

Nor was there any hope of their being able to stem the oncoming tide of victory. For the French and American Armies were well east of the Meuse, threatening Lorraine. The Meuse was already turned. West of the Meuse, the Americans of Liggett's army were slowly but surely turning the line of the middle Aisne from the east. Mangin's army north of the Aisne and Oise turned that line on the west.



THE LINE OF OCTOBER 16 FROM DIXMUDE TO RETHEL.

The retention by the Germans of the bulk of the Chemin des Dames ridge and the St. Gobain Forest, which had yet to be taken, prevented Mangin for the time from entering the plain of Laon and attacking the Hunding line. But the St. Gobain bastion in the German front where it inclined northwards had been rendered insecure by Debeney's seizure of Moy on the Oise and of St. Quentin on the Somme. The fortified zone from the Oise to the Somme north of St. Quentin was still in the enemy's hands, while the piercing of the Hindenburg line by Rawlinson's and Byng's armies left only the comparatively weak Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line to keep the Allies from turning that fortified zone in the north. If, as was to be expected, the Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line were overrun, Debeney would be soon on the Oise at all points and, should he force a passage south of Guise and north of the confluence of the Serre and Oise, the Hunding line would be turned from the north. Accordingly, even if the Kriemhilde and Hunding zones resisted Allied pressure, they would become valueless if Debeney, Rawlinson and Byng stormed the Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme trenches.

North of Cambrai the position of the enemy between the Scheldt and the Lys was similar to that of his troops between the Oise and the Aisne. The rupture of the Hindenburg line and the triumphant movement eastward of the British threatened the communications of the Germans in the Lens and Lille regions. If Namur were reached by us, the Germans north and west of the Sambre and Meuse would be hemmed in. They would have to make their escape through the 40-mile wide front of land traversed by the Meuse between Namur and Visé, north-east of Liége.

Outflanked on the south, the enemy in and before Lille and between Lens and Douai was also being turned to the north of the Lys. As we have seen in Chapter CCLXXXVII, Plumer had recovered the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, and was in front of Wervicq and Menin, due north of Lille. To his left, the right wing of the Belgian Army prolonged the Allied line to the environs of Roulers. Facing Roulers was Degoutte's French Army. The left wing of the Belgians, deployed between the western environs of Roulers and the north of Dixmude, was making ready to march on Bruges and Ostend. Under cover of the fire of monitors troops might be landed behind Von Armin's

troops between the mouth of the Yser and the Dutch frontier.

The Hague Correspondent of *The Times*, writing on October 6, stated that:—

Refugees state that a very strong defensive line is being further elaborated from just south of Ostend towards Thourout, and the Germans are compelling the local inhabitants, including those of Thourout, to work on it. A few kilometres farther north a second line is nearly ready protecting the German line of retirement from Bruges and Zeebrugge. This line crosses, near Ruysselode, the road running from Thielt



[Official photograph.]

TRACK OF A TANK OVER THE HINDENBURG LINE.

north-eastwards. Work is also being done on the defences of Bruges and Zeebrugge, whither the Germans are said to be conveying heavy, but easily transportable, field artillery to replace the fixed position guns.

At Zeebrugge, a warship has always to be ready for sea. It is common talk that the submarines have already been removed from Bruges by train, but I have been unable to obtain reliable confirmation. The Germans try more than ever to prevent any contact between refugees in Dutch Flanders and the inhabitants of the occupied districts. They have been obliged to reduce the sentries along the electric wire, but have adopted a system of electric lamps connected with the wire at short intervals. The stream of fugitives reported to be passing the wire is purely imaginary.

Evidently the Germans did not think their position in the west of Belgium to be very secure, whatever new defensive constructions they might have put up. The recent successful operations of the Allies along the whole battle front had brought this home to them.

The initiative had passed definitely into the hands of Foch, and the German fate was as certain as had been Napoleon's in October, 1813. Emperor, generals and troops were all alike losing heart. They had no chance of manœuvring against a General who thoroughly understood their condition and was pressing onward with indomitable resolution and calcu-



[Photographed during the Armistice.]

THE HINDENBURG LINE NEAR LENS.

lated skill towards the final blow, from which nothing could save them.

In the minds of the Allied Commanders there was no doubt as to what the final result would be. M. Clemenceau on October 3 sent the following reply to congratulations he had received from the Conseil Général of the Department of the Loire :

The Departmental Assemblies have affirmed their desire to see us prosecute our national defence activity with ever-increasing vigour. They may count on the Government as on Marshal Foch, seconded by the magnificent *élite* of military chiefs, Allied as well as French, to profit daily, until the collapse of the enemy, by the decisive advantage afforded by the successes which have been a surprise only to the weak-hearted. The splendid victories of the last few weeks, in which our Allies have so nobly vied with us in *élan*, have definitely decided the fortunes of the war, to the stupefaction of the enemy, who, having grossly blundered in estimating himself, suddenly discovers that he has wrongly estimated us. These are but the first sheaves of the harvest of great rewards, the chief of which will be to deliver the world from an oppression of implacable brutality and at one stroke to throw open the paths of progress to all the permanent centres of human civilization.

Into the abyss of an irreparable defeat Prussian militarism will carry with it the shame of the greatest attempt at evil that a barbaric people can ever have dreamed of. The supreme obstacle to the establishing of right among men is about to disappear, amid the shouts of a victory which it is our duty to turn into a triumph of humanity. Let the final sacrifices demanded by the supreme convulsions of savagery be made. Onward along the road of self-denial, determination, and action—the goal of triumph is in sight !

Our people, who have given so freely of all their strength for the cause of humanity, can no longer count their wounds. They have lived so long in the land of hope that they have the right to the day so long awaited and now dawning. The sole reward they ask is to collaborate with all nations of right conscience in solving the problems of lofty and social justice, which will be the generous fruit of the grandest victory of all ages.

The Allied offensive was for a time hampered, owing to the need for constructing roads across the shell-torn, water-logged area north, east and south of Ypres. Between the Lys and Lens, the army of von Quast was avoiding the blows of Birdwood and the Fifth British Army by continuing its retreat on the Deule-Haute-Deule canal, which from the Lys south of Comines and north of Armentières runs along the western outskirts of Lille in a south-westerly direction east of La Bassée to Pont-à-Vendin (north of Lens) and, then turning east, goes south-eastwards to the Scarpe, just north of Douai. On Thursday, October 3, our line at nightfall ran from Houplines on the Lys, north of Armentières and east of Armentières, now evacuated by the enemy, by Fournes-en-Weppes, Berclare, Wingles, to Vendin-le-Vieil. South-west of the last-named village, Horné's VIIIth Corps, under Hunter-Weston, occupied Lens and its southern suburb of Avion. Some progress was also made between Méricourt and

Oppy, but it was found that von Quast had not abandoned the strongly organized Rouvrois-Fresnos line, or the section of the Drocourt-Quéant line north of the Scarpe, behind it. These formidable obstructions still barred the British advance to Douai.

For the present, they were not to be attacked. Horne's centre, the XXIInd Corps (Godley) and his right, the Canadian Corps (Currie), both south of the Scarpe and the canal of the Sensée, which connects the Scarpe above Douai with the Scheldt below Cambrai, were halted pending the results of the Anglo-American and French operations between Cambrai and the south of St. Quentin. The Canadians were, it is true, close up to the northern outskirts of Cambrai, but von Below's army was still capable of taking the offensive, as had been seen in the violent fighting on October 1 and 2.

It will be remembered that in the battle of September 29—October 2 almost the whole of the Hindenburg fortified zone had been overrun between Cambrai and St. Quentin. Von der Marwitz's troops, however, had not yet been dislodged by Byng and Rawlinson from 6 miles or so of the line midway between Cambrai and St. Quentin, from Lateau to the west of Le Catelet, while just north of St. Quentin a couple of miles of the line had still to be reduced by Debeney.

East of Le Catelet, from Beaufort by Estrées and Sequehart to Fonsomme, five miles or so north-east of St. Quentin, ran the southern part of the Lesdain-Beaufort-Fonsomme line. The northern portion went from Beaufort east of the, as yet, untaken section of the Hindenburg line to Lesdain, five miles south of Cambrai. The concrete redoubts, trenches and wire from Lesdain to Fonsomme formed a continuous fortified position for the Germans barring the way to the Sambre. Once it was passed, the threat to the enemy's communications would, in Sir Douglas Haig's words, "be direct and instant: for nothing," he adds, "but the natural obstacles of a wooded and well-watered country-side lay between our armies and Maubeuge."

The reduction of the two remaining untaken sectors of the Hindenburg line could be accomplished by an advance against and through the part of the Lesdain-Beaufort-Fonsomme line lying between and to the east of them. The village of Le Catelet with the hamlet of Gouy east of it, were included in our objectives. The extreme left of Debeney's army was to assist

between Sequehart,* which we had taken on the 2nd, but had been obliged to abandon again, and Lesdins. It was correctly anticipated that if the push were successful, von der Marwitz would evacuate the northern fragment of the Hindenburg line. When that had happened, Byng, whose army was not to be engaged in the first operation, Rawlinson and Debeney would again attack all along the line and Horne's Canadians storm Cambrai from the north.

The first part of the programme was carried



[Official photograph.]
SALVING THE SCULPTURES FROM A
DAMAGED CHURCH IN ARMENTIÈRES.

out on October 3. The weather was propitious, being fine and clear when at 6.10 a.m. the British who were east of the Escaut-Somme canal moved to the attack. Rightly appreciating the gravity of his position and of the consequences to his comrades if he were beaten, von der Marwitz had concentrated his aircraft, which made frantic but vain efforts to protect their dispirited infantry. On the extreme left, west of the canal, English and Irish troops of the 50th Division, like the French on the extreme right who did not come into action until

* See ante Vol. XIX., p. 454.

10 a.m., awaited the result of the fighting in the centre.

The left of the British, east of the canal, was formed by the 2nd Australian Division, deployed between Mount St. Martin, south of Le Catelet, and the west of Joncourt. At 6.10 a.m., with tanks accompanying them, they advanced behind a powerful barrage, towards the German line and the villages of Beaufevrier and Wiancourt behind it. The Germans were on the higher ground. Apart from the usual defence, there was an important obstacle formed by a channel draining a small local marsh, known by the name of the Fosse d'Usigny, and a powerfully defended house on the eastern outskirts of Estrées.

The channel, which lay in front of Beaufevrier, contained water and was at the bottom of a deep ravine, formed part of the Lesdain-Beaufevrier-Fonsomme system. The house, strengthened by concrete defences, was strongly garrisoned, 200 unwounded prisoners were subsequently taken there with 20 machine-guns. It was not reduced till after noon, the assailants all the while being shelled with mustard-gas shells. The fall of this fort, the key to the line assaulted, greatly facilitated the progress of the Australians north and south of it. They completed the reduction of the defences in front of

Beaufevrier, capturing the eastern end of the ravine, and carried the high ground and a windmill and a farm in the vicinity of the village, whence they could sweep the streets with machine-guns. At 8 p.m. a fresh attack secured them the remainder of the heights between Beaufevrier and Wiancourt.

When the left of the Australians, Queenslanders and others, had passed south and eastward of Gouy, the English and Irish troops of the 50th Division forced the passages of the Escaut-Somme canal, stormed Le Catelet and Gouy. They gained the high ground to the east, and linked up with the Australians north-east of Beaufevrier. The Lateau-Le Catelet sector of the Hindenburg line was turned from the south, as it was already from the north by Byng's troops at Crèvecœur. Counter-attacks at Le Catelet and Gouy in the course of the day were beaten off.

Meantime, south of the Australians, English and Scottish troops of the 32nd Division, at 6.10 a.m., had attacked the Lesdain-Beaufevrier-Fonsomme line and the villages of Wiancourt, Ramicourt, and Sequehart. Tanks lent their assistance. At Wiancourt the enemy fought stubbornly, but we broke through the wire and trench lines, and rushed Ramicourt and Sequehart in the early morning. From



[Photographed during the German occupation.]

ST. QUENTIN.



[Official photograph.]

REFUGEES ABOUT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN THE DISTRICTS NO LONGER UNDER THE ENEMY'S FIRE.

Ramicourt Midlanders advanced and attacked the considerable village of Montbrehain, east of it. For eight hours a fierce struggle for its possession went on, but it was eventually taken. To recover Montbrehain and Sequehart von der Marwitz strained all his resources. Units of no fewer than 38 German battalions, some brought from Cambrai and St. Quentin, representing nine different divisions, were flung into the combat. Mined houses went up at intervals to increase the confusion. Finally, overpowered by numbers, the Midlanders withdrew to Ramicourt.

The counter-attacks at Sequehart were not successful. At 10 a.m. reserves of the 34th German Division were repulsed after hand-to-hand fighting. An hour later, a second counter-attack was dispersed by shell fire. Other counter-attacks followed suit. At the end of the day, we were firmly established on the high ground a mile north-east of Sequehart.

Though we had retired from Montbrehain, the Lesdain-Beauvevoir-Fonsomme line had been penetrated between the north of Beauvevoir and the east of Sequehart. The country in front was green with rolling hills and undamaged trees; the trenches which faced us

were only small practice systems in which the Germans had been trained for raids. Rawlinson's army was at last in the open.

Away to the north Horne and Byng were attacking the northern and southern outskirts of Cambrai, where machine-gunners on the roofs of the houses fired continually at our men. Scots and Midlanders penetrated into the Faubourg St. Sepulchre; a redoubt south of the Faubourg de Paris was secured. Explosions and fires in Cambrai showed that von Below felt that his tenancy of the city was expiring.

While Rawlinson was debouching into open country, the left wing of Debeney south of Sequehart had attacked at 10 a.m. Von Hutier was struggling fiercely to retain the fragment of the Hindenburg line north of St. Quentin, from Lesdins to Morecourt, and, to prevent it from being turned between Sequehart and Lesdins he fought with the utmost determination. The advance of the French at this point was small, but, issuing from St. Quentin, they gained a footing on the railway skirting it on the east and entered the Lisle suburb.

Though Debeney had gained St. Quentin on the Somme and Moy on the Oise, he had

yet to tackle the strong hilly position between the two rivers.

The centre of the southern half of the right wing in the battle-front had been shattered on October 3. The same day in Champagne the centre of the German left wing was also shattered. While Mangin marked time and Guillaumat, taking Cormicy, approached Berry-au-Bac on the Aisne and secured bridgeheads on the Aisne-Marne canal, Gouraud, east of the Suippe, carried the crest of the Blanc Mont and Médéah Farm, obtaining thereby an uninterrupted view over the whole country to the north as far as Attigny on the Aisne. Challerange, on the edge of the Argonne, had been captured the night before. The Moronvillers, Nogent l'Abbesse, Brémont heights were turned from the east. The 2nd American Division, on Gouraud's left, won distinction in the fighting, which was of the fiercest description.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff now realized to the full the fatal effects of a defeat at this vital point. Since September 26 von Einem's 13 divisions had been reinforced by 12 others, and the courage of the German soldiery had been stimulated by every possible means. For example, an order addressed to

the 200th Division, composed of Jaeger regiments, which fell into the French hands, ran as follows:—"It must be driven into the flesh and blood of the men that they must hold their ground. The honour of the officers stands or falls with these positions. When the main line of resistance is at stake there is no such thing as a mobile defence." This was a reversion to the original method of defence in which the front line was to be held at all costs, and the plan employed for the last two years, of holding the advanced lines in front of the main line only sufficiently long to inflict losses on the enemy which diminished his strength so much as to render his success in assaulting the main line very problematical, was to be abandoned. The German troops at this time could not be trusted to retire in orderly fashion from line to line, and if they began to fall back, the movement might be continued indefinitely.

On Friday, October 4, nothing of importance occurred between the region of Le Catelet and the North Sea. Von Quast, however, continued his withdrawal to the Haute-Deule canal and Birdwood his pursuit. But from Le Catelet to the Argonne, with the exception of Mangin's front, the British, the French, and the American



[Official photograph.]

TRANSPORT CROSSING THE CANAL DU NORD BY A SANDBAG CAUSEWAY.



[Official photograph.]

A BATTLEFIELD SCENE IN THE EARLY MORNING.

British and French troops and a disabled tank.

Divisions with Gouraud resolutely kept on the offensive, while in the Argonne and between the Argonne and the Meuse the Americans again attacked.

To commence with, the Americans' capture of Challerange, which is only six or seven miles west of Grand Pré on the Aire at the head of the Argonne, had materially weakened the position of the enemy in the northern Argonne. Liggett in his turn was directed by Foch to advance east of the Argonne, so as to bring the Germans in the forest land under a cross fire. At 5.30 a.m. on October 4, behind and in face of a terrific barrage and counter-barrage, troops from Virginia, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Wisconsin, together with regulars of Major-General R. L. Bullard's corps, set out. Their objective was the southern approaches to the Kriemhilde line, the last fortified zone between the Argonne and the Meuse. This line ran from Grand Pré north of St. Juvin, south of Landres and St. Georges, by the Bois de Romagno and the Bois de Gesnes through the north of the Bois de Cunel and the Bois de Fays. Thence it ran north, following the crest of the hills west of the Meuse, which it joined north of Briulles.

Tanks were at the heels of the American barrage, then came the infantry. On the left the tanks and men made for the villages of Exermont and Fléville, both just east of the high road from Varennes to Grand Pré, which skirts the right bank of the Aire. Our Allies soon gained Exermont and, debouching from it, assaulted Fléville. Hill 240 was next taken

and, in a brisk action, a detachment of the Prussian Guards, counter-attacking, was routed. Some 400 prisoners and six field-guns were secured. There was fighting west of the Aire in the Argonne itself, where 500 Americans under Major Charles W. W. Whittlesy, took Charlevaux Mill in the Binarville region. During the following night they were surrounded by the Germans, but, though they had but two days' supplies, they held out till October 7, when they were rescued. East of Flerville on October 4 the Americans took Gesner. The tanks had greatly helped them in their difficult task.

How those machines appeared to the enemy may be gathered from a Berlin semi-official telegram published a few days later.

Fighting sector. A regiment surrounded by the wooded summits of the Argonne. Morning. It is chilly. Orderlies hurriedly arrive. At the overworked telephone the adjutant is trying to get an idea as to the actual situation. Something is in the air, in spite of moderate artillery fire during the night. Nerves are strained to the utmost. The commander is restless; he must put an end to all doubt about a hollow noise which drives him out of his dug-out. The mist is hanging over the field. Suddenly there is firing from the height in the centre between the regimental fighting sector and the hill occupied by the enemy. At first nobody understands the meaning of these early shots, but soon there is no further doubt. Anti-tank guns are firing. Suddenly, as though rising from the ground, black colossal forms in a long line approach from the valley with a hollow bellowing sound. Twelve, 15, 16, 19 tanks. They have a ghostly appearance that makes the blood freeze. The tension is general. Will the anti-tanks be able to master the situation?

West of the Argonne on the 4th, Gouraud exploited to the full his victory of the day



WHERE LENS ONCE STOOD.

[Official photograph.]

before. Challerange was, indeed, for a brief time evacuated, but the Germans, constantly shelled, were unable to re-occupy the village. Gouraud, temporarily leaving aside the Argonne, was turning westwards against the communications of the enemy on the Moronvillers and Nogent l'Abbesse heights. Orfeuil and St. Etienne-à-Arnes were secured, and the Arnes reaches five miles north-west of Somme-Py, while his left advanced two and a half miles north of Auberive at the south-eastern foot of the Moronvillers heights. The villages of Vaudesineourt and Dontrien on the Suipe below Auberive were secured, as were also St. Souplet and the woods in the region of the Grand Bellois. No frontal attack had been made on the tiers of pill-boxes with which von Einem had strengthened the height of Notre Dame des Champs between Somme-Py and St. Souplet. They were isolated in the course of the advance.

Simultaneously Guillaumat's army crossed the Aisne-Marne canal and reached Bernericourt. After dark, fires on the Brémont heights and in the valley betwixt them and the Nogent l'Abbesse massif showed that von Mudra was in retreat.

Thus by the night of the 4th, von Einem and von Mudra were being obliged to release their grip on the bloodstained Moronvillers heights and those hills where, since September, 1914, had been posted the guns which had wrecked Reims Cathedral.

Away to the north-west, too, the day had gone badly for Germany. The army of Debeney had stormed Morecourt and had penetrated Lesdain. To the south of Sequehart it had carried Chardin Vert and secured strongly fortified woods. The fragment of the Hindenburg line north of St. Quentin was almost reduced, the enemy's vigorous counter-attacks had been bloodily repulsed, and 400 prisoners with four heavy guns had been captured.

In conjunction with Debeney, Rawlinson had also been engaged. He had made substantial progress south-east of Beaurevoir and north of Gouy and Le Catelet, taking over 800 prisoners.

On Saturday, October 5, the results of the operations in the two preceding days began to be perceived. Menaced by Rawlinson's progress north of Le Catelet and Gouy, von der Marwitz evacuated the remainder of the Hindenburg line and the high ground known as the La Terrière Plateau in the bend of the Eseau-Somme canal. Byng's troops promptly crossed to the eastern bank and swarmed up on to the abandoned positions. To the north of Beaurevoir the left of Rawlinson got possession of Aubencheul-aux-Bois and crossed the ridge running towards Lesdain.

Meantime the Australians, supported by English troops, attacked Beaurevoir. The Germans fought with courage, and it was not till nightfall that the village was gained by English troops. South of the road to Le

Cateau, the Australians early in the morning cleared the enemy out of the ruins of Montbréhain. There was a hard struggle at the cemetery south-west of it, but, surrounded on all sides, the village was speedily reduced. The German LV. Corps, also defending Beaufort, repeatedly attempted to regain Montbréhain. Charge succeeded charge. But our tanks moved up and ploughed a way through the enemy's columns. At nightfall the village was still in our hands. This minor offensive of Rawlinson was supported by Debeney, whose left, foot by foot, expelled the Germans from the height three-quarters of a mile from the east of Chardin Vert and from the woods near it, and pushed eastwards of Lesdain.

On the 5th, also, the area north of the Aisne again became active. In the Ostel-Soupir region the Italian contingent on Mangin's left forced their way up the spur leading to the Chemin-des-Dames and carried the trenches across the neck of the spur.

It was, however, for the events south of the Aisne that October 5 was chiefly memorable. During the preceding night von Mudra and von Einem on a front of 28 miles had retreated to the Suippe and the Arnes. The pursuit at once began. Fort Brément was occupied, the Nogent l'Abbesse massif was surrounded and the Moronvillers ridge secured. By sunset

Guillaumat's vanguard was across the Suippe at Orainville and Gouraud's troops were beyond the Arnes at numerous points. Several hundreds of prisoners had been taken and Reims was finally freed.

In the valley of the Aire, the same day, the Americans had been struggling from dawn till sunset to capture Hill 244 and a hill north of Chatel Chéhery. The counter-attacks of von Gallwitz's troops issuing from the Kriemhilde line had been repulsed. Breuillos, north of which the line touched the Meuse, was in flames.

On Sunday, October 6, the ding-dong battle between the Meuse and the Aire continued without decisive results. In Champagne the troops of Gouraud reached the wooded crests north of the Arnes. The Suippe was reached at Pont Faverges and west of it, and the Nogent l'Abbesse massif secured and passed. Near the junction of the Suippe and Aisne the advanced guards of Guillaumat from the Aisne-Marne canal approached Aguilcourt. In the region of Lesdain and between Lesdain and the east of Sequechart the troops of Debeney advanced, though strongly opposed. Rawlinson and Byng rested their wearied troops, but, north of the Scarpe, Horne's VIII. Corps took Fresnoy. The fires which continued to be observed in Cambrai and also in Douai pointed to a speedy evacuation by the enemy of both cities.



A FOURTEEN-INCH AMERICAN RAILWAY GUN IN THE ARGONNE.

(American official photograph.)

Horne with the Fifth Army now joined in. While Byng and Rawlinson were preparing for another move forward, Hunter-Weston with the VIII. Corps on Monday, October 7, struck at the Rouvroy-Fresnes line, the outer of the remaining defences of Douai. The plan was to get through at the Scarpe end of the line and then roll up the garrison. At 5 a.m. Middlesex, West Yorks, Devon and Worcester troops attacked on a front of 3,500 yards. Biache, on the Scarpe, north-east of the famous site of Rœux, was stormed and the advance carried to a depth of 5,000 yards.

Meanwhile, north of St. Quentin the struggle between Debeney and von Hutier continued with redoubled violence. Steadily the Germans were driven back, 700 prisoners being taken. On the Aisne the troops of Guillaumat secured the important crossing of Berry-au-Bac on the Reims-Laon road. On the Suippe-Arnes front von Mudra and von Einem did everything that they could to drive the advancing French back across the rivers. But, after a murderous contest, a fortified system which defended the southern outskirts of l'Ile-sur-Suippe was carried by our Allies, who reached the edge of St. Etienne-sur-Suippe. At two more points the Suippe was crossed by French detachments. A few hours later Bazancourt was captured. From Bazancourt ran the well-known railway to Grand Pré. In the morning of the

same day Liggott's men, just after dawn, crossed the Aire under cover of a mist and at 8.40 a.m. gained Chatel Chéhery. They next stormed Hills 180 and 223, and, later, Hill 244, which hills commanded the valley of the Aire.

The comparative slowness with which Liggett advanced was largely accounted for by the fact that his right was exposed to the fire of von Gallwitz's artillery east of the Meuse. North of Verdun, the Allied line roughly remained as it was at the termination of the Fourth Battle of Verdun. It left the Meuse just north of Samogneux and proceeded across the Meuse Heights south of Beaumont and west and south of the twin Hills of Ornes into the Wœvre. The Americans on the left bank of the river were some seven miles north-north-west of our line across it, and consequently their communications were under the observation and fire of the German gunners in the wooded hilly region opposite.

To give Liggett more elbow room for his projected blow at the Kriemhilde line, French and American divisions, on October 8, attacked between the Ornes hills and the Meuse. They stormed Brabant and Consuege on the river bank and, to the east of Brabant, Haumont and Beaumont. Some 1,600 prisoners were taken by the French together with 18 heavy mortars; the Americans captured about 1,400 Germans. The same day Liggett's men cap-



THE SMOKING RUINS OF REIMS.

tured Cornay, west of the Aire, some five miles south-east of Grand Pré, while Gouraud thrust his right somewhat farther into the Northern Argonne.

South-west of Cornay (which must not be confused with Cornay) on the western edge of the forest, troops secured the plateau north-east of Autry and reached the outskirts of



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH FIREMEN IN A BURNING VILLAGE.

Lançon. The French were steadily pushing up both banks of the Upper Aisne to its confluence with the Aire, the valley of which was being simultaneously cleared of Germans by the Americans. Sooner or later, French and Americans would meet at or near Grand Pré, and any enemy left in the Argonne would be in danger of capture. Farther west, Gouraud enlarged his success of the previous days. Supported by tanks, his men, north of the Arnes, drove back the enemy two miles. He was well backed up by Guillaumat. On the Suipe the fighting continued from dawn to nightfall, von Mudra making violent but ineffective efforts to capture the French bridge-heads at Bazancourt, Pont Givart and Oranville. The German reverses on the 8th were not confined to the Meuse, Argonne, Arnes and Suipe district. Between St. Quentin and Cambrai the enemy was completely defeated that day by Debenev, Byng,

Rawlinson and Horne's right, and north of the Scarpe by Horne's left.


On this occasion our leaders decided to assault the German centre three hours before his wings were engaged, and that the attacks on the wings should begin at different times.

The rain which had fallen during the previous night, further dispirited the demoralized foe, whose left had been already ejected from the Lesclain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line. The plan for reducing the remainder of that line and for driving back von der Marwitz and von Hutier to the Sambre and Oise was as follows. While Horne's Canadians continued to work their way into Cambrai from the north-west, Byng's 57th Division and Horne's 63rd Royal Naval Division, under Major-General C. A. Blacklock, with Byng's 2nd and 3rd Divisions were to hold fast the Germans in the southern suburbs of the city; move eastwards across the level plateau intersected with sunken roads, and storm the village of Niergnies. On the right an advance was to be made up the long narrow valley, which runs north-eastwards to Seranvillers and the high ground round Wambaix. Just east of Wambaix goes



A FRENCH TANK CROSSING A SHELL-HOLE.

the trunk railroad, Lille-Cambrai-Hirson-Mezières-Metz, joined between Le Cateau and Bohain by the trunk railroad Liège-Namur-Charleroi-Maubeuge-St. Quentin-Paris. The latter communication had been crossed by the Allies at St. Quentin and southwards. The cutting of the former would force the enemy henceforth to communicate between Lille and Metz by the railroad Lille-Valenciennes-Avesnes-Hirson-Metz, which would be



NEW ZEALANDERS ATTACKING ACROSS A STREAM.

speedily under the fire of the British guns, if Cambrai and the ground to the south-east passed into our possession.

Below, the 57th, 63rd, 2nd and 3rd Divisions, the New Zealand Division and the 37th Division were detailed to reduce the northern end of the Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line, which terminated at Lesdain in a valley traversed by the Esnes torrent, a tributary of the Scheldt. The valley divided the Wambaix heights from those farther south. The carrying of the rest of the line was reserved for the 21st and 38th Divisions. In front of the town of Villers-Outréaux the line was peculiarly formidable, and from the outskirts of that town northwards to Esnes, east of Lesdain was a tributary flowing into the Esnes stream. East of the latter were the fortified villages of Malinecourt and Walincourt and the strongly organized wood at the latter point.

In the open country between Villers-Outréaux and Beaurevoir the 66th Division, which included the Connaught Rangers, Dublins and Inniskillings, and the 25th Division, were to move on Serain, south-east of Malinecourt. At 1 a.m. Welsh troops of the 38th Division were to storm Villers-Outréaux.

From the east of Beaurevoir to the east of Montbréhain was aligned the 30th American Division, under General Lewis, comprising troops from North and South Carolinas and Tennessee. Its left was to advance from Ponchaux up the road to Le Cateau and to capture Prémont, south-east of Serain. The Le Cateau road passes between Serain and Prémont. The right of the Americans was to take Brancourt. On the extreme right of the Anglo-Americans, between Montbréhain and Sequehart, the 6th Division had the task of dislodging the enemy from the high ground east and south-east of Montbréhain. In the coming battle it will be observed that representatives from almost all of the English-speaking races were to be employed.

The front measured some 17 miles, and was prolonged southwards over six miles and more by the left wing of Debeney, which was ordered to storm Fontaine-Uterte, south-east of Sequehart, and, if possible, to turn the Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line from the south.

It was at 1 a.m., as already indicated, that the battle began by the advance of the Welsh troops on Villers-Outréaux. Our intensive artillery fire commenced a little past midnight, but the Germans thought that it was only an

attempt to annoy them, and they retired to their dug-outs. Suddenly they were startled by the shouts of their sentinels in the little town crying out that the British were upon them. Emerging into the pitch darkness and drenching rain, they closed with their adversaries, and a fierce and prolonged combat ensued. German reserves came up and the Welsh had temporarily to retire. At 4.30 a.m. the fight opened in other sectors, and by 5.10 a.m. the battle was joined at all points. The Welshmen returned, assisted by tanks and, after bitter fighting, Villers-Outréaux was taken.

Far away on the left the Canadians north-west of Cambrai were engaged. South of Cambrai the 57th Division kept up a fusillade and machine-gun fire against the Faubourg de Paris and the other outskirts of the city. The rain had ceased, only to fall again between 6 and 7 o'clock. Niergnies, drenched with shells by our guns, was on fire. The "Ansons" and other battalions of the 63rd Royal Naval Division, shortly before 8 a.m., broke into the village. From the sunken road between Niergnies and Awoingt to its north-north-east, seven tanks—including some British which had been captured—emerged, and followed by German infantry, delivered a counter-attack. Our men fell back. Anti-tank guns promptly came into action. Four tanks were knocked out by them, and a fifth destroyed by a German field-gun taken by us. The remaining two turned tail. As for the German infantry, it was dispersed by our guns. Niergnies was retaken, with the help of British tanks, and our line pushed eastward nearly to the trench-railway. South of Niergnies our troops also, aided by tanks, stormed Seranvillers, and established themselves on the high ground west of Wambaix. Two tanks entered Wambaix itself, causing much havoc and panic.

Tanks were also instrumental in the clearing of Lesdain. From Lesdain, up the Esnes Valley, the New Zealanders, overcoming numerous machine-gun emplacements, marched forward and entered Esnes before 9 a.m.—the Rifles on the left, the South Island Brigade on the right.

Above the valley on the sloping ground to the south, English County troops dislodged the enemy from the Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line. The Germans fell back on the Brisieux Wood and a group of farms between Esnes and Villers-Outréaux. Abruleyard, north of Villers-Outréaux, held out until it

was bombed from the air. Brisieux Wood was surrounded and Malincourt captured. As already related, Villers-Outréaux was ultimately taken by the Welsh.

Equally successful were the operations of the 66th and 25th Divisions of the Americans, and our 6th Division. The Germans retired helter skelter before the 66th, abandoning Serain and a battery of heavy howitzers. But they rallied again and, reinforced, they re-entered Serain, but the Connaught Rangers, with a bayonet charge, sent them flying out, and they then evacuated Elincourt, north of Serain, and east of Malincourt, at midnight. The Americans, attacking at 5.10 a.m., after a savage tussle carried Brancourt, and, storming Fraicourt Hill and Wood, captured Prémont. They took over 1,600 prisoners. On the extreme right of the British attack the 6th Division and troops of another English Division drove the enemy from the ridge east and south-east of Montbréhain, and secured the hamlet of Beauregard.

In this battle several thousands of prisoners and many guns were taken. Debeney's left, in spite of stubborn resistance, had also made important progress. Fontaine-Uterte and the Bellecœur Farm were gained, together with the

wood east of Tilloy and Hill 134. In the north-eastern outskirts of St. Quentin, the village of Rouvrois, in marshy land, was captured. Some 1,200 prisoners had been taken by the French.

The success between Cambrai and St. Quentin was supplemented on the 8th by another north of the Scarpe. It will be recollected that, on the 7th, Horne's VIII. Corps had broken the southern part of the Rouvrois-Fresnes line. On the 8th, the East Lancashires, Sherwood Foresters, Northhamptons and Rifles, victoriously assaulted the north part, while the advance was also pushed on the south. The villages of Neuville and Fresnes were taken, and on the 9th and 10th our line was advanced to within 300 yards of the northern sector of the Drocourt-Quéant line, the last barrier between us and Douai.

Reverting to the Cambrai-St. Quentin battlefield, we have seen that by nightfall on October 8, the remainder of the Hindenburg and the whole of the Lesdain-Beaurevoir-Fonsomme lines had been won. At 1.30 on the morning of Wednesday, October 9, detachments of the 3rd Canadian Division crossed the Escaut and entered Cambrai while the 57th Division pushed into the city from the south. At 4 a.m. the Canadians and the British troops gained



A REST ON THE ROAD TO LE CATEAU.



[Official photograph.]

A PATROL OF NORTH LANCASHIRES MARCHING INTO CAMBRAI.

contact in the chief square of Cambrai, and in the course of the day the whole of the town fell into our hands. Steps were at once taken to extinguish the fire lit by the Germans. The latter were retreating with the utmost rapidity, and doing their best, by the destruction of bridges and setting villages on fire, to hinder pursuit.

Thus was gained the important tactical point which it had been the object of the Allies to win and the Germans to cling on to ever since November 1917. All the environs of the town had been reduced to ruin. Along the road from Bapaume through Fontaine-notre-Dame the destruction of the houses bore testimony to the prolonged and arduous nature of the struggle. Bourlon Wood, that much-disputed point, presented now a very different aspect from that which it had a-twelvemonth before. The trees had been largely swept away by artillery fire and destroyed by the gas shells which both sides had showered on them. The immediate outskirts of the town had suffered considerably; but in Cambrai itself, although the enemy had undoubtedly endeavoured to wreak his vengeance on it, the damage to buildings was not as great as might have been expected. There were big fires in the Place du Théâtre, and beyond the Place d'Armes, but

the higher part of the city had suffered little injury, and there were many houses, and even streets, which had not been touched. Still standing on a wall was the proclamation by the German Commandant of Cambrai, ordering the evacuation of the town on September 7 and 8. It ran: "In the interests of security, the inhabitants of Cambrai will be evacuated to a region farther removed from the War Zone." On each day a train carrying 1,500 people left the town, and the baggage they could take with them was so small that it practically meant that nothing but a hand-bag could be carried by each person. The German soldiers, probably acting under orders, had performed their usual work of devastation and made away what was left behind. Great houses and small had their contents pillaged or ruined, and the deeds done were of the most wanton character. But that was so usual that it scarcely excited comment, though naturally it raised indignation. There is no doubt that the German-created ruin would have been greater but for the immediate pursuit of their retreating troops. So close did we follow on their heels, that even the German incendiary parties were unable to get to work in some of the villages.

One characteristic of the way in which the enemy made war was well exemplified by the

way in which they destroyed the costly machines which the inhabitants employed at Selvigny and Walincourt, amongst other villages, for making embroidery and tulle. These were deliberately smashed up by the German command, as part of their general scheme to render



Official photograph.

A CHURCH TOWER IN CAMBRAI.

these French industries impossible. At the village of Serain the Germans had hoisted a large Red Cross flag, and our artillery fire was therefore not directed against it, but immediately we captured the place they turned their own guns on it. The object of the red cross had apparently been to save the inhabitants from our fire, and we had accepted it. Naturally this was no reason why, in the German eyes, they should do the same.

North of Cambrai the Canadians captured Morenchies and Ramillies—not Marlborough's Ramillies—and the bridge-heads over the Escant as far as Eswars. North-west of Eswars they secured Cuvillers and Bantigny. South of Cambrai at 5.20 a.m. Byng's and Rawlinson's men, preceded by cavalry, resumed the attack. The roads converging on Le Cateau had been

reported by our airmen to be blocked with German troops and transport, and every effort was made to convert the disorderly retreat of the enemy into a rout. The cavalry prevented him from completing the destruction of the Cambrai-St. Quentin railway, and when our infantry was held up by heavy machine-gun fire from Cattigny Wood and Clary, a dashing charge of the Canadian Fort Garry Horse gained a footing in Cattigny Wood and assisted our infantry to clear it. Canadian cavalry and the Dragoon Guards helped to capture Honneehy, Reumont and Troisvilles. When the sun set we were across the Cambrai-Le Cateau road and within two miles of Le Cateau. On the St. Quentin-Le Cateau road we had gained Bohain, where the road from Cambrai to Guise crosses it. The Lille-Metz railroad was cut and another sector of the Liège-Paris railroad was held by us and Debeney's troops, before whom the Germans, threatened by the movement of the British towards the Sambre, were in full retreat. The French had passed Fonsomme, and were sweeping the Germans from the high ground between the Somme and the Oise; they had occupied Mezières-sur-Oise, north of Moy. Some 2,000 prisoners and machine-guns had been taken.

The moment had not yet come for Mangin to advance. Nor on the 9th did Guillaumat do more than consolidate his positions on the Aisne and Snippe. Gouraud, however, north of the Arnes, drew nearer to Conroy and, west of the Argonne, he took Mantehentin and Grand Ham, the latter on the left bank of the Upper Aisne. That river was crossed north and south of Grand Ham and the villages of Senue and Lançon were taken. Senue was but three miles south-west of Grand Pré.

Simultaneously on the 9th Liggett's army, west of the Meuse, after a preliminary bombardment of 18 hours, assaulted and pierced the Kriemhilde line in the Cunel Wood, a very meritorious performance, seeing that the German engineers had lavished barbed wire on this line and provided it with deep concrete dug-outs, and innumerable machine-gun emplacements.

The next day, Thursday, October 10, the French and Americans north of Verdun resumed their advance, and, pushing down the east bank of the Meuse, captured Sivry. The flank of Liggett's army, about to assault the whole Kriemhilde line, was secured from material interruption by the German artillery

across the river. Two to six miles behind that line, which protected the Lille-Metz railway, already cut by the British east of Cambrai, von Gallwitz was hastily constructing another fortified zone, the Freya line.

The day before the Kriemhilde line had, as mentioned, been breached in the Cunel Wood near the Meuse. On the 10th Liggett went forward to assault its western end at Grand Pré. By nightfall the Americans were in the northern outskirts of the Argonne Forest in front of the village. The struggle in the ravined and marshy woodland had been of the most arduous nature. At places the barbed wire to be traversed was 500 yards deep, and the concrete villages on the light railways had proved tough nuts to crack. Garrisoned by snipers and machine-gunners, they had exacted a heavy toll from the assailants.

Grand Pré, four miles east of the Upper Aisne, remained to be taken. Its importance lay in the fact that it was the connecting point between the Kriemhilde and the Hunding lines. Immediately north of Grand Pré was a hill, converted into a machine-gun fortress, and hard by was Loges Wood with its steep wooded sides and ravines affording admirable cover for numerous guns and machine-guns. Grand Pré was the key to both the Kriemhilde

and the Hunding lines, and it was on the Hunding line that the armies of von Einem, Eberhardt, von Mudra and von Carlowitz were retreating.

From Grand Pré the Hunding line proceeded north-westwards with the Aisne at its foot, through Vouziers to Rethel and Château Porcien, where it turned south-westwards, leaving the Aisne opposite Asfeld. It then ran north-westwards across hilly ground and, 12 miles or so east of Laon, entered the plain, crossed the Laon-Mezières railway and at Dercy, 10 miles north of Laon, reached the Serre, a tributary of the Oise running parallel with the Aisne. Along the right bank of the Serre it went west-south-west to La Fère, where the Serre joins the Oise.

The chief defects of the Hunding line were that, like the St. Gobain-Chemin-des-Dames section of the Hindenburg Line, it was outflanked by the advance of Debenedy through St. Quentin, and also that between Dercy and Asfeld no obstacle in the shape of a river or canal guarded the face fronting the oncoming armies of Guillaumat and Mangin.

While the Franco-Americans east and the Americans west of the Meuse and in the Argonne were advancing, Gouraud had not been idle. On October 17 his right wing



[Official photograph.]

CANAL BRIDGE AT CAMBRAI DESTROYED BY THE RETREATING GERMANS.

established contact with the Americans on the outskirts of the Argonne, south of Grand Pré. Meanwhile Guillaumat's army progressed north of Berry-au-Bac on the Aisne; Mangin, with the assistance of Italian troops, cleared the enemy from the centre of the Chemin-des-Dames.

From the reports of the airmen it was evident that von Einem and von Mudra were on the point of retreating to the Aisne, Eberhardt from the Aisne to the Hunding line, and that von Carlowitz was about to evacuate his last



[French official photograph.]

THE CATHEDRAL OF CAMBRAI.

strongholds on the Chemin-des-Dames, Laon and the St. Gobain forest-land. The decision to abandon the bastion between the Aisne and the Oise had been taken owing to the victorious advance eastwards of Debeney, Rawlinson, Byng and Horne.

On October 10 Debeney occupied the heights dominating the west bank of the Oise from the

north of La Fère to Guise. The same day Rawlinson and Byng, in open country, drove before them the beaten divisions of von der Marwitz. The enemy rallied on the little river Selle, a tributary of the Escaut. Nevertheless, Le Cateau was stormed and the Selle crossed immediately to the north of the town. South of Le Cateau Americans in the evening seized Vaux, Andigny and St. Souplet, and our patrols approached the Oise and Sambre canal.

After some four years the British had returned to the spot where Smith-Dorrien, against orders and overwhelming odds, had given battle to von Kluck on August 26, 1914.

Byng's troops on October 10 west of Solesmes reached St. Vaast and St. Aubert, while Horne's Canadians, skirting the east bank of the Escaut, advanced from Cambrai up the road to Valenciennes and threatened the communications of von Below's troops defending the portion of the Drocourt-Quéant line north of the Scarpe. Against this section of the Drocourt-Quéant line details of Horne's 8th Division of the VIII. Corps were to be launched the next morning (October 11). From Lens to the North Sea Birdwood and Plumer, King Albert and Degoutte were busy with preparations for the advance which was to wrest from the Germans Lille, Bruges, Ostend and Zeebrugge. Von Quast and von Armin were trying to create entrenched lines to bar the expected forward movement of the Allies. Von Armin, in addition, was holding the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge, meanwhile transporting inland as many of the guns of the coast batteries as he could move. It was a prudent measure, as they were now liable to be attacked and bombarded from the land as well as from the sea and air.

It was not, however, till October 14 that the storm burst on von Armin. The three days intervening were packed with incidents distressing to him and to his fellow-commanders. At 5.10 a.m. on Friday, October 11, Horne launched the 8th Division of the VIII. Corps at the northern sector of the Drocourt-Quéant line. The attack had been preceded by a very heavy barrage which, at the rate of a hundred yards every eight minutes, worked gradually up the German trenches from the Scarpe at Vitry towards Drocourt. The German garrisons in the dugouts and machine-gun emplacements mostly fled eastwards as the tide of bursting shells approached them. By 7 a.m. the three lines of trenches were carried, and our



ALBERT, KING OF THE BELGIANS.

Commanded the International Force which pursued the Germans through Belgium.

front brought forward 4,000 yards on the flanks and 8,000 yards in the centre. The Devons, Berkshires and Middlesex occupied the forsaken trenches and dugouts. A platoon of the Middlesex had crossed the Searpe at Vitry and taken Mont Metier, an eminence about 1,000 yards south of the river.

In the next two days the 8th Division, fiercely opposed by the Germans, drew nearer to Douai, and by the evening of October 13 they had reached its western suburbs. As Horne's XXII. Corps on October 9 had crossed the Sensée marshes and captured Arleux and the island bounded by the Searpe, Sensée and Sensée Canal, Douai was also being reached from the south as well as from the west. On the east it was being turned by the same corps, which, on October 11, replaced the Canadians. The latter, with the 56th and 11th British Divisions were aligned from Brebières on the Searpe through Arleux to the west of Iwuy. The XXII. Corps, repulsing a counter-attack at 11 a.m. on October 11, in which the enemy had employed four British captured Tanks and

one of their own, enveloped the German positions at Iwuy and won a footing in the village. The next day (October 12), under a very heavy enfilade artillery fire from north of the Sensée and east of the Selle, our troops captured the whole of Iwuy and reached Avesnes-lo-Sec. The German guns and machine-guns prevented for the moment further progress. The XXII Corps halted, pending the results of Byng's and Rawlinson's operations on the Selle.

To maintain the line of the Selle, Hindenburg and Ludendorff bent all their activities. That river and the Forest of Mormal, through which ran the Lille-Valenciennes-Hirson-Metz railways east of it, were the sole natural defences against a British advance along the north bank of the Sambre to the environs of Charleroi, which is only 10 miles from Namur, where the Sambre joins the Meuse. It empties itself into the Eseat south of Denain, where Villars defeated Prince Eugene in the last great battle of the War of the Spanish Succession. Just south-west of Denain is Bouchain, the reduction of which was the final military exploit of

Marlborough. The angle formed by the confluence of the Selle and Scheldt was, north of Avesnes-le-Sec, strongly held by the enemy, who was thus able to outflank and enfilade our troops endeavouring to cross the Selle. From Le Cateau to its head-waters the Selle approaches and runs parallel with the Sambre-Oise Canal. To march round the head-waters and move northwards between the

bank near Neuville were enlarged and Briastre was captured by the New Zealanders.

In the afternoon of October 13, under cover of a heavy bombardment, the enemy unsuccessfully counter-attacked the bridgeheads with infantry and tanks, and by nightfall the west bank of the Selle was almost everywhere in British or American hands, from the head-waters down to Haspres near Avesnes-le-Sec. At



[Official photograph.]

LOADING WHIPPET TANKS.

Selle and the Canal was not easy, because, east of Bohain, there was difficult wooded country in the way. At this end the enemy was in strength and his guns in the woods round Bohain, like those north of Avesnes-le-Sec, commanded the crossings of the river. Along the higher ground on the east bank trenches had been dug and machine-gun posts established; there was also a good deal of wire. As previously mentioned, north of Le Cateau, near Neuville, we had crossed by wading or swimming; but, until the enemy had been dislodged from the villages and strong points on the west bank, it would have been hazardous to advance farther. During October 11, 12 and 13 our troops were engaged in driving rear-guards from the villages north and west of Solesmes and in local fighting between Solesmes and Le Cateau. The bridgeheads on the east

several points we were on the east bank, and we had pressed forward in the Bohain woods. The troops were cheered by the knowledge that since October 8 no fewer than 12,000 prisoners and 250 guns had been taken by Byng and Rawlinson. Twenty British Infantry, two British Cavalry and one American Infantry Division between them had routed twenty-four German Divisions. The enemy's discipline was fast deteriorating, as had been revealed by an intercepted order from the Kaiser's Adjutant-General to the German Army:—

"His Majesty the Kaiser," it ran, "is displeased to note that when he is passing through villages, along roads, by a railway crossing, and so forth, the troops fail to pay him the necessary respect, and the inhabitants fail to greet him in the proper way by removing their headgear. This must be seen to."

The three days preceding the renewed attack of the Anglo-Franco-Belgians in Belgium witnessed German reverses or retreats along the French front from the region east of St. Quentin to the Argonne. Flaming villages in the Oise valley marked the retirement of von Hutier's army in front of Debeney's. On the Chemin-des-Dames the troops of Mangin, with the Italians operating under him, on October 11 forced back von Carlowitz's men beyond the road which, by Troyon, crosses the ridge and proceeds to Laon. At last Troyon, Courtecon and Cerny-en-Laonnais were finally cleared of the Germans, who were now huddled together on the narrow eastern end of the ridge and in the ruins of Craonne below it.

South of the Aisne during the night of October 10-11 von Mudra's and von Einom's

the Retourne, a southern tributary of the Aisne at Hondilcourt, and Sault-St. Remy. Farther east Cauroy and Maehault, on the road from Reims to Vouziers, were taken by Gouraud and, three miles south of Vouziers, the village of Savigny-sur-Aisne. The German retreat on the Hunding line, menaced by Debeney at its western end and by Liggett at its eastern extremity, was in full swing



[Canadian War Record].
NEW PICKELHAUBEN FOUND IN A
CELLAR IN CAMBRAI.

armies again decamped before Guillaumat's and Gouraud's forces. Behind a fan of cavalry the French infantry on October 11 crossed the Suippe, and, overcoming the resistance of the rearguards, captured Bertrécourt and reached



[Russell].
GENERAL HON. SIR JULIAN BYNG,
K.C.B.

Commanded the Third Army.

The next day, Saturday, October 12, the enemy was pursued on a front of 90 miles between the north of St. Quentin and the south of Grand Pré. The left wing of Debeney moved up the west bank of the Oise and crossed the river and canal at two points east of St. Quentin, well to the north of the Hunding line. His right wing forced its way into the mine-sown forest of St. Gobain and reached the centre of the wooded hill country. Simultaneously Foch directed Mangin and the Italians on Laon. Capturing the remainder of the Chemin-des-Dames and pouring across the Ailette, the French and Italians at nightfall were only two miles south of Laon and Mangin's cavalry was in the plain $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles north-east of Craonne; his infantry was in Berriex, two miles behind. What Nivelle had aimed at in April, 1917, was now being achieved by Mangin a year and a half later. It was this moment of French success that the Germans chose for the distribution of fatuous leaflets such as that given below. It claimed to be a French translation

of a leading article published in a Moscow newspaper, which was entitled "The Wish to Kill."

At the present moment (it said) it is absolutely evident that the wish to kill starts from the White House at Washington and is concentrated in the person of President Wilson. What difference is there between Wilson of the University of Philadelphia and a Nero? The one defends his thesis, the continuation of the war, before the American Senate. The other used to defend each of his crimes before the Senate of Rome. What belm can the rhetorical niceties of the President bring



[From a German photograph.]

LAON CATHEDRAL

As a hospital for German wounded.

to the men who have been sacrificed in this war? In face of the cruel truth that human blood has been flowing without a break for now nearly five years, it is natural that we should point out to human justice the man whom humanity will be able to accuse of the prolongation of the hideous butchery. To-day the nations are longing for peace. Only England and America attempt to remain deaf to pacific proposals, whether they are due to the initiative of the Russian Government, of the Pope, or of a neutral State. Their one and only answer is, "To the end." To what end?

The gifted author then proceeded to ask President Wilson:—

Must Europe perish, must the human race disappear from the face of the globe? Or do you wish that the ancient Continent should from now on be nothing but a vast cemetery where there would reign, to the great joy of American millionaires, the calm of a peace that would really be eternal?

No commentary is needed on such rubbish,

but it explains the peculiar mentality of the Germans, who could believe for a moment that it would affect the soldiers of France, burning to avenge the atrocities perpetrated on their beloved country during the past four and a half years.

From Berriex the French front of pursuit ran for about five miles to the south of Amifontaine and then dropped down to Neufchatel—east of Berry-au-Bac—on the Aisne, the course of which it followed as far as Blanzly in the direction of Asfeld, opposite to which the Hunding line left the Aisne for the Serre. The army of Eberhardt was in full retreat, hotly pursued by Guillaumat, whose left wing had crossed the Aisne at Guignicourt and Neufchatel. His right wing, south of the Aisne, had forced the passage of the Retourne, advanced 6½ miles and captured Asfeld, while Gouraud had hunted the defeated Germans into the loop of the Aisne. By the evening Gouraud was only three miles south of Rethel, and his patrols were in the outskirts of Attigny. In the morning troops of his right wing had entered Vouziers.

The battle which opened in Champagne on September 26 [Marshal Foch announced] has come to a close after 17 days of fighting and the complete defeat of the enemy. . . . The total number of prisoners taken by the Fourth Army, Gouraud's alone, since the beginning of this offensive amounts to 21,567, including 499 officers. It has captured in addition over 600 guns, 3,500 machine-guns, 200 minenwerfer, several hundreds of wagons, and a great quantity of munitions and material of all kinds.

Gouraud had finished the task commenced by Langle de Cary in September, 1915, at the battle of the Champagne-Pouilleuse.

On Sunday, October 13, at daybreak Debeney's troops captured La Fère, crossed the railway from La Fère to Laon near Danizy and Versigny, and reached the southern bank of the Serre as far as the station of Courbes. Von Carlowitz's incendiaries at once set fire to the villages south of the Serre, and his men retired on the Hunding line. Debeney's and Mangin's battalions completed the reduction of the St. Gobain massif, and at 10 a.m. Mangin's vanguard ascended the hill and entered Laon. A *Times* Correspondent at midnight sent off a report of what he saw that day:

The approach to the town across the Laffaux plateau, past the barely distinguishable beginning of the Chemin des Dames and the crumbling remains of the Malmaison Fort, and then across the Ailette and the canal down into the swampy meadowlands of the Ardon valley, where every shell hole is filled with stagnant water and the broken road is pestilent with the carcases of dead horses, is as horrible a picture of the desolation



GENERAL MANGIN DELIVERS LAON TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

The scene at the review of troops following the ceremony.

of war as any that I have seen. From the crest of the plateau as far as you can see for miles and miles right and left stretch after stretch of bare dreary wastes are pitted with the dumb unsightly mouths of shell holes, and the road in front and behind and on each side is littered with the hideous rubbish that battles leave in their wake, including a great profusion of shells and shell baskets and coil upon coil of rusty wire abandoned by the enemy in his flight. Across the top of the plateau every tree that is still standing is a naked and stunted skeleton. For the heroism of the human flesh and blood that for month after month faced those hurricanes of steel and fire and poisoned gas, and pressed on through them to victory, no praise and gratitude can be enough. The real monument to those fearless devoted soldiers of France, living or dead, must be written in our hearts. You cannot put it into words.

But the men who fought for us on those plateaux had a visible inspiration always before their eyes, the towers of the Cathedral crowning the long flat-topped barrowlike hill on which Laon is built. It was to win that back and to free from the clutch of the enemy the thousands of French men and women and children that have been imprisoned in Laon for more than four years that they gave and offered their lives. This morning the fight was finished. Before daybreak the last hundred Germans of the garrison hurriedly left the town, which was entered by the first French troops at 10 o'clock, and this afternoon General Mangin went up to discuss with the civil authorities the means to be taken for the immediate relief of the 4,500 of the original inhabitants who are left and the refugees (about a third of that number) who have come in from the neighbouring farms and hamlets, which the Germans burnt before their final retreat. A mile or two outside the town they had blown up the bridges over the Ardon and two other brooks crossing the road, and we had to wait

a few minutes while the engineers were driving the final nails into the temporary structures which they had put up in their place.

We left our car at the foot of the cobbled way which winds up into the town and followed the General up the hill, climbing round six enormous mine craters which were exploded last night. The first thing to say about the town is that, unlike Noyon and so many others, it is practically undamaged. The chief crime of the Germans during their occupation appears to have been looting, or what they called "requisitioning." All the usual articles that seem to excite their cupidity, principally linen, men's clothes, and every description of metal—such, for instance, as the Cathedral bells and the pipes, or most of the pipes, of the organ. But the beautiful Cathedral itself they have left uninjured. They used it at one time as a stable for their horses until so strong a protest was raised that they were shamed out of doing it, and since then Protestant and Catholic services, German and French, have been held alternately at regular intervals. This evening just before I came away a solemn *Te Deum* for the deliverance of the town was sung, at which for the first time for four years only French (and one Englishman) were present. It was an extraordinarily moving service, and I shall never forget the sight of that large congregation thronging the building in the evening gloom, lit only by the twinkling lights of the altar, while the organ, which somehow managed to make music in spite of the absence of many of its pipes, crashed out the great chords of thanksgiving.

But the whole town was in a state of thanksgiving all the time that we were there. At the foot of the hill two working men and two little boys carrying tricolour flags—hundreds of which now decorate the streets—met General Mangin, whose visit was quite informal and unexpected, and escorted him up into the town.

All along the streets everyone we met wanted to shake hands, and some of the tiniest girls were even held up by their mothers to be kissed. If we had had a dozen pair of hands a piece we could not have satisfied everyone. And all the time it was, "Oh, merci, Mon General, oh, merci Monsieur, pour votre deliverance." Or, "If you only knew how glad we are. Four years of servitude. It is a long time, you know. But now it is over. Oh, if you only knew." Many of the men could hardly speak, many of the women were in tears.

But the most pathetic sign of all that they had gone through was the way in which they seemed almost to look upon themselves as a people apart from their own people. "Ce sont des Français," I heard said over and over again as we walked along—for all the world as if they were not French themselves. That made one think—think furiously—of the many, many thousands



[Russell.]

GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, K.C.B.
Commanded the Fifth Army.

of French and Belgian people who are still in the same condition of servitude, and whose deliverance can only be brought about in one way.

For the German who is talking of peace is still unregenerate. The day before yesterday there were taken away from Laon to Germany 500 boys and men of military age and also—as a hostage—the mayor. In the name of all that is not wildly and ridiculously mad and unjust, a hostage for what? The breaking up of families has been a common practice, I am told, of the Germans during their occupation of Laon. It is a crime which used to be laid to the charge of slave dealers in the old far-off days of the Southern States. Is there any other civilized people in the world who would do these things to-day? Some of the crimes of Germany are the crimes of savages. I beg the savages pardon. I met this morning a French colonial missionary, a splendid type of a man, and a French gentleman who has come over from Africa to visit some of his people among the Senegalese troops. "I know," he said to me, "many savage tribes. I know none that would do some of the things that have been done by the Germans in France."

When the above despatch was penned the French front between the Oise and Aisne ran from the confluence of the Oise and Serre by

Courbes through Couvron-Hamencourt, Vivaise, Aulnois-sous-Laon, Gizey and Marchais to the outskirts of the Camp-de-Sissonne due east of Laon, close to the Hunding line. Thence by La Malmaison and Villers it struck south-east and reached the Aisne at Aire. On the south bank Gouraud's troops drove back across the river a German rearguard into Château Porcien. While Debeney, Mangin, Guillaumat and Gouraud were thrusting the enemy forward to the Hunding line, the Americans on both sides of the Meuse and in the Argonne were heavily engaged. On October 12 and 13 they and the French north of Verdun were vainly counter-attacked by von Gallwitz. In the Argonne the victory of Gouraud assisted Liggett to reduce the few remaining German strongholds south of Grand Pré and the Kriemhilde line.

Thus by the night of October 13 Horne was in the environs of Douai and his right on the road to Valenciennes in the pocket formed by the Scheldt and Lille. On the west bank of the Selle and, at places across it, were Byng and Rawlinson in touch with Debeney, whose troops east of St. Quentin had bridged the Oise,



[Russell.]

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROGER KEYES,
K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

Commanded the Squadron operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Coast.

and who were north of the western end of the Hunding line. From La Fère round Laon to the Aisne the right wing of Debeney, the army of Mangin with the Italians and the left wing of Guillaumat were confronting the Hunding line. South of the Aisne the right wing of Guillaumat and the army of Gouraud had killed or captured almost all of the enemy still on the left bank and were facing the Hunding line

across the river. In the Argonne details of Gouraud's army and Liggett's Americans were on the northern fringo opposite Grand Pré. The remainder of Liggett's forces were struggling to break through the Kriemhilde line, already pierced near the Meuse south of Dun. East of the Meuse the French and Americans were considerably north of the positions gained by General Guillaumat at the fourth Battle of Verdun.

By this date the preparations of Sir Roger

before Haig would have been at Namur, von Armin and von Quast would have been behind the Meuse, as, owing to the enumbered roads and broken down bridges, described by the *Times* Correspondent when he entered Laon, the armies of Debency, Mangin, Guillaumat and Gouraud, like those of Horne, Byng and Rawlinson, were not ready immediately to resume the pursuit. Foch, unless he attacked with de Castelnau's group of armies in Lorraine and Alsace could only follow the course he did.



[Official photograph.]

PREPARATIONS FOR THE REPAIR OF A BRIDGE OUTSIDE CAMBRAI HIT BY A SHELL.

Keyes, King Albert, Degoutte, Plumer and Birdwood for expelling von Armin from western Belgium and von Quast from Lille, were completed, and Foch, while Horne, Byng, Rawlinson, Debency, Mangin, Guillaumat and Gouraud got ready for a further advance, ordered fresh offensives in Belgium and in the Argonne and up both banks of the Meuse. As the Commander-in-Chief said: "He blocks this road and then this. He covers every track and line of pursuit with the litter of the material he abandons. The advance of the pursuing enemy becomes more and more difficult. You cannot get on fast enough to catch him. At the cost of great sacrifice of material he gets away. *Ce n'est pas élégant, mais c'est comme ça.*" Long

The Franco-American push down the valley of the Meuse began on the morning of Monday, October 14. Little progress was made north of Verdun on this date, for the Americans found themselves up against positions of extraordinary strength. Between the Meuse and the Argonne, however, the troops of Liggett penetrated farther into the Kriemhilde line, passing beyond the village of Cunel. West of Cunel the enemy was ensconced on a range of wooded heights bristling with machine-guns. Hill 288 in the Bois de Romagne and Hill 286 in the Bois de Gesnes to its south-west were surrounded and taken and Romagne entered. That village was immediately deluged with gas-shells by the German gunners and had for some hours to be



[French official photograph.]

A LIGHT BRIDGE HASTILY BUILT TO FACILITATE THE PURSUIT OF THE GERMANS.

evacuated. Nevertheless, by nightfall it had been re-occupied by our Allies. Nearer the Argonne they penetrated the German entrenchments at Landres and St. Georges. Some 750 prisoners were captured.

The next day, Tuesday, October 15, the fighting increased in violence. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had reinforced von Gallwitz with depleted divisions from Champagne and Metz, but the last named on both banks met with fresh reverses. At the third attempt the Americans secured Hill 299, and, after a series of hand-to-hand encounters, the Kriemhilde line was broken at new points.

On October 16 in drenching rain the summit of the Bois de la Grande Montagne, east of the Meuse, was gained and, west of the river, the Côte de Chatillon was stormed. At the northern edge of the Argonne Liggett's men fought their way through the Bois des Loges, and at nightfall were in Champigneulle, just west of the Upper Aire, and in Grand Pré, where the Kriemhilde was attached to the Hunding line. They had arrived at Grand Pré by the valley of the Aire through a rain of bullets from innumerable machine-guns.

The Argonne was virtually reconquered and Liggett could now move safely on Buzaney and on the Lille-Hirson-Mezières-Metz railway, the chief lateral railroad communication behind the rapidly contracting German front. Liggett's operations on the Argonne had been materially

assisted by Gouraud's right wing. West of Grand Pré and east of the Aisne, Termes and Olizy, with 800 prisoners, had been captured on October 15, and on October 16 the road from Grand Pré to Vouziers was gained.

Satisfactory as had been the results of the Franco-American offensive in the Argonne and down the banks of the Meuse, they were entirely dwarfed by those of the Anglo-Franco-Belgian offensive. The previous advance in Belgium on September 28 had been in the nature of a surprise to von Armin. On this occasion, so far as he could, he was ready to parry the blow. Most of the guns had been removed from the Belgian coast and the harbours of Ostend and Zeebrugge, already half blocked by the British, were rendered almost impracticable for navigation. At Ostend, between the spot upon which the Vindictive was lying and the west pier, on or after October 14, a paddle steamer was scuttled and other ships were sunk higher up the harbour. Von Armin's alarm was betrayed by the fact that every morning before dawn, however quiet the Allied front might be, his artillery had shelled heavily as counter-preparation to any attack and by frequent raids into the Allied lines.

On October 11, after a violent artillery preparation, the French front before Roulers was unsuccessfully attacked. The next day, near Dixmude, two German raids were repulsed,

as was another in the region of Moorslede, south of Roulers, on October 13. The difficulties of the Germans were increased by the wild excitement of the Belgian and French populations within their lines. Crowds of fugitives poured backwards to escape the sholls of their deliverers, and hampered the movements of the enemy, who, at last fearing reprisals, did not as heretofore dare to pacify them with lead and cold steel.

The forces at von Armin's disposal were the 20 or so divisions of his army, reinforced by four or five divisions borrowed from von Quast. As the front about to be attacked by King Albert, Degoutte and Plumer measured some 28 miles, he could oppose to the Allies almost a division a mile, but his divisions were of poor quality and not up to strength. He had brought up every available gun, and does not seem to have been heavily out-gunned in the battle. His airmen were daring and active and resolutely engaged their opponents. Though the French were able to use their light tanks, in the other sectors these machines, so dreaded by the Germans, could not be employed.

On October 12 and 13 the weather had been bad, rain having fallen in large quantities,

which was also in von Armin's favour, nor was he in danger of being enveloped. His right rested on the Canal of Handzaeme, which from the south of Cortemarek goes by Dixmude to the canalized Yser; his left rested on the canalized Lys at Comines. The east bank of the Lys from Ghent up to Frelinghien, 10 miles or so north-west of Lille, was, too, in the possession of the Germans. From the wooded flats behind the Lys the guns of von Armin during the night of October 13 ceaselessly bombarded the British positions with high-explosive and gas shells. The battle of September 28 to October 1 had, it is true, carried the Allies beyond the water-logged, crater-pitted fortified zone which von Armin had successfully defended in the autumn of the preceding year, and the German general had not had time to construct another continuous barrier of entrenchments. But the considerable towns of Roulers at his centre and of Menin, Werwicq and Comines on his left and the numerous villages and farms dotted about the marshy ground had since October, 1914, been put in a state of defence. Moreover, the rows of concrete pill-boxes constructed in 1918 between Roulers and Werwicq were



[Official photograph.]

CAVALRY READY TO PASS THROUGH THE GERMAN LINE.

They have their own horse-ambulances with them.



GENERAL GILLAIN.

Commanded the Belgian Army under King Albert.

mostly still intact, while canals, irrigation ditches and the railway embankment from Roulers to Menin lay athwart the Allied advance. Under the circumstances of 1917 and the spring of 1918 he might have confidently joined battle. But his faith in his men was shaken, and theirs in him, the Kaiser, Hindenburg, Ludendorff and "the good, old German god." Von Armin prepared for a short not a long contest, and put all the strength he could muster into his front line, which in general was held by not less than two battalions of each regiment.

Since October 1 the Allies, by prodigious efforts, had made roads across the morasses of the battlefields of Ypres and Messines. On the night of October 13, amid the bursting shells of the alarmed enemy, the reserves threaded their way to the new front and, with their comrades already there, awaited the dawn.

King Albert was in command. At his elbow was General Degoutte, representing Foch. General Gillain immediately directed the movements of the Belgian Army, which was divided into a left wing, composed of three divisions of Northern Belgians, and into a right wing, comprising as many divisions of South Belgian troops. Between these wings were four French Divisions with light tanks. Behind the Franco-Belgians was a French cavalry corps and a division of Belgian cavalry. In the background were other French infantry divisions.

The Belgian left wing extended from Dixmude to the south of Cortemarck. The French were deployed from the Ypres-Thorout-Bruges railway to the region of Roulers. Their task was to storm Roulers and the heights of Hooglade, Gitsberg and Geite to the north. From the environs of Roulers to St. Pieter the Belgian right wing prolonged the line, touching at St. Pieter the extreme left of Plumer's army, also under King Albert's command.

The famous Second British Army was disposed between St. Pieter and the west of Comines, where the Yser-Ypres canal enters the Lys. Three of its corps were to be used in the attack. The II. Corps, led by Lieut.-General Sir C. W. Jacob, contained the 36th, 29th and 9th Divisions. The X. Corps (30th and 34th Divisions), under Lieut.-General R. B. Stephens, and the XIX. Corps (35th and 41st Divisions), under Lieut.-General Sir E. E. Watts, were to the south and south-west of Jacob's men. They were astride the never-to-be-forgotten Ypres-Menin road, and their aim was—storming Gheluwe, a village on that road—to arrive at the southern edge of the rising ground overlooking Wevelghem, Menin and Werwicq.

Between the Lys and Lens the army of Birdwood awaited the result of the battle. If it ended in a victory, Birdwood, driving before him the remainder of von Quast's Divisions, would encircle Lille from the west, south and east.

The rain had ceased in the early hours of Monday, October 14, but a thick autumnal fog covered the ground when at 5.35 a.m. the battle opened. Later the fog lifted and the day was clear and cold. Off the Belgian coast lay a line of British monitors hurling shells at the right wing of von Armin and at his communications. In front his right, centre and left were plastered with high explosives, gas and

shrapnel shells. The Allied artillery barrage was unusually severe. The German gunners, nevertheless, pluckily replied, and above, in the air, the constant rattlo of machine-gun fire betokened frequent aerial duels. Beneath, on the ground, a few German units of infantry and dismounted cavalry fought with desperate courage, machine-gunners rushing through the barrage at places and firing at the advancing infantry. These men, who so lately had almost ejected us from the ruins of Ypres, who had recovered the lost Mossines-Wytsehaete ridge and reached the culminating point of the Mont-des-Cats hills, could hardly realize that they—or the survivors of them—were bound, not for Calais, but for the Rhine. They dreamt still of Victory, and they did their utmost to achieve it.

Notwithstanding the brave efforts of these unfortunate men, at almost all points von Armin's line gave way. The Belgian left wing crossed the Handzaeme canal and captured the village of that name and Cortemarek, east of it. To their right the French swarmed up the heights and occupied the plateaux of Geite, Gitsberg and Hooglede, seizing the villages of Geite, Hooglede and St. Joseph. They crossed the Ypres-Roulers-Thourout railway and broke

into the village of Beveren, north-east of Roulers. Towards midday Roulers itself was carried by assault. The light tanks had greatly helped Degoutte's soldiers. The Belgian right wing had overrun the Roulers-Menin railroad and taken Rumbeke, Iseghem and Winkel St. Eloi. Belgian patrols approached Lendelede. Near Roulers six whole batteries with their escorts and gunners had been captured in the act of limbering up to get away.

South of the Belgian left the British were opposed by the 6th Cavalry Division, nicknamed ironically "The War Prolongers," the 2nd Guard Reserve and several other Divisions, mostly Bavarian. English and Scottish troops of Jacob's Corps, taking Rollegem-Cappelle, made for Heule, north-west of Courtrai, on the Courtrai - Ingelmmster - Thielt - Ghent railway. Home troops, after a hard tussle, stormed Ledeghem, on the Roulers-Menin railway, defended by Bavarians, and going forward between pill-boxes secured the village of Moorseele, due west of Courtrai, and reached the western edge of Gullegehem. At Roethoek Farm, near Moorseele, a battery of five guns, with all the officers and crews complete, was captured.

Farther south English and Scottish battalions



[Belgian official photograph.]

IN ROULERS AFTER ITS RECAPTURE.

Crater of a mine which exploded after the Germans had left the town.

worked down through pill-boxes forward to the Lys between Courtrai and Menin. The hamlet of Gheluwe, under cover of a smoke screen, was surrounded and carried at a rush, 200 prisoners being taken. Going through a strong line deeply wired, our men reached the north-western edge of Wevelghem and the northern environs of Menin. The rising ground overlooking Wevelghem, Menin and Werwieq was ours. Menin, the strategic importance of which had so struck Lord, then Sir John, French in October, 1914, was at our mercy.

The crushing defeat inflicted on von Armin broke the German resistance in Western Belgium and the spirit of his wearied troops. One captured officer explained the psychological situation created: "What can you expect," he said, palliating the cowardice of his men, "when our soldiers look forward to an Armistice in two or three days?" They knew their Government had begun negotiations. A German officer said that he was wearing his "peace clothes." The attitude of the men was shown by the nonchalant answer of a hungry, pallid non-commissioned officer. "Deutschland uber Alles?" inquired a British soldier who

passed him as he sullenly trudged onwards to his cage. "Nein, unter Alles," he replied.

The privates firmly believed that an Armistice would be proclaimed within two or three days. "Does that mean, then," asked one of them, "that Germany has lost everything?" The reply was: "More or less." The interrogator paused and reflected. "But I don't mind in the least," he observed; "the war has gone on long enough."

On Tuesday, October 15, the fruits of the victory were garnered. The Belgian left reached the environs of Thourout and the French those of Lichtewelde. Degoutte's patrols, in spite of lively resistance, pushed on beyond the Roulers-Lichtewelde-Thourout-Bruges railway. The Belgian right wing secured Lendelwe, while Plumer's troops arrived at Le Chat, on the Courtrai-Ingelmunster road, and, to the south, captured Gulleghem and Henle and entered the outskirts of the city of Courtrai. The towns of Menin, Werwieq and Comines were occupied and the British crossed to the east bank of the Lys. Since the morning of October 14 the Allies had captured 12,000 prisoners and more than a hundred guns. We



[Official photograph.]

THE GERMAN LONG-RANGE GUN WHICH SHELLED DUNKIRK.

The photograph was taken during the King's visit in December, 1918, and shows the result of a near hit by a British gun.



THE HOTEL DE VILLE, COURTRAI.

were not now far to the north of Lille and its industrial annexes, Roubaix and Tourecoing.

In these favourable conditions Birdwood's army was sent against von Quast. In spite of considerable opposition, the former's troops crossed the Haute-Deule canal on a wide front north of Lens and Pont-à-Vendin and east of La Bassée, and moved on Lille, which was being evacuated by the enemy. Meurchin and Provin were secured and the east bank of the canal to the region of Berclare. Northwards we were on October 15 west of the canal, but we had seized the railway yards at Don, whence our line ran north-eastwards in front of Lattre, Erquinghem, Escobeques, and Wez Macquart to a mile or so east of Armentières. All able-bodied civilians had been removed from Lille by General von Bernhardt, whose corps held the city. The weather had again broken, but nothing could deter our triumphant soldiers. That night—a characteristic touch—the Germans with their long-range guns bade farewell to Dunkirk by firing shells into it which killed two women and injured a male civilian.

On Wednesday, October 16, in a deluge of rain, the Belgian offensive was extended to the Yser front. Keyem was captured and the Yser crossed at Schoorbakke. The wood and château of Wynendaele were carried and Thourout enveloped from the west. To the east the Belgians reached the Thourout-Bruges

road and cut the Ypres-Thourout-Bruges railway. South-east of Thourout the French captured Lichtervelde, reached the outskirts of Coolscamp, and penetrated into the park of Ardoye Château. The Belgian right wing advanced beyond the railway station of Ingelmunster and reached the Lys near Bavichove. Four years, almost to a day, had passed since the Belgian Army, Rawlinson's 7th Division, Byng's cavalry and Ronarch's French Marines, pursued by overwhelming numbers, had traversed the same roads bound for the Yser and the Ypres region!

The same day (October 15) the British secured the northern portion of Courtrai and crossed the Lys at other points between Menin and Armentières. They had taken over 4,000 prisoners and upwards of 150 guns. Sir Roger Keyes and Admiral Ronarch were about to land at Ostend; the Belgians were swiftly advancing towards it and Bruges; the French were moving on Thielt and Ghent; Pluner's troops were across the Lys within sight of Courtrai and approaching Tourecoing; and Birdwood's army was at the gates of Lille. The discomfited armies of von Armin and von Quast were beating a retreat on the lower Scheldt. Horne was preparing to take Douai, Byng and Rawlinson to carry the Lille line.

During October 14, 15 and 16, while the Belgian and Meuse-Argonne offensives were



[Royal Air Force photograph.]

A BRITISH BATTLE-PLANE PURSUING A GERMAN IN CLOUDLAND.

proceeding, the French had drawn nearer to the Hunding line and the Oise area north of it. We have seen how units of Gouraud's right wing had established themselves on the Vouziers-Grand Pré road. On October 15 Nanteuil-sur-Aisne, west of Rethel, was captured by him, as was the village of Acy the next day, October 16. North of the Aisne progress was made in the Sissonne region and Mangin's left and Debeney's right reached or approached the Serre. Debeney's left was about to move on Guise, to enlarge his bridgehead on the Oise east of St. Quentin at Origny; Mangin, Guillaumat, Gouraud and Liggett were getting ready to storm the Hunding and the remainder of the Kriemhilde lines. East of the Meuse and north of Verdun the troops of von Gallwitz were making desperate efforts to stem the advance of the Franco-Americans.

The air warfare during the course of the events just described had gone on continuously and with increasing advantage to the Allies. On October 3 the 5th Group of the Royal Air Force severed the railway between Lichtervelde and Thourout and blew great gaps in the line between Roulers and Lichtervelde. Owing to the previous attacks of the Allied airmen, traffic had been suspended in the railway triangle, Cortemarek-Thourout-Lichtervelde. The same day four German machines were

brought down by the British, and Lieutenant Coppens, the Belgian champion, scored his 33rd victory by destroying a captive balloon. A day or two later he brought down two more of these aerial observation posts, while Belgian and British airmen dropped over 10 tons of bombs on enemy railway stations, organizations, and aerodromes, hitting, among other places, Zeebrugge and Melle. The Melle sidings east of Ghent had been increased enormously, so that 25 trains could be dealt with at one time.

On October 4 the Royal Air Force squadrons, working with the Navy on the Belgian coast, who between September 29 and October 5 had let fall 72 tons of bombs, destroyed 37 German aeroplanes and two captive balloons. Between the 6th and the 12th their activity was impeded by the bad weather, but they dropped 14 tons of explosives, and, with a loss of two, destroyed eight enemy machines. During the new battle in Belgium, on October 14, our airmen, at a cost of 11, smashed 30 German aeroplanes and shot down a captive balloon in flames. Two enemy machines were brought to the ground by anti-aircraft fire. Our bombing machines during the day caused great damage to von Armin's communications, and at night dropped over 13 tons of bombs on the railway junctions through which his defeated troops were being railed back. The next day (October 15) 10 tons of high explosives were loosed on railway

and other centres, and the retiring troops and transport were harassed by machine-gun fire from the air. The weather was, however, so bad that day operations were impeded and night flights completely suspended on the 15th and 16th.

In the battles between Cambrai and St. Quentin and in the pursuit to the Selle and Oise which followed them the Allied aircraft played also a notable part, though during the pursuit the atmospheric conditions to some extent protected the enemy. The day before the battle of October 3 the junction of Aulnoy, south of Valenciennes, had been visited and an ammunition train blown up and rolling stock destroyed. The station of Valenciennes had, too, been heavily bombed and 15 German machines and three balloons destroyed. At night the weather made flying almost impossible, but before the dawn of October 3 a ton of bombs was dropped on the German lines. During the battle every form of aerial cooperation with our troops was carried out. Some 27 hostile machines were destroyed, five driven down out of control and a balloon set fire to. Our advancing infantry were screened by smoke curtains caused by smoke bombs dropped from the air and our forward machine-guns were supplied with ammunition by aeroplanes. The enemy's troops and transport were, moreover, from a low height attacked with bombs and machine-gun fire. All this was done at a loss of only 12 machines.

It was the same story in the battle of October 8. Our ascendancy in the air had become almost overwhelming. After that battle, despite the weather, our aircraft did magnificent service. Squadrons of aeroplanes flew low over the retreating enemy, causing destruction and confusion among his columns by bombs and machine-gun fire. His railway communications at Valenciennes and Mons were interrupted by bombing on the permanent way. The German airmen fought to protect the retreat and lost 21 machines in their endeavours, while we lost only nine. Had not at this moment the weather broken the British might have converted the retreat of the enemy into a rout.

Nor was the Independent Air Force inactive during the same period. For example, on the morning of October 5 it made 11 direct hits on the Metz-Sablou junction and bombed Kaiserslautern and Pirmasens. Four enemy machines were destroyed, while we lost an equal number. Without loss on the night of October 5-6 the

railways at Metz-Sablou, Thionville and Mezières were bombed, together with the aerodromes at Morhange and Frescaty and the factory at Burbach. Raids in the same areas occurred on October 9 and 10. Two trains were bombed at Metz-Sablou and the Karlsruhte works at Thionville received four direct hits. On the 15th, through thick mists, clouds and rain, our airmen attacked the Frescaty aerodrome. One bomb, dropped from a height of only 40 feet, passed through the roof of the Zeppelin shed and did great damage. Another hangar was wrecked. Machines which were being run out to mount against our men were promptly machine-gunned. The enemy's anti-aircraft detachments had been completely surprised, and did not open fire till after the attack was over.



[Royal Air Force photograph.]

A BURSTING SMOKE-BOMB.

Smoke can be seen issuing from the point where the bomb has burst, and this rapidly develops into a thick cloud.

The French aviators were not behindhand in aerial work. During Gouraud's advance in Champagne on October 3 they powerfully assisted by dropping 51 tons of projectiles on the enemy during the day, and 29 tons was dropped on his communications by night at Vouziers and other points. Certain of their advanced units were provisioned by the French from the air. The process is described by a *Times* correspondent reporting an incident of the kind which had occurred in the battle of October 1.

Upon October 1 the Belgian forces had thrust forward

beyond the Houthulst Forest, and a number of divisions of them lay upon a line the roads to which through the woods had become impassable. Continuous rain, shell fire and the artillery traffic had ground them out of existence; they were mere channels of deep mud; and by evening the General was reporting that supplies of food had been used up and that supplies for the morrow were doubtful. Would it be possible, he inquired, to send up food by aeroplane? The answer was that it would, and forthwith the order went round to the Belgian Air Force, a brigade of the R.A.F. and to the 5th Group. The task of this last was to deposit 1,000 army rations at a point to which nothing but a bird or an aeroplane could penetrate.

It has been done before, of course, but it had never been attempted till now on such a scale, and its entire success adds to the significance of the air arm and throws a light on the possibilities of the aeroplane after the war. The cases of rations were broken up into appropriate parcels, and these were packed in sacks of earth to cushion them for the fall; while upon the front the hungry divisions prepared the dumping grounds and marked them with large white crosses.

Some 80 machines shared the work between them, including a squadron of the 5th Group's two-seaters. They lifted their loads easily, and one by one they dipped to the front and dropped them overboard to the cheering reception committees below, circled round

and returned. Only one machine, attacked by a German machine-gun from the ground—it was as close to the front as that!—had to land, and by 11 a.m. on the morning of the 2nd the General reported that all his units had been supplied. The total weight carried and delivered, without damage to the rations, was 13 tons.

On the 3rd the French airmen put out of action 19 enemy machines and three balloons; on the 4th they accounted for 21 hostile aeroplanes, on the 5th for four and on the 6th for nine. Again on October 10 over 35 tons of explosives were dropped in the region of Vouziers. A munition depôt was exploded, and, after sunset, 24 tons were let fall on the Laon region and on stations behind the German lines such as Hirson. Some 17 enemy aeroplanes were wrecked, and on the nights of the 10th–13th the station at Attigny and bivouacs in the region of Laon and the stations of Hirson and Longuyon were bombed.



CHAPTER CCXCII.

THE RUSSIAN EXPEDITIONS.

THE BOLSHEVIST REGIME—REASONS FOR ALLIED INTERVENTION—GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN FINLAND—THREAT TO THE MURMAN RAILWAY—OPERATIONS IN MURMANSK AND ARCHANGEL—WORK OF GENERALS IRONSIDE AND MAYNARD—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL GROGAN'S RELIEF FORCE—THE BOLSHEVISTS IN SIBERIA—COLONEL SEMENOFF'S CAMPAIGN—THE CZECHO-SLOVAK EPIC—JAPANESE AND BRITISH LAND AT VLADIVOSTOK—THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY FREED—COLONEL JOHN WARD AND ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK—KOLTCHAK SUPREME GOVERNOR—PERM CAPTURED—THE OFFENSIVE OF 1919 OPENS—ALLIES RECOGNIZE KOLTCHAK.

BOLSHEVIST Russia in the spring of 1918 was still in the period of its *peredishka*—the "respite" which, according to Lenin, the country needed before he could proceed to the building of the Communist millennium. The well-intentioned but feeble Kerensky *régime* was a thing of the past, damned by its own futility beyond hope of revival; groups of sane and solid Russians, the mortal enemies of the Soviet, were beginning to gather together on the outer fringes of the old Empire—at Archangel, in the Don and Caucasus territory in the south, and eastward of the Volga into Siberia; but in the heart of Great Russia, though it was still a welter of anarchy and disorganization, Lenin and Trotsky's power was supreme.

But, in fact, Russia was no longer independent; actually or potentially she was under the dominion of Germany, and destined to remain so if the Kaiser's hope of "a great peace" could be achieved. The dictum of a German scribe, "Russia for the Bolsheviks and the Bolsheviks for us," became the key-note of German eastern policy. The German military organization was already spreading its tentacles to the remotest corners of the Ukraine. The Black Sea was a German lake, or was soon to become so. German

officials were placed in all the Russian Ministries on the plea of enforcing the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. And the Wilhelmstrasse had a secret understanding by which the Murman coast in the north and the Murman Railway were to be annexed to a dependent Finland and a U-boat base established by Germany on the Murman coast. Might she not carry this penetration still farther and make of Russia a *hinterland*, whose vast resources in foodstuffs, minerals, oil, and cotton would afford her the means of maintaining herself for an indefinite time and of defying the blockade till her western enemies were divided or worn out? This, at least, was the guiding principle of all German policy in the East, and it was a danger which was very much in the minds of the Allies in the spring of 1918.

To appreciate the reality of this danger it is necessary to recall the military situation as it appeared at this period, for judgments are apt to be tinged by the impression of the marvellous change which was wrought during the following summer. Ludendorff was then massing for the supreme effort on the western front the great numbers of troops set free by the collapse of Russia. The American Army was still in the making. Moreover, at this time the submarine menace was by no means mastered, and there



NORTHERN RUSSIA.

was a chance that it would so hamper the bringing over of American reinforcements that the Allied position would be irretrievably compromised before they were in the field. It must also be remembered that even after the storm had burst on March 21 and the Germans had been stopped before Amiens it was little thought that the enemy could be decisively beaten by the end of 1918—many prudent persons doubted whether this could be achieved even in 1919.

It was a broad view of these facts which dictated the policy of intervention in Russia. The Allies' aim was to reconstitute an eastern front against the Germans, which would at least deter the enemy from diverting more

troops from Russia, and might, if the war proved long-protracted, check the enemy's grandiose plan of fighting a stone-walling campaign in France while he based himself on the resources of the East. But, lest it should be thought that a purely selfish interest called us to Russia, let it be added that the very best elements in the country prayed for troops to be sent—and not only those of what we should call the Conservative parties. The most familiar figures of Russian Socialism joined in these appeals—Madame Breshkovsky, the "Grandmother of the Revolution"; M. Burtseff, who cried, "Come and help us to drive out the traitors who are clutching our throats; come and restore order and liberty to our



THE PORT OF ALEXANDROVSK.

country"; and many another veteran of the movement who had proved the purity of his Socialist opinions by long periods of exile or imprisonment under the autocracy.

Intervention was possible only at two points, the northern coast of European Russia, and Eastern Siberia, from the Pacific. Great Britain was specially interested in the Archangel and Murman enterprise, first because the operations were of an amphibious nature and the whole arrangements for transport were bound to fall on us. The supreme command of the expedition and the coordination of the Allied measures were accordingly entrusted to Great Britain, though the responsibility was a common one, shared by all the Allies and undertaken after careful consideration by the Supreme War Council. Another reason for the preponderant British interest in the North Russian Expedition was the existence at Archangel of enormous quantities of military stores, which were in course of being appropriated by the Bolsheviks and transferred by rail to the Germans. Some idea of the immense value and importance of the stores landed at Archangel will be obtained when it is mentioned that up to the end of 1917 between three and four million tons of munitions and other warlike supplies had been shipped there from this country. A third reason was the German-Finnish menace to the port of Murmansk at the head of the Kola inlet, the Arctic terminus of the Murman Railway to Petrograd. Alexandrovsk, on the same inlet, the landing point of the Peterhead cable, had also to be safeguarded. Part of the German design was to make of Murmansk a base for submarine operations. Within the



CHURCH AT ALEXANDROVSK.

influence of the Gulf Stream, it is the only ice-free port of Northern Russia, and as the U-boats, sallying out from this safe retreat, would be able to imperil all traffic coming from the North Sea, its preservation was obviously a matter of great concern to this country.

The whole of this incident of the German adventure in Finland is exceedingly interesting, and if we trace back its obscure origins it will afford an instructive example of Teutonic intrigue. The country at this moment was in the throes of civil war, following the declaration some months earlier of Finnish independence from Russia. When this event happened in December, 1917, it was not actively opposed from Petrograd; that would have been inconsistent with the boasted doctrine of self-determination. Nevertheless, Lenin was resolved that Finland should not remain under the control of his hated enemies, the *bourgeois* class who ruled in Helsingfors, but should be placed in the hands of his partisans

the "Reds" of Finland. The "Whites" (or anti-Bolshevists) had prepared for this emergency in advance. It was of little use declaring themselves free from a hostile Russia without some powerful backing from outside, and negotiations with Berlin had been going on for some months. In these arrangements the ambitions of the expansion party in Finland played a certain part. This party, whose schemes went by the name of the "Stora" (i.e., Greater) Finland movement, dreamed of widening the borders of the country so as to include the whole of the Murman coast and the Kola Peninsula, from the frontier line of Norway to the White Sea; also the country called Russian Karelia up to a line running southwards from the White Sea to the neighbourhood of Petrograd. There is this much to be said for the movement, that the Karelians were a people with racial affinity with the Finns—they were the descendants of a Finnish




**DUKE ADOLF FRIEDRICH OF
MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN.**

Nominated by Germany for the Crown of Finland.

tribe who over-ran most of the south-western shores of the White Sea six or seven centuries ago; but a vast part of the area on which they had designs was inhabited by alien peoples.

This modest proposal, which would have doubled the territory of Finland and handed over to her the Murman Railway, fitted in admirably with the German plan. An understanding was reached which left the Finns pretty much at the mercy of their powerful "friends." It was agreed that in return for

support with men and munitions against the local Bolsheviks Germany should have the use of the outlet which the Finns obtained on the Arctic, whilst the Finnish Government on its part agreed to carry through the Diet a Bill establishing a Monarchy under a German dynasty, and to place the Finnish military



M. ULIANOFF LENIN.

forces under German leadership. A secret convention was said to have been drawn up to this effect. This was, of course, denied in Berlin, but proof of part at any rate of the bargain was forthcoming at a later date. There is the authority (on this point unimpeachable) of the Russian wireless for the statement that Germany completed an arrangement with the Russian Bolshevik Government for the cession to Finland of "the western part of Murman with the outlet to the sea."*

* The following extract from the Russian wireless was quoted by *The Times* on June 3, 1918:—

"Commissioner Tchitcherin has transmitted to Count Mirbaeh the following note:—

"The Russian Government agrees with the German Government, in view of the desirability of obtaining a speedy and complete accord with the Government of Finland, that it should accept as a basis for the regularization of relations with the present Finnish Government the proposal of the German Government transmitted to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs by the Diplomatic Representative of Germany, Imperial Ambassador Count Mirbaeh.

"This proposal consists in provision for the ceding by Finland to the Russian Republic of Fort Ino and of Raivola [near the Russo-Finnish frontier], if the Russian Republic promises not to fortify these places, and in the ceding by the Russian Republic to Finland of the western part of Murman with the outlet to the sea. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs believes that a sensible arrangement has been obtained, and that armed complications and the shedding of blood will be prevented."

In any case, Finland herself made little effort to disguise the terms under which she had become Germany's catspaw in the North, for which there was the less reason because the whole course of events in the first half of 1918 was merely the fulfilment of the bargain to which she had bound herself.

In March, 1918, the Reds had seized all the southern part of Finland, putting it to fire and sword, and there seemed to be nothing to prevent their over-running the rest of the country. The "White" Government were in flight in the north; their fortunes were at a low ebb. It was at this moment that a

Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg-Schwerin as King of Finland was put forward and became the subject of acute dissensions in the Diet. In the end, it may be added, the Monarchy project was dropped, the whole idea receding into a gradual and decent obscurity in almost exact coincidence with the decay of Germany's military might in the West. But in the spring, which is the time we are now concerned with, Finland had become a vassal State of Germany which it was not safe for an Allied national to enter unless he wished to find himself in a German prison.



THE BRITISH ARMOURD CAR SECTION IN NORTHERN RUSSIA, 1916.

Dragging a gun on a sledge through the snow.

force of 20,000 Germans landed at Hangö, on the Gulf of Finland, and quickly wrested Helsingfors, the capital, from the Reds. They were hailed with enthusiasm by the Finns, more especially by the Finnish Army, whose officers, fresh from two years' training in Germany, were as full of German ideals as of German military science. The Government forces, aided by the new arrivals, made short work of the Red Army, which before long was overwhelmed. Germany on her part was not slow to exact the price of her help. Her influence permeated the country. The reorganization of the Finnish Army under German instructors was undertaken, the German Colonel von Redern being appointed Chief of Staff, and the candidature of Duke

This digression has been necessary in order to show that the danger in the North was no imaginary one. The Allies had taken timely steps to meet it and to protect the Murman Railway by a naval landing on the Murman coast. This bleak, inhospitable land, the resort of the fishermen of Archangel, was less familiar at that time than it afterwards became to Englishmen. Strictly speaking the name applies only to the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula, upon which had sprung up during the war the town of wooden huts known as Murmansk, a place strangely reminiscent of the mushroom cities of Western America. Southward from Murmansk, across a vast and thinly populated region, stretched the Murman Railway, which, skirting the White Sea lower



ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST AEROPLANE AT MURMANSK.

down, ran through Karelia to Petrograd, over 500 miles distant from the northern terminal. Foreigners, it must be admitted, were not popular with the local population of this region after the Revolution. The aggression of the Finnish "White Guards," however, worked in favour of the Allies, with the result that when the British naval men disembarked the Bolshevik armed forces on the spot, some 1,500 in number, offered no opposition. The expansion aims of the German-Finnish combination even led to a working coalition between the Allied authorities and the local Bolsheviks of the Murman Regional Council. Moscow was consulted about the means of organizing a defence, and Trotsky, then Commissary of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed an order to the Provincial Council to cooperate with the British forces for the defence of Russian territory. A definite arrangement was reached by which the British and French authorities at Murmansk agreed to recognize the local Soviet as the supreme authority in that region; undertook not to interfere in internal affairs and to pursue no annexationist aims; and promised to supply food and other necessaries for the inhabitants and the local Red Army. The terms of this agreement at a later date were embodied in a formal document under 14 heads, which was ratified

on July 7, 1918, and circulated by the Russian wireless, apparently with the full approval of the Bolshevik Government.* Thus, whatever happened afterwards, it will be seen that when the Allies first intervened in Russia their action was known to and approved by the Bolshevik Government of Russia.

For some months the intentions of the Finno-German enemy remained obscure, though signs were not wanting of their aggressive designs. From time to time patrols crossed the frontier, and in the far north, opposite Petchenga, the nearest Russian harbour to the Finnish frontier, a great military road towards that point was made, the whole district being under German military control. The German troops in Finland were increased to over 50,000 men, General von der Goltz being in command. To meet the impending danger the Allied Council at Versailles sent Major-General Poole to take the chief command of the Allied forces, at the same time dispatching reinforcements, which arrived about the middle of June.

Trotsky's attitude now entirely changed, probably under strong German pressure, which in any case he was not in a position to resist. For an explanation of the reasons of this

* For the text of this document see *The Times*, July 24, 1918.

sudden shifting of policy, which was to have far-reaching consequences, we must probably look elsewhere than in the Far North. The Commissary for Foreign Affairs was at this time embarrassed by the remonstrances of Berlin against permitting the departure from Russia of the 120,000 Czecho-Slovaks who were anxious to proceed to Europe to fight with the Allies on the West Front. This interesting episode of the Czecho-Slovaks will be dealt with in detail when we come to describe events in Siberia, but for the present its reaction on the general situation was immediate, and nothing could better illustrate the subserviency of the Bolsheviks to Berlin than this particular incident. In June we find the *North-German Gazette*, the official organ of the Wilhelmstrasse, warning Russia that she would "endanger her dearly bought peace" if she allowed the Czechs to depart; and Trotsky at once ordered their disarmament. The exact degree of collusion between the Germans and the Bolsheviks will always be difficult to determine, and probably cooperation between the Allies and a power which openly professed its intention of spreading its anarchical doctrines among the peoples of all "Imperialist" countries could never have been of long duration; but at any rate by July, the Czecho-Slovak incident had reacted on the Bolshevik policy towards the Allies in the Murman region, whom Trotsky now endeavoured to obstruct and oppose in every

possible way.* In a wireless message to the provincial authorities in Russia Trotsky an-



BRITISH WARSHIPS AT MURMANSK.

nounced that "the Entente's enterprise is not

* *The Times*, on July 22, 1918, published the following extract from the wireless news sent out by the Bolshevik Government:—

The following order has been given by L. Trotsky:—
 "In connexion with the landing of English and French detachments on the Murman coast, and the open participation of French officers with the counter-revolutionary mutineers—the paid Czecho-Slovaks—I order all military institutions and soldiers not to support the French and English naval and military officers; not to permit them to go from one town to another; to watch carefully all their acts as the acts of persons who, it has been proved, are capable within the territories of the Russian Republic of conspiring against the sovereignty of the Russian people. The causes which have compelled me to issue this order will be explained later."



MURMANSK: RAILWAY TRUCKS AS TEMPORARY BILLETS FOR ALLIED TROOPS AND CIVILIAN REFUGEES.

intended to protect its own stores, but aims at the overthrow of the Russian Government," and he declared the Allies' action to be tantamount to a declaration of war. The Murman Provincial Council received orders to require the withdrawal from Russia of all Allied military and naval forces. This complete disavowal of an agreement which had been ratified earlier in the same month was not to be tolerated by the Allies, and the Provincial Council, repudiating its allegiance to the Central Government, threw in its lot with the Allies. Thus occurred the first definite breach, and hereafter Moscow was in a state of war with the Allies.

The landing was not a difficult operation to a naval force, especially to a squadron accompanied by a reconnoitring force of aeroplanes to explore the coast. On August 1 the ships moved down the Channel as far as Modiuga Island, 30 miles north of Archangel, where there was a brisk encounter with a shore battery, till the aeroplanes appeared and dropped some enormous bombs which put many of the gunners out of action. The unequal fight could not last long, and the enemy guns were soon silent. There was no other opposition before the disembarkation. This took place the next morning, when the procession of ships, keeping a sharp look-out



ARCHANGEL.

We now come to a more important stage of the Russian operations, the occupation of Archangel, and the winter campaign which followed. The warlike stores which had been landed at Archangel were of much greater importance than those taken to Murmansk, but the naval forces cooperating with the Russian authorities had been withdrawn in December, 1917. Whether the Bolsheviks during the following spring would have consented to their return is uncertain. By July, however, the course of events had rendered the forcible occupation of the White Sea port imperative, for a glance at the map will show that the lengthy line of the Murman Railway in the occupation of the Allies was untenable with an enemy in a position to raid it at any moment from the east.

for mines, passed down the channel and anchored in the harbour. The latter part of the approach was like a triumphal progress, and in the port of Archangel itself the warships' arrival was hailed with enthusiastic cheering, all the steamboats hooting furiously. This was no spurious demonstration of a conquered people, as will presently be explained, because a genuine revolution had taken place in favour of the Allies on the previous day; and very terrifying accounts of the naval bombardment having been brought by fugitives from Modiuga, the Red Army had fled from the town in panic. They remained, however, not far away, and showed some fight when a landing party began to advance. But the position was completely dominated by the fleet. Whenever a detachment of Bolsheviks emerged from behind a



GENERAL SIR E. IRONSIDE.

[Vandyk.]

In command of the Allied Forces at Archangel.

railway embankment, or an armoured train approached along the railway, there was a signal from shore, and a few well-placed shells scattered them. The British troops also occupied the station, a movement carried out so smartly that there was no time to destroy the telegraphs, and Lieut.-Commander Rendall, who commanded the landing party, received an order from 'Trotsky to burn all coal and destroy' the shipping at Archangel! The Bolsheviks had no desire to remain in the uncomfortable proximity of the naval squadron, and retired farther inland. Including seamen, workmen, and the troops of the Red Army they numbered about 8,000, supported by Germans.

Five miles south of the town they again offered some resistance, but now were finally driven back and retired on their Staff Headquarters at Obozerskaya, 70 miles to the south on the Vologda Railway, which place was also captured soon afterwards.

A brief glance at the internal conditions of the town and province of Archangel will serve to explain the revolution which had heralded our arrival, and will also help us to appreciate the footing on which the Allies stood as well as the obscure and somewhat unsatisfactory atmosphere which developed during the ensuing winter. How came it that on the eve of our landing the Bolsheviks were so easily ousted



AN OUTPOST ON THE MURMAN FRONT.

from power by their rivals? For one thing, Archangel was on the verge of famine. The province, which is largely covered with impenetrable forests or swampy tundras, never at any time produces more than half its own food requirements, and the usual supplies from outside had failed. Faced with starvation, many of the workmen, in spite of the Soviet, looked forward to the coming of the Allies, but their leaders denied access to the Allies' ships. It may here be added that the hopes placed on the Allies in this respect were amply realized, for before the winter fell, closing up the White Sea with ice, ships from England had brought enough food to feed the whole population within our jurisdiction—some half a million persons—until the following summer.

Famine, however, was not the main reason of the Soviet collapse. The internal politics of the North were confused, and in the preceding months the party dissensions among a people unused to self-government played into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The latter, as the representatives of the proletarian dictatorship, were the only party allowed to carry arms, and very naturally they remained all-powerful as long as Archangel was cut off from the outside world. But other parties were fairly strong in numbers, though scattered. The adherents of the Monarchy had a certain amount of popular backing, as was shown by the way in which the peasants still adorned their houses with the picture of the late Tsar.

There was also a democratic and Socialist party, equally removed from the ideals of Bolsheviks and Monarchists. It was this body which had overthrown the local Soviet the day before the Allies' landing, and which afterwards set up the Republican Government of the North, composed of members of the Constituent Assembly and representatives of the local Zemstvos and municipalities. This Government was formed on the initiative of the Union for the Regeneration of Russia, which included members of all political parties recognizing the Constituent Assembly as the only body with lawful power to rule in Russia. At the head of it was M. Tchaikovsky, an eminent leader of the very important Russian cooperative movement and a man of indisputable democratic sympathies.

With this Government the Allies cooperated on definite conditions of non-interference with the internal affairs of Russia. But with such incongruous elements in the population—for though the Soviet was dethroned there remained many passive Bolsheviks behind—the life of any Government was likely to be a troubled one, and within a month the Allies were called upon to intervene in a new *coup d'état*. This was a Monarchist rising, engineered by Russian officers, who deposed and sent away the members of the Government, and proclaimed a military rule. M. Tchaikovsky himself was seized and deported to Solovetsky Island in the White Sea. Two other Ministers who

escaped summoned the people to resist "the proposed reinstatement of an officer of the Monarchy in the person of the Grand Duke Michael who had arrived in Archangel," and urged the workmen to strike in defence of the Revolution. The strike started, but hereupon the Allies stepped in, released the expelled Ministers, and invited the disputants to come to an agreement rather than plunge the community into a succession of disorders. Eventually the deposed Ministers were restored in their positions and henceforward continued to exercise their functions unmolested.

The military operations were pursued with little interference from the enemy during the remaining months of the year. The breathing space was utilized by the local authorities to raise and train an armed force of Russians which later became a useful and disciplined body; but at present everything naturally fell on the Allied troops, who were drawn from many nationalities.* They pushed out on all sides and by the end of December had consolidated a satisfactory line to be held during the winter. This formed a semi-circular front at an average distance of over 100 miles from Archangel, beginning at the River Onega on the west, crossing the Archangel-Vologda Railway (which carried the Bolsheviks' communications from the south and the Allies' from the north), passing round Kadish to Shenkursk on the Vaga (180 miles S.S.E. of Archangel) and across the Dvina and the swampy country to Pinega on the east. A regular trench system was, of course, impossible. The ground was frozen to a great depth, and the whole country was a wilderness of snow, covered for the most part by dark pine forests, and intersected with swamp, lake and river. A system of tactical defence suitable to these conditions was evolved, the central feature of which was a large number of blockhouses, built in clearings in the forest, and linked together by wires. In front of each blockhouse extended radial lines cut through the woods to enable the fire of machine-guns to be brought to bear in any direction.

The essential fact about these preparations was that the Archangel force would have to

* In March, 1919, the numbers of the Allied forces in North Russia were stated by M. Pichon in the French Chamber to be:—13,100 British, 4,820 Americans, 2,350 French, 1,340 Italians, 1,280 Serbians, and 11,770 Russians. The last-named were a continually increasing element.

depend upon itself alone for at least six months, for once the ice set in on the White Sea it would be practically cut off from the outside world till the end of May. Happily its enemy was in no position to oust us at that time. For quite apart from the remoteness of Archangel and the hopeless disorganization of the Russian railway system the Bolshevik Army was deeply committed elsewhere. By a singular



GENERAL IRONSIDE IN ARCTIC KIT.

irony the Moscow apostles of peace and brotherhood had involved their followers in war in half a dozen other directions. The vigorous thrust of Admiral Koltchak's army loomed up menacingly in the East; in the South was Denikin's Volunteer Army, always aggressive and organizing for greater things; in the South-West Trotsky was engaged upon the conquest of the Ukraine; he had plans also against the Poles and against Rumania;

and the indomitable Esthonians were fighting a grim campaign in the West, to say nothing of the Germans and Lithuanians. It was for this reason that General Ironside's command at Archangel was left for some months in comparative peace.

The winter, however, was a dreary and trying time for the troops. They were not the men who would have been chosen for such a life of hardship in other circumstances, but when the force was dispatched to Russia every fit man was required on the Western Front; consequently they were for the most part low category troops or soldiers who had been wounded. Not all, however; they included, for example, men of the Vindictive, and some hard-bitten veterans who had seen as many campaigns in East and West as a Roman legionary. True, the home authorities had done wonders to make the conditions of life tolerable. They had consulted Sir Ernest Shackleton and other Arctic explorers, and had furnished the force with the completeness of a Polar expedition, with furs, snow-glasses, skin-lined sleeping bags—even skis. But the life and bustle of a campaign were lacking, and crowded Archangel, a town built of wood and destitute of any interest, was a place of exile

more than usually tedious. Moreover, the troops had little faith in the first Russian battalions recruited on the spot—though it must be added that the later Russian formations were decidedly better fighting material. All this put a severe strain on the discipline of the force; and no wonder, for there were too, the relative idleness, the gloom of a Polar winter, the almost complete absence of touch with the outside world, and the knowledge that the comrades of these men in France were being steadily demobilized. Happily this appeared to be only a passing phase, as was shown by the good account they gave of themselves when a serious effort was demanded; and the news that the War Office was successfully raising a strong force of volunteers to replace the conscript troops in the summer did much to restore the spirit of the command.

Archangel was connected with the Murmansk area by a lonely trail across the snow, traversed by reindeer sledge, but impracticable for the transfer of any large body of troops. The two commands were therefore distinct, and Murmansk during the winter had its own difficulties, which were inseparable from a country of such vast spaces. Only an officer of strong



BRITISH SOLDIER IN RUSSIAN OUTFIT, WITH SKIS, DRAWING SLEDGE.



LIEUT.-COLONEL MOORE IN CHARGE OF REINDEER TRANSPORT.

personnel could have controlled such an area, but General Maynard, who now commanded, had achieved much with a handful of men, and taken charge of the Murman Railway for hundreds of miles south of Murmansk. It was a country of extreme difficulty through which he had to penetrate, a region covered with a mass of swamps, rivers, and dreary tundras, in which it would have been impossible to operate without local help.

Such help, however, was readily forthcoming from the Karelian inhabitants, who furnished General Maynard with a strong auxiliary force. It fell mainly to them to check the Red advance that was made against the Murman Railway. This was in the last days of September, 1914, when a Russo-German force had crossed the frontier and penetrated 40 miles to Ukhomaya, intending to make it a base of operations. The Karelians attacked and scattered the enemy, driving them back to the frontier, and hereafter the Karelia remained practically free of invaders from Finland. The German war, in fact, was now declining, and Finland was unwilling any longer to be dragged along in a policy of adventure. The military tasks which the Germans had made, the organization of the army, which had been waiting for the opening of the ground to open a serious campaign, were now all useless; the time was out of joint with things in the West, and the

German troops were now withdrawn from the country.

It might be thought that with the disappearance of one general enemy the task of the Murman force would be a simple one, but this view would be inadequate justice to our Bolshevik adversary. Not that the Red Army being one was a very dangerous foe; every soldier in the North despised it for its lightness of equipment. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks, though poor soldiers, were the most consummate propagandists in the world, and their agitation within the area of the Murman command was a cause of endless anxiety. This will not be surprising if the very dense population which had drifted into this region be considered. It included 4,000 Russian laborers, imported to build the railway, a type which easily fell a prey to the proceedings of agitators. There were also the Red Finns who had fled before to escape the on-gaze of their employers; these men were willing enough to fight with us against the "White" Finns, but very much more ready to desert when the Russian *horde* troops were in the neighborhood. Again, there were many Chinese, a rough class of men ready for violent excesses. Altogether the physical temporary population of the Murman was pretty certain to give trouble when the growths of Bolshevism were added to the demands of winter and military rule.

The case of General Maynard's command had been vigorously at work to make Mur-



THE RUSSIAN CRUISER ASKOLD, RE-NAMED GLORY IV.

niansk habitable for the winter. Not even the long weeks of the Polar night, when throughout the month of December there was scarcely a glimmer of light, stopped the constructive works; and hospitals, stores and hutments were built by the light of flares. All this was done in the face of great difficulties. The same discontents among the Allied troops which reigned at Archangel existed here, where our men were surrounded by an atmosphere heavily charged with Bolshevism. Incendiary fires, stray shots fired after dusk, and frequent rumours of revolts kept Headquarters on the alert. In March secret meetings of the pro-Bolshevists were told that Allied troops sympathized with their agitation, and one morning proclamations, surreptitiously posted, appeared in the streets exhorting to a rising. General Maynard thereupon shut off the worst parts of the town with a cordon of troops, instituted a systematic search for arms, and had 20 of the ringleaders arrested. Incidents of this kind created an unpleasant feeling of insecurity at Headquarters. They were, however, a source of anxiety rather than of real danger, for H.M.S. *Glory* lay in the harbour, and near her was anchored the old Russian cruiser *Askold* (re-named the *Glory IV.* after a mutiny of the Russian crew in the early days, put down by British bluejackets), both of which could cover the town in case of a revolt.

There was trouble also with the Red Finns, culminating in an attempted rising at Kaudalaksha, on the railway 120 miles to the south of Murmansk. What to do with these men was a difficult problem. Now that the Finno-

German menace had subsided and they had ceased to dread their "White" compatriots their sympathies were naturally with the Russian Bolshevists. It was altogether a rather anomalous situation, but it is difficult to see how it could have been prevented in view of the way in which things developed. The British authorities had endeavoured to secure an amnesty for them from the Finnish Government, but the bitterness of feeling excited by the Finnish Revolution had not calmed down, and the negotiations had not prospered. Their mutiny, at all events, was an affair which required to be promptly dealt with, as it was now suspected that they intended to effect a junction with the enemy. Troops were rapidly moved down the railway from Murmansk and the revolt was nipped in the bud. The mutineers were overawed, and their leaders signed an agreement promising to comply with the orders of General Maynard. The solution was much helped by the staunchness of the Karelian Regiment, who in spite of their racial affinity with the Finns and the attempts of the Bolshevists to seduce them, remained throughout the crisis perfectly loyal to the Allies.

In the meantime the military operations of General Maynard's troops to the south had made satisfactory progress. The first thing to be done was to secure the road from Soroka which skirted the southern shores of the White Sea, and thus to ensure communications with Archangel. This accomplished, the troops pushed forward through the difficult lake region along the Murman Railway, where they found that the bridge across the Onda River

had been burnt. This was repaired, but a more serious affair was to prevent the destruction of the bridge at Segeja, farther south, the loss of which might have interrupted the railway for an indefinite period. The only hope of preventing it was by a surprise attack, so in February a mixed force, with great dash and courage, rushed forward and seized the bridge, capturing or killing, at small expense, all the Bolsheviks found there. The force continued to advance south during the spring months and reached first Lake Uros (April 11), then Maselskaya, 25 miles farther on (May 3), finally, with a vigorous thrust, gaining another 20 miles, and capturing the Bolsheviks' advanced base at Povicnets on the northern shores of Lake Onega. In all these affairs of outposts through a thickly wooded and marshy country armoured trains played an important part on both sides, and a body of American engineers smartly repaired the line as we advanced. The great object was to increase our hold on the Murman Railway, which was now held for a distance of over 400 miles south from Murmansk. Headquarters were therefore moved nearly 300 miles southwards to Kem, on the White Sea, to which in the summer months we should have access by water. The force was rapidly approaching the Oloniets country, which had risen against the Bolsheviks, and with the assistance of a Finnish Army of volunteers was waging a separate war with the enemy farther south.

To return now to the more serious operations in the Archangel area, in January there had been a week's fairly heavy fighting resulting from the attempt to defend an exposed salient before Shenkursk, forming the most advanced part of the line, 180 miles south-east of Archangel. The enemy's plan was framed with some skill, his idea being to squeeze out the salient by simultaneous attacks in front and on the right flank 20 miles away, followed by an enveloping movement on the left. The first attack at Ust-Padensk (15 miles south of Shenkursk) was delivered with 1,200 men, who were opposed by Americans and Cossacks. The enemy came on spiritedly against a group of blockhouses in the forest dressed in white to make themselves inconspicuous against the snow, and despite machine-gun fire reached the blockhouses, smashed in the doors and killed the occupants. Meanwhile another enemy force of 1,000 men sought to drive in

the right (western) flank on the River Turnia, 18 miles west of Shenkursk, and the Cossacks who were defending it were forced back by superior numbers. News then came of a third Bolshevik force on the eastern flank which threatened to surround Shenkursk. The first step was to withdraw the Americans and Cossacks at Ust-Padensk, who were plainly in serious danger of capture. By a ruse they succeeded in slipping away at night by a trail through the frozen swamps, saving all their guns except one 18-pounder. Throughout these movements, which lasted from January 19 to January 23, Allied aeroplanes, in spite



[Elliott & Fry.]

**BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. S. S. MAYNARD,
C.M.G.**

In command at Murmansk.

of the wintry weather, actively cooperated, flying low over the roads wherever the slow-moving Bolshevik sledge transports were seen and bombing them. Their information was that the enemy were still pressing in on the flanks and that Shenkursk would soon be surrounded. Accordingly a general withdrawal was decided upon, and during the night of January 23-24 the troops marched out of Shenkursk, taking with them all the sick and wounded, together with 500 refugees. The lesson of this engagement was the decided improvement in the leadership of the Bolsheviks, who on this occasion fought with skill and courage, though their losses must have been heavy.

With the exception of an attack at Yevsi-ovskaya on the Vaga on March 1-2, when General Ironside's troops were compelled to retreat another mile downstream, nothing of moment occurred until the approach of the thaw. This period was awaited with a good deal of apprehension in England. The Bolsheviks had a fleet of 70 vessels, some of them heavily armed, which had been frozen in during the winter far up the river at Kotlas. Owing to the earlier thaw in the south they would be released a week or 10 days before our own gunboats would be able to go up the river, and a full month before the White Sea was free from ice. This circumstance would obviously

surprising suddenness. At the beginning of May sleighs were crossing the estuary at Archangel, even a light railway still stretched across the river over the ice. A week later the estuary was quite open to ships, and the water was pouring freely into the White Sea. In the meantime the enemy's attack had begun, but unexpectedly late. The critical time had been slipping away, and Archangel found it difficult to understand the enemy's delay. More surprising still was the feebleness of the effort. On May 1 the Bolshevik gunboats appeared opposite our front on the Dvina, near Tulgas (about 20 miles above the confluence with the Vaga) and bombarded it for some hours, after



GENERAL MAYNARD REVIEWING TROOPS AT MURMANSK.

give the enemy a substantial advantage. In a country where roads scarcely existed, and such as there were would be mere bogs during the spring thaw, the enemy for a week or two would have the sole use of a magnificent river highway. The Bolsheviks boasted of driving us into the sea, and at home some extravagant comparisons were made between Ironside's isolated forces and the beleaguered garrison of General Townshend at Kut. These alarmist views were not shared at Archangel itself, where the time had not been lost. The British flotilla was got ready to go upstream the moment the ice was free, with icebreakers to open the way, while General Ironside made a 300-mile sledge journey to the various fronts to organize the resistance.

The opening of the river came at last with

which infantry were thrown forward, but without success. Our 60-pounder guns, manned by Russian artillerymen under Canadian officers, were the deciding factor in the battle, blocking all approaches, and driving off the Bolshevik flotilla.

On the Vaga a slightly more serious effort was made. Here our lines crossed the river in the neighbourhood of Bereznik, 13 miles above the confluence with the Dvina. There were two separate attacks, on May 2 and May 5. In the first, which was designed on the usual plan of a combined frontal and enveloping attack, the enemy formations which had been assembled under cover of the woods advanced to the assault, attempting to capture the village, but were shattered as they came into the open. A second column endeavoured to turn our



THE QUAY AT MURMANSK.

flank between Bereznik and the mouth of the Vaga. It succeeded in getting behind our lines, then was counter-attacked by Russian infantry and defeated. On the 5th there were again two infantry assaults after artillery preparation, but both were easily dealt with. This was the whole extent of the Bolshevik effort. It left the Allied position entirely intact, indeed our losses were trifling. The British naval flotilla had now reached the front, and the danger of any successful attack against us was over.

A record of the active fighting would be

incomplete without some reference to the achievements of individual battalions. The 2/10th Royal Scots had been engaged in the line almost from the beginning of the operations in the previous August. They had had the hardest time of any troops in the Archangel sector and the heaviest casualties, and were specially singled out by General Ironside for the high *moral* which they maintained to the end. The Liverpools and the Durhams were also prominently mentioned for their meritorious service, although the majority of them were "category" men; and the Canadian



DOG TRANSPORT.



GARRISON KIT FOR NORTH RUSSIA.

artillery and some of the Russian gunners distinguished themselves in the final operations.

After the great expectations the enemy's spring offensive was an anti-climax. How can we explain this very half-hearted attempt, which was obviously never intended to be a serious challenge to our position? It is pretty certain that the Bolsheviks had left a comparatively small army on the Northern front, and the reason becomes apparent by a glance at the many dangers menacing them elsewhere. The greatest of these was the re-birth of the Siberian Army under Admiral Koltchak and its powerful thrust, then in full progress, towards the Volga. Koltchak's name had become a legend in Russia, and no one was so

much feared by the Bolsheviks. The latter, had, it is said, withdrawn 20,000 men from the Archangel front to meet this formidable danger in the East. In the far south General Denikin's Volunteer Army was victoriously advancing; it had taken 10,000 prisoners, and its strength was renewed by the arrival of British munitions, including Tanks. An attack on Petrograd also had long been talked of, and General Yudenitch, the victor of Erzerum, was organizing an army on the Finnish frontier for this purpose; while, south of the Gulf of Finland, supported by a British Squadron, the Esthonian Army was about to make a sudden swoop on Petrograd, which had unexpected success, the Esthonian advancing to within 30 miles of the old capital by May 23.

As to the future of North Russia, which with a limited amount of outside aid had thus for nearly a year been saved from Bolshevist tyranny, the policy of the statesmen in Paris, after much uncertainty, was at last becoming somewhat clearer. In some Allied countries, notably the United States, there had been a strong agitation for a complete withdrawal, but this policy did not prevail. The volunteer relief forces sent to take the places of the tired troops who had held the line during the winter were to remain and to form a nucleus and a stiffening for the local Russian forces. Though their numbers were small there was no finer fighting material in Europe than the British troops, of which the first contingent, under their commanding officer, Brigadier-General Grogan, V.C., landed at Archangel on May 26. With these veterans of the Great War and the troops dispatched by other Allied countries was associated a large and growing army of native Russians under General Marushevsky, which had been called up on a general mobilization order, rapidly trained during the winter, and latterly had been taking an increasing and important part in the defence. General Ironside had striven with some success to set this new Russian Army on its feet and to instil into it a feeling of self-confidence. To it was now to be entrusted the main burden of holding and consolidating the position won.

Whether it could safely be left to face the Bolsheviks alone, supported by Allied munitions and fortified by the example of tried and disciplined men, was a question which could be answered with far more confidence than it could have been a few months before. In any

case, the guiding principle of the Allies was that Russia must be saved by Russians. They had been given a fair field, and the outlook of Russia was brighter than it had ever been before. Above all, hope lay in the prospect of an eventual junction of the Archangel forces with those of Admiral Koltchak in the East. Koltchak's was a large and powerful army. From apparently hopeless beginnings it had been steadily built up on the firm foundation of a well organized State, and was now the great hope of Russia. This great constructive work had been going on in Siberia simultaneously with the events in North Russia which have been described above, and in order to show how it had been accomplished it is necessary to go back to the period anterior to the Allies' intervention in Russian affairs.

SIBERIA in the first half of 1918 was in a state of considerable chaos. Politically it was a single autonomous State, and in theory was under the sway of the Duma of Tomsk, a purely Socialist organization, not untinged with Bolshevism; but in practice the local Soviets everywhere did just as they liked. In Irkutsk there was hardly a street which did not bear the visible marks of civil strife, and the same war of classes was waged in all the chief towns.

These events for long were very imperfectly understood in Europe. Belated news of them reached the outside world mingled with rumours of the arming and drilling of the German and Austrian prisoners, who were at large—rumours which soon assumed very alarming proportions. There were said to be 150,000 of these prisoners, and it seemed obvious that they were a factor of great potential danger. In the light of later knowledge it is clear that the prisoners' power for mischief as the advanced guard of German Imperialism was exaggerated. It was not surprising, perhaps, in the chaotic condition of Siberia, that they should be left unguarded,



DEPARTURE FROM TILBURY OF A CONTINGENT OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCE FOR THE RELIEF OF THE TROOPS AT ARCHANGEL, MAY, 1919.

nor was it unnatural that, moving about freely, they should become imbued with Bolshevik ideas and should take up arms under the Soviets. They were, for example, frequently engaged with the force of Colonel Semennoff, which during the spring of 1918 carried on a single-handed warfare with the Bolsheviks on the borders of Manchuria. The episode of Semennoff's campaign, which was of a fluctuating and guerilla character, is of some slight interest and can be told very briefly.



COLONEL SEMENOFF.

Commanded an Anti-Bolshevist force in Siberia.

Semennoff was a Cossack officer who was originally engaged under the Kerensky régime in raising a Buriat Mongol regiment for service in Mesopotamia and Persia, where other Russian forces were operating. In the spring of 1918, however, he conceived the idea of using it as the nucleus and rallying point for all moderate Russians opposed to the Bolsheviks in Eastern Siberia. Its scene of action was near the Manchurian frontier along the main line which runs from Vladivostok to Karimskaya, the junction of the Siberian and Amur Railways. Sometimes it advanced deep into the enemy's country, then the local Cossacks who had been attracted to Semennoff's standard were themselves infected with Bolshevism and fell away. In this way five or six months passed without bringing together the great force of Russians which had been hoped for, and finally, with the opening up of a passage to the East by the Czecho-Slovaks and the immediate successes of the Allied troops landed at Vladivostok, it sank to a subordinate position as a military factor.

The appearance of the Czecho-Slovaks on the Far Eastern scene was the close of a very

remarkable adventure. As the fragmentary rumours of the doings of these gallant troops emerged from the dark interior of Russia—the story of how they had successfully defied the Bolsheviks in the very heart of the country,



GENERAL DENIKIN.

Commanded an Anti-Bolshevist Volunteer Army in Southern Russia.

of how they crossed the vast spaces of Siberia, deposing Soviet factions, fighting the lawless dregs of the population, till they finally achieved their liberty—they wore the aspect of a legendary and almost incredible incident, and



VLADIVOSTOK TO LAKE BAIKAL.

even now the Czecho-Slovak episode must be regarded as an astonishing one. Their ultimate rescue, indeed, became one of the first reasons calling for Allied intervention, and therefore the history of their sojourn in Russia deserves some attention.

Originally the Czechs were unwilling conscripts of that amalgam of races, the Austrian Army, from which, like the soldiers of the other oppressed peoples of the Monarchy, they seized every opportunity to desert to the

Russians. Before the Bolshevik Revolution there were some 120,000 of them in Russia. They had readily consented to be formed into battalions, and served under the Russian standards in Galicia, fighting with a dogged staunchness which won for them the respect of their commanders. What is more, they remained free from the taint of Bolshevism. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk provided for their exchange, but with a lively apprehension of the fate in store for them had they consented, they very naturally refused to be repatriated. Then the French offered to take them, *via*

their monotonous existence, caused a tense and explosive atmosphere.

The men were ripe for trouble when, in the month of May, 1918, a disturbance occurred at Penza, which led to an open conflict in which they seized a great depôt of arms and ammunition. They surprised the Bolshevik guard at the great bridge over the Volga at Sysran and established themselves at Samara. The revolt spread to all the other Czech detachments scattered at great intervals along the railway. Trotsky became alarmed. He issued orders that all who resisted disarmament should be



VLADIVOSTOK.

Siberia and America, to the Western front, to fight their hereditary enemies there, the Bolsheviks (at that time at peace with the Allies) promising to provide transport. The journey began, but the conveyance of a force equivalent to several divisions over 6,000 miles of railway is a slow and tedious business, even in a country less disorganized than Russia. There were long delays and broken journeys. An atmosphere of intense propaganda surrounded them, and the pressing instances of Bolshevik preachers urged them to join their cause. They became impatient and suspicious. Was Trotsky repenting of his agreement, perhaps under pressure? Might he not be in the pay of the Germans and be deliberately retarding their journey to France? These ideas, and the irritability caused by

shot on the spot. His fury was in vain, for the Czechs were a united and coherent force, and they quickly showed what boldness and resolution could do in a country torn by dissensions and riddled with enemies of the Soviet. They captured Kazan, and there seized the Russian State Treasury of £65,000,000 held by the Bolsheviks; they drove the enemy out of Tcheliabinsk, the European terminus of the Siberian Railway; and the whole length of the railway, from the Volga far into Siberia, passed into their hands. They even played an important part in an incident which shaped the future of Siberian Government. At the end of May, allying themselves with a party of moderate Russians, including the peasant co-operative societies and the industrials and traders, they overthrew the



KAZAN.

Where the Czechs seized the Russian State Treasury held by the Bolsheviks.

Bolshevists and aided at the birth of the Siberian Government of Omsk, the forerunner of the most hopeful instrument of Siberian regeneration which the country had yet seen, the Ministry of Admiral Koltchak.

As has been said, the Czecho-Slovaks did not travel across Siberia as an army, but in scattered detachments of varying strength, stretching over thousands of miles of railway, and early in June their vanguard reached Vladivostok, the great Siberian harbour on the Pacific. This force, numbering 15,000 men, was under the command of General Diterichs, one of the most distinguished young officers of the Alexeieff school, who had proved his capacity as Director of Military Operations in the brilliant Galician campaign of 1914-15. The arrival of the Czech warriors was irksome to the local Bolsheviks, who were rebellious to all authority and who showed their resentment; but Diterichs and his men were fully capable of controlling these gentry. They also took possession of the military stores, and thus saved these immense depôts, sent by the Allies, from being employed against them by the

enemy. The Bolsheviks were only too anxious for the Czechs to be shipped to Europe, but by this time the plans of the latter had changed. On June 3 the first step to the admission of the Czecho-Slovak nation as an Ally had been taken by the British Government, which recognized the Czecho-Slovak Army as an Allied and belligerent unit. This important step—soon to be followed by other Allies—which was in some measure a tribute to their own indomitable conduct, completely changed the Czechs' status; their desire now was to help the Allies, and as their services would be more immediately effective in Siberia in the now rapidly approaching period of Allied intervention, they decided to remain. Meanwhile, a body of some 5,000 of their compatriots was in imminent danger near Lake Baikal, far to the west. Early in July they were reported to be in full possession of Irkutsk; then there was a complete absence of all news from them for a month, causing intense anxiety. General Diterichs's men were pathetically anxious to fly to their rescue, but were restrained by the Allies, who were now nearly ready. How they were ultimately saved will be recorded later, for the story of their relief belongs more properly to the issue of the larger operations which followed upon Allied intervention, the history of which now claims attention.

The proposal to send troops to Siberia had

been under discussion for at least six months. The problem here was different from the general question of intervention in Russian affairs, because during the titanic struggle with Ludendorff's last offensive in France, which absorbed every energy of the Western Allies the burden of any action to be taken must fall upon Japan. On the other hand, the very aim of the Allies was to bring about the resurrection and unity of Russia, as the German desire was the dismemberment of Russia: and this being our purpose, and the memories of the Russo-Japanese War so recent, there was at least a possibility (so it was urged, with considerable

the only Power able to act with the necessary promptitude, should send the bulk of the troops, accompanied by detachments of a few thousand men from all the chief Allied countries. The first declared purpose of the expedition was the rescue of the Czecho-Slovaks. At the same time it was announced in the most public and solemn manner that there was no intention to interfere with the political sovereignty of Russia nor in its internal affairs, or to impair its territorial integrity. Neither was it intended to undertake for the Russians the burden of re-establishing order: our sole purpose was to render such aid as should be acceptable to the



CZECHO-SLOVAKS PARADING FOR MASS BEFORE GOING INTO BATTLE AT NIKOLSK (USSURI), NEAR VLADIVOSTOK.

In front, leaning on his cane, is General Diterichs.

force) that we should defeat our purpose and excite the distrust of Russians if a purely Japanese expedition were landed on Russian soil. There were, too, considerable elements in Japan which, to say the least, showed no enthusiasm for intervention. For long, therefore, Japanese action remained in abeyance, whilst the Chancelleries discussed. In April, Japanese marines and a few British bluejackets were landed at Vladivostok, but their mission was limited to quelling the disorders at that port, where the buildings of Japanese firms had been looted and Japanese killed. It became clear, however, as time went on that some action was inevitable. In July definite proposals were made by the United States to Japan, and these were accepted in Tokyo, the arrangement being that Japan, as

Russian people themselves in their endeavours to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.* For which purpose a small expedition was to remain behind in Siberia, after a way had been opened into the country, for the steadying of any efforts at self-government or self-defence.

The military position in the Far East at this moment was as follows: Somewhere east of Lake Baikal were the 5,000 Czecho-Slovaks, completely isolated. From this point eastward—a stretch of over 1,000 miles—the Bolsheviks were in possession of the Amur Railway to Khabarovsk. From Khabarovsk they had advanced southwards towards Vladivostok, and a weak force of Cossacks and Czechs had to

* Statement issued by the United States Acting Secretary of State, August 4, 1918.

retire before them. The main line of advance into Central Siberia, however, was the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs west from Vladivostok, through Kharbin, and joins the Siberian Railway at Karinskaya. At the point where it crosses the Russo-Manchurian frontier Semenoff's force was operating, and from there to Vladivostok it was only thinly patrolled. The danger of the position was from a descent on this railway from the north before the Allies could bring their weight to bear.

The British were the first to land on August 3, 1918. A French detachment arrived on the 9th, and the leading troops of the Japanese contingent on the 12th. Later there were to follow Americans, Canadians, Italians and Serbians, the whole expedition being under General Otani, who had lately commanded the Japanese garrison at Tsingtau.* The threat to the Allies' communications quickly developed. Four thousand Bolsheviks were embarked in steamers on Lake Khanka, about 100 miles north of Vladivostok, and after being landed

* At a much later date, in March, 1919, the effectives of the Allied forces in Siberia, apart from the Russians, was given by M. Pichon as follows:—Czecho-Slovaks, 55,000; Poles, 12,000; Serbians, 4,000; Rumanians, 4,000; Italians, 2,000; British, 1,600; French, 760; Japanese, 28,000 (half the Japanese force had then been withdrawn); Americans, 7,500; Canadians, 4,000.

were sent forward to cut the Vladivostok-Kharbin Railway. This move was nicely calculated to upset the Allies' plans, for at this moment the bulk of the troops were not yet in position; but the Japanese acted promptly, scattered the enemy and left strong guards to protect the railway tunnels.

Meanwhile, on the main front in Ussuri (the most easterly province of Siberia, north of Vladivostok), the first blow was struck by the Bolsheviks, and the Allied line had to be withdrawn six miles. Japanese and American reinforcements, however, were rapidly arriving on the scene, and within a few days a quick change was wrought in the aspect of affairs. On August 24 all the Allied forces began a forward movement, the British, French, Czechs and Cossacks being in the centre, and the Japanese on the flanks. General Otani thrust forward his left flank, captured two armoured trains, and got astride the railway, running due north, in the enemy's rear. The Japanese, by arriving in such force, had completely surprised the enemy. With a broken front the Bolsheviks rapidly went to pieces; a general *saute qui peut* followed, and an excellent opportunity had arrived for the employment of cavalry. The active Japanese horsemen left the infantry far



A BRITISH REGIMENT PARADING IN VLADIVOSTOK.




CZECHO-SLOVAK TROOPS AND JAPANESE MARINES IN VLADIVOSTOK.

behind, covering hundreds of miles, and arriving on September 5, with a detachment of Cossacks, at the enemy's headquarters at Khabarovsk, 400 miles north of Vladivostok. So precipitate had been the flight that when the pursuing cavalry entered the town they found the famous bridge which crosses the mighty Amur in 17 gigantic spans, quite untouched; disorder and neglect were apparent everywhere, and it was an eloquent sign of the disorganization which had overtaken the enemy, and of a pretty poor state of discipline also, that, though they were deficient in artillery and equipment, they left behind them 120 guns and a considerable amount of rolling stock on the railway.

The overwhelming success of these movements in the Ussuri province had placed the security of the Kharbin line beyond question, and the way was now clear for the main operation, the opening of the road into the centre of Siberia and the succouring of the isolated Czechs in Transbaikalia. From these gallant men little more definite news had come through; their whereabouts even were unknown, and dark forebodings filled the minds of General Diterichs and his relief force. They were known to be very short of munitions, food, and clothing—as was the case, indeed, with most of these Czecho-Slovak bands during their long migration; the season was late, and the effort to rescue them became a race against the dread Siberian winter. In the meantime, however, the Japanese had been acting energetically.

A detachment under General Fujii had reached Manchuria Station on the frontier of Transbaikalia on August 23, and the main body arrived in the vicinity on the following day. These powerful supports, together with General Diterichs's Czechs, who were now arriving on the scene, provided a powerful backing to Semenoff's Cossacks (who acted as the spear point of the Allied forces), ensuring the Cossacks' communications, besides having an important moral effect on the enemy. The Cossacks had latterly been going forward again, and now reached Olovyanna on the Onon, more than half way to Karimskaya. By this time news of the collapse in Ussuri must have reached the Bolsheviks, whose forces melted away into the Amur country. Suddenly there was a complete transformation in the position. General Diterichs had hardly moved over the Manchurian frontier to bring relief to his hard-pressed countrymen when, to the surprise of everyone, General Gaida arrived with them at Semenoff's camp at Olovyanna, half-way to Karimskaya Junction. Thus the first object of the Allied intervention was achieved at a stroke, the road was open into the centre of Siberia, and Gaida's men were soon enthusiastically greeting the Czechs who had been brought by General Diterichs from Vladivostok.

This unexpected climax came as the end of a long and vigorous effort on the part of General Gaida's command. Unknown to his friends of the relief force he had made a resolute thrust



THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

from Lake Baikal, cutting his way through all opposition. A thrilling account was given afterwards of how at the beginning of his march the numerous tunnels south of Lake Baikal were saved from destruction at the hands of the Bolshevists. The safety of these tunnels was of considerable importance, since the railway on which all depended would probably be interrupted for many months if they were destroyed. The story told was that the enemy rushed up a car-load of dynamite past a lonely Czech sharpshooter posted on a hill top, who fired a bullet through the car, exploding the contents and blowing up buildings and men. The Bolshevists tried to bring up fresh supplies, but it was too late, the Czechs were advancing, and this country was soon in their solid possession. They marched east in three columns, between the railway and the Mongolian frontier, defeated or over-awed into retreat the Bolshevists wherever they met them, and in this way pushed through all opposition for 600 miles till they reached the advanced guard of the relief force.

This sudden development meant that communication over the whole distance between Vladivostok and the Volga was restored. Munitions could now be brought to any point on the railway where the Czechs were fighting, and the friends of order and sound government were assured of a backing with the material resources of the Allies, and could proceed with the organization of their own forces. Internal reconstruction, however, would take time to achieve, and at present the conditions in Siberia were highly unsatisfactory. Material assistance of all kinds was urgently needed. The country was disorganized and industry paralyzed. What government there was was hardly yet set on its legs; there was great

confusion as to the question of authority, and friction constantly arose between the military and civil powers. The people themselves were not ready for the rapid change that had come about. The majority of the peasants had not yet grasped the situation, and were kept in the dark as to the objects of the Allied troops—there remained, indeed, many passive Bolshevists among them, though they dared not act openly. German agents were everywhere, busily making mischief, and prisoners were unguarded in the towns, mixing with the population and fomenting hostility to the Allies. Added to this was the disorganization of the Siberian Railway, the great arterial route of all traffic, which was working with exasperating inefficiency, an enormous proportion of its rolling stock being *hors de combat*. The railway in a sense was the key to the whole situation; it was essential for controlling the country and for bringing in munitions, and without it the front on the Volga would collapse and Siberia revert to chaos.

In this unsatisfactory condition of affairs the arrival of Allied troops in the centre of the country had a steadying effect. It had been decided that while the actual fighting at the front was to be left to the Russians and the Czechs, detachments of British, American, French, Italian and other Allied troops were to be quartered in the chief towns as a visible sign of the moral support given to the Government. The Japanese in considerable strength patrolled the eastern part of the Siberian Railway—perhaps the most lawless region in the country—and a battalion of the Middlesex Regiment (followed at a later date by a detachment of the Hampshires, who had come straight from a hot summer in India!) went to take up winter quarters at Omsk. The Middlesexes,

who travelled thither in October, were joyfully welcomed at the stations *en route*, and their visit made a marked impression. Between Irkutsk and Omsk their journey was interrupted by a dramatic incident, which will serve very well to illustrate the state of the country. In command of the battalion was Colonel John Ward, the redoubtable Labour member for Stoke, who after distinguished war service in other fields, had come to Siberia with his command in August, and been decorated for his conduct in the Ussuri campaign. The troop train arrived at the station of Zema, where the driver was held up by armed men and threatened with shooting if he refused to leave his post and join a strike. An alarm by bugle sounded at once, and the Middlesex men turned out and took control of the station. Inquiries revealed the fact that orders had been sent down the line ordering a general strike, and the startling information was received that a large force of armed Bolsheviks was in the neighbourhood. Colonel Ward marched a detachment into the town, arrested the leader, occupied the workshops and public buildings, and by this show of force persuaded the strikers to return to work next morning. Further, in view of the truculence of armed Bolsheviks, both inside and outside the town, and the possibility of concerted action between them, he ordered the surrender of arms by a fixed hour, threatening trial by martial law for defaulters. The whole proceeding might appear somewhat high-handed, and hardly consistent with our professions of non-interference, but it never occurred to anyone to associate the level-headed and democratic John Ward with such action; and, as a matter of fact, it was learnt afterwards that the projected strike was part of a deliberate plan to stop the transport of troops, and was admittedly dictated by political motives.

In time the presence of Allied troops produced the steadying effect hoped for, but before this could happen the Russians had to reconstruct their governmental machine, which at this time was about as unsatisfactory as the state of the country itself. Siberia was on the eve of a political crisis, which was to determine whether the country was to submit to a set of unpractical politicians who were playing with Bolshevism, or to build up a government and an army on firm foundations. There were, in point of fact, two Governments, and the duality arose in this way. In September there had met at Ufa, beyond the Urals, a Conference,

summoned to form an All-Russian Government from the parties opposed to Lenin. From this Conference—which included 100 members of the Russian Constituent Assembly, which the Bolsheviks had so cynically swept aside, and which was predominantly Socialist in complexion—there issued a body of five members, called the Directory, which was to assume the reins of power and sit at Omsk. On the other hand there was the Siberian Government, created in May, as we have seen, with the aid of the Czecho-Slovaks. This Government, whose shade of politics may be described as Democratic Conservative, was in being, had made a beginning with the raising of a new Russian Army, and had won public recognition;



COLONEL JOHN WARD, M.P.
Commanded a battalion of the Middlesex Regiment
at Omsk.

moreover—a very powerful factor—it was in possession of the Russian State treasure of £65,000,000, captured by the Czecho-Slovaks at Kazan.

In other circumstances a combination between two such discordant elements would have been impossible, but both knew that until a united Government was formed which could be really regarded as representative there would be no Allied support or recognition. And this was a consideration of the first importance. Without the prestige that it would

consequences were bound to be so ruinous to discipline that it led to a *coup d'état* in which the Directory was swept away, and its leading Socialist members placed under arrest.

In this crisis a very interesting incident occurred, which showed the great importance attached by the Siberians to Allied, and especially British, goodwill. At this moment Colonel John Ward and the men of the Middlesex battalion were making a tour of the front at the invitation of the Czechs, and in company with Admiral Koltchak, the Minister of War. Suddenly, in



UFA, THE SCENE OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE.

conier and the equipment for the Army which the Allies alone could supply, no real prosperity for any Government was possible. For Siberia had no munition factories, its new troops possessed few rifles, and at Omsk the recruits could be seen drilling in tattered hoots and greatcoats made of sacking. A compromise was arranged, leaving the Directory, it is true, in a predominant position, and for a few weeks this precarious arrangement worked. But the causes of discord were too profound. Differences arose at once, which were brought to a head by a manifesto, which recalled only too plainly the fatal and sinister influences which had wrecked the old Russian Army. It claimed for the soldiers these "political liberties" which produced in 1917 the "fraternization" with the Germans, and declaimed against the "old-style discipline" which was being instilled into the new army. The Directory, it is true, were not actually responsible for this manifesto, but at least it had their tacit approval, and its

the midst of this tour their train, instead of proceeding west, turned east and steamed directly back to Omsk. The very night after their return the Directory was removed, its leaders disappeared, and there was little doubt what their fate would be at the hands of the Cossack officers who had engineered the *coup*. Colonel John Ward promptly wrote to Admiral Koltchak intimating in pretty plain terms that if the arrested men were disposed of without a proper trial, it would have a very painful effect on British public opinion. His protest was heeded, the Directory leaders were deported to China, and, moreover, Koltchak took immediate steps to put himself right with the British public. He called on Colonel Ward, and explained that though he was, in effect, a Dictator, he had no idea of encouraging reaction or restoring the Monarchy; that if the country was to be saved there must be a practical Government and a disciplined army; and that, against his will, he had been obliged to assume



ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK.


Who became Supreme Governor of Siberia in November, 1918.

the supreme position, with the object of establishing a Constitutional Government. Koltchak's sincerity could not be doubted, and from this day forward the Allies did their utmost to give him sympathetic backing and to place him firmly in power.

The new form of Government was much better fitted for dealing with the Russian character than that which it supplanted. Practically absolute power was vested in one man for the express purpose of making the military effort of the State efficient. The new ruler was a remarkable man, as his brilliant career as a sailor attested. He had sailed the

Arctic as an explorer, had organized the defence of the Baltic, and was a full admiral in command of the Black Sea Fleet when the revolution arrived. In those critical days a dramatic moment arrived when the Bolshevik sailors forcibly took possession of the Fleet, and amid the bloody scenes that ensued he flung his sword into the sea rather than truckle to the disorderly rabble about him. In Siberia much of the strength of his position consisted in his detachment from the extremists on both sides. The country was full of reactionaries. They were, indeed, a more serious danger to him than the Bolsheviks themselves: but he soon made

it clear that he would never become their instrument, being convinced that the old régime was disastrous to Russia. His first act was to issue the following proclamation, in which he



THE EAST RUSSIA OFFENSIVE.

epitomised, with characteristic frankness, the policy which he intended to pursue :

The All-Russia Government has been abolished. The Council of Ministers took upon itself the whole power in the country, and has given it to me, Koltchak, Admiral of the Russian Navy. Having received power at a difficult moment, when civil war is proceeding, I declare that I will not follow a reactionary path, nor allow myself to be affected by party strife. My aim is to organize the Army, so as to be able to fight and conquer the Bolsheviks, and to be able to maintain law and order in the land, that the people may, without restraint, select the form of Government which they desire, and realize the high ideal of freedom now prevailing throughout the world. I ask you, citizens, to stand firm together, to control Bolshevism, and make sacrifices for the country.

(Signed) KOLTCHAK.

This pronouncement made an excellent impression in Siberia, but it remained to be seen what would be the effect of the *coup d'état* at the front. It was very necessary that the Czech soldiers, as well as the Russians, should be won over. The Czechs held the greater part of the line west of the Urals, and, until the training of the new Siberian Army was completed, the stability of the whole position largely depended upon them. But they were not in a very tractable mood; 40 per cent. of their numbers had fallen in battle, and being worn out with constant fighting, they were becoming tired of all the sacrifices they had to make without being able very clearly to foresee the issue. As democrats and Socialists they

were suspicious of Koltchak's arbitrary usurpation of power. They declared that the *coup d'état* was contrary to Czech ideas, and large numbers withdrew from the front. So embarrassing did their intervention in Siberian affairs become that General Syrov, their commander, issued to them a pre-emptory order to cease from meddling in politics on pain of death. By a happy fortune, however, a representative of the Czech Government in Europe arrived at this juncture in the Urals in the person of General Stefanik—that romantic figure, airman, propagandist, and Minister of War, who had served the national cause in so many lands during the war and who was killed while flying a few months later. He visited all the Army units, dissolved the recalcitrant Czechs' Committee and by an appropriate combination of persuasiveness and authority, succeeded in convincing them that, as they owed everything as a nation to the aid and countenance of the Allies, they were in honour bound to act loyally towards them and their friends. Thus the trouble was smoothed,



GENERAL STEFANIK.
Czech Minister of War.

and the troops which had retired returned to the front.

Admiral Koltechak had said when he came to power that if he was able to retain office for a month the new army which he had created would be able not only to hold the Urals but to take the offensive. It was composed of excellent material, mostly stalwart young men of the peasant class; while, to provide reserves for later operations, conscription was put in force, and training schools for officers were set up in the chief towns. In this work the British force under General Knox was able to lend valuable assistance, particularly in the technical branches. British Army methods were taught, and whatever was found to be an improvement on the Russian practice was embodied in the training of the new troops.

In November the Russians were able to take over the Ural front, relieving the Czechs, who went into reserve. The new vigour of the military administration was very quickly apparent. The Bolsheviks' left wing was then threatening Ekaterinburg, a place of sentimental interest as well as of economic importance, for it was at Ekaterinburg that the Tsar and his family had been foully murdered in the preceding spring; while the town was also the centre of the Ural mining district and an objective of value to the enemy, owing to the scarcity of metals in Russia. The Siberian Army, as it may be called, though it was largely recruited in East Russia as well as in Siberia, came out well from this first trial. It succeeded in rolling up the enemy's left wing, thus warding off the danger to Ekaterinburg, and capturing a thousand prisoners.

This was a promising preliminary to the coming offensive, which was opened about the middle of the month in the Perm region. Since the summer, when the Czechs dominated the Volga valley and held Kazan and Samara, a change had come over the scene, and the Bolshevik front had been carried much farther east. It ran at this time from near Verkhoturie in the north, east of the large town of Perm, then south-west towards Sarapul on the Kama, and south to the Siberian Railway near Bugulma. On this line the enemy had their First, Second, Third and Fifth Armies, aggregating 115,000 men. From north to south the positions of these armies were as follows:—Third Army, Perm; Second Army, Sarapul; Fifth Army, Ufa; First Army, south of the Siberian Railway. Far the strongest of these armies was

that before Perm, which town the enemy was certain to defend stoutly, because it was not only an arsenal of military supplies, but possessed large factories for the production of the Red Army's requirements. It says much for the confidence of Admiral Koltechak that this was the sector chosen for the chief attack. The commanders of the new army were young



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR A. W. FORTESCUE
KNOX, K.C.B.

Commanded the British Force in Siberia.

men, General Popelaëff, who led in the Perm sector, being only 28. On December 16 the junction of the Perm-Verkhoturie line with the branch from Solitansk was captured, with much rolling stock and 2,000 prisoners. Popelaëff's troops were then within 35 miles of Perm, which was reported as being evacuated. A week later they were in the town. One column had marched 17 miles in a day, which, considering the heavy clothing worn and the severity of the weather—the temperature varied from 15 to 40 degrees below zero Fahr.—was a remarkable performance. There was severe fighting in the streets of Perm, which

ended in the enemy being defeated and driven out along the railway towards Viatka. Before the operation was closed the number of prisoners taken reached the formidable total of 30,000, while an enormous number of the enemy were killed or died of cold: the Bolshevik Third Army was practically destroyed.

At first large results were expected to flow from the Perm victory. Hopes were entertained that the whole Bolshevik position would be shaken, especially when Popelaeff's troops turned south in a threatening movement directed to the outflanking of the adjacent armies. It soon appeared, however, that the offensive had spent its force. Unfortunately, the troops had suffered severely from the cold, there were countless cases of frostbite, and the privations of the campaign, in a climate where men who are stricken down wounded are frozen stiff within a very short time, somewhat shook the army's *moral*. These first Russian levies, though spirited in attack, proved to be deficient in staying power—a defect, however, which would probably be remedied when they became tried campaigners. Moreover, almost at the same time that General Popelaeff was winning his spurs at Perm, the Bolsheviks were pushing a vigorous offensive against the Siberian left

wing, 300 miles to the south, which had results of even greater strategical import than the blow in the north. For it carried their front far forward to the extreme limits of European Russia and even beyond into Turkestan, where they linked up with the local Soviet forces, and thus ensured for themselves much needed supplies of food and cotton from that area. The net result of the November and December operations, therefore, so far as territory was concerned, was a gain to the Bolsheviks. It would seem also that the Siberian Army's Staff had made a miscalculation when they weakened so greatly their southern front for the sake of the Perm offensive.

During the depth of the winter field operations were impossible, but the Koltchak Government was usefully engaged in perfecting its military machine and building up the mechanism of the State. Though it held firmly the reins of power, it was embarrassed by many enemies, both those who wanted to depose it and those who were anxious to quicken its pace. To the latter category belonged the Monarchists; to the former the semi-Bolsheviks and the direct agents of Lenin, whose poisonous influence found a fruitful field among the discontented workmen,



EKATERINBURG.

The scene of the slaughter of the Tsar and his family.



PART OF A TRAIN WRECKED BY BOLSHEVISTS AT BAIKAL STATION.

soured by the inevitable hardships of the time, and the unusual privations of the winter—the coldest that Siberia had known for many years.

In Omsk these conditions were aggravated by the enormous influx of refugees, who had swollen the normal population of 100,000 to six times that number, causing dense overcrowding and under-feeding, to which were added the miseries of typhus and cholera epidemics. Prisoners of war, back from their long captivity in Germany, also flooded into Omsk and other towns, thousands of them—a piteous spectacle—having made the whole journey across Russia on foot. Others, more fortunate, came by the railway, and it was a strange sight to see the eastward-bound train passing through Omsk with the ragged and half-starved wanderers covering it like locusts, clinging by the score to the engine, tender, footboards and couplings. Among the returning prisoners there was a constant infiltration of Bolshevik agents, who smuggled themselves into the country in order to tamper with the fidelity of the troops or to keep alive their restless propaganda. More than once plots aiming at the overthrow of the Government were discovered. One desperate enterprise of this sort gave the people of Omsk a day's fright in the month of December, when a band of conspirators planned to seize the railway at Kolomsino just outside Omsk, and having released the German and Bolshevik prisoners in the gaols, to urge the troops, in the midst of

the confusion thus caused, to revolt. The first part of the programme actually succeeded, but the troops remained faithful, except two companies, which mutinied, declaring themselves in favour of the Bolsheviks. This piece of treachery was not a thing that a dictatorship was likely to deal with by half measures. The revolting troops were surrounded and surrendered, the Bolsheviks were driven into the forests, where many probably perished from the cold, and next day 60 conspirators and soldiers were court-martialed and shot.

Among the Monarchists and reactionaries, who, as has been said, were an element not less dangerous to a Government with the moderate aims of Koltchak than the Bolsheviks, was the Cossack General Semenoff, whom we have seen opening the way for the Czechs into Siberia in the preceding August. Since then he had sadly fallen from grace and was conducting a kind of irregular war entirely independent of all authority. Every train on the Siberian Railway had to run the gauntlet of his men in Trausbaikalia—part of which region, indeed, was popularly known as Semenoff's country and Chita as his capital. They collected the Customs dues belonging to the Omsk Treasury, appropriated wagons and sold them, and successfully defied any interference with them. Whilst this continued orderly government was impossible. Koltchak sent an officer to replace Semenoff and to impose martial law at Chita, but apparently the



ON THE DVINA: FRENCH TROOPS ON BOARD A BRITISH SHIP ON THE WAY TO ARCHANGEL.

Cossack general was too strong for him. It is an unfortunate fact, only too typical of the disorder against which the Omsk Government had to struggle, that Semenov continued to defy Admiral Koltehak during most of the winter, and though later he made submission and offered himself for a command at the front, it is uncertain to what extent the anomalous state of things in the Transbaikal country was cleared up.

But neither Bolshevik sympathisers nor reactionaries could move Koltehak from the path of moderate and prudent statesmanship which he had set himself. The nascent confidence in his rule was helped and stimulated by the sight of Allied uniforms in all the chief towns, and though the Allied Governments—true to their policy of allowing the Russians to work out their own salvation—did not send these troops to the front, their assistance in the cause of order and stable government was none the less valuable. The two British battalions—the Middlesexes and the Hampshires—remained at Omsk, where they became very popular. The presence of Colonel John Ward, as the very embodiment of British democracy, could not fail to be an asset to a Government which earnestly desired to con-

vince a distrustful proletariat of the genuineness of its intentions. In one respect the action of the Allies was not helpful. The proposal from the Peace Conference at Paris inviting the Siberians among other Russian groups to send delegates to meet the Bolsheviks at Prinkipo had a deplorable effect, and was at once rejected. This unfortunate overture was the more to be regretted because of the excellent impression which had been caused shortly before by a message of goodwill from the British Government, followed by a similar message from the French, expressing sympathy with Koltehak's attempt to establish a free Government on the foundation of public confidence. But in spite of the misplaced efforts of Allied statesmen, and his own many internal troubles, Koltehak's Government retained with the greater part of the population the prestige which it had won, largely owing to the energy and strong personal influence of the "Supreme Governor" himself.

In the spring of 1919 all other interests were dwarfed by the re-opening of military operations. The offensive began in the middle of March, when about a month remained before the spring thaw. Two big salients were thrust deep into the enemy's line, the first from the neighbourhood of Perm (where the Czech General Gaida

was in command), the second, farther south, from Birsik (General Khangin commanding) which threatened the rear of the Bolshevik Army defending Ufa, lost by the Siberians some months before. The line was soon straightened out, and the troops pressed on till the whole army was moving forward on a front of nearly 400 miles. Unfortunately, all this country is heavily wooded, afforded abundant cover for the retreating enemy, and

to the east up to Orenburg won by the Bolsheviks in the preceding December. The enemy perceived this danger in time, and by strengthening his forces on the high ground about Sterlitamak (between Ufa and the Orenburg-Samara line) succeeded for the time being in staving off this threat to his deeply projecting right wing and saving Orenburg.

Such was the position when the spring thaw towards the end of April compelled the Siberian



RECRUITS FOR THE RED GUARD.

Won over by a member of a Soviet, who is seen in civilian dress behind the leader.

blinding snowstorms also hampered the pursuit. The young Russian National Army made light of all difficulties. They were now a thoroughly disciplined force, acting with great vigour and moving swiftly; often with the aid of sleighs they rushed forward over the snow-covered country 40 miles in a single day. In this way Koltchak's army recovered within a month a big area varying from 100 to 200 miles in depth on a front of over 300 miles. Ufa fell at the outset, and other important places captured were Sarapul and Tichistopol on the Kama and Buguruslan, through which the army pressed forward towards the Volga valley. At one moment it looked as though a still more important strategical result would be achieved by pressing south from Ufa with such force as to render untenable all the ground

commanders to slow down operations. Koltchak's new army, though it had not achieved the highest strategic aim, and though it later lost some little ground in a Bolshevik counter-offensive, had good grounds for congratulating itself upon the outcome of its effort. It had taken 10,000 prisoners from the enemy and accounted for many more killed, it had rescued from Bolshevik tyranny a vast tract of country, and was well placed for resuming its march to the Volga valley and beyond. Moreover, it possessed abundant reserves for renewing its effort on the return of favourable conditions, and was at last admirably equipped, and furnished with plentiful munitions, thanks to the Allies. Most important of all, the vigorous Government behind it was still unshaken in the saddle and

its prestige was growing. At the beginning of May it was recognized by the Archangel Government—a similar step had already been taken by General Denikin in the South—showing that Russians beyond the borders of Siberia had come to see in Koltchak the only man who was capable of saving his country. The all-important step of Allied recognition followed later at the end of the same month, a condition attached to the offer being that the Omsk Government should undertake to respect the freedom of the Russian people and summon a Constituent Assembly as the authority from which the powers of a future Russian

State would be derived. As the calling of a Constituent Assembly on a democratic basis was an essential part of Koltchak's policy, there could be little doubt that these conditions would be accepted. Though the course of future events could not be predicted with certainty, there seemed at last to be reasonable grounds for hoping that the efforts of Koltchak and other patriotic Russians would finally prevail against the Bolsheviks and be successful in restoring to their country the blessings of orderly and settled government, of which it had so long stood in need.



CHAPTER CCXCIII.

THE ARMIES OF FRANCE:
1914—1917.


MAIN BURDEN OF THE WAR BY LAND ON THE FRENCH—FIVE PERIODS OF THE WAR—FIVE SECTORS OF THE FRONT—THE FIRST FOUR PERIODS—JOFFRE'S OFFENSIVE POLICY IN THE EAST—BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ—RETREAT FROM THE SAMBRE AND MEUSE—BATTLE OF THE MARNE—THE AISNE—THE RACE TO THE SEA—TRENCH WARFARE—THE FRENCH SOLDIER—VERDUN—THE SOMME—THE GERMAN RETREAT—THE AISNE OFFENSIVE—THE CHEMIN-DES-DAMES—MALMAISON—MORTHOMME.

IN this and a subsequent chapter will be given a résumé of the main operations of the French army in Belgium and France from the beginning to the end of the war, with the object of presenting a connected view of the predominant part played by our great ally in meeting and defeating the land forces of the enemy.

In a sense it is true that the victory was won on the sea and not on land. Without the British Fleet it would certainly not have been won at all. That has been frankly admitted by M. Clemenceau and all thinking Frenchmen, even by some who are inclined to be ungenerous in their estimate of the comparative merits of the two armies. For our part it is natural (and in this all Frenchmen are with us) that we should regard as one of the greatest of the miracles which were the outcome of the German onslaught the incredibly rapid formation and equipment by our "unmilitary" nation of the huge armies which not only in Europe but in many parts of Asia and Africa, sometimes in cooperation with our Allies, but more often by independent action, were such an invaluable factor in the common fight for the common cause. It is natural that the eyes of the people of the British Isles and of our Colonies and Dominions should turn rather to the part of the western field where our own men were engaged

than to the far larger sector of the front defended for 51 months by the French. We are bound to be more familiar, and to wish to be more familiar, with the names and achievements of our own generals than with those of the band of great captains who under Joffre and Foch and Nivelle and Pétain outgeneralled and outfought their Prussian and Bavarian and Saxon rivals. But for all that, if we are to see the war in its true perspective, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that after, as well as before, the expansion of our Expeditionary Force into an army of Continental proportions, after, as well as before, those mountains of the weapons and stores and machines of war came into being, the main burden of the terrible struggle on the western front fell on the shoulders of France, and but for the fine strategy of her generals and the unflinching self-sacrifice of her soldiers must over and over again have borne her to her knees.

A simple way to form a clear and just estimate of the French share in the fighting in the western theatre of the war, as far as it can be isolated from the efforts of the British and the other Allies, is to divide the whole war into five distinct periods, the campaigns of the years 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, and 1918. There is naturally here and there a certain amount of overlapping, especially in the case of the pro-



THE SEAT OF WAR IN THE WEST

longed period of trench warfare, which began in November, 1914, and lasted on through 1915 into 1916, when on two sectors of the front it was locally and temporarily brought to a close by the German and Allied offensives at Verdun and on the Somme. But, generally speaking, as a matter of practical tactics, the campaign of each year was self-contained and was brought to a definite close by the barrier of the winter months, until once again, with the return of spring, one side or the other was in a position to make a fresh start. The plan, therefore, of the present chapter will be to present the first four campaigns, from 1914 to 1917 in-

clusive, in four separate compartments; the chapter to follow will deal solely with the grand final act of the drama, the campaign of 1918.

Briefly stated, the principal operations in which the French Armies were engaged during the first four periods were as follows:

In 1914 the defeats of Charleroi and Morhange in Belgium and in the east of France and the subsequent retreats, followed by the twin victories of the Marne and the Grand Couronné of Nancy, led up to the September-October attack of the first battle of the Aisne, after which, in the middle of November, when the German attempt to turn the left flank of

the Allies' line and strike at the Channel ports had been checked by the fighting on the Yser and in the first battle of Ypres, both sides dug themselves in along the whole line of the four hundred miles from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier, and settled down to the "nibbling" conditions of siege or trench warfare.

During 1915 the fighting on the French sectors of the front was almost wholly confined to this species of warfare, and a long series of minor but exhausting engagements in Artois, on the Aisne, in Champagne, in the forest of the Argonne, on the heights of the Meuse, in the

On July 1, after the attack on Verdun had lasted for four months, the French and British together began their joint offensive south and north of the Somme, and after making good progress in the first burst continued to advance slowly till well on in the winter.

In the spring of 1917, partly as the result of the weakening effect on their forces of the Somme offensive, partly in the hope of upsetting the plans for another big attack which they believed the French had in view, the Germans suddenly, on March 17, withdrew their armies between Arras and the Oise and fell back to



[French official photograph.]

TRENCH WARFARE: FIRING GRENADES BEFORE ATTACKING WITH THE BAYONET.

forest north of Pont-à-Mousson, and in the Vosges, was broken only by the French offensive of September 25 on a 25-mile front in Champagne.

In 1916, though trench warfare continued to be the rule on the greater part of the front, there were two further limited offensives of great importance. From the end of February to the end of September the Germans kept up an almost continuous assault on the French positions in front of Verdun, but were afterwards deprived of nearly the whole of the ground they had gained by the two big French counter-attacks of October 24 and December 15.

a new line running from Lens through St. Quentin and La Fère to Barisis on the edge of the forest of St. Gobain. This retreat did not, however, prevent the French from delivering the expected offensive. A month later, on the Aisne, Nivelle attacked along a front of about 30 miles between Soissons and Reims. The offensive was partially suspended from political motives before it had fulfilled all it had in view, but it gained a depth of three or four miles on a good stretch of the front of the attack and netted a large number of prisoners. It was followed, all through the summer, by a tremendous series of German and



FRENCH INFANTRYMAN OF 1914.

Blue coat, red "pantalons," red kepi.

French attacks and counter-attacks along the Chemin-des-Dames and in the plain of Champagne, and on October 23 the line was pushed some miles farther forward, up to the valley of the Ailette, by the well-planned limited offensive on the fort of Malmaison, a little way north-east of Soissons. Meanwhile, in August, French Armies were engaged in two other local offensives, one in Flanders, where they fought side by side with the British, the other in front of Verdun, where on August 20 and the next few days the enemy were finally deprived of the whole of the advantage which they had gained by their seven months' campaign in 1916.

The geographical front, from the Channel

to Switzerland, along which most of the fighting took place, falls, like the war itself, into five sections, each of them about 80 miles in length. It is possible even without the help of maps to form an idea of the nature of the principal features of these five sections, measured along the line which remained the battle-front from November, 1914, to July, 1916, accurate enough to prove a useful guide in following the whole course of events.

The first section stretched nearly due south from Nieuport up the valley of the Yser to Dixmude and Ypres, then in front of Mont Kemmel through Messines, across the Lys at Armentières, past La Bassée, Loos, Lens, and Vimy, across the Scheldt at Arras, and up the valley of the Ancre to Albert. The whole of this line, except for a few isolated heights such as Kemmel and the Messines and Vimy ridges, ran over a vast low-lying plain on about the level of the sea as far as Arras, south of which, for 20 miles, it crossed the belt of low hills, about three hundred feet in height, which run from the south of Calais round the west of St. Omer, Béthune, and Arras to the south of Cambrai and then continue along the north bank of the Aisne to the plain of Champagne.

In the second section of the front, from Albert to Berry-au-Bac (at the eastern extremity of this belt of high lands and plateaux), the line after crossing the Somme ran south past Chaulnes and Royo over the Oise at Ribécourt into the valley of the Aisne, round the bend to Soissons, and then nearly due east along the Aisne valley south of the belt of plateaux along the top of which runs the Chemin-des-Dames, past Missy, Vailly, and Roucy out on to the plain to Berry-au-Bac, a little village on the Aisne 30 miles east of Soissons. The first part of this stretch, between the Somme and the Oise, is an island of low ground surrounded by wooded hills; from the junction of the Oise and the Aisne at Compiègne there are two lines of heights north and south of the Aisne valley running parallel to the river from which deep ravines run up into them at right angles. In the angle between the Oise and the Aisne is the forest of Laigle, and south of the Aisne, between Compiègne and Soissons, the forests of Compiègne and Villers-Cotterets, the last some distance back from the river. East of Soissons, to the south of the river, and also on the north side as far as the Chemin-des-Dames and the Ailette, the heights are comparatively

open, but beyond the Ailette, which here runs parallel to the Aisne, lies the formidable obstacle formed by the two forests of Coucy and the massif of St. Gobain, north-east of which the conical hill on which Laon is built rises steeply from the plain.

At Berry-au-Bac, in the third section, the line left the Aisne and struck southwards over the low ground in front of Reims, between the Vesle on the west and the Suipe and the formidable forts of Brimont and Nogent L'Abbesse on the east, down to the smaller fort of Pompelle about 10 miles south east of Reims. From here it ran due east across the Champagne plain south of the massif of Moronvillers across the centre of the forest of the Argonne, another network of steep ravines, to the high barrow-like downs north of Verdun. To the west of the stretch between Berry-au-Bac and Reims, and round the bend farther south for some distance between Reims and Moronvillers, the French had the advantage, over a large horseshoe curve extending 10 miles north and 10 miles east of Reims, of excellent artillery positions on high ground, from which they looked down on the plain as one looks at the stalls of a theatre from the dress circle, but on the other hand the Germans, especially on the Moronvillers massif, were in much the same position on the north of the battle-front. East of Moronvillers stretched the flat chalky plain of the Camp-de-Châlons, on which there was no defence, but trenches between the enemy and Châlons and Bar-le-Duc. East of the line Bar-le-Duc—St. Menchould (on the west edge of the forest of the Argonne) the ground rises to a vast plain a hundred miles wide and over six hundred feet in height, drained by the upper waters of the Marne, the Meuse, and the Moselle, which stretches right away to the Lorraine frontier and the Vosges.

The fourth section lay altogether in this plain. It started in the plain from the village of Ornes just clear of the heights of the Meuse, 10 miles north-east of Verdun, and from there ran south, first in the plain of the Woëvre and then diagonally westwards across the heights of the Meuse and the Meuse itself, a little way north of St. Mihiel. Just south of St. Mihiel it turned up again in the contrary direction, making a hairpin bend round the wood of Apremont, and then struck north-east to Pont-à-Mousson and Bois-le-Prêtre on the Moselle, 15 miles south of Metz, where it crossed the river and turned south-east along the Lorraine frontier up the



FRENCH INFANTRYMAN OF 1915.
Varieties of colour have disappeared.

valley of the Seille, and through the forest of Parroy, a few miles in front of Lunéville, to Blamont at the north extremity of the Vosges.

The fifth section ran south from Blainmont, first a little to the west and then a little to the east of the crests of the Vosges, across the south-east corner of Upper Alsace known as the Sundgau, in front of the Troué or Gap of Belfort, to Pfetterhausen on the Swiss frontier.

Along the front of the first, third, fourth and fifth sections of this line there were, with one or two notable exceptions, hardly any important variations except in the first and last few months of the war. In the second, along the arc of the circle the chord of which is the straight line

90 miles long between the two fixed points of Arras and Reims, the fight was continually swaying backwards and forwards, like the handkerchief tied to the centre of the rope in a tug-of-war, the obvious reason being that this section cut straight across the Oise valley and the traditional line of advance on Paris from Brussels, through Mons, Le Cateau, St. Quentin, Noyon, Compiègne, and Senlis. During the



AMIENS CATHEDRAL.

war there were five great movements of the opposing armies up to or beyond this line—the main front between Albert and Berry-au-Bac—in one direction or the other. In September, 1914, when the German advance guard got within 20 miles of Paris, they pushed their right wing 25 miles west of it to a line just beyond Doullens and Amiens, and 50 miles south of it to Coulommiers and Sézanne. The battle of the Marne carried the battle front back again to the Albert—Berry-au-Bac line, and the Somme offensive and the German retreat of 1917 thirty miles beyond it to the Cambrai—St. Quentin—La Fère line. The German thrusts from March to June, 1918, pushed the Allies back across it once more, on its northern half to a maximum depth of 40 miles westwards, nearly up to Amiens and Compiègne, on its southern a depth of 30 southwards, up to and beyond the Marne. In the offensives of July

the French and British for the last time drove the enemy across and beyond it to the Arras—Cambrai—St. Quentin—La Fère line and then on farther still to the line of Ghent—Mons—Sedan, till the armistice stopped our further progress.

So much for the second sector. The first, from Albert northwards, was, with the exception of the small Belgian front, from the autumn of 1914 to the end almost exclusively the British zone. But here also the French had a good share of the fighting. Up to the moment when the British Army moved north after the first battle of the Aisne they were almost wholly responsible for the defence north of the Oise; they held the short front from Nieuport to the Belgian left up to the August of 1917, when they fought side by side with our men round Dixmude in the Flanders offensive; they joined in the operations round Mont Kemmel in April, 1918; from March to August they had two armies between the Oise and the Somme; and from August to the end of the war a third shared with the British, Belgians and Americans in the final stages of the offensive in Flanders and the advance through Belgium.

In the third, fourth and fifth sections, east of Berry-au-Bac, with the exception of the part played by the American Army on the front east and west of Verdun during the last three months of the war and the assistance given for short periods by eight British and about the same number of isolated Italian, Russian and American divisions, they had throughout the whole 51 months to do all the work themselves, including the heroic defence of Verdun and the masterly stand against the German offensive of July, 1918, the stroke which was the beginning of the end and enabled the combined armies of all the Allies to turn the tide of German invasion and bring the bloody struggle to a triumphant finish. Through very nearly the whole of the war they were continually confronting the enemy on four-fifths of the battle front, and except for certain comparatively short periods, notably the German offensive of March and April, 1918, they had always the larger proportion of the enemy's forces arrayed against them.

From this brief general outline of the part played by the French during the war we will now go on to examine in rather fuller detail the first four periods, referring when necessary to the five divisions of the front as the sectors of Picardy-Flanders, the Aisne, Champagne, Lorraine, and the Vosges, each of which, it may be



FRENCH INFANTRY ATTACKING, 1914.

useful to remember, is almost exactly 80 miles in length.

During the first part of the 1914 campaign the struggle opened, as it ended in 1918, with a phase of open warfare. Both sides still had to learn the effect of modern weapons and the disadvantages as well as the advantages of the war of the trenches. For France the active fighting began in the Lorraine and Vosges sectors. On Sunday, August 2, while still officially at peace with her western neighbours, Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, addressed an insufferably insolent and high-handed ultimatum to Belgium, and trespassed on the soil of France by sending a number of small raiding parties across the frontier (from which the French, in order to avoid all possible risk of incidents which might precipitate the conflict,

had withdrawn their troops) at several points between the Swiss frontier and Metz. On August 3, the day following these outrages, she threw off the mask and declared war openly on her destined prey. The reply of France was characteristic. Two days later, on August 5, she delivered her *riposte*, carrying the war into the enemy's country by an offensive in Lorraine, between Metz and Strassburg, followed on August 8 by a similar attack south of Strassburg in Alsace. The second of these operations, though the more successful of the two, was at first carried out with a very small force, and was rather a raid than a serious offensive.

To the end of time there will probably be two opinions as to the wisdom of this forward policy. It had long been laid down as an axiom by most of the strategists of all nations that



FRENCH INFANTRY FOLLOWING THE RETREATING GERMANS THROUGH AMIENS, 1914.

when Germany attacked she would come, in spite of her solemnly sworn treaty obligations, by way of Belgium, though in the case of Bernhardt, von der Goltz, and other Germans this intention was camouflaged by the statement that the main attack would be on Nancy. Because their judgment of German strategy and Germany's sense of honour proved to be right, many of these experts still hold that Joffre was wrong in massing troops in the east which would have been invaluable in the north. But the fact that some part of these forces would have been extremely useful in Belgium by no means proves that they were not of still greater service in Lorraine. Joffre's object, according to his officially published statement, was to keep as large a portion of the enemy's forces as possible engaged at as great a distance as possible from the main theatre of operations. That purpose the two offensives unquestionably fulfilled. But they did far more than that. They fortified the *moral* of the French Army and nation at one of the most critical moments of the war. The French Army is a marvellous weapon, but it can only be wielded by those who know how, and who understand the nation from which it is drawn. In those early days it was everything for the army, and for France and Paris as well, to be able to say as they waited for the drama of the war to unfold: "We are attacking the attacker; we are advancing against the enemy on the sacred soil

of the ravished provinces." The moral value of assuming the offensive on that particular part of the front at that moment was immense. It was a tonic which acted on every fibre of the nation, as Joffre knew that it must, because he knew his soldiers and his people. It was of vital importance at the very outset to banish from their minds the idea which they shared with most people outside France that the German army was a better fighting machine than their own. To attain that end he could hardly have hit on a surer means than an immediate offensive in Alsace and Lorraine. On more strictly military grounds he had also one specially sound reason for keeping on the eastern frontier a larger body of his available forces than his critics would have liked. His first business, even if he decided to defend by attacking, was defence, and even as it was the troops concentrated in the east were only just strong enough to prevent the Germans from breaking through.

On August 20 the Lorraine attack under de Castelnau was ended by the defeat at Morhange, and on the 23rd Pau's small army was withdrawn from all but a narrow strip of Alsace only a few days after it had occupied Mulhouse for the second time. From then till September 12, during the retreat from Mons and the battle of the Marne, while in Lorraine and behind the Vosges de Castelnau's army on the left wing and Dubail's on the right stood with their backs



WAR-TIME IN THE VINEYARDS OF CHAMPAGNE.



MARSHAL JOFFRE.

[Meley.]

to the wall of the Grand Couronné of Nancy and in front of the Gap of Charmes between Epinal and Toul, no one knew what the issue would be. Foch has told us that the ruling idea of the strategy of Von Moltke, then the chief of staff and presiding genius of the German army, was to defeat his enemy by getting round his flanks. At that time outflanking was possible. There was no continuous line of

trenches. There were, indeed, hardly any trenches at all, beyond the shallowest and poorest of human rabbit-scrapes. Von Moltke's design was patent. He massed most of his strength on his two wings, and while Von Kluck worked round the Allies' left flank in front of Paris, von Strantz and the Crown Prince of Bavaria wore to do the same in the east, cutting through between Epinal and

Toul in the Lorraine plain so as to get behind the French Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies in their position on or behind the Champagne plain. If they had succeeded (and the Kaiser, even while the greater battle of the Marne was raging, was



[Manuel.

GENERAL DUBAIL.

Commanded an army in the Vosges in 1914.

there in front of Nancy to see them do it) the result of the battle of the Marne would have been reversed and the war finished almost before it had begun. But de Castelnau and Foch and Dubail were just strong enough to hold them and eventually to drive them back to the frontier by September 12 or a few days after. The battle of the Grand Couronné was won, like the battle of the Marne, after a retreat. Pau's small force was recalled from Alsace because Pau himself and some of his men were wanted elsewhere, in Lorraine and in the north. Dubail's army fell back from the Vosges because two of de Castelnau's army corps on his left, after a series of fairly easy triumphs in Lorraine, had run up against a strongly entrenched position in front of Morhange and Saarburg—the first that was met with in the war—and had been so badly hammered that they retreated in confusion, which was only saved from becoming a rout by the covering support on their left of Foch and the XX Corps. The twin offensives were at an end, and only defence remained. Braced up by the rest of de Castelnau's army on their left and Dubail's on their right, in two days the

two corps that had finched made a wonderful recovery, and the two armies, sorely pressed, stood their ground so heroically and so firmly that defeat was turned into victory. Though overshadowed by the simultaneous and more important victory of the Marne at the other end of the line, the struggle in front of the Grand Couronné of Nancy was without doubt one of the great and decisive battles of the war.

Two hundred and fifty miles away in Belgium the first collision between the French and the Germans at the other end of the line took place on August 15, at Dinant, 10 miles up the Meuse from the point where it is joined by the Sambre at Namur, when the Germans first attempt to cross the river was defeated. On the 20th, the day of the defeat at Morhange, the enemy's right entered Brussels unopposed, and soon after from von Kluck on the right to the Crown Prince on the left they began their advance in earnest along a front of 160 miles between Brussels and Metz, some way north of which the Crown Prince's army was held up till the 27th at Longwy by the gallant defence of a single battalion heroically inspired by its commander, Colonel Darche. On the 23rd, the day on which the battle of the Grand Couronné began, the French were defeated at Charleroi and Namur was evacuated; on the 25th Sedan, 50 miles higher up the Meuse and more than half-way to Verdun, was occupied by the enemy, the line of the Sambre finally abandoned, and the retreat towards the Marne begun. The next fortnight was the most anxious time that France was to know till the last summer of the war.

The tract of country over which the main line of the French and English retreat moved is the nearly equilateral triangle of which Verdun, Brussels, and Paris are the three angles. It is approximately enclosed by the valleys of the Meuse on the right, the Marne on the base or south side, and the Oise on the left, the actual distances being—Brussels to Verdun, 140; Verdun to Paris, 150; and Paris to Brussels, 160 miles. As was the case afterwards all through the war, Verdun remained a fixed point, on which the line of the retreat hinged, swinging across the triangle from east to south with the other or marching end of the line describing the arc of a quarter-circle beyond and then across the valley of the Oise, from Mons, 35 miles south-west of Brussels, to the neighbourhood of Meaux, 30 miles east of Paris. In the French sectors the chief incidents

were a fine counter-attack on the 29th by the Fifth Army between Guise and Péronne, and the failure of an attempted offensive through the Belgian Ardennes. On the same day as the attack at Guise, when the British were north of the Oise, Joffre reformed his line. Part of a new army, the Sixth, covered by Sordet's cavalry corps, which all through the retreat did splendid work, was placed on the left of the British, who had the Fifth Army on their right. Then came another new army, the Ninth, under Foch, then the Fourth, under Langle de Cary, and then the Third Army

under Sarrail, which finally fell back to a position based on Verdun, the right facing north, and the centre and left west along the Meuse from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc. In that order the armies continued to retire, at the same time forcing the enemy to lengthen his lines of communication and gaining a delay which gave Joffre and French breathing space to restore the strength of their exhausted armies, till the moment came when they were ready to make the marvellous attack which drove the equally tired Germans back to the Aisne.



GENERAL DE CASTELNAU.

[Meley.]

When Joffre's order to turn and stand firm was given to the retreating troops on September 5 the enemy's advanced posts near Pontoise were within 15 miles of Paris on the north; the French centre near Provins was 30 miles south of Paris and the Marne, and only 10 north of the Seine. In 14 days French and British had marched 140 miles from the line of the Sambre and the Meuse, continually engaged in severe rearguard actions, generally against superior forces. Lille, Amiens, Laon, Compiègne, Soissons, Reims, Epernay, Châlons, and hundreds of smaller towns and villages were in the hands of the enemy. Small blame to the fainthearted if they thought that Verdun and Naney and Paris were practically doomed to the same fate. On September 2 the Government had left the capital, and still on the next three days the flood of invasion, leaving behind it a broad wake of blood and destruction, swept



[Manuel.]

GENERAL SARRAIL.
Commanded the Third Army.

nearer and nearer, threatening to overwhelm the exhausted armies and the straggling columns of homeless war-stricken refugees that blocked every road to the capital with their piteous household goods. A nightmare of flight and pursuit and still worse horrors to come brooded over the land, and France, with the enemy's hand at throat, seemed almost at her last gasp.

Almost, but not quite. Paris and the people of France still had to wait in blind faith, knowing next to nothing of what was happening, except



[Manuel.]

GENERAL LANGLE DE CARY.
Commanded the Fourth Army.

that the enemy was nearly at their gates. But the faith was there, and they never lost it. The black injustice of the invasion had given them a sacred cause and made crusaders of them all. They believed that the God of Justice was on their side, and very soon, in a spirit of the highest idealism, they began to think of themselves as the people chosen to defend the liberty and brotherhood not only of France but of the world, even if they perished in the attempt. The enemy was for them the barbarian, false to the core, and they conversely the champions of civilization and truth. At that time they felt themselves very much alone. The war was in their own land. They knew hardly anything of the prodigies of valour and invaluable services, out of all proportion to its size, of the little British Army. They never dreamt, any more than the rest of the world, what it was to grow to in the near future. More easily depressed and elated than the British, the qualities that they have always admired most in us are our bulldog tenacity and what they love to call our habitual phlegm, in moments of emotional stress no less than in the field. Fortunately

they have far more of our tenacity (just as we have far more of their traditional *élan* and dash) than they suppose, and in those dark days of the retreat, when the enemy was advancing with giant strides on the capital in the west and was only five miles from Nancy on the other flank, both nation and army held with grim resolve, and the rush was stopped. The Germans had shot their bolt.

As we can see now, the war was won from the moment when Joffre made his stand on the

danger of being outflanked instead of outflanking, and when he decided in consequence on the 4th to give up the attempt, as well as the idea of an advance on Paris, and to keep in touch with von Bulow (who had been obliged by the weak condition of von Hausen's army on his left to close in towards him), he made so sure that the British in front of him were a disorganized force that he dared the risky manoeuvre of marching across their front to attack the French Fifth Army, now



VERDUN.

Marne, or perhaps even earlier still, when von Moltke, obsessed by the stereotyped idea of getting round the Allies' flank and possibly at the same time demoralizing the French by a direct attack on Paris, neglected his chance of striking at the Channel ports and cutting the British off from their base. Psychologically and strategically Joffre chose the ideal moment for his counter-stroke. The enemy was tired by his prodigious exertions, and to a certain extent dispirited by the great losses he had suffered owing to his attacks in mass formation on troops that knew how to shoot. He was also finding a difficulty in getting his guns to keep up with the rapid advance of the infantry. The French and British, on the other hand, though also in need of rest, were burning to advance instead of retreating. Von Kluck, on the German right, had made two miscalculations. He was not aware of the existence of Maunoury's Sixth Army on the Allies' left, and was in

under Franchet D'Espérey, on the British right.

It was in these conditions that the battle of the Marne began, on September 6. On the 5th, Maunoury with the Sixth Army engaged von Kluck's rearguard, which was based on the Oureq, a tributary of the Marne, which flows into it from north to south at Lizy, 30 miles east of Paris. His right wing pivoted on the Marne at Lagny, half-way between Paris and Lizy, and his left was at Betz, 20 miles north of the river. As the result of the day's fighting he had advanced his right to Meaux, rather more than half-way from Lagny to the Oureq, by the morning of the 6th.

For the great battle the British had been brought up on Maunoury's right, and occupied a front of about 20 miles in a south-easterly direction from Lagny to Jouy le Châtel, behind the Grand Morin, another tributary of the Marne, flowing into it from the south at a point



THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE MARNE: GERMAN DEAD.

between Lagny and Meaux. On their immediate right were first Allenby's and then Conneau's French cavalry, and on their right the French Fifth, Ninth, Fourth and Third Armies were drawn up on a line running nearly due east as far as Bar-le-Duc, 120 miles east of Paris, from which it turned north for another 30 miles to Verdun. From Maunoury's left to the extreme right of the line was thus about 170 miles. The Fifth Army, under Franchet D'Espérey, extended to somewhere near Esternay, nearly due south of Château-Thierry; the Ninth, under Foch, from there to Mailly, nearly due south of Reims; the Fourth, under Langle de Cary, from Mailly through Vitry le François, 20 miles south-east of Châlons, to a point a little north of Bar-le-Duc; and the Third, under Sarrail, occupied a semi-circular position from there to the north of Verdun, astride of the River Aire, a tributary of the Upper Aisne, which flows along the east side of the forest of the Argonne.

The battle has already been so fully described in this history that we need only recall its general outlines. The first point to remember is that west of Mailly and the Champagne plain the trend of the operations consisted in a series of advances in echelon, starting from the Sixth Army on the extreme left, each of the Allied Armies in turn attacking the German army to their immediate front as soon as its flank was uncovered by the retreat of its fellow army lying west of it on its right. Thus when von Kluck had been pushed back by Maunoury and the British, so uncovering von Bulow's right, von Bulow was attacked and fell back before Franchet D'Espérey, when it was von Hausen's turn to be attacked by Foch, and so on *da capo*. That, approximately, though not with quite such mathematical precision, was the way the battle went on the left of the Allied line, that is to say on the fronts of French and D'Espérey and Foch on the great Sézanne plateau south of the Marne, across which run the Grand and the Petit Morin, and in Maunoury's sector on the plateau north of the Marne drained by the Oureq. On the right of the line, in the plain of Champagne and in the valley between the Meuse and the Argonne, Langle de Cary and Sarrail, though they were engaged in a great deal of hard and glorious fighting and kept the enemy well in check, did not change position much till nearly the end of the battle. Almost to the last the right remained firm while the left swung forward, pivoting on Foch's

right near Fère Champenoise, at the east edge of the Sézanne plateau, where there is an abrupt drop of about three hundred feet into the Champagne plain from the line of bluffs that run north from Fère Champenoise across the Marne to Reims. The axis of the advance was not therefore from south to north but from south-west to north-east, in the general direction of Meaux, Château-Thierry, Reims. On September 7 the British advance to Coulommiers and the Grand Morin uncovered the right flank of the Germans opposite the French Fifth Army, and D'Espérey advanced against them and also reached the Grand Morin between Esternay and La Ferté Gaucher. Next day the Fifth marched forward another six miles to the Petit Morin, thus uncovering the flank of the Second Army under Von Bulow, and Foch pushed his left and centre forward to the Petit Morin line. On the 9th the enemy withdrew both their First and Second Armies still farther back, masking the operation by furious attacks on the French Sixth Army on the Oureq. The British thereupon pushed forward at right angles to the line of the Sixth Army, now holding the whole of the Oureq, and crossed the Marne right and left of Château-Thierry. On the 10th again both German Armies retreated and the Allies advanced in echelon, Maunoury to the Aisne between Compiègne and Soissons, the British to a line between his right and the Marne, D'Espérey from Château-Thierry to Dormans, both on the Marne, and Foch on their right to the line between Dormans and Mailly. In the course of the day he executed the brilliant stratagem which will for ever make famous the name of the Marshes of St. Gond, seven miles to the north-west of Fère Champenoise. On the 11th the Duke of Wurtemberg, commanding the German Fourth Army, finding himself occupying a growing salient formed by the progress of Foch on his right and Langle de Cary on his left, began to fall back, and on the 12th, the Sixth Army and the British having advanced to the Aisne, east and west of Soissons, the whole line followed in echelon from the left, the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourth Armies crossing the Marne between Epernay, Chalons and Vitry le François, and the Third Army forcing the Crown Prince to retreat in front of it to the Argonne, thus giving much needed breathing space to the fort of Troyon, north of St. Mihiel on the Meuse, where its defenders had put up a magnificent resistance. At the same time on the extreme east Nancy was

finally and definitely safeguarded by the re-occupation of Lunéville. The first round of the war was over, and the enemy, in spite of the preliminary advantage which he gained by the foul blow below the belt with which he opened the fight, had been thoroughly thrashed. Numerically the forces engaged between the Meuse and Paris were in the end almost exactly equal—about 47 infantry and nine cavalry divisions on the side of the Allies as compared with about 46 and seven put into the field by the enemy. But the Germans had the pull at the beginning because they were the attacking force and because they attacked from a vantage ground which they only gained by breaking their plighted word.

Enough has been said here to recall the great importance of the British share in the victory. During those three weeks of constant fighting side by side with their French brothers in arms the gallant and highly efficient officers and men of the original Expeditionary Force laid firm the foundations of the mutual understanding and mutual admiration between French and British soldiers which more than anything else won the war. It was not only between the Oise and the Somme in 1918 that the Germans tried to drive a wedge between the two armies and the two countries, and one of the reasons why their efforts to separate us have always failed is that on the whole we have been generous in our appreciation of each other's services to the common cause. Here is what the military correspondent of *The Times* wrote a short time after the battle:

"The immediate interest to us is the proof which the battle affords of the capacity of the French leading, and of the resolution of the French troops. For a fortnight the French Armies had been in retreat. No army likes to retreat, and a French army least of all. Yet directly General Joffre called upon his lieutenants they responded nobly, and the leading of the various armies by their commanders is deserving of the highest praise. The German Armies in their full career of victory were immediately checked, stubbornly fought, and rapidly driven back with heavy loss. . . .

"The French Armies in the battle of the Marne performed prodigies of valour, and changed the aspect of the campaign. The French staff and commands gave to the world a convincing proof of their worth and competence. The cavalry were active and audacious. The famous '75' shattered the German infantry

and overwhelmed the German guns. The French infantry fought with all their legendary dash, and were not to be denied with the bayonet. All the German Armies in France were in line and bent upon victory. It was a fair field and no favour. The good ordering of the battle, its methodical conduct by the French army commanders, and the self-sacrificing of France's gallant soldiers brought victory to the French standards. France has every reason to be proud of the splendid valour of her sons."

Thousands of similar passages might be quoted from *The Times* and other British newspapers and articles and books on the war. We will take one only, from Viscount French's "1914":

As regards the tactical aspect of the battle of the Marne, I believe that the name of Marshal Joffre will descend to posterity with that battle as one of the greatest military commanders in history; I believe that the battles fought and won throughout the great length of the line over which they took place by the armies of France under their splendid leaders, will outshine for valour and skill even those glorious deeds of the past, the memorials of which deck their colours with imperishable laurels.

The battle of the Aisne followed immediately on the battle of the Marne, beginning on September 13 and going on till the end of the month. The action covered the whole of the Champagne section of the front besides two-thirds of the Aisne section as far as Compiègne, from which place it gradually extended north by successive stages across the Oise. The line to which the enemy retired pivoted north of Verdun on the left flank of the Crown Prince's Fifth Army, ran for 10 miles over the broken ground of the heights on the left bank of the Meuse and the forest of the Argonne, and then for 60 across the plain of Champagne by Reims to Craonne, and finally for another 40 along the heights, three to five miles north of the Aisne to the forest D'Aigle north of Compiègne. Along this last stretch of plateaux, which had on its north the valley of the Ailette and beyond it Laon and the Massif of St. Gobain, the ground fell steeply down into the flat Aisne valley from half a mile to three miles wide, with many steep gorges cutting up from it into the hills. On Sunday the 13th and next day the British crossed the Aisne on a front of about 15 miles between Soissons and Craonne, shelled for the first time with the 8-inch howitzers brought down by the Germans from Maubeuge. All the 11 bridges in front of them had been broken down and had to be repaired or replaced under



GENERAL MAUNOURY.

Commanded the Sixth Army in the Battle of the Marne.

heavy fire from the heights overlooking the river, rather over 50 yards wide. At the same time the French Sixth Army crossed west of Soissons, just north of which the enemy were entrenched, as far as Vic, 10 miles west of the town and half way to Compiègne. From here the German line ran diagonally N.N.W from the Aisne to Noyon on the Oise, a stretch of 12 miles. Between the Oise and Verdun the fighting was continuous, and east of Reims, which was bombarded for the first time on the 18th, the French took the fort of Pompelle and Souain out on the Champagne plain, and a little later Mesnil and Massiges, while they also did well in the Vosges and Alsace.

But for the moment, as so often during the

war, the chief interest was on the Aisne and Oise-Somme sectors, and on the 16th, having achieved the main objective—the crossing of the Aisne—Joffre decided with Lord French to give up the idea of frontal attacks north of the river, and to try instead to outflank the enemy on the left.

It was a notable moment in the strategy and tactics of the war. The Germans were so strongly entrenched that trench-fighting, with its modern or modernized armoury of trench mortars, hand grenades, and bombs, became the order of the day. Both armies retired underground and the sniper saw to it that they stayed there. On the left, however, beyond Noyon and the Oise, there was still a chance of



GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.

Commanded the Fifth Army in the Battle of the Marne.

open fighting, and with Joffre's decision to extend the battle in that direction began the race to the sea, with its continual and successive attempts at flanking and outflanking on the part of both sides, which went on till the middle of November.

In order to carry out the outflanking policy a new French Army under de Castelnau was brought up from the east and placed on Maunoury's left, north of the Oise, between Noyon and Peronne, 25 miles north of the river. The battle front now extended from there by Vic, Soissons, Craonne (where the Fifth Army had their left), Brimont, Pompelle,

Souain, Grand Pré, Montfauçon, Consenvoye, St. Mihiel, Pont-à-Mousson, Lunéville and the Vosges to the Swiss frontier, and all but 15 miles of it was defended by the French.

The object of Joffre's series of turning movements was not only to protect the Channel ports but also to try and force the enemy to evacuate first the district from the Oise to the Scheldt and then the Sambre-Meuse angle and the railways to the Sambre from St. Quentin, La Fère and Laon, when they would automatically have had to retire from the Aisne. Castelnau's army was to occupy the country in the angle between the Oise and the Somme up to Albert

and the Ancre, and then advance north-east on St. Quentin and La Fère. On September 21 his right had moved up the Oise as far as Noyon, and from there his front extended 25 miles in a shallow curve north-west by Lassigny and Roye to Peronne at the point where the Somme turns west in direction of Amiens. The Germans thereupon brought up a large force to St. Quentin, and on the 25th he was forced to fall back, reinforced and advanced again, and again was forced to retire, this time to a line running from Ribécourt on the Oise, behind Lassigny, Roye and Chaumes, to the plateau north of the Somme between Combles and Albert, over which the French and British were two years later to advance in the first stages of the battle of the Somme.

By the end of the month de Castelnau, after a good deal of this give and take kind of fighting, was, like the armies on the Aisne, more or less in a position of stalemate, and Joffre got together yet another army, the Tenth, under de Maud'huy, and placed it on de Castelnau's left in the district round Arras (which the Germans had evacuated) on the low hills which separate the valleys of the Somme and the Scheldt. Shortly afterwards Lille and Ypres were also evacuated by the enemy, and de Maud'huy advanced on a front of about 40 miles, with his right on the Ancre, his centre at Arras, and his left through Lens to Lille. In the first days of October, the Germans, after vainly trying to push de Castelnau back from the Ribécourt-Lassigny-Roye line, brought a big force up in front of Arras, which with Lille was bombarded from the 6th to the 9th, with the result that de Maud'huy was forced to retire and his advance, like de Castelnau's, was checked.

This time it was the Germans' turn to execute the flanking movement, which they did by occupying Ypres, 18 miles north of Lille, on October 3, whereupon Joffre at Lord French's suggestion brought the British up from the Aisne, and placed them to the north of de Maud'huy, with yet another new French Army under D'Urbal on their left. At the same time he appointed Foch Commander-in-Chief of the armies north of the Oise to coordinate the forces under de Castelnau, de Maud'huy, and D'Urbal. His headquarters were at Doullens, between Amiens and Arras, where nearly four years later the meeting took place at which he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied Armies. The results of these various

dispositions of the Allied forces were far-reaching. The attacks by Castelnau and Maud'huy between the Oise and Lille had forced the Germans to keep their reserves south and east of the Scheldt, which runs through Arras to Ghent, thus relieving the Belgians in the Dunkirk sector, and at the same time preventing the enemy from advancing at St. Mihiel, which they had occupied on September 24, and so endangering the position of Verdun. The bringing up of the B.E.F. and D'Urbal's army across the lines of communication of Castelnau and Maud'huy—a difficult operation which was organized with great skill by the French Headquarters staff between the 3rd and the 8th—had saved Dunkirk and Calais, though against this must be set off the occupation of Antwerp on the 9th. In the race to the sea Joffre had fairly outmanœuvred his opponents.

They had, however, by no means given up the idea of reaching the Channel ports, and from the 11th onwards there followed the grim struggle of the Battle of Flanders, which included the battle of the Yser and the first battle of Ypres. It began with the evacuation by the Allies of 25 miles of coastline east of Nieuport, together with Ostend and Zeebrugge. The front of the Allies' left wing which was to engage in these battles then ran nearly due south for 49 miles from Nieuport to La Bassée, with Ypres halfway between them, and Dixmude in the northern section and Armentières in the southern half-way between Ypres and Nieuport and Ypres and La Bassée. D'Urbal and the Belgians held the northern half of the line and the British the southern, with their centre astride of the Lys running through Armentières. Lille, Menin, and Roulers are respectively 12 miles north-east of La Bassée, Armentières, and Ypres, and the objective of the Allies in the Ypres section north of the Lys was to cut the Menin-Roulers-Ostend road and railroad, while fighting a defensive action along the lower Yser from Dixmude to Nieuport. The attempt to cut the Menin-Roulers road, after a promising beginning in which both French and British took part, failed, and the action eventually became a defensive operation along the whole Nieuport-La Bassée front. Both the Yser and the Ypres fighting have already been fully described, and for our present purpose it is only necessary to recall the fact that the French had a big part in each of the battles. General Grossetti's division at Nieuport, Lombartzyde,

and Pervyse, Admiral Ronarc'h and his wonderful 6,000 Breton marines at Dixmude, De Mitry and Conneau and their cavalry in the forest of Houthulst, at Roulers, and Givenchy, and Bidon's Territorials, and some Senegalese battalions at other parts of the line were constantly in the thick of the fight alongside our men, and besides them large reinforcements were brought up to the Yser and to Ypres at moments when it seemed to be touch and go whether the Allies' line could stand against the formidable pressure which was brought to bear against it. During all those terribly anxious days they shared in our advances and retreats and our heroic resistance right up to the middle of November, when the rains and the floods put an end to active operations for the year. At that moment well over three hundred and fifty of the four hundred miles of front was entirely held by them, and on the rest of the line as well there were very few miles where their troops were not engaged side by side with us and the Belgians.

After November 17, when the flooding of the area north of Dixmude was completed, the battle of Ypres petered out, and after that, till the end of the year, no engagement of any importance, except the fighting round Givenchy and La Bassée just before Christmas, relieved the monotonous grind of the daily and nightly wear-and-tear of the trenches. That first

winter the troglodyte life was particularly trying! There were then few of the (comparative) creature comforts, such as dry and almost luxurious dug-outs and good supplies of warm clothing, which made the next three cold spells a little more bearable. The patience and heroic cheerfulness with which the French Armies endured the intense suffering and discomfort of those bitter months of stagnation were a revelation even to themselves. All the world knew what they were in attack. Hardly anyone suspected that they would show themselves capable of this kind of enforced passive resistance without losing their *moral*.

During most of 1915 they were condemned to the same *inertia*. Till September they undertook no really big operation, partly because, with them as with us, the supply of big guns and all kinds of ammunition was seriously inadequate. Behind the lines every nerve was strained to make good these deficiencies, often with the result—till they relearned the old lesson that more haste means less speed—that the shells were badly made and burst the guns. It seems also that the commanders themselves hardly yet realized the immense scale of the war and the necessity for correspondingly huge offensive actions. The outflanking race had ended because there were no flanks left for either side to get round. Big frontal attacks were believed to be too



SENEGALESE IN TRAINING.



GENERAL DE MAUD'HUY.

Commanded the Tenth Army in the Battle of the Marne.

expensive, and the time had not yet come when that objection was to be overcome by making them bigger still. So for months and months the war degenerated all along the line into a fitful artillery duel, sometimes of tremendous severity, and a constant succession of local infantry attacks, most of which only resulted in the gaining or losing of a few yards of often valueless ground, at a very heavy cost, when all the totals were added together, in valuable human lives. On the other hand there is this to be said, that without the exciting stimulus of raids and counter-attacks, the deadly monotony of sitting still underground and being

shelled day after day would have broken the heart and destroyed the discipline of any army in the world.

In August, and again in September, as the British Army began to grow in size, it took over some 20 or 30 miles of the French lines, but our Allies still continued to hold by far the biggest part of the front and consequently to do most of the fighting. In the north they were most frequently engaged at Notre Dame de Lorette, Neuville St. Vaast, and at the Labyrinth, north of Arras. Farther south in the Aisne, Champagne, Lorraine and Vosges sections, they were continually fighting,

especially to the north of Soissons, in the Argonne, at Mesnil and Tahure in the Champagne plain, at Les Eparges, to the east of Verdun, in the forest of Apremont, south of St. Mihiel, in Bois le Prêtre, close to Pont-à-Mousson, and at Hartmannsweilerkopf in the Vosges, all of them names that will ever be glorious in the history of France.

No attempt will be made here to follow the trench campaign of 1915 through all the ups and downs through which it passed. They left the line of the front practically unchanged, and nothing is to be gained in so short a record by wading once more through the mud and blood of these particular shambles or the hosts

of others where the soldiers of France stood in the breach and blocked the way of the invader with their dead and mutilated bodies. We will try instead to get some idea of the kind of men that they were, and of some of the places in which they fought their hardest and longest fights. The old English notion of the average French infantryman, that he was rather a slouchy person in baggy breeches, slow and clumsy in his drill, and physically soft and unathletic, is about as far from the truth as it can be. A special correspondent of *The Times*, who began and ended the war with the French Armies, was moved more than once to describe them as looking like a pack of inter-



A SHELL FROM A FRENCH 155 mm. GUN IN FLIGHT.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH IN SANDBAG SHELTERS IN THE FLANDERS AREA.

Strengthening their defences against the floods.

national Rugby football forwards in perfect training. They were all as hard as nails and quick movers, and the drill of many regiments, particularly the active little Chasseurs Alpains, as smart as that of the best troops in any of the armies. But their distinctive feature was their extreme solidity. The great mass were an army of peasants, leavened by the lighter frames and quicker wits of the town-bred artisans, artists, actors, authors, arts and crafts men, and even Apaches, that were the salt of the intellectual and artistic life in the ranks. They came from the furrow and the pavement. They were all the sons and grandsons of soldiers back to the beginnings of their national story. Periodically from the days of Attila their eastern provinces had been the great battlefield of Europe. They had imbued their African troops with their own fighting spirit, and their commanders, most of whom they adored, were steeped in the Napoleonic tradition and profound students of the art as well as the science of the drama of war. They possessed also, to a far greater extent than the machine-made army to which they were opposed, the genius of personal initiative and resource. Their cavalry, between the spells of open fighting which began and ended the

war, took to fighting on foot and digging with wonderful skill and cheerfulness, and their splendid artillery had in the *Soixante-Quinze*, the finest field gun in existence.

Three of the most typical and most blood-drenched local sections of those hundreds of miles of trenches during the purely trench period were Apremont, Bois le Prêtre, and Hartmannsweilerkopf. The road to the forest of Apremont, which crossed the Meuse about five miles south of St. Mihiel and the apex of the famous salient, was constantly under fire, as Commercy, four miles farther south, was itself often bombarded. On the east bank it ran under cover of a line of bluffs, the sides of which were honeycombed with dugouts up to the beginning of the communication trenches in the heart of the wilderness of tree stumps which had once been the forest. The front lines about a mile south of the Camp des Romains, the bare commanding height above St. Mihiel, were in many places almost touching, conversation was always carried on in whispers, and looking through the loopholes in the trenches at the Germans in the village of Apremont down below in the plain was a risky pastime. Bois le Prêtre, at the base of the salient on the other side of the plain of the Woëvre, was



CHASSEURS ALPINS.

another place of the same kind. For long months French and Germans lived underground in the same blighted forest of shattered stumps, continually trying from trenches a few yards apart to drive each other out into the open; so that even on quiet days, when there was no raid on and the screech and roar of the shells and the rat-tat-tat of the machine-guns and the ping of the rifle bullets were only occasional—not more frequent perhaps than about one a minute—the destruction of life and limb through the parching heat of summer and the numbing cold and wet of winter was never-ceasing. To make things still more cheerful Pont à Mousson itself and the roads on both banks of the river leading back to Nancy, by which all supplies and troops passing to and from the front had to move, were in full view of the enemy on the height of Norroy, just outside Bois le Prêtre and barely over two miles from Pont à Mousson. At Hartmannsweilerkopf both sides were fighting for and on the top of a mountain over three thousand feet high, from which there was a magnificent view across the breadth and length of the Alsace plain eastwards to the Rhine and, to the south, of the whole chain of the Bernese Alps a hundred miles away. Sometimes one side, sometimes the other, had possession of the actual summit, which changed hands over and over again, and sometimes French and Germans sat one on each side of it, with 15 yards between the foremost trenches, and round them a shell-swept abomination of desolation, as bare of vegetation as the slopes of an active volcano.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that there was a definite system followed in the numerous

attacks made at these and scores of other points on the French and British fronts, and that by simultaneous raids at corresponding distances on each side of the centre of the line in the plain of Chalons the Allied commanders gained much valuable information as to the disposition and extent of the German reserves. From the composition of the extra forces which they brought up to resist a thrust that seemed to them of more than average importance—chiefly of course by the locality from which they were brought—it was after a time possible to judge what, if any, were the available German troops behind the fighting line.

With this information in hand the Allies made in September, 1915, their first important offensive move since the battle of the Aisne. On the 25th simultaneous attacks were made by British and French at Loos and in Champagne on a bigger scale than had yet been tried from the time when the opposing armies had gone to ground. The two thrusts were at right angles to each other and over a hundred miles apart. Both aimed at the enemy's chief lines of communication and concentration, the British striking east and the French north. If both or either of the attacks had gone far enough the whole of the Aisne section, from north of Albert to Berry au Bac, would have been converted into a huge German salient from which if they had not first been enveloped the enemy would have been obliged to retire. That, however, was not to happen for another three years.

The front over which the French attacked—under Langle de Cary and with Castelnau in supreme command—was about 10 miles long, and extended on the west from Auberville on

the Suippe, south-east of Moronvillers, past Souain, Perthes and Mesnil to the famous Main de Massiges, east of which the upper waters of the Aisne skirt the west side of the Argonne. It was the classic battle ground on which Attila made his last stand, now converted into a complicated maze of trenches and saps marked by long, ugly lines of piled-up lumps of mud and chalk, criss-crossed like the wrinkles on the face of an old, old woman. The lines which the besieged Germans had constructed, thickly sown with large dug-outs 30 or 40 feet deep, were of extraordinary strength. The distances between them and the French lines varied from about 100 yards to 700 or 800 in front of Souain in the centre and the Main de Massiges on the extreme right. Everything connected with the battle, except the length of the front of attack, was on a grander scale than the war had yet seen. The preliminary bombardment, thanks to the greatly increased supply of shells, was terrific. It began on the 22nd and went on without a moment's pause till the moment of the attack on the 25th, thereby entirely doing away with any possible element of surprise, except as to the actual hour of the assault. It completely wrecked all the trenches and most of the wire entanglements, but not the dugouts, of the first system of defences, asphyxiating and demoralizing the German infantry, who for over three days were completely cut off from their sources of supply

in the rear. The first rush of the French across the exposed zone of No Man's Land was carried out with splendid dash and courage in pouring rain and over horribly sticky and holding ground, and the whole attack was a magnificent success till it was at places held up by entanglements hidden in folds of the ground and on reverse slopes where the French artillery had not been able to make a thorough clearance. In the end, therefore, though at least 25,000 prisoners were taken and nearly a hundred guns, the French failed to reach the lateral railway to the rear of the enemy's position between two and three miles from the original front of the attack. On the other hand, though their own losses were also exceedingly heavy, they put out of action about 180,000 of the enemy, and for the rest of the year the German efforts to expel them from the new positions which they had gained completely failed. But for all that, in spite of the fine heroism of the attack, nothing really big had been accomplished, and once more—with the exception of their capture of the Vimy Ridge on September 29, and the heavy fighting in Artois—the French front settled down to trench warfare.

The next year, 1916, like 1914 and 1918, was rather more lively. On February 21 the great German offensive on Verdun—"the heart of France," as the Crown Prince told his armies—started with a terrific rush and a prolonged



GERMAN AERIAL RAILWAY IN THE HARTMANNSWEILERKOPF.

bombardment, once again more severe than any that had preceded it. A huge number of guns, many more than those which Joffre had massed in Champagne in September, had been brought up during the winter, for the enemy meant to succeed where the French had failed. At first the infantry attack only covered a front of five miles on the right bank of the river, in the sector eight miles due north of the town, but during the next four months the area of the battle was extended till it raged along an ellipse 25 miles long by five deep, from Avocourt, 11 miles north-west of Verdun on the left bank to Etain, the same distance north-east on the right. Over the whole of that tangled mass of hills and gullies the French fought as they never had fought yet, with a desperate heroism which roused the admiration of the whole world, and a fixed resolve that come what might the German should not pass.

The reader will find it easy to follow the general run of the complicated fighting if he will consider Verdun as the centre of three semi-circles drawn round it on its north side, having respectively a radius of three, five, and eight miles.

The town lies at the bottom of a hollow. Above it, on the north side line upon line of

bare straight-topped hills, rather over a 1,000 feet high, rise one behind another to the commanding Douaumont ridge on the farthest horizon, like the tiers of seats above the floor of an amphitheatre. Below the town the river curves first left, then right, and then left again, after which it flows N.N.W. in a straight line. The low ground on the right bank in the bend of the third and biggest loop was exposed to flanking fire from all directions, so that neither side tried to hold or gain it. The rest of the belt between the five and eight-mile circles on that side of the river was fought over foot by foot till at the end of the first week of the attack the whole of it, from the Côte de Talou on the north-west at the entrance to the loop round to Moulainville on the east, was in the enemy's hands. And yet in the next four months' struggle they advanced barely another mile, and it was only in July, and then only at one point, that they were able for a short time to get a footing just on the three-mile circle at Fleury.

Still keeping to the same side of the river, the following are the chief points to be borne in mind. Fort Souville (1,268 feet) and the village of Fleury (1,134 feet) lie a mile apart, between one and two o'clock on the circum-



A FRENCH COMMUNICATION TRENCH IN CHAMPAGNE.

ference of the three-mile circle, and the Côte de Froide Terre, the same height as Fleury, is about a mile to its west; on the five-mile circle the forts of Vaux and Douaumont (1,149 and 1,268 feet) are two miles apart on the circumference between two and one o'clock, and the Côte de Poivre (1,128 feet) fills the belt between the three and five-mile circles from 11 to 12 o'clock; the Bois d'Haumont, the Bois des Caures, and Herbebois, all three lie just to the north of the eight-mile circle, between 11 and one o'clock.


On the other or left bank the points of interest, all of which lie beyond the eight-mile limit between 10 and 11 o'clock, are from right to left, the Côte de l'Oie (873 feet), the Bois des Corbeaux and the Bois des Curottes, Mort-homme, which has two summits, 972 and 873 feet high, Hill 304, just over 1,000 feet, and the Bois d'Avocourt.

The offensive, which was to be the last against the French, began with a fierce bombardment of the centre of the position to be attacked, the Bois d'Haumont, the Bois des Caures, and Herbebois, and as soon as they had been destroyed the infantry advanced in dense masses, walled in by a curtain fire from guns ranging from 5-inch to 15-inch, while at the same time all the roads behind the French forward positions were deluged with a hurricane of shells. By the 24th, for all their valour, the French had been driven back to a line which was the chord to the arc of their original front, stretching from Champneuville in the mouth of the big loop past the north of the Côte du Talou and the Côte du Poivre, along the top of the five-mile circle to a point south of Ornes, about a mile north of Douaumont. The assault was then extended outwards on both wings, and renewed all along the line from Malancourt, five miles west of the Meuse, a little way north of Hill 304, to Etain, 11 miles out in the plain of the Woevre on the east. Attack after attack was made on the village and fort of Douaumont in blinding snow till at last both were taken, and when the first phase of the assault ended on the 29th the enemy had gained in the centre, on the east side of the river, a solid block of ground three miles deep, and had also advanced their front a similar distance on their left, where the French had on the night of the 24th evacuated their lines down in the plain behind Etain and brought the troops back nearly to the five-mile circle on to higher and drier and safer ground.



WINTER ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

The actual extent of ground won by the enemy—three to four miles in depth over a front about five times as long—was not unduly great. That amount of advance could be counted on as the practically certain result of the first day of every big attack by either side. It was something therefore that at the end of a week they had got no farther, and that the infantry had lost so heavily by the dense formation in which they were sent to the assault that two out of their three corps had to be withdrawn for refitment. The French had fought like supermen. Every foot of the ground lost had been contested with the finest individual and collective courage and determination. Otherwise nothing could have checked the onward rush of those specially-selected shock troops who kept on charging day after day with admirable disregard for the death and dangers they were ordered to face. But though for the moment the attack was stayed, thanks to the sublime self-sacrifice of Verdun's defenders, the position was desperately serious. Douaumont had fallen, Vaux and Souville were in grave danger, and another week of advance at the same rate would bring the enemy right up to the Verdun gates. Even as



PARIS TO VERDUN.

it was for a stretch of five or six miles between Douaumont and the river they were less than five miles away. The brief delay of forty-eight hours that followed, while the enemy was gaining breath for the second phase of the attack, was as momentous as any time that France had known during the war.

On the 25th Castelnau had arrived on a special mission of enquiry into the position of affairs, and at about the same time Pétain took over the command of the Group of Armies of the Centre, and with it the chief responsibility for the defence of Verdun. From a military point of view there was, in the opinion of some eminent soldiers, no absolute reason why it should not have been abandoned and the line moved back from the heights in front to the heights behind. But, after all, *noblesse oblige* with armies and nations as well as individuals, as the French commanders perhaps

thought when they decided not to accept the help of British troops offered them for the defence of the city. The honour of France was at stake. For the sake of the effect which its evacuation would have had on the *moral* and pride of the French, to say nothing of the encouragement which it would have given to the enemy, Verdun had to be held at any cost. "The country," said Joffre to its defenders, "has its eyes upon you. You will be of those of whom it is said: 'They barred for the Germans the road to Verdun.'" On the other side the road to Verdun was always open. When the offensive began, besides the main line from Paris, the last stretch of which was commanded by the enemy's guns, the only railway communication between Verdun and the outer world was the small line running up the valley from Bar le Duc. As the year went on other railways were built, but at that time the troops and nearly the whole of their supplies were



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH GUNS INSCRIBED WITH THEIR PET NAMES.

moved to the front by road. A marvellous system of motor transport had been organized, and day and night an endless chain of between three and four thousand lorries passed and repassed up and down between Verdun and the railhead like a well-oiled machine, at the rate of over two a minute, and the road over which it carried those fine soldiers full of life and vigour up to the north towards those deadly ridges, or southwards away from them wounded and dying, they called "The Sacred Way." That was the spirit in which they answered their country's call.

The opening phase of the assault, up to the end of February, had been an attack on the centre. On the 1st of March the second period began with an extension of the battle on both wings. West of the river the French advanced left held a front of six miles along the Forges brook, rather over a mile north of Hill 304 and Morthomme, from Malancourt by Bethincourt to Forges and the Côte de l'Oie, three miles south of which on the other bank the left centre started from the loop and stretched away from the river across the Côte du Poivre by Deuannont to a point just beyond the village and fort of Vaux. These positions were bombarded with increasing force till on the 6th the first serious infantry attack on the left bank gave the Germans Forges and Regnéville on the river bank east of the Côte de l'Oie, and an attack on Morthomme was followed from the 8th to the 10th by a fierce assault by the new reconstituted shock-troops along the whole front from Malancourt to Vaux. In the Vaux section during the whole of the next week the enemy's infantry tried time after time to rush the village and fort, advancing throughout in columns of fours, but always without reaching their objective. On the other side of the river repeated efforts were made, following on an intense bombardment, to reach Morthomme by way of the Bois des Corbeaux, till at last on March 20 they succeeded in gaining a footing on the eastern and higher of the two crests of Morthomme, but failed to drive the French from Hill 304. Then for a time the assault on the wings slackened, and the French were able to review their position. At the end of the first stage of the battle they had lost the whole of their first positions on the right bank. At the end of the second their first positions on the left bank were also in the enemy's hands, but along the whole front after a month's fighting, they were still defending their second

positions. The enemy's advance was nowhere more than four miles on the right bank and less than three on the left, their wireless boast that they had taken Vaux fort on the 9th was a fiction—which anticipated the truth by just two months—and their casualties were nearly



FRENCH INFANTRYMAN OF 1916.

In "bleu d'horizon," with steel helmet.

three times as heavy as the French, amounting in some units to over 50 per cent. of their strength.

The third period opened at the end of March with renewed attacks on the French positions on the left bank, which continued all through April and May, towards the end of which as the result of a long series of extremely violent



[French official photograph.]

A TRENCH IN THE MEUSE SECTOR.

assaults, sometimes carried out by seven or eight successive waves of storm-troops and supported, as on May 20, by over 60 batteries, the whole of Morthomme and Hill 304 were at last carried and the enemy's front advanced to a line stretching from just short of Avocourt to the west extremity of the big loop of the Meuse. But that, so far as the left bank was concerned, was the limit of the German advance. On this section of the Verdun front they had pushed their line forward a maximum depth of two and a half miles on a front of eight as the result of three months' constant effort, and they never there gained another yard.

On the other bank on May 22 the troops of General Mangin, then in command of the 5th Division, stormed and captured the fort of Douaumont by one of the characteristic assaults which later in the year on the same front, and afterwards in still more important actions north and south of the Aisne, made this great general's name a synonym for the real attacking spirit of the French. "You march," he told his men a month earlier, when they were going to the rear for a short rest after two months' continuous fighting, "You march under the wings of Victory. . . . There is no rest for any Frenchman so long as the barbarous enemy treads the hallowed ground of our

country." But the end was not yet. On the 24th Douaumont was once more lost, and on June 6, after prolonged days of furious bombardment and fierce hand-to-hand struggles the fort of Vaux at last fell into the enemy's possession, though the gallant Commandant Raynal was allowed, as a tribute to the heroism of the defence, to keep his sword. A fortnight later the village of Fleury, on the three-mile circle, was attacked in force. A hundred thousand German soldiers were thrown against the French on a front of three miles, and on July 11, a few of them succeeded in crossing the narrow valley between it and Fort Souville. But though they actually reached the fort they could not get into it, and were driven back into the valley. The tide of invasion had reached its high-water mark and the ebb was beginning. At the end of August the 30 German divisions on the Verdun front had been reduced to 15 in response to the call of the Somme, and from that moment the attack was in the hands of the French. From the end of February to the end of July, the extent of the German advance on the right bank, except for the brief excursion to Souville, was nowhere more than a mile. The attack had ended in complete failure, the cost to the Germans was probably not less than half a million men, and Verdun had become the

most glorious name in the whole story of the armies of France.

It still remained, however, to recover the ground that had been lost, and give the city room to breathe. The Verdun army was now under the command of General Nivelle, the successor of Pétain, who had himself taken Langle de Cary's place as commander of the group of Armies of the Centre. On October 24 he entrusted to the Mangin group the task of driving the Germans out of Douaumont and Vaux, which after a magnificent offensive, in which the French conclusively proved themselves the better men, was accomplished on October 24 and November 2. The enemy's reaction was of the most violent nature, and the divisions of de Salins, de Passaga, and de Lardemelle (three divisions in the front line against eight) suffered heavily after they had gained their objectives, as every vestige of the trenches had been swept away. But they held their ground in the folds and shell-holes of that hideous, trackless waste of churned-up mud, every yard of it covering, or not covering, the shattered remains of human limbs and bodies, till on December 15—three days after Nivelle had been appointed to succeed Joffre as Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the

North and East—the order was given for the second of the great assaults which in two strides retook a good half of the ground on the right bank which the enemy had gained by all their terrific exertions since they started the offensive 10 months before. Again it was the Mangin group that did the work. The front line divisions were those of de Passaga, de Salins, du Plessis, and Muteau, and when they had gained their objectives, which placed six miles between the enemy and Verdun, they had taken nearly 12,000 prisoners and over a hundred guns. After the long and patient resistance the swift and brilliant attack. Between them, after 10 months of superb effort, they had saved Verdun and perhaps France.

On July 1, 10 days before the Crown Prince's army reached their farthest south and got within three miles of Verdun at Fleury and Souville, the French under Foch and Fayolle made their second great effort of 1916, and began the long and trying offensive of the Somme. The glory of Verdun was entirely their own. They had been able to check the enemy's progress without calling on the help of the troops which we had offered to place at their disposal. But their Verdun troops had



FRENCH DETACHMENT IN A FLANKING TRENCH AT VERDUN.

been severely tested by the unceasing pressure of those four months, and the Somme offensive brought a much-needed relief. This time they were fighting alongside the British, now become a formidable striking force. The front chosen by the French and British commanders for the long expected attack ran from near Thiepval on the Amiens-Albert-Bapaume railway, nine miles north of the stretch of the Somme which runs nearly due west from Péronne to Amiens, to a point near Chaulnes on the Amiens-Chaulnes-Péronne line, about the same distance south of the river. The French on the right had the section south of the Somme and about three miles on the north side as far as Maricourt, from which the British front ran in a shallow semi-circle back to Thiepval. Between the river and Chaulnes the ground over which the French advanced was a level plateau, right and left of the straight Roman road which runs due east from Amiens, crossing the Somme, which here flows from south to north, at Brie, about four miles south of Péronne. At Péronne the river turns west at right angles to its previous course. The actual stream is considerably widened by the chain of swamps and marshes through which it runs, and at Frise, where it was crossed by the French line, river and marshes make an impassable obstacle two miles from south to north, reaching nearly up to Maricourt, so that the front from which the French attacked north of the river was barely a mile long.

Partly on this account their progress on the

right or north bank was at first very slow. On the other, where they were facing the stretch above Péronne, it began, especially along the river valley, with a fine rush, which carried them at one bound almost up to Biaches, five miles ahead, and within a mile of Péronne, which was their principal objective. Farther to the right the speed of the advance tailed off. Biaches was taken on the 18th, and it was not long before most of the ground and all the villages in the angle between the bend of the river and the Roman road were in the hands of the French, and with them several thousand prisoners and many guns. But south of the road the tract of land taken in the advance gradually narrowed, till behind Chaulnes, which the Germans held till their retreat in 1917, it was barely a mile wide. On the whole sector south of the river, in spite of continual fighting of the most desperate character, the line of the front at the end of the year was hardly any farther forward than it was after the first three weeks of the offensive.

On the north side of the Somme, the French gradually widened the front on which they were operating till in October instead of the original base a mile long between Maricourt and Curlu it extended eight miles north of Péronne along the road to Bapaume. Their right worked eastwards along the river by Curlu, Hem and Clery till it was opposite Biaches on the other bank, their left moved north-east through Hardecourt, Combles, and Morval, up to the Péronne-Bapaume road beyond Sailly-



EXAMINING A GERMAN PRISONER AT MORONVILLERS.



GENERAL NIVELLE.

Appointed French Commander-in-Chief in December, 1916.

Saillisel, and by the middle of October their centre, spread out fan-shaped between these two points, had got a mile beyond the same road for some distance on each side of Bouchavesnes, a total advance of only six miles from the lines of July 1. But, slow though their progress was, the French and the British in the Somme battle advanced nearly twice as far as the Germans at Verdun in the same time, and their attack, instead of dwindling to a point as the Crown Prince's did at Souville, ended by establishing a salient 40 miles long from Thiepval to Chaulnes.

The French claimed that their losses in the

first 100 days of the attack only came to about half the total of those which they had inflicted on the enemy in the Champagne offensive of 1915 in a fifth of the time, and great efforts were made by the judicious use of heavy artillery and by profiting by the experience gained in previous battles to reduce to a minimum the risks which the infantry had to face. But even so, and though the French certainly suffered less than their British brothers in arms, most of whom were comparatively new hands, the fighting was terribly arduous. Maurepas, hardly two miles from the *ligne de départ* of July 1, was not taken till August 24, it was

over a month later when the French and British together entered the ruins of Combles, only a mile and a half farther on, and though our allies had crossed the Péronne-Bapaume road at Bouchavesnes to the east of Maurepas on September 12, it was not till October 15 that they won their way up the exposed slope two and a half miles long between Combles and Saily-Saillisel, and established another dominant position beyond the famous road. At the other end of the line, on the south of the river, to take a still more striking example of the stubbornness of the enemy's resistance, it was not till November that the French took Ablaincourt only two miles from the trenches out of which they went over the top in the early morning of July 1. Between then and the middle of September the number of German battalions that went into action on the Somme against the French was 312, two more than those that fought against the British, and in the same time our Allies captured 35,000 prisoners, 144 guns, and 500 machine-guns.

Even after the winter had well set in there was still a great deal of very heavy fighting on the Somme front, especially at the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, between Saily-Saillisel and Bouchavesnes. But the enemy, though forced

time after time to give way, clung to each fresh position with grim determination, and it was not till the following year and the rapid retreat to the Oise that French and British reaped the full benefit of the tremendous struggle in which they stood shoulder to shoulder through those trying and costly but ever glorious months.

For the French Army the year 1917 is the year of the battle of the Chemin des Dames, with interludes in the shape of the German retreat of March 17 north and south of the Oise, the French share in the battle of Flanders in the late summer, and the final *riposte* at Verdun on August 20. Of these the retreat, as we have already said, was partly the result of the Allied attack on the Somme and partly designed to take the wind out of the sails of an expected French offensive. Its possible claims to admiration as a judicious and well executed military movement were heavily discounted by the acts of robbery and destruction, especially of fruit trees, and the forcible abduction of numbers of young girls and other innocent civilians by which it was accompanied and disgraced.

As a matter of fact the retreat from the front between Arras and Soissons, besides giving the French back about 1,400 square miles of their



[French official photograph.]

SEARCHING AMONG THE DEBRIS OF THE ENEMY'S RETREAT FOR MEANS OF IDENTIFYING THE REGIMENTS ENGAGED.



A CAPTURED TRENCH BEFORE VERDUN.

territory, practically brought them up to the Hindenburg line as far south as the forest of Coucy and rather facilitated than hindered their next offensive, which began on April 16 on a front of over 30 miles from Laffaux, a few miles north-east of Soissons, along the Chemin des Dames to Juvincourt, and then south past Berry au Bac to Courcy, not far north of Reims. On the first day nearly the whole of the German first position from Laffaux to Craonne was taken and a good advance was made on the rest of the front of attack together with a haul of 10,000 prisoners. On the 17th the operation was extended 12 miles east of Reims across the Champagne plain and the base of the Moronvillers massif to Auberive on the Suippe, so that the battle front was the biggest there had been since the Marne, and on the 18th the number of prisoners had risen to 17,000, with 75 guns, and a considerable advance had been made. It was not, however, as great as the country by somewhat injudicious talking had been led to expect, and the operation, instead of being hailed as the success which, in spite of temporary checks at Laffaux and one or two other points, it undoubtedly was, was severely criticized and partially suspended by orders from Paris. General Nivelle and General Mangin, of all people in the world, were pitched upon as scapegoats, and as the result of a general reshuffling of the higher commands,

General Joffre's powers were limited, General Foch was appointed Chief of the General Staff and General Pétain succeeded General Nivelle as Commander in Chief of the Armies of the North and East.

In his new office Pétain rendered France one invaluable service. He successfully tackled and overcame the spirit of disaffection which at this moment had infected certain battalions at the front—partly thanks to agitators in the ranks, partly to the contamination of unrestful politicians in Paris—and by a judicious and masterly combination of firmness and fatherly interest in the men under his command made the Army itself again.

Meanwhile he went on with the offensive which Nivelle had begun. Day after day all through the summer French and Germans went on attacking and counter-attacking on the hills of the Moronvillers massif and the narrow exposed plateaux of Hurtebise, Californie, and Craonne and the rest of the hogbacked ridge along which runs the Chemin des Dames, till the whole of their surface soil and the green things that had grown there were shelled to powder and buried deep beneath a hideous coating of broken lumps of chalk and rusty iron and decaying human remains. No greater self-sacrifice was shown by the soldiers of France during the whole war than on those blood-drenched shell-swept hills, the everlasting

monument of an army of heroes. Till well on in the autumn there was hardly a day on which at some point or other along the 20 miles between Laffaux and Craonne the deadly struggle was not raging. Then, on October 23, Pétain struck the final decisive blow, and his carefully prepared offensive east of Laffaux on the fort of Malmaison and the Mont Parnasse quarries swept the enemy off their feet and forced them in the next 24 hours to retire without waiting for a further attack, so that, a day or two later, they had withdrawn to the other side of the Ailette and the whole of the Chemin des Dames was won for France.

The other closing scene in the drama of the year had been played two months before in front of Verdun, beginning on the left bank of the Meuse. On August 20 a sudden French attack on a front of 10 miles drove the enemy out of Avocourt Wood and off the Morthomme, on the 21st they evacuated Hill 304 and fell back on the Forges brook, and by the end of the

month on both sides of the river they had been forced to give up the last remaining fruits of their offensive of the previous year. The end of the war still seemed a long way off, and the armies of the Republic were desperately tired. Even on the three hundred miles of their front remote from the big battles there was continually minor fighting going on every day, thousands of shells and bombs were being hurled on Reims and Nancy and other of the martyr towns of the north and east, every day fresh ruins cried out to heaven, and every day, though there was never a semblance of truth in the legend, industriously spread and widely believed, that France was bled white, fresh blood was flowing. But, for all that, at the close of the year which wrote on their war-worn colours the glorious names of Morthomme, Malmaison, and the Chemin des Dames, the army as a striking force was stronger than it had ever been, as the next and last year of the war was to show.



CHAPTER CCXCIV.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: LAST YEARS.

MURDER OF COUNT STÜRGKH—DEATH OF EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH—DIL. VON KOERBER, AUSTRIAN PREMIER—THE *Ausgleich*—THE EMPEROR CHARLES—POLITICAL CHANGES—COUNT CZERNIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS—EFFECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION—PEACE CURRENTS—THE REICHSRAT SUMMONED—RESIGNATION OF COUNT TISZA—LETTER OF THE EMPEROR TO PRINCE SIXTE OF BOURBON—AUSTRIAN VICTORIES IN ITALY—THE PEACE OF BREST-LITOVSK—POLISH PROBLEMS—ALLIED VICTORIES IN FRANCE—EFFECTS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY—AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PEACE NOTE.

COUNT STÜRGKH, the Premier who during the first 27 months of the war had governed Austria without a Parliament, was murdered on October 22nd, 1916, at a time when a strong current in favour of a return to more or less constitutional forms of government had set in.* The change could hardly have made itself felt when on November 22, 1916, the Emperor Francis Joseph I. died at the age of 86 and after a reign of 68 years. The new course was to be steered by new men. Dr. von Koerber, an old servant of the Emperor Francis Joseph, who had been entrusted with the formation of the Cabinet on October 27, was dismissed from office on December 13. It was with the appointment of Count Clam-Martinic to the Austrian Premiership on December 20 and of Count Czernin to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on December 22, 1916, that the personal *entourage* of the Emperor Charles assumed government and that his personal reign can be said to have begun.

The summoning of Dr. Ernest von Koerber was on the part of the old Emperor, or whoever directed his actions, a move towards resuming pre-war traditions, and that under the leadership

of one of the most honest, most liberal and most independent of Austrian civil servants. Further, it was an Austrian revolt against Magyar predominance. During his previous Premiership (1900-4) Dr. von Koerber had tried to hold his own against Hungary, sometimes with insufficient respect or understanding for Hungary's constitutional independence, and this on one occasion brought him into a sharp conflict with Count Stephen Tisza, then also Hungarian Premier. No wonder, then, that on his return to office Dr. von Koerber was greeted by Count Tisza's mouth-piece, the *Pester Lloyd*, with a long lecture on what was due to Hungary, "to remind him on the threshold of the new stage in his career of this great, nay, the greatest, lesson of the world-war."

The choice which Koerber made of his colleagues disclosed part of his programme; none of the men who during the preceding year had carried on the negotiations for the *Ausgleich*—the economic treaty with Hungary—and for Austria's internal reconstruction were retained. Yet the Cabinet could by no means be described as pro-Slav or as opposed to *Mittel-Europa*. Dr. Franz Klein, a man of high character and ability, but a strong Austrian-German Centralist and a supporter of a close alliance with

* Cf. Chap. CCLXXXI., pp. 249-251.

Germany, became Minister of Justice, and Dr. F. Stibral, who had publicly declared himself in favour of economic *rapprochement* with Germany, was appointed Minister of Commerce. On the other hand, the Czechs were left practically unrepresented. There was only at the Ministry of Public Works the insignificant Baron Trnka, a son-in-law of the old Emperor's Court physician—as member of Stürgkl's Cabinet he had watched with exemplary

on their political aspirations rather than on their national "species."

The inheritance which Koerber received from his predecessor was a practically complete draft for the new *Ausgleich* with Hungary and an agreement with Germany concerning the future of Poland; further, the draft of an Imperial Rescript to be addressed to the Austrian Premier instructing him to prepare proposals for a wide enlargement of Galician autonomy.*



THE FUNERAL OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH: THE MOURNERS.

The young Emperor Charles, with the Empress Zita and the Crown Prince are in front; following them are the Kings of Bulgaria, Bavaria, Saxony and Würtemberg.

patience the persecutions inflicted on the Czechs (the *Neue Freie Presse* of November 2, 1916, openly admitted that he was retained in the Cabinet probably "only because no other suitable Czech could be found"); and at the Ministry of Agriculture Count Clam-Martinié, one of those Bohemian aristocrats whose nationality was territorial and not linguistic. If there was any promise to the Czechs in the appointment of a Clam-Martinié, it was that they would be oppressed and persecuted only in so far as this was considered necessary for the good and strength of the Hapsburg State, but not to the extent which the Pan-Germans would have liked; that war would be made

No Austrian Government could have gone back on the agreement with Germany, nor on the decision with regard to Galicia, but the concluding sentence of the Imperial Rescript as published on November 5, 1916, was made to run as follows: "In signifying to you my will in this matter, I charge you to prepare and to submit to me proper proposals for realizing it *in accordance with the constitution* ' (zu ihrer gesetzmässigen Verwirklichung). The momentous word *gesetzmässig* was Dr. von Koerber's addition. The proposals for the exclusion of Galicia were to be submitted to

* Chap. CCLXXXI p. 249.

Parliament, where in all probability they could not have secured the two-thirds majority required for changes in the constitution.* Koerber thus went counter to the demand of the German parties that the changes in the Austrian constitution should be carried out before Parliament met, so that the new Parliament might start with a clear German majority on a clear German basis.

The terms of the *Ausgleich* as negotiated by Count Stürgkh's Cabinet were withheld from the public. It was, however, known that the new *Ausgleich* was to run for 20 instead of 10 years, so as to open the road for agreements with Germany which were to cover a similar period, and that its terms were highly disadvantageous to Austria. The Hungarian Government was Parliamentary, the Austrian Cabinet was dependent on the Hofburg. To the Hofburg the political consideration of holding together the two parts of the Monarchy was paramount, and by economic concessions at the expense of Austria it paid the Magyars for remaining in the union. Koerber, before accepting office, asked to be allowed to make himself acquainted with the arrangements of his predecessor concerning the *Ausgleich*. In the Vienna Press it was given out that changes in the agreement were considered in Koerber's conversation with Tisza, a statement categori-

* Cf. Chap. CCLXXXI., pp. 243-244.



COUNT CLAM-MARTINIC.
Austrian Premier, 1916.



DR. ERNEST VON KOERBER.
Austrian Premier, October-December, 1916.

cally denied from Budapest. Koerber was once more coming up against the Magyars; to hold his own he would have needed the support of the Austrian Parliament.

On December 9, 1916, the German National Union declared that "Parliament must be summoned, but that first the necessary conditions and basis must be created to render its work fruitful." "The assembled German national members of Parliament most emphatically adhere to the demand that Galicia should be excluded and Parliament should meet without the Galician members."* "It was also emphasized," stated the official report of the meeting, "that if Parliament was summoned without these conditions, Parliamentary life in Austria would be permanently endangered." The Germans threatened to break up Parliament unless their programme for Germanizing Austria was first carried by unconstitutional methods. Moreover, although most of them desired the *Ausgleich* with Hungary to be concluded without delay, so

* This demand was, of course, incompatible with the Galician problem being solved "in accordance with the constitution"—i.e., by Parliament.



THE LAST OF THE HAPSBURG EMPERORS.

that the question of Central European Union could be taken in hand, they, and especially the Christian Socialists, who had to compete for the popular vote against the Social Democrats, were not prepared to vote for an agreement economically so unfavourable to Austria, and wished the Government to relieve them of all responsibility for it by enacting it through an unconstitutional Imperial Rescript—a manoeuvre typical of the ideas and morals of the old Austrian Parliament.

The Hungarian Government was loth to lose the advantages which it had gained in a year of laborious negotiations with Stürgkh and Spitzmüller. The new economic agree-

ment was described in the *Pester Lloyd* as “a bridge leading across a sea of blood to the bank of a glad future.” “. . . The bridge is practically built. . . . It is true Dr. von Koerber was not its architect. In this or that detail he might have planned it differently. But because the builder died, is the structure to be destroyed which cost so much labour. . . ?”

On December 13, at 11 a.m., Koerber was to have received some leading German members of the Austrian Parliament. On arriving they were informed that he had been suddenly summoned by the Emperor Charles, who had just returned from Budapest. The Emperor declared in favour of the procedure demanded

by the Germans and Magyars, and Dr. von Koerber, whose endeavour it had been to make the young monarch adhere to the Constitution, resigned office. "*Karl der Plötzliche*" (Charles the Rash) had taken the first weighty decision of his reign. Charles and the clerical, centralist camarilla around him, though personally hostile to the Calvinist Magyar Tisza, had enabled him to win another victory. Spitzmüller, the man with whom he had settled the preliminary terms of the *Ausgleich* and whom Koerber had excluded from his Cabinet, was entrusted with the formation of a new Austrian Cabinet. The *Pester Lloyd* greeted him as a man for whom "the Hungarians feel the most sincere respect and friendly feelings."

Spitzmüller was to have carried through the *Ausgleich* on the basis of the previous negotiations, and then he was to have withdrawn. From the very outset Count Clam-Martinić, a personal friend of the young Emperor, had been designated as his successor. A week followed of intrigues and negotiations, in which men who so far had no constitutional standing whatsoever tried to dictate to the Premier. Count Czernin, *e.g.*, demanded that both the *Ausgleich* and a scheme for Austria's internal reconstruction, which he had drawn up, should be enacted by Imperial Rescript. But on December 14, in view of Spitzmüller's appointment, the Hungarian Opposition, to embarrass Tisza, raised the question whether Hungary could acknowledge the validity of an *Ausgleich* enacted in Austria in an unconstitutional manner. Tisza—who like most of his Magyar contemporaries, worshipped the letter of constitutional law, even when he violated its spirit—was unable to disprove his opponents' argument. Thus after all it was found impossible to conclude the *Ausgleich* without the Austrian Parliament, and Spitzmüller had reluctantly to face the difficulties in which Koerber had got involved. Thereupon, contrary to previous practice, it was decided to carry the *Ausgleich* through Parliament *en bloc* like a commercial treaty not admitting of amendments. This would have enabled the parties which voted the *Ausgleich* to plead that they had no choice but to accept the Bill or imperil the unity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the future of *Mittel-Europa*. The fact, however, remained that Parliament had to be summoned before the *Ausgleich* could be completed—which brought up once more the prob-

lem of the German *Vorbedingungen*. In other words, the "transition Cabinet," which was to have done the most unpleasant work and then departed, proved impossible, and on December 18 Dr. von Spitzmüller was charged with forming a Cabinet on an "enlarged basis." New difficulties, however, arose of a personal nature, and on December 20, after a conference with Prince Fürstenberg, Count Clam-Martinić and Count Ottokar Czernin, Spitzmüller resigned his mission.

The conference held immediately before



THE EMPEROR CHARLES AND THE EMPRESS ZITA.

Spitzmüller's resignation disclosed the coming powers in Austrian politics: Prince Fürstenberg, a personal friend of the Emperor William and a leader of the German aristocracy in Bohemia in the closest touch with the German Nationalists; Count Czernin, another German-Bohemian aristocrat, a close friend of Baron Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, whose Centralist leanings he shared; and Czernin's friend, Count Clam-Martinić, Minister of Agriculture in Koerber's Cabinet. It was

by an open break with the Czech national movement that Count Clam-Martinic had qualified for the Premiership. On December 8, 1916, Prince A. Windisch-Grätz, Counts Clam-Martinic, N. Des Fours, A. Monsdorff-Pouilly, J. Nostitz and Baron O. Parish, gentlemen representing by their origin every nation of Western and Central Europe rather than the Czechs, moved a resolution in the



PRINCE MAX-EGON ZU FÜRSTENBERG.
A leader of the Conservative German Party
in Bohemia.

executive committee of the Conservative Big Landowners of Bohemia sharply condemning the Czech national movement. Failing to receive sufficient support they withdrew from the club, and the last link broke which had connected them, however distantly, with the Czech nation.

On December 20, 1916, Count Clam-Martinic was appointed Premier, and on the very same day the list of the Cabinet and its programme were published in the Press. It was, in fact, the Cabinet as arranged for Dr. von Spitzmüller, but with its true chief at the head and Dr. von Spitzmüller at the Ministry of Finance, a department of vital importance in the negotiations for the *Ausgleich* and for Central European union. The composition of the Cabinet was significant; it consisted almost entirely of old

associates of Count Stürgkh excluded from office by Dr. von Koerber—men who had shared with Count Stürgkh the responsibility for the two years of unconstitutional government and had worked out schemes for centralizing Austria's government, for Germanizing her internally and for concluding a Central European Union. General Baron von Georgi, under whose authority the notorious courts-martial had carried on their terrorist activity in the Czech, Jugo-Slav and Little Russian provinces, returned to the Ministry of National Defence; Baron von Forster, who had excelled in Germanizing the Austrian railways and in oppressive action against their employees, became once more Minister of Railways; Baron von Hussarek, one of Count Stürgkh's closest collaborators, reappeared at the Ministry of Education, and the indispensable quasi-Czech, Baron Trnka,



GENERAL BARON FRIEDRICH VON
GEORGI.

Minister of National Defence.

continued at his post as Minister of Public Works. Baron von Handel, who during the last year of Count Stürgkh's *régime*, as a departmental chief, prepared the scheme for Austria's internal reconstruction,* was promoted to the position of Minister of the Interior. Two prominent German members of Parliament were, however, added—the Government was to aim at re-establishing constitutional

* Cf. Chap. CCLXXXI., p. 239.

forms, but on a clearly German basis. Dr. Urban, a leader of the German Nationalists in Bohemia, became Minister of Commerce, an appointment on which he himself, two days later, made the following comment: "It is no accident that at a time when the settling of our economic *rapprochement* to Germany has become one of the chief and most urgent problems a German member of Parliament should take charge of the Ministry of Commerce. This shows to what a marked extent the interests and wishes of the German Austrians coincide with the needs of the new Austria." Dr. Baernreither, another German leader from Bohemia, was added as German *Landsmannminister* (a Minister without portfolio specially charged with guarding the interests of his nationality)—the post had not been filled since 1910. No appointment was



DR. BAERNREITHER.
Landsmannminister.

made to the corresponding Czech office, which had been vacant since 1909; quite to the contrary, one of the first acts of the new Cabinet was definitely to abolish the post of the Czech "compatriot-minister" by dissolving its chancery, which had been in existence since 1879. The Poles were represented by M. de Bobrzynski, one of their ablest and most prominent Conservative leaders, who, as Minister for Galicia, was to prepare the scheme for enlarging its autonomy; this was to have

been done exclusively in the Polish interest, although the Poles formed considerably less than half the population of Galicia. Lastly, a Polish official from Galicia, Baron von Schenk, was appointed Minister of Justice. In an agreement with the Poles the Austrian Germans proposed to carry through the first measure for the Germanization of Austria, the exclusion of



DR. KARL URBAN.
A leader of the German Nationalists; Minister of Commerce.

Galicia, which would have given the German members in the Austrian Parliament a clear and permanent majority over the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs; in exchange the Little Russians or Ruthenes of Galicia were to have been put entirely under Polish dominion.

"To re-establish constitutional life in full," read the programmatic declaration of the new Cabinet, "to create the necessary preliminary conditions for it (*die Schaffung der notwendigen Voraussetzungen*), to open the road for Parliament, these will be the high aims of the Government." An unconstitutional change of the Austrian constitution was thus foreshadowed, and even the term *Voraussetzungen* was taken over from the political jargon of the German Nationalist parties. The conclusion of the *Ausgleich* treaty with Hungary and the preparations for closer economic union with Germany were mentioned as being among "the most immediate tasks of the Government." "These inter-connected matters, as well as the commercial treaties to be concluded with other States, will be submitted in proper

time for the approval (*zur Genehmigung*) of Parliament." The trick of treating the *Ausgleich* as a commercial treaty not admitting amendments was thus announced to reassure the German members that no responsibility would be thrown upon them by having the matter settled in a Parliamentary manner. "The coming change in Galicia's position within the State" was mentioned, and lastly a number of internal reforms, including measures for the "moral strengthening of loyalty to the State among the growing youth."

On December 22 followed the appointment of Count Czernin to the Joint Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "There is some movement now in Austrian politics," wrote the Vienna Socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung*. "Every day a change of ministers. Only yesterday we received a new Austrian Cabinet, and to-day we have a new common Ministry: Baron Burian



DR. MICHAEL BOBRZYNSKI.
Minister for Galicia.



BARON BURIAN IN BERLIN.

is dismissed from his post of Foreign Minister and replaced by Count Ottokar Czernin; Burian in turn is made Joint Minister of Finance, and Prince Hohenlohe, who took over that office only a few days ago, has to leave . . . These changes seem to be the inverse of what usually happens: the new man does not come because the old one is gone, but Baron Burian had to go in order that Count Czernin could come. First arose the necessity that Count Czernin should become Foreign Minister; and the need for Baron Burian's resignation followed. To some extent the same is true of Count Clam-Martinic; here also there was first the Count and then a Cabinet was formed around him . . ." The new Emperor's friends were moving in.

Negotiations for the economic treaty with Hungary were resumed immediately on the formation of the Clam-Martinic Government. Little, however, was heard about them until on February 24, 1917, when the official announcement was made of their having reached a provisional conclusion—"provisional" because no one could foresee the outcome of the war, but sufficient for "initiating political and commercial negotiations with third States, and in particular with the German Empire." The provisional terms of the *Ausgleich* were kept secret, but it was known, and stated plainly in the Vienna papers, that the agreement was on a 20-years' basis, which was to be

adopted in the agreement with Germany also, that Hungary had obtained her principal tariff demands, that a definite bank agreement had been postponed, and that special agreements had been concluded about future trade in the Balkans.

In the first days of January Clam-Martinic started conferences with the leaders of the different parties and nationalities in the Austrian Parliament. There was no time to be lost. The mandate of the Austrian Parlia-

To carry out this programme immediately would have been a very different matter—the Hapsburgs would have narrowed down their freedom of action and bargaining in the Polish question without any advantage to themselves. Moreover, the Germans and the Poles, though agreed in wishing for an extension of Galician autonomy, were by no means at one as to the form which it should assume. The Poles raised economic and financial claims. Galicia had suffered in the war more than any other



CZECHO-SLOVAK COSTUMES.

As exhibited at a fair at the Czecho-Slovak Military Mobilisation Camp, Stamford, Connecticut.

ment was to have expired in July, 1917, and in war-time the Austrian Government could not have risked a general election, in fact not even a single by-election. Still, before Parliament met the internal "reconstruction" of Austria was to have been carried out, and for this the exclusion of Galicia from the Austrian Parliament was to have provided the Archimedean point. But this was not an easy point to tackle. It had been convenient to the Hapsburgs to put forward Galician autonomy as a programme, and thus to signify to the Poles that they did not insist on Galicia being part of a centralised Austrian State, but that, on the contrary, they were prepared to include it in the kingdom of Poland if the latter came under the Hapsburg sceptre.*

province of Austria-Hungary, and it was but reasonable that the whole State should bear the expense of reconstructing the devastated borderland. The question of war damages, deliberately delayed by the Austrian Government and the Austrian Germans, who were unwilling to spend money on a province which they might lose after all, would have had to be settled definitely if a separation had been decided upon. The Poles, too, naturally insisted on retaining a representation in the Vienna Parliament if Galicia remained part of the Austrian State for any purpose, economic or military, and its retention was especially important to them in view of the part which the Austrian Government was bound to play in the further developments of the Polish question. The German Nationalists, who were recruited very largely from the commercial

* Cf. Chap. CCLXXXI., p. 249.



THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS INTERROGATING REFUGEES AT GYONGYOS, IN HUNGARY.

and industrial middle classes, on the other hand, wanted to retain their economic hold on Galicia, but to exclude entirely the Galician members from Parliament so as to secure for themselves a clear and permanent majority in it. Moreover, the German-Austrian centralists did not want to admit an enlargement of Galician autonomy such as would have weakened Austria politically. In the new draft of the German programme as voted on January 16, 1917, the paragraph concerning Galicia ran as follows: "In excluding Galicia in accordance with the Imperial Rescript of November 4, 1916, special care has to be taken that the enlarged autonomy of this greatest of Austrian provinces should not result in a weakening of the cohesion of the State, and that the interests of the State in military and financial matters, in problems of transport and in other questions should be fully preserved and safeguarded." By accepting this scheme the Poles (who were anyhow dominant in Galicia though they formed but a minority of its population), would have gained nothing but would have remained under a Parliament over which they would have lost all influence. The Germans, on the other hand, refused the terms of the Poles, which would have virtually established Galicia's economic and administra-

tive independence with regard to Austria. By the end of February it was clear that the question of the exclusion of Galicia could not be settled without Parliament by an agreement between the Germans and the Poles. The programme of the wide "internal reconstruction" was rapidly shrinking.

Meantime, the revolution of March, 1917, supervened in Petrograd. After all that has followed it is difficult to go back to its early days, to recall their ideas and hopes, and to recapture that feeling of buoyancy which then inspired the popular masses throughout Europe and in Austria-Hungary in particular. Vistas of freedom suddenly opened before the suffering nationalities and the suffering masses, even among the Germans and Magyars, and all faces were to the east. A hope entered the hearts of the Austro-Hungarian Slavs such as they had never felt since the outbreak of the war, and the Vienna Socialists were beginning to awaken from their own intricate sophistries and to believe in a creed which they had hitherto repeated without faith or twisted with art. And those who for years had talked of "reconstruction," meaning thereby repression, began to wonder whether after all it would not be advisable to change the nature of their schemes. The summoning of Parliament could

no longer be postponed. On April 12, Dr. Victor Adler, the distinguished leader of the Vienna Socialists, started out for the International Socialist Conference which was to have met at Stockholm. On the same day Count Czernin, to whom he had talked before leaving Vienna, addressed a secret memorandum to the Emperor surveying the situation. "It is perfectly obvious that our military forces are coming to an end" he said. "I have merely to point to the exhaustion of raw materials for munitions, to the completely exhausted reserves in men, and most of all to the sullen despair which under-feeding has produced in all the strata of the population, rendering it impossible to bear the sufferings of the war any longer. . . . Peace has to be concluded at any price in the late summer or autumn.

"It is undoubtedly of the greatest importance to start these negotiations whilst our enemies are not yet fully conscious of the dying-away of our strength. Should we approach the Entente when incidents within our State make imminent collapse obvious, . . . the Entente will accept no other conditions but such as would imply the complete destruction of the Central Powers.

"To begin in time is, therefore, of cardinal importance. . . ."

He then called attention to the danger

of the Russian Revolution spreading to the Central Powers. "Let no one tell me that things are different in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that the deep roots which the monarchical idea has in Berlin and Vienna exclude such a possibility. This war has opened up a new era in the world's history, it is without precedent. . . ."

"Your Majesty is acquainted with the secret reports of the Governors. Two things are obvious; the Russian Revolution works more strongly on our Slavs than on the Germans of the German Empire, and the responsibility for continuing the war is much greater for a sovereign whose country is united by the bond of dynasty alone, than for the ruler of a country where the people itself fights for the national cause. . . ."

Count Czernin then proceeded to discuss the chances of an Entente offensive on the Western front, the exaggerated hopes which Germany built on unrestricted submarine warfare and the influence of America's entry into the war. He hinted even at cessions of territory if necessary to obtain peace.

On April 14 the official Telegraph Bureau published a peace offer directed by the Austro-Hungarian Government to Russia. It pretended to see an accordance of aims between



GALICIAN REFUGEES IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP.

the declaration made by the Russian Government on April 11, 1917, against the dominion of one nation over another, and the so-called peace offer made by the Central Powers on December 12, 1916. The Hapsburg Monarchy, which on Count Czernin's own admission did not represent any national cause, began to play the burlesque of disguising itself as a "nation" and of claiming rights of "self-determination" within its frontiers of 1914.

But this disguise, however transparent, entailed certain consequences for its home policy. The war against the subject nationalities had to stop, and the unconstitutional schemes for Austria's final Germanization had to be postponed. On April 16 Count Czernin explained to Count Clam-Martinić that internal developments in Austria must not hamper the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the same day a Cabinet Council took place at which it was decided to summon Parliament without carrying out any of the German demands by means of Imperial enactments. This development seems to have come as a complete surprise even for the two German Ministers. Dr. Urban and Dr. Baernreither handed in their resignations, and were joined by the representative of the Poles, Dr. Bobrzynski. Party meetings were summoned immediately and at

first the situation looked rather grave. Assurances were given, however, to the Germans by the Government that only a change of tactics, not of policy, had occurred, and that the original programme was to be carried out at a more convenient time. It seems to have been pointed out, too, to them that the Austrian solution of the Polish question, for which the Austro-Hungarian Government continued to work, implied a separation of Galicia from Austria as part of the peace treaty and not as a change in the constitution, and that the Germans would thereby automatically obtain a majority in the Austrian Parliament, and could then realize the rest of their programme. A solemn promise that the original policy would be adhered to, to be given not by a Prime Minister or Cabinet which might change any day, but by the Emperor himself, was thereupon demanded by the Germans. On April 19 a joint deputation from the German Nationalists and the Christian Socialists was received by the Emperor and repeated to him the demands for Austria's "reconstruction" on a German basis. The Emperor gave the desired promise.


The event of outstanding importance during May was the decision of the Emperor Charles to summon the Reichsrat for the first time



THE EMPEROR CHARLES EXAMINING FOOD CONDITIONS IN GRASLITZ.

since March, 1914. This was dictated by a well-meant desire to free Austria from the reproach of being the only belligerent country whose Parliament was not allowed to meet during the war. To an even greater extent was the step prompted by the demand which the Russian Revolution had stimulated. On May 3, the Press had published an inspired forecast

Slavs. These fears were shown to be groundless by the events just after the opening of the Parliament. The way in which the vacancies in the Upper House were filled showed that no profound change of policy was to be expected. Foremost among those selected were Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff; Dr. Dumba, who had obtained notoriety in Wash-



A SITTING OF THE AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENT.

of the course of the impending Parliamentary session, the most important feature of which was the hint it gave that the Cabinet would undertake no negotiations for compromise between the parties before the assembling of Parliament, but would confer with them after the opening of Parliament.

Of the 516 seats, 46 were vacant, owing to the deaths, absence abroad, or condemnation for high treason of their holders. Of the remaining 470 members, 213 were Germans (104 Nationalists, 67 Clericals, and 42 Socialists), 96 Czechs, 78 Poles, 31 Jugo-Slavs, 29 Ukrainians, 10 Italians and Rumanes, and 13 Independents.

When the decision to summon the Reichsrat was first announced, it had produced considerable dissatisfaction in extreme German-Austrian circles, which feared concessions to the

ington by his anti-American activities just before the declaration of war on Austria-Hungary; and Herr Moritz Benedikt, the owner of the *Neue Freie Presse*, whose powerful, brilliantly exerted and pernicious influence was one of the strongest supports of Germanism against Slavdom in the Dual Monarchy.

Very significant, too, for the mood of the Germans, was the election to the Presidency of the Chamber. The German Nationalists, as the most numerous single party in the Austrian Parliament, had by parliamentary practice the right to nominate the President, but instead of putting forward a moderate candidate, selected Dr. Gross, President of the German National Union, the militant German member for Iglau in Moravia, where he had long led the struggle against the Czechs. The Slav deputies abstained from voting, and Dr. Gross was elected.

The Emperor's Speech from the Throne was full of vague phrases concerning devotion to Constitutionalism, which, however, did not obscure the fact that the Constitutional Oath would not be taken until, as the Emperor said, "the foundations of a new strong and happy Austria could be laid." It went on to make clear that "decisions to be taken at the great moment of the conclusion of Peace" were to



M. STANEK.
Czech Leader.

be reserved to the Crown alone. There was, further, an ambiguous reference to the need for "expanding the Constitution and the administrative foundations of public life especially in Bohemia." The Germans immediately signified that they would never agree to any such changes were they to be favourable to the Czechs, and the Czechs took up the challenge, their leader, Stanek, demanding that Austria-Hungary should become a Federal State of Free National States with equal rights. As this meant the union of the Czechs with the Slovaks—more than 2,000,000 of whom lived under the domination of Hungary—it was evident that the session was to see a direct challenge not only to the long predominance of the Germans in Austria, but also to the sovereignty of Hungary and to the privileged position of the Magyars in it. The lists were being cleared for a struggle in Hungary as in Austria.

In Hungary the principal event had been the resignation of the Tisza Cabinet. What brought Tisza to his fall was principally his temperamental disagreement with the Emperor; also a disagreement on the question of Hun-

garian franchise reform and the settlement which Berlin and Vienna were discussing on the question of Poland and Mittel-Europa respectively. The proposed cession of Galicia to the new kingdom of Poland would have struck a fatal blow at the commercial arrangement between Austria and Hungary, which Tisza had succeeded in extracting after prolonged negotiation, and was, moreover, the policy advocated by Tisza's hereditary enemy Count Julius Andrassy, the foremost Hungarian advocate of Mittel-Europa. The two names mentioned as Tisza's successor were those of Count Andrassy and Dr. Wekerle.

As it turned out, neither was chosen. After a considerable amount of private conference with various Hungarian politicians, the Emperor Charles sent Baron Burian to Budapest on a mission of enquiry, as a result of which Count Maurice Esterhazy, a young man who had never held office in any Government, was entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet.



COUNT MAURICE ESTERHAZY.
Hungarian Premier, 1917.

Esterhazy was a follower of Count Andrassy, who, as a personal enemy of Tisza and leader of the strongest party in the Chamber, had had to stand aside; Esterhazy, on the other hand, was not hostile to Tisza, and had, in fact, recently been offered office by him; the selection meant a compromise. Esterhazy's first declaration showed that there was to be concession on the franchise to Magyars, but none to the subject races under Magyar domination.

By the end of June a Cabinet crisis followed in Austria. The insufficiency of the declarations in the speech from the Throne, and the still less satisfactory statements of Clam-Mar-

tinic in making his Budget speech on June 12, had evoked a strong opposition among the Slav Parties, particularly among the Czechs. Their spokesman, Stransky, began by expressing his grief at the thought that so many of his colleagues, Kramarz, Klofac and Rashin, in particular, were still in prison, and went on to declare that the world was making a serious effort to adapt the interests of sovereigns to those of their peoples. "In future crowns will rest upon and base themselves on the peoples. . . . The postponement of the Constitutional Oath meant in the language of the Government, 'I, Clam-Martinic, and my Ministers are not a Constitutional Government.' . . . The Czechs wish to settle the form of their own political life, and, therefore, demand the restoration of the political independence of the Bohemian nation. . . . In the new order the related Slovak branch of the Czech nation must be taken into account."



DR. DUMBA.

Formerly Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
in Washington.

Jugo-Slav and Rumanian declarations were equally firm, the spokesman for the latter, Deputy Oncioul, deliberately carrying to absurdity the pretence of loyalty to the Hapsburgs—with which the different nationalities cloaked their irredentist programmes—by demanding the inclusion of all the Rumanian nation in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Everything now depended on the attitude of the Poles. If they showed solidarity with their Slav colleagues in the Reichsrat, the position of Clam-Martinic would become untenable. In consequence of the now dominant position assumed by the Left in the Polish Parliamentary Club, a

policy of compromise with the Government was doubtful.

At first there were efforts on the part of the Government to postpone the evil day, and about the middle of June Count Clam-Martinic was engaged in constant negotiation with the Polish representatives. One of the means of conciliation to be tried was the reconstruction of the Cabinet, in which the Poles were to



DR. GUSTAV GROSS.

President of the German National Union.
Elected President of the Chamber.

receive two seats. Any disposition which there may have been in Polish Conservative circles—the Conservatives, it should be remembered, numbered only 19—to accept this concession, was wrecked on the persistence of the Socialist and Democratic Parties, by whom the resolution proposed by the Social Democratic leader, Daszynski, was carried, instructing the Polish members of the Budget Committee to vote against the provisional Budget. Count Clam-Martinic's approaches to the South Slavs, and finally his despairing invitation to the Socialist leader, Karl Renner, proved of no avail, and on June 21, rather than be defeated on the Budget, he resigned, shortly afterwards to take up the Governorship of Montenegro.

If the successor to Tisza's Cabinet was colourless and transitional, that which succeeded Clam-Martinic was even more so. At first expectations were aroused by the summoning of von Koerber to the Emperor, who had previously kept him at a distance, not liking to have about him politicians of so much deeper and wider political experience than himself. The rumour that von Koerber was to be asked to

form a Cabinet, however, was soon disposed of, and in the evening of June 23 it was announced in the *Neue Freie Presse* that the former Chief of the Department of Agriculture, Ritter von Seidler, had been appointed "President of the Ministry composed of the Heads of Departments." The phrase aptly summed up the character of the Cabinet. Von Seidler, himself a not very prominent official, had gathered around him a number of equally colourless permanent officials. The provisional nature



RITTER VON SEIDLER.

President of the Austrian Ministry composed of the Heads of Departments.

of the arrangement was admitted by von Seidler himself in his opening statement. When the following day, June 27, he was challenged by an interpellation in the Chamber to state his attitude to the constitutional demands of the nationalities, he definitely rejected the right of nations to determine their own fate as a basis for peace, and declared that he did so after consultation with Count Czernin: the Austro-Hungarian Government took its stand on the Constitution, which specially reserved to the Emperor the right of concluding peace. In a later speech, with particular reference to the Constitutional Committee, he rejected as inadmissible any interference with the circumstances of Hungary, and asserted that the work of the Committee, while "leaving untouched the relations between the two states . . . yet would give a practical proof . . . that



PRINCE SIXTE OF BOURBON.

To whom the Emperor Charles addressed his historic letter acknowledging French claims in Alsace-Lorraine.

Austria contains neither oppressed nationalities nor the desire to oppress." Thus under von Seidler, as under his predecessor, the Slavs could expect no fundamental concession. Certain minor favours granted by the Austrian Government—for example, the amnesty of July 6 accorded by the Emperor Charles to those sentenced because of political offences—most prominent of all, Dr. Kramarz, the Czech leader—merely served to increase the indignation of Hungary without easing the domestic situation to any appreciable degree.

Under von Seidler and Esterhazy respectively, the course of Austro-Hungarian history was comparatively uneventful. Beneath the surface, however, the desire of the country for peace was continually growing in strength, now and then manifesting its presence in the form of open protest. The more prominent statesmen in the Dual Monarchy, above all, Count Czernin, had long convinced themselves that the one necessity of Austria-Hungary, both from the point of view of her policy towards her nationalities, no less than from that of her economic interests, was a swift end to the war. The question was how to reach this with an unconciliatory German Ally on the one hand, and the ever more radical demands of the subject nationalities—now more than ever conscious of the appeal of their

brothers in race outside the borders of the Dual Monarchy—on the other.

Early in 1917 the Emperor Charles addressed a letter to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixto of Bourbon, who had served in the Belgian Army during the war, and on March 31 the letter was communicated to Monsieur Poincaré to be forwarded to the French Prime Minister. After some preliminary eulogy of the French Army the Emperor stated that he was ready to use, and was in fact using, all his personal influence with his German Ally to support France's just claims in Alsace-Lorraine. He also stated that he was in favour of restoring the sovereignty of both Belgium and Serbia, the former also to receive her African possessions and the latter to be accorded an outlet to the Adriatic, on condition that she abstained from political agitation against the Dual Monarchy. This, in brief, was the Emperor's basis for the opening of negotiations. No territorial questions other than those of Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium and Serbia, were mentioned, for, as the Emperor said, "the events which had occurred in Russia compelled him to reserve his ideas on the subject until the days when a legal and definitive government should have been established there." The whole document betrayed a pathetic under-estimation of the seriousness of the disease from which the



DR. GUSTAV GRATZ.

Chief of the Commercial Department in the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, 1917.



M. IGNACE DASZYNSKI.

Represented Cracow in the Austrian Reichsrath.

Dual Monarchy was suffering, and even had this been correctly diagnosed by the young and inexperienced Emperor he would still have been compelled to deal with the obstinacy of Berlin.

Greater understanding of the realities of the situation, particularly in regard to the attitude of Germany, was shown by Count Czernin in the private memorandum which he sent to the Emperor on April 12. He saw the absolute necessity of peace for Austria-Hungary and the difficulty of getting Germany, which still believed in the success of the U boat warfare, to conclude it on the only possible terms. Against her opposition the influence of the Emperor Charles was of no avail.

Even so the ruling circles of Austria did not, and in fact could not, relax their efforts in the direction of peace. Not only was the Nationalities crisis becoming more and more acute, but the financial and economic position of the country was growing rapidly worse. Dr. von Spitzmüller, the Austrian Minister of Finance, in his Budget speech of June 16 carelessly concealed most of the essential facts, but it was known that the war liabilities of Austria alone amounted to 44,226,919,544 kronen (£1,842,789,000), of which 1,844,166,400 kronen (£76,000,000) had been lent by German banks. All this was apart from Hungary, whose war expenditure was not made public. The poor harvest, the great drop in coal production, the


lack of fruit, vegetables and milk—lack of the latter accounting for the fact that deaths from tuberculosis in Vienna had doubled since the beginning of the war—the desperate shortage of material such as woollen and cotton, which reached such a point that even the well-to-do were going about in rags—all this meant a terrific strain on Austrian civilian *moral*.

The rulers of Austria-Hungary, particularly of Austria, would have been blind to the obvious had they not attempted every means, unofficial as well as official, of securing an early peace. The Prince Sixte correspondence developed into the famous Armand-Revertera Conversations at Fribourg in July, but these negotiations, none of which was revealed until nearly a year later, were doomed to failure, even though supplemented with all kinds of less official efforts in the same direction. Stockholm was one of these. Only the tamest of the German-Austrian Socialists were selected for the mission, Dr. Viktor Adler being accompanied by Dr. Karl Renner and Herr Seitz. Before these left in May they had a three hours' conference with Count Czernin. The Austrian Socialists, who even before the war used jokingly to be named the "K.K. Sozialisten"

(Imperial and Royal Socialists) were, however, able to effect nothing.

The next opportunity, the Papal Note, was equally barren of result. There is little doubt that Austrian officials, or at least, Vatican officials in close touch with the Emperor and Count Czernin, were consulted before the Note was drawn up. The hopes which it raised in Austria were, however, dashed by the firmness of the Entente reply no less than by the vagueness of the German answer. By the end of August it was clear that a separate as well as a general peace was out of the question; Austria-Hungary would need to face a fourth winter of war.

In the meantime a great deal of political shuffling both in Austria and in Hungary had been going on. On July 16 the Reichsrat, after passing a four months' budget and a bill extending its mandate until the close of 1918, was adjourned indefinitely. Before the adjournment much discussion had been provoked by a proposal of von Seidler for Constitutional Reform, according to which a committee of 25 members, 5 from the Upper House, 10 from the Lower and 10 from outside, was to have been charged with the duty of drafting



THE EMPEROR CHARLES AT CZERNOWITZ IN 1917.
Conversing with the Commander of the Landesgendarmerie of the Bukovina.

a new Constitution on the basis of that racial equality in the Dual Monarchy which was guaranteed by the law of 1867, but had been only very imperfectly put into practice. The attempt was shipwrecked on the intransigent attitude of the Czechs, and the question of amendments to the Constitution was buried.

gether with the utterly uncompromising attitude of the Czechs, who, with the Slovak subjects of Hungary in their mind, desired not merely a reconstruction of the Austrian Constitution, but a throwing of the whole Austro-Hungarian question into the constitutional melting-pot—this was to prove the undoing



FOOD SHORTAGE IN AUSTRIA.

A group of undernourished children sent from Austria to Switzerland to be fed. The photograph was taken at Einsiedeln.

Next came von Seidler's attempt to reconstruct his Cabinet on a parliamentary basis. The support of the German parties was of course certain; von Seidler's principal efforts were directed to breaking down the obstinacy of the Czechs and Southern Slavs. The Poles, as usual, were an uncertain factor. Certain of the more conservative among them would no doubt have been willing to accept the portfolio which von Seidler offered them in common with the other Slav groups. But again the dominance of the radical element was to prove an insuperable obstacle. To-

of the whole project. By August 7 von Seidler's scheme was known to be a failure, and on August 31 a reconstruction of the Cabinet, again on an "official" basis, was effected. No one, not even the German press, was deceived by the fact that some of the new ministers belonged to the non-German nationalities, and the German-Bohemian daily *Bohemia* expressed the truth briefly but accurately by the heading of its article on the subject, "Ersatz" (Substitute).

During 1917 the Dual Monarchy was rather like a see-saw. No sooner had the weight of

a crisis in one half been removed than down came the plank with the weight of another. Ritter von Seidler had not completed his so-called "reconstruction" before a change became necessary in Hungary. There, too, on August 19, a reconstruction had been announced, involving the appointment of the Clerical leader, Count Aladar Zichy, and Count Batthyanyi and Vaszonyi, the latter of whom, significantly enough, had early in the month made a public attack on Tisza, and emphatically declared against modifying the proposed franchise reform. Immediately the air was full of rumours of a crisis, and shortly afterwards Count Esterhazy retired. Until August 19 it was believed that Count Andrassy, who had had frequent audiences with the Emperor Charles, would be appointed to the vacancy, but suddenly, on August 20, Dr.



COUNT THEODOR BATTYANYI.
Member of the Hungarian Cabinet, 1917.

Wekerle was offered office, which he accepted. It appeared that Andrassy was unacceptable at Vienna on account of his pro-German policy and the strong line he had taken on the Polish question, which was still the subject of very delicate negotiations between Austria and Germany.

The first asset of the new Premier was that, though a Dualist and known to be in favour of a twenty years' *Ausgleich* with close relations with Germany, he was yet acceptable to the

Independence parties. A second and more valuable asset was his great reputation as a financier. He was 69, a man of great political experience, had three times been Premier, and was one of the foremost financial talents in Europe. It was natural that in the first outlines of his programme he should devote a great deal of attention to economic and financial reform.



DR. WEKERLE.
Hungarian Premier, 1917.

On September 25 the Austrian Parliament re-opened. In his opening speeches, the first he had made since the reconstruction of his Cabinet, von Seidler, apparently taking his cue from Wekerle, laid all the stress not on political but on social and economic questions.

Knowing that it could not succeed in conciliating the Southern Slavs, Czechs or Ruthenes, the Government decided to offer certain material concessions in Galicia to the Poles and thus avert a crisis. At the beginning of October there had been conferences between von Seidler and representatives of the Polish Club, in which the usual demands as to Galicia were brought forward, and as a result the Polish representatives in the Budget Committee were empowered to vote for the Provisorium, which was thus passed by 28 to 11 votes on October 12.

Austrian or—more strictly speaking—German-Austrian *moral* was perceptibly heightened by the victory over Italy, which between

October 25 and the beginning of November advanced their line from the Isonzo to the Piave. Naturally, every attempt was made to exploit this considerable success, and thereby divert public attention from the grave internal position of the Dual Monarchy. The victory



DR. VASZONYI.

Democratic Member of the Hungarian Cabinet of 1917.

was described as "Italy's Sedan," and the Austrian General Staff boasted that in seven days they had "occupied ten times more ground than the Italians in 2½ years." The real state of feeling in the country, however, was far less bright, and evidence of a general desire for peace continued to multiply. Few flags, except on official buildings, were flown, and in the first weeks of November, even while the Austro-Hungarian advance was in full swing, there were two significant peace demonstrations, one by the German Clericals at Salzburg, the other by the German Social Democrats at Vienna. On November 11—the first time the Viennese Social Democrats had assembled for four years—Dr. Viktor Adler, their chief leader, whom no one could accuse of lack of fidelity to the Vienna Government, declared that "the most honourable peace is that which comes soonest . . . no time must be lost. The hand of Russia is stretched out . . . one would expect our Government quickly and firmly to grasp the hand, all the more as the offer is only the natural sequel of the policy that Count Czernin promised to pursue months ago . . . Russia is not a hostile country. The Russians are our brothers and the Russian Revolution will prevail." A telegram was sent from the Conference to the Congress of Soviets

in Petrograd welcoming "the news that the Russian Democracy has attained power," and declaring that German-Austrian Socialists "were in full accord with the proposal for an armistice and peace negotiations."

The Russian Bolshevik proposals for peace reached Austria-Hungary through a Reuter telegram. The Press, taking the official cue, immediately treated Lenin as "beyond all question the only Russian politician qualified to speak in the name of the Russian masses." On November 23 Dr. Wekerle—significantly coming with his speech six days in advance of that of Count Hertling—announced in the Hungarian Parliament that the offer would be most sympathetically received.

On November 27, Count Czernin, too, let it be known that Austria was ready to negotiate with Russia. The evident removal of all menace to Austrian frontiers, the spectacular victory over Italy, the support of Tisza, and, not least, the agreement with and the support of von Kühlmann, which the latter had expressed during a visit to Budapest on October 21—all




COUNT ALADAR ZICHY.

Clerical leader in Hungary.

these factors cooperated to strengthen Czernin's position. He may well have faced the now imminent assembling of the Delegations with a considerable amount of confidence.

The Delegations, the committees of the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments for joint

affairs, to which therefore the three Joint Ministers of the Dual Monarchy (for Foreign Affairs, War and Finance) were responsible, had not been allowed to meet since the spring of 1914. On Monday, December 3, they were to assemble for their first War Session. Inspired statements in the German-Austrian Press hailed the decision as "a new step on the road leading to complete Constitutionalism." "There, in the constitutionally appointed forum, our



VIENNA: THE KARTNER STRASSE AND ST. STEPHEN'S CATHEDRAL.

foreign policy must be discussed," wrote the *Neue Freie Presse* on October 31. "Only from that forum will the words spoken by the Foreign Minister find the echo they demand."

The day before the Delegations assembled at Vienna, Trotsky acknowledged the receipt of Czernin's wireless communication of November 29, accepting the Russian invitation to open armistice negotiations. This Russian invitation, significantly enough, had been published in a mutilated form, the most important omission being the clause concerning a "democratic peace without annexations or indemnities with a guarantee of national self-determina-

tion." Later, on December 31, the Presidents of the Czecho-Slovak, Jugo-Slav and Ukrainian Clubs were to publish a strongly worded condemnation of what could not have been anything but a piece of official manipulation.

The Speech from the Throne began with the assertion that the Emperor had not desired war. After praise of the army and a reference to "the noble-minded intervention of the Pope," it expressed a keen desire to resume friendly relations with "the sorely tried Russian people, the first of our enemies to respond to our peace appeal." The wording of this part of the speech indicated that it was rather towards a general peace than a separate peace with Russia that Austria's desires were directed. But it went on to declare the Monarchy's resolve not to "lay down the sword which was forced into our hands by the greed of plunder-loving neighbours until our enemies have unequivocally renounced their insane plans of partition and violence. We will remain masters in our own house."

In Count Czernin's general survey of the events since the last meeting of the Delegations he made a brief reference to "an ever-spreading system of Pan-Slav propaganda," but otherwise passed over in complete silence the Southern Slav problem out of which the war had arisen. In his first speech there was a brief and not over-cordial allusion to the alliance with Germany. Later, this was compensated for by a protest against all idea of a separate peace, and an assertion that "in the matter of defence there were no frontiers between the Central Powers, and that Austria-Hungary was fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as Germany fought for Lemberg and Trieste. In certain events Austro-Hungarian troops would be sent to other fronts," that is, the Western front. In regard to the Bulgarian alliance Czernin argued that Greece, Serbia and Rumania—who on December 6 was forced to apply for an armistice owing to the Russian collapse—had with the support of the Entente acquired altogether undue power at the expense of Bulgaria. Then followed an offer to Italy. The best she could hope for was the *status quo*; if she continued the struggle a worse peace would follow. "And this I say quite openly so that Rome can hear me." Karolyi's suggestion that Austria-Hungary should now bind herself to a kind of self-denying ordinance in regard to territorial gains Count Czernin rejected with scorn "as a free insurance



BUDAPEST, FROM THE ROYAL CASTLE.

for Italian adventures." In regard to Poland, the pledge of November 5, 1916, was re-affirmed to the effect that after peace was restored Poland would be able to decide on its own future status, but, Czernin continued, "the direction to which she will gravitate both by inclination and interest seems to us quite obvious." Lightly dismissing the intervention of America, Czernin proceeded to deal with Russia and the principle of self-determination.

His remarks on Russia were of studied moderation. "On the Revolution . . . I can pass no comprehensive judgment, for events do not seem to have reached a definite termination." He claimed that Austria-Hungary and her Allies, in contrast to the Entente, had never dreamed of exerting any influence on the internal conditions of Russia, and declared that the Quadruple Alliance was willing to treat with any Russian Government actually in power as with any other opponent.

Count Czernin's most important detailed consideration of the principle of self-determination was made in a speech on December 8. He objected to the interpretation which the statesmen of the Entente attempted to attach to the phrase. "It has come to cover the brutal demands of the Entente Powers for the forcible cession of various parts of Austria-Hungary." In other words Count Czernin

maintained that self-determination could only be accepted for States but on no account for the nations or irredentas which might happen to be included in them—a most significant line for him to take up at the moment of participating in the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk.

The proceedings at Brest made their influence felt in the Dual Monarchy's domestic policy. First a Franchise Bill, extending the suffrage to men over 24 who possessed certain qualifications—literary, military service, payment of 10 kronen of direct taxes—as well as to women, was introduced into the Hungarian Parliament. The whole scheme, though a partial concession to the democratic demands which the Russian Revolution had fortified, was so drawn up as to exclude any danger to the national predominance of the Magyars and the social power of their upper classes.

More ominous was the echo which the Russian peace proposals awakened among the Czechs. Having protested against the mutilated form in which the Russian message had been published in the Austrian Press, their leader, Stanek, went on to reject Count Czernin's interpretation of the principle of self-determination and insist that "in the interests of a lasting settlement the peoples of Austria-Hungary must be allowed a voice at the negotiations. The German-Magyar lords



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DELEGATES AT BREST-LITOVSK.

are not called to speak for the different nationalities . . . until these nationalities are summoned to decide what kind of peace they want and how they conceive the principle of self-determination." This sentiment was endorsed by the Jugo-Slav and Ukrainian deputies, the latter in particular protesting against the proposal, recently approved in Berlin, of ceding the whole of Galicia to the Poles.

Count Czernin nevertheless proceeded to Brest-Litovsk to take part in the negotiations with the Russians. On December 15 the armistice agreement was signed, providing for a truce of 28 days on the Eastern front beginning with December 17. A week later formal meetings for the discussion of the peace terms were opened, and on Christmas Day Count Czernin was put up by the Germans to announce that the Central Powers were ready to agree to a peace without annexations and indemnities, provided the Allies accepted that principle and joined in the negotiations. To allow the Allies an opportunity of replying the Conference was adjourned until January 4. From the outset there were difficulties in the paths of the negotiators. The German and Austrian delegations on the one hand were irritated by the Bolsheviks' evident intention of using the

Conference as an opportunity for revolutionary propaganda, while the Russians on their part were intensely irritated by the German demands for the setting up of a Special Commission to deal with the border provinces, Poland, Lithuania and Courland, where, it was asserted, the inhabitants had already shown their desire for separation from Russia and for accepting the protection of Germany. Subsidiary negotiations which had been going on during the general adjournment were interrupted by this demand and were broken off on December 29 in spite of Austria's attempts to mediate. Before the General Conference assembled on January 6, an Ukrainian delegate, Holubovitch, had opened direct negotiations with the Germans, the reason for which was, as stated by Count Czernin in his speech of December 11, 1918, that events had occurred at home (*in unserem Hinterlande*) which necessitated this—an obvious reference to the need for a *Brotfrieden* (Bread Peace). The pressure of this demand was so great—about this time the corn ration had had to be reduced and a serious strike was brewing—that, according to Czernin, the Ukrainian refusal to discuss with Polish representatives and the demand for the Cholm district had both to be acquiesced in. On January 22 the Russian delegation at Brest-

Litovsk expressed its willingness to admit the Ukrainian delegates as part of itself. When the Brest-Litovsk Conference assembled on the 30th, however, Trotsky delivered a stormy speech against the separation of the Ukraine. On February 3 Kieff was taken by the Bolsheviks, and the Ukrainian separatists turned to the Central Powers. Six days later the Ukrainian Peace Treaty was signed, and hailed in the German-Austrian Press not only as a relief from the economic and military points of view, but as an apt example of the way in which the Entente's formula of self-determination had turned against itself. This principle was, however, obviously violated in the case of Cholm, of which not merely the ethnically Ukrainian eastern districts, but also the overwhelmingly Polish western parts, were included in the Ukraine in return for economic advantages which the other clauses of the Treaty both demanded and expected.

The Ukrainian Treaty sneeknated Trotsky ; on February 10 he declared that Russia would not resume the war but would sign no treaty. Thereupon, after a few days of hesitation, the Germans set their armies in movement. Lenin had been right in prophesying this, and his influence in favour of signature now prevailed. On February 24 the Bolsheviks surrendered.

and on March 3 the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. The obvious fact that the treaty gave Germany far more than it gave Austria-Hungary was generally recognized and commented on in the Press. With characteristic acuteness and foresight the Social Democrat *Arbeiter-Zeitung* expressed its misgivings both from the general and the particular Austro-Hungarian points of view :

No doubt Germany has the power to enforce such a peace with Russia and has used it. We all earnestly desired peace with Russia, but now that it has finally arrived we are not happy, for a peace which the German sword has enforced is not one which will give us a lasting peace of reconciliation in the east. It will fill the Russian people with the deepest bitterness and with a passion for revenge. It will leave half a dozen small States to form a second Balkans ; to be the occasion for intrigues between the Great Powers and the starting-point of new perils of war. At the same time it will be a source of danger for Austria-Hungary. For it strikes at the vital principle of a State of nationalities like Austria by erecting autonomous and unfederated States. The peace which, instead of an East European federated Republic, which might and should have arisen out of the Russian Empire, puts a chaotic mixture of small and secondary States, will introduce a new and more terrible period of world-armament.

One immediate result of the peace was yet another Budget crisis in Austria. The cession of the Cholm district to the Ukrainians was bitterly resented by the Poles, behind whose backs the arrangement had been made, and in the Committee charged with the discussion



CHOLM: THE CATHEDRAL.

of the provisional Budget a strong protest was made. There was no longer a majority for the Budget since the Poles had passed into opposition. The conservative elements among them could not, however, reconcile themselves to the change of policy urged by the radicals and to identifying themselves with the determined anti-Austrian policy of the Czechs. On March 1 the proposal of the Polish Club that it should urge a tactical understanding with the Jugo-Slav, Czech and other opposite parties was carried by only one vote, and the issue of the whole affair was that the Slav bloc was not established and von Seidler was able to effect the passing of a provisional Budget once more, the Socialists alone from among the Polish members voting with the opposition.

There was an uneasy feeling that at the next peace negotiations, those with Rumania, Hungarian interests would predominate over Austrian, though it was Austria which, as the *Neues Wiener Abendblatt* aptly put it, needed to effect a peaceful economic penetration of the Balkans:—

Rumania in particular seems fitted to provide us with the produce of the soil in exchange for our industrial products. With the increasing industrialization and food deficit of Austria, the surplus of the Balkan States can be consumed by us without injuring our home agriculture.

The peace which issued from the negotiations was Czernin's work, and in the cession of the

Dobrudja to Bulgaria, its principal feature, carried out his leading idea, expressed in his speech to the Delegations to the effect that Rumania had been unduly strengthened at the expense of Bulgaria. Another fact which the treaty illustrated was Czernin's conversion to "Mittel-Europa," towards which the peace conditions formed an important step.

To the protests of the Left that the Treaty violated the principle of self-determination, Czernin's speech of April 2 to the party leaders of the Vienna Municipal Council was a reply. He mentioned that the "frontier rectifications" in the mountain passes which in reality placed Rumania at the mercy of Austria-Hungary, were but "slight" and were not annexations, but merely served for military security. The author of the Rumanian peace was not, however, to survive in office to set his signature to his work.

In his address to the deputation of the Vienna Municipal Council Count Czernin spoke of his "endeavours" to conclude peace, about the treaties with the Ukraine, Russia and Rumania, and optimistically reviewed the chances of Austria's obtaining food supplies from these countries.

Count Czernin concluded his speech by a harangue against the Czech leaders for attacking the German Alliance, for voting resolutions in favour of Czecho-Slovak reunion and inde-



THE EMPEROR CHARLES AND THE GERMAN EMPEROR DISCUSS THE OPERATIONS ON THE PIAVE IN FEBRUARY, 1918.



THE TOWN HALL, VIENNA.

pendence, for morally supporting the Czech revolutionary legions which had been raised on the side of the Entente, and for making speeches "which cannot be construed otherwise than as a call to enemy countries to continue the struggle solely in order to support their own [the Czech] political efforts. . . . The wretched and miserable Masaryk is not the only one of his kind. There are also Masaryks within the borders of the Monarchy."

Count Czernin's speech had serious effects also on Austrian internal politics. His attacks against the Slav leaders intensified the hostility of the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs to the Government, while the consequent disclosure of the Emperor's letter to Prince Sixte of Bourbon, which was considered to have been a gross breach of faith to Germany, and led directly to Czernin's resignation on April 14, pro-

duced profound unrest among the German Nationalists. The Austrian Parliament, which had been adjourned on March 15, was to have reassembled on April 30, but unless the Germans were previously reconciled, the Court and the Government were threatened by most embarrassing debates. On April 20, Prince Fürstenberg, a personal friend of the German Emperor, returned from German Headquarters, and, under his leadership, a pointed resolution was voted by the German members of the Austrian Upper Chamber, demanding that constitutional forms should be carefully observed in acts of high political importance, and that the policy of the German Alliance should be strictly adhered to. The German members of the Lower Chamber proposed even more explicit resolutions demanding "guarantees that foreign policy would be con-



MEETING IN VIENNA TO PROTEST AGAINST THE CZECHO-SLOVAK SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN BOHEMIA.

The Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Weiskirchner, stands in the centre of the group.

ducted by the responsible Foreign Minister to the exclusion of irresponsible influences, along the lines hitherto followed and in the closest understanding with the allied German Empire," and moreover threatened to attack the House of Parma by name. But, as only too frequently happened in Austrian politics, blackmail was at the bottom of moral indignation, and the silence of the German members could be secured at the price of a vigorous anti-Slav policy.

On May 3, Dr. von Seidler, whose tactics had hitherto been conciliatory towards the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs, attacked them in a speech at a conference of Parliamentary leaders. He foreshadowed the partitioning of Bohemia into German and Czech districts, and a régime of repression in the Jugo-Slav provinces of Austria. The Czech and Jugo-Slav opposition, a chronic disease of Austria, was now certain to assume an acute form. It was only to be expected that they would do everything in their power to upset the Government, to impeach it, etc. The Government had therefore to make sure of a reliable "defensive majority" (*Abwehrmajorität*). On May 4, Parliament was

prorogued by Imperial order without a date being fixed for its reassembly. It was, however, stated that this would be done before the financial votes expired (July 1), and June 18 was therefore spoken of as the most likely date of its reassembly. On May 6, M. Zolger, an official of Jugo-Slav nationality, who since August, 1917, had sat in Seidler's Cabinet, resigned office, and on May 19 an order was published dividing Bohemia into 12 districts, four German, seven Czech, and one mixed. The first two of them were actually to start work on January 1, 1919. Negotiations were now opened with the Poles, whose chief complaint about Czernin's speech of April 2 had been that "in spite of the heavy sacrifices which the Polish regiments had made in defending the frontiers of Austria-Hungary in the east and in the west, the Poles had not been mentioned among those who defended the integrity of the State." But although as a rule the Poles showed no regard for Czech or Jugo-Slav interests, they demurred at the order for the division of Bohemia for fear that this might serve as a precedent for a similar division of Galicia, where the Poles formed but a minority

of the population, but had complete control of the Government. They therefore proposed that "a government of trustees" should be formed guaranteeing an unaltered *status possidendi* to the different nationalities for the duration of the war. The German Nationalists naturally rejected that proposal, considering the war the best season for establishing their dominion over the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs, but entered into negotiations with the Poles for a general political alliance which besides internal Austrian affairs would have covered matters of foreign policy (the future of Poland and the alliance with Germany).

In the beginning of June, while these negotiations were still proceeding, the Poles made a startling discovery. They found that a promise had been given to the Ukrainians at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to withdraw the Ukrainian part of Galicia from Polish dominion, and to form it, together with

the Ukrainian districts of the Bukovina, into an autonomous Ukrainian province. Consequently, on June 10, the Parliamentary Committee of the Polish Club passed a resolution, confirmed by the plenary meeting of the Club on June 21, to oppose Seidler by the sharpest possible means. Whilst reaffirming their belief that a strong Austria was to their interest, and declaring themselves prepared to vote credits to any other government, they absolutely refused to vote them as long as Seidler remained in power. But although all attempts at mediation failed, the German Nationalists insisted on Seidler remaining in office—they would not admit the fall of the Premier who had been the first to grant them the much-coveted division of Bohemia and the first to proclaim publicly the "German course" in Austrian internal politics.

Whilst the Parliamentary tangle was thus getting steadily worse, July 1, the day on which the financial vote expired, was drawing near



A GREAT DEMONSTRATION IN BUDAPEST IN FAVOUR OF A REPUBLIC.
The crowd was dispersed by the military.

On June 23 Seidler handed in the resignation of the entire Cabinet to the Emperor. It was refused, but contrary to threats that should a settlement prove impossible, not Seidler, but Parliament, would have to disappear, the reassembly of Parliament was fixed for July 16. In view of the critical internal position of Austria, the Court and directing circles did not dare to revert to the unconstitutional system of Count Stürgkh.

Parliament met without Seidler having been able to assure himself of a majority. He was certain of only 220 votes in a House of 466

members (50 seats were by now vacant, and no by-elections were held in Austria during the war, to avoid a triumphant re-election of the condemned Czech and Jugo-Slav members). As the opposition of the 60 members of the Polish Club was directed exclusively against the person of Seidler, the Premier responsible for the agreement with the Ukrainians, and was to cease with his withdrawal, on July 20 he renewed his resignation, which this time was accepted by the Emperor. In the political obituary devoted to him the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* aptly described him as "a sheer waste of time."



THE PROCLAMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC.
A women's demonstration.

On July 24 Baron von Hussarek was appointed Prime Minister and took over the personnel of Seidler's Cabinet except for the two Polish members to whom the Poles objected for having retained office under Seidler; they were replaced by two other official nonentities of Polish nationality. Hussarek had spent his previous career partly in the Civil Service and partly as lecturer on Canon Law at the University of Vienna. In 1911 he became Minister of Education in Count Stürgkh's Cabinet. Little was known of his personal views except that he was ultra-clerical and a bureaucrat who would behave with the modesty becoming to an Austrian Premier, and take his orders from the Emperor, his confessor, from archdukes, court officials, generals, or from his colleague the Hungarian Premier—in short, from Austria's true rulers.

Hussarek's first pre-occupation naturally was to settle with the Poles at the expense of the Ukrainians, wherein he had the support of the Magyar clique, Burian, Tisza and Wekerle. The notorious Magyar diplomat, Count Forgach, was sent to Kiev to declare that, the Ukraine having failed to fulfil her engagements concerning food supplies, Austria's promises also had ceased to be binding. Sixty Polish votes were thus gained in the Austrian Parliament, which, discounting the corresponding loss of 28 Ukrainian votes, would have raised Hussarek's following to 252 in a House of 466. But now a new complication arose: the extreme German Nationalists wanted "a strong man" for Premier whom they could trust to rule without Parliament and carry out a *coup d'état* in their favour. Baron von Handel, who under Stürgkh had prepared a scheme for Germanising Austria, and under Clam-Martinić, in the days of the "German course," had been Minister of the Interior, seems to have been their candidate. They declared against Hussarek, who, with the loss of their 30 votes, lost his majority in the House. And here began the most amusing, because the most characteristically Austrian, stage of the crisis—the last Parliamentary crisis to be recorded in Austrian history. The Polish Club, trying to save Hussarek, approached the Czechs with the proposal that to save that "deserving moderate man" they should for every Pan-German voting against the Government tell off one of their own men to leave the House. The Czechs refused, and the moderate Hussarek had to find another way out of his difficulties.

At the last moment he struck a bargain with the Pan-Germans. Seidler had promised them to set up two national districts in Bohemia on January 1, 1919, and no date had been fixed for the remaining 10. Hussarek now promised the first two for September 1, 1918, and the rest for January 1, 1919, adding a few more administrative bribes of a similar character. Thereupon the Pan-Germans voted for the Budget, which passed by a majority of 20 votes. Immediately after the vote had been taken the




BARON VON HUSSAREK,
Austrian Prime Minister, 1918

Lower Chamber was adjourned, not to reassemble until September, for the final scene of Austria's disruption. The Upper Chamber sat for a few days longer, which gave Hussarek an opportunity to deliver a German harangue in the style of von Seidler's last speeches.

Meantime the tide had turned in the gigantic struggle in France. Consequently a change supervened in Austrian internal policy which in the days of the German advance had assumed a more and more pronounced German colouring, but now was turning towards compromise with the subject nationalities.

About the middle of August reports appeared in Czech clerical papers alleging that a scheme was being prepared for the federalization of Austria; that it was to be changed into four national States, German, Czech, Jugo-Slav and Polish; that the work was done by a committee composed of "the best men of all the nationalities of the Monarchy" because Parliament, "too much under radical influences," was incapable of doing it; and that as soon as a satisfactory scheme was evolved a new govern-

ment would be appointed to realize it. In view of the approaching military catastrophe the Austrian Court was having recourse to men such as Professor Lammasch and Professor Redlich, pacifists in international and in internal Austrian affairs whose views had been completely disregarded whilst there was still



PROFESSOR LAMMASCH.
Austrian Pacifist Leader.

any hope of winning the war. But even now the attempt at reform was given an unofficial colouring, and the work was done almost in an underhand manner so that it could be disavowed should luck yet return. On August 28 the Austrian Government issued an ambiguous *communiqué* denying the different reports, stating, however, that the Government was considering "a revision of the constitution preserving all the interests involved in the integrity of the State," but that the preparatory work had not advanced sufficiently for any public announcement to be made about it.

Equally sterile and equally much embarrassed as Austria's internal policy was her foreign policy of this period, the last of her existence. On April 10 M. Clémenceau published the full text of the Emperor Charles's letter to Prince Sixte of Bourbon, on the 14th Count Czernin handed in his resignation, and on the 15th the Emperor went to Budapest to arrange for the appointment of a new Foreign Minister,

to justify himself with the Magyars and to receive their forgiveness. He had to capitulate before Count Tisza, who though out of office remained the leader of the majority in the Hungarian Parliament and the dictator in the country. On April 16, at 10.45, the Emperor left Budapest in a motor car to call on a sick aunt at Alesut; he was accompanied by Count Stephen Tisza. On their return to Budapest at 2 p.m. Baron Burian, Tisza's faithful follower, was appointed Foreign Minister. Tisza once more proved himself the dominant personality in the Dual Monarchy. Thereupon the Hungarian Premier, Dr. Wekerle, resigned office, partly because of the intense hostility of some of the members of his Cabinet against Count Tisza, and partly as a protest against the unconstitutional manner in which the new Foreign Minister was appointed without previous reference to the Premiers of Hungary and Austria. The Austrian Premier naturally did nothing of that kind—he was not accustomed to being treated as anything but an obedient official. After a long-drawn crisis during which different combinations were mooted, Dr. Wekerle was re-appointed on May 6 by an Imperial letter containing the necessary apology. "I desire to preserve in its integrity the constitutional influence due to my Hungarian government in the conduct of common affairs. . . ." Further, a "development of the Hungarian national State" was foreshadowed, a vague phrase which seemed to indicate in the first place the separation of the Hungarian from the Austrian Army and thus its exemption from the common Supreme Military Command, and in the second a solution of the Jugo-Slav question in accordance with Magyar wishes.

These problems, however, were bound up, as they had been throughout the war, with the solution of the Polish question—the problem whether the Hapsburg Monarchy was to be composed of two or of three States and of the mutual relations of these to each other, and with the problem of Central European union, which again turned to a large extent on the solution to be adopted for the Polish question. But the negotiations for an agreement in that matter, which had always been found extremely difficult, were in 1918 still further complicated by changes in opinion and policy within the Central Powers themselves.

The conclusion of peace in the east had



THE AUSTRIAN EMPEROR CHARLES AT GERMAN HEADQUARTERS IN 1918.
The German Emperor in Austrian uniform walks beside him.

brought the question of the territories abandoned by Russia to the fore. The negotiations started in the spring of 1918 in circumstances anything but favourable to Austria. Her desperate internal situation, the personal difficulties in which the Emperor Charles had found himself involved, and, finally, the commanding position which Germany had attained through her victories in the west, made the Germans hope that they would be able to impose their own scheme on Austria-Hungary. On May 12 the Emperor Charles went to German Headquarters, received forgiveness, but had to agree to the "deepening" of the alliance between the Hapsburg Monarchy and Germany—the details of the new agreement were to be worked out in conferences of representatives of the respective countries. Immediately following on the meeting serious differences arose over the question of what exactly had been agreed upon. The Austrian and Hungarian Press suggested that the Polish question had been the most important problem dealt with, and that it had formed practically the pivot of the discussions on the future relations of the two Powers. The German Press denied this having been so. Austria-Hungary insisted that the problem of Poland was to be solved before military or economic questions were

discussed, because it was necessary to know what territories the Hapsburg Monarchy would comprise before making any military or economic arrangements for the future. The Germans, on the other hand, insisted that the military and economic questions should be settled first, and maintained that not until then would Germany be able to determine how the Polish question could be solved within the framework of a Central European union. Obviously, had the Germans once obtained their part of the bargain, they would have been less willing than ever to listen to Austria's demands with regard to Poland, and they proposed to conduct the military and economic negotiations on the territorial *status quo* as far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, because they proposed to maintain that *status quo*.

On the 11th June Count Burian went once more to Berlin to put before the German government his ideas as to the order in which the different problems should be discussed, and his arguments in favour of the Austrian solution of the Polish Question. The Germans answered by counter-proposals, and no understanding was reached. It was rumoured in Berlin that "the German Government intended shortly to inform Vienna that it could not accept the Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question"; it was declared in the



CRACOW: THE TOWN HALL.

Press that "the Polish question forms part of the general East European problem, but has nothing to do with the development of the alliance" between the Central Powers. In Vienna Burián's statement that all problems connected with the "deepening" of the Austro-German alliance—therefore also the Polish question—formed one inseparable whole, was described as expressing not merely "a one-sided view of his own which could be met by a different view on the other side"; it was semi-officially asserted "that the uniform treatment of all these questions had formed the

starting-point of the negotiations at German Headquarters."

By the end of July, however, the Germans had decided on a new scheme for settling the Polish question by means of concessions to Polish Imperialism. They addressed themselves directly to the Poles, and, after a sufficient measure of agreement seemed to have been reached in negotiations between the Polish and German Governments, on August 10 Prince Radziwiłł, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, received a telegraphic invitation to German Headquarters. He went there imme-



LEMBERG.

diately, accompanied by Count Adam Ronikier, the Polish representative at Berlin, a decided pro-German, and stayed until August 13, when he left for Warsaw. The Austrian Emperor arrived at German Headquarters on August 14, accompanied by Count Burian, who still persisted in his demand for the Austrian solution of the Polish question.

The Germans now offered a compromise—that Poland should be constituted on the German plan, but that Archduke Charles Stephen should be its king. The Austrians refused. On August 16 the entire German Press declared that the Austrian solution had been dropped, and that the German scheme, with Archduke Charles Stephen as king, had been accepted. Thereupon the entire Austrian



PRINCE RADZIWILL.
Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

and Hungarian Press answered with a most emphatic denial. On August 19 Count Burian communicated the true results of the conference to the *Neue Freie Presse*. "A plan was drawn up," said Count Burian, "as a result of which further negotiations will proceed very quickly. . . . The wishes of the Polish people regarding their future must be considered within the limits essential to the interests of the Central Powers. It was therefore decided to invite the Poles to participate

in the Austro-German negotiations. . . . The Poles have the right to choose freely their own king." Obviously the Germans offered this mode of settlement, or agreed to it, counting on it that the Poles would choose their scheme. The Austrians could not refuse it without putting themselves into an impossible position with



ARCHDUKE CHARLES STEPHEN.
The Austrian Prince whom the German Government proposed to nominate King of Poland.

regard to the Poles. Moreover, there may have been some hope in their minds that, should it come to the worst, once a Hapsburg was King of Poland, sooner or later the matter might yet be put right.

At this point the negotiations once more reached a deadlock, each of the three parties concerned, Germany, Austria and the Poles, manœuvring for position. Before any progress was made the final catastrophe came upon the Central Powers.

On September 8, the *Neue Freie Presse* published a leading article by Count Czernin. It turned against those who on either side hoped for victory. "When we advance we speak of a 'hard peace'; when the Entente gains ground they declare against all compromise. At this moment they are drunk with victory over there, they imagine that they are able to break through

and force a military decision ; disappointment and disillusion will come as certainly as that the sun will set at night. But then we must not again wander away from the idea of peace by conciliation or we shall move in a circle until all of us, friends and enemies, are ruined." The last paragraph of this interesting though hardly prophetic article contained a veiled reproach against Burian for not having called the Austro-Hungarian Delegations to discuss foreign policy and peace.

On the next day, September 9, Burian delivered a speech to the representatives of the German Press who had come on a visit to Vienna. He also spoke about victory being very improbable if not impossible for either side, and then again and again in a way alluded to, and in a way complained at, the Entente's aiming at the disruption of Austria-Hungary. The Allies, he said, "desire to set right the inner affairs of other nations which are quite capable of doing so themselves." He finished with an explicit appeal for "a direct informative conversation, which would by no means amount to peace negotiations, but at which everything which now divides the belligerent parties could be discussed and considered, and then soon

perhaps no further fighting would be required in order to achieve a *rapprochement* between them."

This prelude was followed up by the Austro-Hungarian Peace Note of September 14, in which, with a curious lack of consistency with regard to his own speech of the 9th and lack of political common sense, Burian made an attempt to prove from old speeches of the Allied statesmen that they in reality did not propose to "dismember" Austria-Hungary. A feebler document hardly exists in diplomatic history than this Note of a dying Power which, begging for peace, tried to disguise to itself, to its opponents and to the world the only terms on which this peace could be obtained ; terms which anyone could have read from the nationality map of Austria-Hungary, the only one which revealed the vital forces within the Hapsburg Monarchy. These forces were bound to destroy at last the obsolete framework of a dynastic inheritance. The Peace Note of September 14, 1918, may be treated as the conclusion of Austria-Hungary's existence as a European Power, its first step on the road to unconditional surrender, and the opening of the revolutionary period which destroyed both the Hapsburg dynasty and its realm.



CHAPTER CCXCV.

END OF WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS.

THE ADVANCE CONTINUED—FALL OF OSTEND—CAPTURE OF THOUROUT—GERMAN STAND ON THE SELLE—DOUAI ENTERED—GERMANS EVACUATE LILLE—AMERICANS TAKE GRAND PRÉ—HOW THE SELLE WAS CROSSED—GERMANS ABANDON THE BELGIAN COAST—ENEMY STAND ON THE LYS—BELGIANS IN ZEEBRUGGE AND BRUGES—GERMAN RESERVES EXHAUSTED—FRENCH ADVANCE BETWEEN OISE AND SERRE—VALENCIENNES CAPTURED—THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE, NOVEMBER 4—GREAT GERMAN RETREAT—MAUBEUGE AND Tournai TAKEN—CANADIANS CAPTURE MONS—THE ARMISTICE—WEAPONS AND THE WAR—GERMAN BOOBY TRAPS—AIR FIGHTING—GERMAN VIEWS—THE KAISER ABDICATES.

THE operations on the Western front had now (mid-October, 1918) definitely assumed a different complexion from that which they had had during the last four years. The era of stationary warfare had definitely passed away, and that of movement had begun. In the former period there was but little freedom of action; the foes faced one another, the positions were more or less fixed and were known; but now the armies were advancing over new country, and this gave more opportunities to the Allies, for they had the initiative. They could direct their forces as they liked and the Germans could do no more than parry their blows. To conduct the armies in the forward movement was much more difficult than when they were stationary. Destroyed railways and interrupted roads, rivers, not very formidable in themselves, but still considerable obstacles, over which all the bridges had been destroyed, had to be dealt with. To supply the troops with food and ammunition involved the transport of enormous tonnage. Thus, although to the actual fighting troops the situation was ameliorated, to the Staff of the Army it was rendered much more difficult. Information of the disposition of the enemy's forces, the value of the various divisions composing them, reserves available, and the intentions of the enemy, were problems of a far more difficult character than they had hitherto been. The work involved in putting up new telegraph lines and telegraphic installations and supplementing these with telephones

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was increased in a ten-fold degree. The latter were now supplemented by wireless telephony, which considerably lightened the task of our artillery observation aviators, and also facilitated communication with advanced posts. The constantly shifting positions of the Germans involved an immense amount of labour by the Staffs of the different divisions, army corps and armies. Reports from different parts of the Front had to be considered and compared, decisions come to and fresh orders sent out, which might be liable to modification at any moment by further and newer information brought in. Moreover, troops which had been engaged in prolonged fighting had to be relieved, and this involved extensive movements by omnibus, where roads permitted, or by march route. The condition of the roads alone was a tremendous difficulty to those concerned; most of them were badly damaged and had to be repaired, and often a side road, which it had been hoped to employ, was on exploration found also to be impassable. The arrangements for the repair of vehicles which broke down on the road were of an arduous character, and breakdown gangs had to be everywhere available to repair a broken road or bridge, or to clear a road which had been blocked. Moreover, with the enormous amount of stores to be brought to the front, it was necessary to follow up the advance with light railroads, the construction of which involved large numbers of men, who, in their turn, required feeding and directing as much as those in the fighting line.



[Official photograph.]

RECEPTION OF THE LIVERPOOL IRISH BY WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF LILLE.

The reconnoitring aeroplanes brought in daily, often hourly, fresh news as to the country, the condition of the roads, and the defensive preparations of the enemy. All these facts had to be dealt with and laid down on maps, which had to be turned out with the utmost rapidity, because the troops in their daily advance and the operations on the line of communications depended upon them. These multifarious duties of the army in the field are but little appreciated by the public, although they are in no way inferior in importance to the actual conduct of the fighting. But little about them appears in the reports, and the ordinary citizen grasps but feebly, if at all, their enormous importance, and the need for a clear and unflinching grasp of the situation required to carry them out properly. It is not the least of the proofs of the efficiency of the British Forces that all these problems were satisfactorily solved.

One thing was in our favour—the pressure exerted by our defensive armies on the retreating enemy was such that he had been obliged to abandon vast stores of material, accumulated for the further offensive which he had evidently hoped he might carry out in the summer of 1918. These were of the greatest utility to us, and practically our engineers were enabled to employ them all. The main difficulty met with was getting up the guns and heavy stores, which involved much bridge and road making.

On October 16 the Germans delivered a strong counter-attack at Haussy after heavy artillery preparation, and the British troops

were pressed back to the western edge of this village. This was part of the German plan to hang on to the Selle, which was an important line on which to resist the further advance. Further progress was made by the British on the south-west of Lille.

Large numbers of the inhabitants of Courtrai were caught in the screen of the German rear-guard covering the retreat from Lille. Two-thirds of the town was held by the enemy behind the front of the Lys Canal. The northern third of the town was in the hands of the 41st Division, including men of the Middlesex and Queen's Regiments. The opponents were only separated from one another by a strip of water some 30 feet wide, and were firing continuously from the windows of the houses while trench mortars maintained a bombardment over the hostile positions.

Before the 41st Division occupied the northern portion of Courtrai it had advanced for nearly six miles, pushing down the Lys between Menin and Wevelghem. The result of this movement was that the bulk of the population was held behind the canal which the German machine-guns were defending, and had to remain in cellars or under any cover available. On the north side of the river our advance released nearly 5,000 civilians when the infantry of the Second Army reached that end of the town.

Courtrai, singular to relate, had not been destroyed by the Germans. An effort had been made by the Commandant at the beginning of October to remove all the able-bodied men, orders being given to take all between the ages of 17 and 55, it being the

intention of the Commandant to remove them to Ghent and Brussels. But the retreat of the German forces made it more necessary to employ the means of transportation by canal or road entirely for the removal of military material, and as the inhabitants flatly refused to leave their homes until made to do so, the Germans found themselves with no time left to enforce their decrees. On the 14th the German Commandant had admitted to a Belgian manufacturer that the German Armies were retiring. It had been the German intention to remove what coal was left in the place, but the eventual hurry of their retreat prevented this being done.

The French, too, on the right of the British line, made further progress on the 16th north of Sissonne, east of Laon, and also to the north of Asfeld, a small town on the Aisne.

The British advance was also continued on the 16th along the front between the Sensée Canal and the Lys. On the north of Cambrai the Escaut Canal was crossed on a wide front, and our troops hold the Douai-Denain Road four miles south-east of Douai and captured a number of villages, including Wervicq, Comines,

Halluin and Wevelghem. On this day Ostend fell to the Allied arms.

In the forenoon a division of destroyers had reconnoitred the coast, assisted by aircraft, one of the latter landing on the beach, being received with great jubilation by large crowds of inhabitants. At 11.30 a naval party landed, and as it found that the Germans were not clear of the town, and as a light battery at Le Coq opened fire on the ships and shells fell close to the crowd on the beach, Vice-Admiral Keyes withdrew, for fear that the presence of the naval ships would induce the enemy to bombard it. However, the situation did not deter the King and the Queen of the Belgians from coming to visit their seaside resort at 5.50 p.m. They landed near Ostend and entered the town, where they were received with indescribable enthusiasm, and returned to Dunkerque about 10 p.m. But in the meantime the Allied troops had pushed up and occupied the place, which had been evacuated, by all except roarguards, on October 13, 1914. The troops reached Ostend without any fighting in the afternoon, by which time the Germans were in full retreat. French aeroplanes reported that in the neigh-



[Official photograph.]

LILLE: THE CROWD IN THE GRANDE PLACE WHICH ASSEMBLED TO CHEER THE BRITISH.



OSTEND MARINE STATION.
Showing result of bombardment by British Monitors.

bourhood of Ostend and Ghisteltes the roads were empty and there was not the slightest opposition to their movements.

Ostend itself was found less damaged than might have been expected. The Germans had, as usual, thoroughly sacked the town, removing all furniture, objects of art, and leaving nothing but the empty houses. For some days previously they had been removing as much of their war material and artillery as they could. Most of the batteries on the sea front were undamaged and a large proportion of the guns remained, but their breach pieces had been removed.

On the afternoon of October 16 the north bank of the Lys was held from Frelinghem to opposite Harlebeke, and the river itself had been crossed at many points. Further north our lines had also made striking progress. Thourout had been captured by nightfall on the 15th, and on the 16th the enemy fell back rapidly.

By October 17 the necessary improvements and restorations had been carried out and it was possible to recommence the operations for the capture of the enemy's positions on the Selle, and the attainment of the general line from the Sambre Canal along the west edge of the Forêt de Mormal to the neighbourhood of Valenciennes. This line once attained, the

important junction of Aulnoye would be under fire by British guns. This was a very important meeting point of railways, where the railway line stretched from Valenciennes back to Mons. From it lines ran to Valenciennes, to Maubeuge, Le Cateau, Avesnes, Mézières, and its occupation would have considerably hampered the arrangements for the German lines of communication in rear of this part of their front.

On the same date the advance was commenced, the Fourth Army moving on a front of about 10 miles from Le Cateau to the south, with the French First Army on its right operating on the west of the Somme and Oise Canal. The fighting was opened at 5.20 a.m. by the IXth, the IIInd, the American and XIIIth Corps, employing respectively the 46th, 1st and 6th Divisions, the 30th and 27th American Divisions, and the 50th and 66th Divisions. The enemy held the wooded country east of Bohain and the line of the Selle north of it in great strength both of infantry and artillery, and resisted strenuously all through the day.

Our troops captured on the south of Le Cateau some of the passages over the Selle, and the troops passing over reached the high ground on the east of the river, taking the villages of La Vallée-Mulâtre and L'Arbre-de-Guise on the left. Our attack cleared the

eastern portion of Le Cateau and occupied a line on the railroad beyond the town. All these positions were held by the Germans in strong force, and no fewer than seven divisions were employed against us. These made many determined counter-attacks, which were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy, and 3,000 prisoners were taken in the course of the fighting.

The continuous progress of the British south of the Sensée and north of the Lys now assumed so threatening a form that the Germans began to accelerate their retreat from the salient formed by Lille and Douai.

The advance north of the Lys had brought our troops well to the east of the Lille defences on the northern side, while our progress on the Le Cateau front had turned them from the south. The German forces between the Sensée and the Lys were closely followed by our troops, who constantly harassed their rearguards and took a number of prisoners. The enemy was so closely pressed that he had no opportunity of removing his stores or even of committing any great destruction on the roads and bridges, and still less of evacuating the civil population.

On October 17 the 8th Division of General Sir A. Hunter-Weston's VIIIth Corps entered Douai, and the 57th and 59th Divisions—the latter under Major-General N. M. Smyth—and

Lieut.-General Haking's XIth Corps were on the outskirts of Lille. At 5.30 a.m. on October 18 our troops had completely encircled the town, which the enemy had abandoned, and during the day our line was carried far to the east of these points.

When the fall of Lille seemed imminent, the German Commandant ordered the inhabitants to rise (at 4 a.m.) from their beds and assemble in the principal squares. They consisted almost entirely of women, children and old men; able-bodied men had long been removed and also the younger women in large numbers. When they were assembled the German officers told them: "You may leave in the direction of your friends, the enemy." These unfortunate people moved westward towards our lines, and shortly after daybreak, British airmen flying low over the city saw them waving handkerchiefs and white flags. Information was at once sent back to our troops behind, and infantry patrols pushed forward through Haubourdin into the town while the Germans were leaving it on the eastern side. After this our troops pressed forward steadily.

The French Fourth Army on the 17th drove back a violent attack of the enemy, supported by heavy artillery, in the region of St. Germainmont. To the south-east of Rethel the village



[Official Naval photograph.]

GERMAN BIG-GUN BATTERY ON THE SEA-FRONT AT OSTEND.
The breeches of the guns were destroyed by the Germans when they evacuated the town.

of Acy was taken. Debency's army operating on the Oise-Sambre Canal advanced to a depth of over two miles across the wooded ground east of Bohain and captured Andigny-les-Fermes.

Some further progress was made to the north-west of Sissonne, where Notre Dame-de-Liesse was captured, and near Grand Pré, where the village of Talma was captured. The American Army on the right of the French Fourth Army also advanced. Grand Pré in the Argonne was captured early in the afternoon, thus giving the command of the main defile through the Argonne to the Allied troops.

The Americans pressed their forward movement through the valley which runs on one side of the Bois de Bourgoigne, and reached the northern edge of the Bois des Loges, the most important obstacle between them and Buzancy. These gains coupled with that of the French on their left completed the reconquest of the Argonne Forest and the Valley of the Aire. Farther to the east, La Musarde farm had been taken the previous night, and the line of trenches that runs in front of St. Georges was pierced this day, which placed the Americans in a much more favourable position. The Germans made a considerable effort to stop the latter, and divisions were brought up hurriedly from Champagne and Metz, but their battalions were all at low strength; some companies consisting of under 50 men, and battalions of only 150—forces quite inadequate to provide an effective barrier.

During October 17–18, the German resistance was obstinate, but still the British and American troops made considerable progress, and by the evening of October 19, after a great deal of very heavy fighting, the Germans were driven back over the Sambre and Oise Canal at all points south of Catillon, from which point our lines ran up the valley of the Richefont in a northerly direction beyond Le Cateau.

On October 20, the German line on the Selle to the north of Le Cateau was attacked by our Third Army, aided by the 4th Division from the right of the First Army on the left of the line. The troops from the Third Army were the 38th, 17th, 5th, 42nd, 62nd, Guards and 19th Divisions, in that order from right to left. Three small rivers had to be crossed—viz., the Selle, the Ecaillon and the Rhonelle. These were divided from one another by a rolling upland, practically bare of cover, and thus easily swept by fire from the hills farther back.

They were not in themselves very great obstacles, averaging only about 20 feet wide and from four to six feet deep; but they had steep, soft banks which made bridging difficult, necessitating the making of proper approaches to them, and they were, moreover, defended by machine-gun nests in the numerous villages through which they ran, and the approaches to the rivers were in full view of the enemy on the opposite side of the valleys. It would occupy too much space to describe the steps taken for the passage of all these streams; but it is interesting to give the particulars of the means employed in passing one of them, which will illustrate the arduous work that our troops had to perform.

The Guards Division was ordered to cross the Selle on October 20, and capture the high ground beyond the river. On the two nights previous to the date fixed for the passage of the river, two patrols, each consisting of a Royal Engineer Officer and two men, were sent out to obtain information as to the crossings. They were on each night involved in fighting, in which three of the enemy were killed. On the night of October 19–20, two patrols were sent forward, one to get at the bridges in Vertin, one to reconnoitre the River Harpies. The first-named were unable to reach the point indicated, but the latter brought back valuable information, notwithstanding that the enemy was on the alert holding the eastern bank of the stream.

The troops immediately told off for making the bridges were the 55th, 75th and 76th Field Companies Royal Engineers, with the 4th Bn. Goldstream Guards. Two Brigades of Guards were allotted to different sections of the front, and the following works had to be constructed for their passage. Eight foot-bridges were to be made on each brigade front, alternate bridges being duplicated if possible, and a spare pier and other stores provided for repairs. The 75th and 76th Companies were employed, one on each brigade front, the 75th on the right, the 76th on the left, each assisted by a company of pioneers, and the work was commenced at 10 o'clock on the night of the 19th. The bridges used were of very varying types, piers of cork, petrol tins and light barrels were constructed, and all did the work required of them. The material had to be carried for a considerable distance down an exposed slope from the St. Python-Haussy railway, within close range of the enemy. To guide the operations tapes were laid from the railway to the

river, and notice boards were erected. From midnight on the 19th, material for one bridge was carried down every 10 minutes on each brigade front, and this was to be erected as soon as possible. The work was conducted with absolute success, the enemy not discovering the operation until the last bridge was being erected. A great reason why the work was so well done was the excellent discipline which prevailed, and the complete

Immediately before zero, 10 rounds were fired by the Germans, but did no damage.

To enable field guns to cross the river, two pontoon or trestle bridges were to be constructed as soon as possible after zero, to enable the guns to cross to deal with the enemy tanks, and the construction was to be commenced at 11 p.m. If stopped by the enemy fire, it was to recommence when our barrage began. The 75th Co. got their trestles into position, but one



[Official photograph.]

THE BRITISH ENTRY INTO LILLE.

General Birdwood holding the flag of the City presented to him by the Mayor.

organization of the working parties for the task they had to carry out. Absolute silence was observed by all ranks, and the piers were put into the water without making any splash. Ropes were fixed across the river beside each bridge, so that the men should be able to pull themselves across if the bridge were smashed by the enemy's fire. As each bridge was finished the working party withdrew, except two sappers, who sheltered under the eastern bank, to attend to any small repair which might be necessary. A standing patrol of two infantry was stationed at each bridge head. The recent heavy rain had rendered the soft banks very slippery, and this added to the difficulty, but it was successfully overcome by the care on the part of the working parties,

leg of one of them sank in a deep mud hole, and all efforts to bring it into position failed until daylight, when it was quickly brought into working order. The 76th Field Company used only one trestle, which was carried down successfully by a party of the 4th Coldstream Guards, who went into the river in the dark with the trestle on their shoulders and placed it in exactly the right position. The bridge was completed 15 minutes before 12 (midnight), and was used shortly afterwards by the field artillery, machine-gun limbers, etc. The construction of a bridge to take the tanks was allotted to the 55th Field Company, Royal Engineers, and this was the most difficult of the tasks undertaken. The only approach by which material could be got to the site of the

bridge was blocked some 300 yards west of it by the debris of a heavy brick railway over-bridge, which had been blown down by the Germans, and filled the road. The first duty was to clear away the obstruction, and this was commenced at 4 a.m. on the 20th. The enemy detected the operation and shelled the working party with high-explosive and gas shells. The latter necessitated the men working with their masks on. After four hours' shelling, the enemy ceased to send over gas shells, and the men were able to discard their gas masks, with the result that the work became more rapid. Large blocks of the brick-work were broken up by explosives, and a tank did valuable work in hauling off some of the larger fragments. By 3 p.m. the first supply tank with material managed to scramble over the rubbish which had not been completely cleared away, and at 7 p.m. the actual bridge construction was commenced. But it was carried on under great difficulties. There was some heavy shelling, both of high explosive and gas, up to about midnight, and it was necessary to use gas masks for a great part of the time, added to which, the rain rendered the material very slippery, which prolonged its handling, and it was a

difficult matter to place the trestle in the middle of the stream to take the two 18-ft. spans, one on either side of it. But sappers and engineers alike stuck to the work with great resolution, and the bridge was open for traffic at 8 a.m. on the 21st. The working parties which had been all night engaged in clearing the debris of the railway bridge, had made by this time a clear road for single traffic, and this was widened to take double traffic within the next 24 hours. The whole operation was under the direction of Lieut.-Col. E. J. D. Lees, R.E., C.R.E., of the Guards Division; and the credit for the immediate carrying out of the works was due to Major H. M. S. Mears, M.C., R.E., in charge of the whole work; Lieut. C. J. Creed, R.E., who worked for 24 hours continuously; 2nd Lieut. Birch, who commanded the supply tanks, and 2nd Lieut. Hunter of the Coldstream Guards.

It was found necessary to construct a bridge capable of taking at least 60-pounders to relieve the traffic over the tank bridges. This was done on October 22, the work beginning at 9 a.m., and the bridge being open for traffic at 4 p.m. It consisted of two heavy trestles and three bays, and involved the clearing of the debris of an iron foot bridge



[Official photograph.]

MAKING THE APPROACH TO A BRIDGE IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION.



A BARREL BRIDGE.

[Official photograph.]

which had originally spanned the river at this side. This, however, was done without difficulty.

The resistance of the enemy in the Selle region was stouter than it had been for some time. His positions were better prepared and in front of the greater part of them there were wire entanglements. Not only was the advance sternly resisted all along the line, but frequent counter-attacks were made against our troops. The latter, however, supported by a number of tanks which were brought across the river, carried Neuville after a severe struggle, then Amerval, Solesmes and Haspres, won their way through to the high ground east of the Selle, and pushed out farther on patrols as far as the river Harpies. North of Haspres other troops of the Third Army advanced on both sides of the Escant Canal, reaching the high ground commanding the left bank of the Ecaillon river and occupied Denain.*

Meanwhile the forces under King Albert had made great progress.

The position of the Belgian troops commanding Thourout and the capture of Ostend on the 16th, followed by the retreat of the Germans from Lille and the fall of Douai into Allied hands, plainly placed the German troops in Belgium in a very dangerous position, and

* This town and also Ghent had as much damage done to it as the limited time at their disposal before they bolted allowed the Germans.

it is not to be wondered at that from about the 14th they had already begun to retire from the coast. At first the movement had been limited to sending back stores and artillery and a few troops, and retiring from the more exposed frontal position. But from the morning of the 16th a universal movement in retreat had been begun, extending from the coast to Courtrai, and this in the northern part had been accelerated by the capture of Ostend, and the patent fact that the Allies were sufficiently strong to push up the coast line. The Germans fell back, covered by rear-guards well provided with artillery. Fires and explosions showed in the afternoon that the enemy was destroying his various organizations and depôts at Snaeskerke, Ostend and Ghisteltes, though there was still some artillery in action about Zeebrugge.*

The Belgians were unable to gain contact with the retreating enemy till towards the end of October 17, when they reached the line Oostcamp-Wynghene, both of which places were still held by the enemy.†

* Snaeskerke is on the road to Thourout, three and a half miles from Ostend. Ghisteltes is farther east and about six and a quarter miles from Ostend.

† It was impossible to pursue across the ground between Ostend and Bruges, because of its marshy character, and the pursuit was therefore limited to the roads which lay between Jabbeke and Thourout, where the higher elevation of the ground made movement possible.

The Belgian Cavalry Division sent a squadron forward, which charged a section of artillery and some machine guns established near Zuidwege, which were evidently watching the approaches from the south against Bruges. Near Steenbrugge, where the road from Oost-



[Official photograph.]

THE KING OF THE BELGIANS AT HIS HEADQUARTERS.

camp crossed the Ghent Canal, some of the cavalry, dismounting, captured the bridge, and drove back the German infantry and machine-guns, while others, more to the west, carried Varsenaere and Jabbeke. By 6 p.m. a cavalry brigade had reached St. Michel, about a mile south of Bruges, and with two horse artillery batteries brought fire to bear on the Eeloo Road, along which an important German transport column was moving. Another brigade reached St. André on the west of Bruges.

The Belgians at the end of the day reached the road from Wyngene to Thielt, with very little resistance from the enemy, and held the line of the road from Thielt to Marialoopkauter. Farther south towards Meulebeke the Light Cavalry of the Belgian Division experienced fairly lively resistance on the road to Denterghem, German artillery being in action at Poelberg. The southern portion of the Belgian Army, which included the 6th Infantry Division, after having overcome some resistance at Hulselde, sent up a detachment

to Meulebeke, and occupied Marialoopkauter, as well as the western edge of Marialoop. Some machine-gun nests, however, still remained in action, and the troops were subjected to artillery fire, especially at Paanders and Ketelberg. In the course of the evening the 2nd Belgian Infantry Division carried Oostroosebeke and reached the neighbourhood of the station on the railroad running to the south of this place. The 3rd Division of Belgian infantry had remained on the Lys in the positions which had been reached the evening before. To the north of the Belgian front a body, formed of the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions reached the road from Aertrycke to Zerkegem with the 7th Division and occupied the latter point with the 7th Division, whilst the 8th Division reached Zetelghem. This body gained touch with the northern group, consisting of the 5th and 11th Infantry Divisions, entered Ostend, Leffinghe, Oudenbourg, Snaeskerke and Ghisteltes. In the afternoon British detachments had been disembarked at Ostend. On the front reaching from the North Sea to Harlebeke on the Lys, 17 German divisions had been engaged since October 14. The enemy had destroyed most of his heavy guns on the coast, but the 380-centimetres heavy gun, posted on Leugenboom—the gun that had been used to bombard Dunkerque—was taken by the Belgians without having been rendered completely useless.

On October 18 local attacks, carried out along the whole of the line reached the evening before, showed that the enemy proposed to offer strenuous resistance there. Very little progress was made except by the 2nd Belgian Infantry Division, which managed to push forward $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles on the road to Vielsbeke, and carried, after a severe fight, the station of Oostroosebeke. On the left of the main attack, the 7th Belgian Infantry Division captured Oostcamp. The 8th Belgian Division occupied the eastern borders of Het Kruipveld and Papevyvere. In front of the 5th Division Artillery there was less resistance, and the 5th Belgian Division reached the south and west borders of Bruges; but, on the other hand, the 11th Infantry Division was not able to debouch from Ghisteltes. Here the ground was very marshy, and intersected by banks and ditches. The cavalry division, which had been directed towards Aetre—Eeloo by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was brought up by the destruction of the bridges

at Ruddervoorde, and by the occupation of Ringbeek by the Germans. It took up a waiting position behind the 1st Infantry Division about Laake-Boschen between Ruddervoorde and Wyngenge.

During this day, then, the enemy had occupied the positions they held in the general line Zeebrugge-Bruges-Thielt-Oxyghem; but the resolution to stand fast soon evaporated, and before the next day had dawned the German retreat commenced again. Rearguards, consisting generally of a battalion and battery, covered the retirement of the various columns. They were followed up closely by the Belgian troops, who by the evening had reached the front Maldeghem-Knesselaere-Aeltre-Lootenhulle-Oesselghem and the east bank of the Lys. The Belgian cavalry division was ordered to pursue the enemy, pressing close on his heels; formed into two columns, it was instructed to attain its first objective, the water channel leading from the Lys. The northern of the two columns which marched in the direction of Eecloo by Maldeghem, found itself engaged in a dismounted fight near Burkel. Towards the end of the afternoon two squadrons charged at a gallop towards Burkel and captured a line of German machine-guns, and then, dismounting,

occupied the ground which had been gained. A detachment of the southern column reached Knesselaere and struck the enemy at Waterlooopon.

During October 20, the enemy continued his retirement to the channel leading from the Lys. His rearguards offered a serious resistance on the front Maldeghem-Cloit-Drongengoodbesch-Ursel-Somergem. The Germans held their ground on the west side of the channel on a field which had been thoroughly prepared for defence, and with the ground in front cleared of obstacles. This work had been done largely by forced civilian labour. It was becoming more and more evident that the enemy meant to hold the watercourse formed by the Lys and the channel leading to it. In accordance with the design of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the part of the Belgian troops was now reduced to holding this line of the enemy, while the British Second Army turned it from the south, crossing the Lys to the south of Courtrai and advancing towards the Escaut, thus mastering the higher ground between the Lys and the Escaut, which, as the manœuvre developed, would allow the French and Belgian troops, held back by the Lys channel, to advance. Meanwhile, on the coast the Allies pushed



[Official photograph.]

CIVIC WELCOME TO THE KING AND QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS AT BRUGES.

steadily onward. Blankenberghe was occupied on the 18th, and the Belgian and French troops were cast of Thielt towards Ghent, while Plumer was advancing east of Roubaix and Tourcoing, which was occupied by the 40th and 51st Divisions. The next day the Belgians occupied Zeebrugge and Bruges. On the 20th the Belgian coast was completely cleared up to the Dutch frontier, and Plumer's army was four miles beyond Courtrai on the road to Brussels.

The general line of the advance was directed against Terneuzen Canal and the Escaut, the principal objectives being the town of Ghent and Audenarde. The Belgian left advanced on Eeloo, the Franco-Belgian troops in the centre on Ghent and over the Lys. The Second British Army was on the borders of the Escaut, which it reached and then crossed towards Pecq, below Tournai. The British troops, after having taken possession of Denain-Marchiennes-Orehies, pushed on towards Tournai and Valenciennes. On the 22nd it was a mile off Denain, and had penetrated into the outskirts of Marchiennes, which had been turned by a rapid march of the troops towards Condé, passing through the Forest of Raismes.

Between October 21-31, there were a number of minor actions in which the Belgian troops

gained continual successes, but from the end of the month there was little further fighting, the Germans recognizing their defeat, and on November 11, the Armistice put an end to all further action.

During the operations in Flanders in the period between October 14-27, the Allies had taken 18,493 prisoners, of which 331 were officers; 7,962 were taken by the Belgian Army; 5,354 by the Second British Army, and 577 by the Seventh French Army under Degoutte; 509 guns, of which 351 were field guns, 110 heavy field guns, and 48 of higher calibre, had fallen into the hands of the Allies, as well as more than 1,200 machine-guns.

The successful passage of the Selle made it possible to continue the operations for the larger object of the attainment of the general line running from the Sambre Canal along the edge of Mormal Forest to the neighbourhood of Valenciennes. The original front of attack measured some 15 miles, extending from the east of Mazinghien to Maison Bleue on the north-east of Haussy. The first to begin was the British Fourth Army, on October 23, at 1.20 a.m. The movement was executed by the 1st and 6th Divisions of the IXth Corps, and the



GHENT: THE MAISON DES BATELIERS AND OTHER OLD HOUSES ON THE QUAY.

25th and 18th Divisions of the XIIIth Corps. The Third Army on the left of the Fourth also attacked, with the Vth, IVth, VIth, and XVIIth Corps. The Vth Corps had the 33rd and 21st Divisions in the front line. The IVth Corps employed the 5th, 42nd, 37th, and New Zealand Divisions; the VIth Corps, the 3rd and 2nd Divisions, while the XVIIth Corps had the 19th Division. On October 24, the 61st Division joined the other Divisions of the XVIIth Corps in the attack, while the 4th and 51st Divisions of the XXIIInd Corps, which belonged to the First Army, extended the line of attack for five miles farther to the north of the line of the Scheldt. The very bad weather of the last few days had rendered it almost impossible for the artillery spotting-aeroplanes to locate the position of the German guns, and the consequence was that in the early stages of the battle, hostile artillery fire was exceptionally heavy. But this notwithstanding, our infantry and tanks advanced during these two days (October 23 and 24) some six miles over the difficult country, in spite of the opposition which they received from the large number of German machine-guns. Round many of the supporting points of the German line in woods and villages, which had been imperfectly reduced by our artillery fire, severe fighting took place. This was especially the case in the Bois L'Eveque, at Pommereuil, Boussies Forest and Vendegies-sur-Ecaillon. The resistance of the last-named point was particularly obstinate, and it was not till the afternoon of October 24 that it was taken by a combined attack of the 19th and 61st Divisions, which enveloped the German post.

At nightfall on the 24th, the western outskirts of the Forest of Mormal had been reached. Our troops were within a mile of Le Quesnoy, and on the north-west of that town they had captured the villages of Ruesnes and Maing. During the next three days the work of our troops was confined chiefly to operations intended to secure the line we had won. Englefontaine was captured and our line well established to the north and east of the Le Quesnoy-Valenciennes railway, from the outskirts of Le Quesnoy past Sepmeries and Artres to Famars.

The position at the end of the month had enormously improved for the Allied Forces. The successive victories of the British had had a constantly growing effect, due, not only to the material losses of the Germans, but also to the disheartening effect of their compulsory retreat

on the *moral* of the troops. More and more was it difficult for the enemy to replace his enormous losses in guns, machine guns and ammunition, and what was even more fatal was the fact that his reserves of men were exhausted. In the fighting on the Selle 24 British and two American Divisions had captured 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns from the 31 German



[French official photograph.]

GERMAN WIRE AND TRENCHES ON THE SEA-FRONT AT BLANKENBERGHE.

divisions opposed to them, and had driven these back continuously and practically without any success by the Germans in frequent counter-attacks.* It is true that at places they still offered some resistance to the first assault, but it was becoming more and more common for the German infantry and their front line of machine-gunners to retire without fighting before our artillery barrage. Moreover, the results on other theatres of war had produced a great effect on the German military situation

* The word "Division" is a somewhat illusory expression. The German divisions were diminishing rapidly in strength. The infantry companies were only some 90 strong on July 15. The proper war strength was 250; in March 1918 there were only about 120 present.

on the Western front. Turkey and Bulgaria had already surrendered. Austria-Hungary was on her last legs, and it was becoming more and more evident that Germany had to rely on her own resources only, and that these were rapidly coming to an end. She had, therefore, thrown out tentative proposals for an armistice. On the other hand the British Armies were now in a position to attack upon the vital centre of Maubeuge, which would hasten the enemy's withdrawal and force an immediate conclusion.

The night of the 25th saw practically no cessation of the fighting, and in the morning the French again moved forward, securing the village of Mortiers on the Serre and reached between Sissonne and Château-Porcien, the line of Bannogne-Recouvrance-Moulin Herpy, having broken through the German position to a depth of nearly two miles. In the afternoon the enemy delivered counter-attack after counter-attack against the French Fifth Army, which in spite of everything held its own. The French First Army, supported by numerous tanks, pushed farther up between the Oise and the Serre, and in spite of the resistance of the Germans, thrust them back towards the north-east. The strenuous fighting of the last few days had had a great effect on the German troops,

and towards the end of the day they broke suddenly on a front of some 16 miles and fell hurriedly back. On the 27th the French followed hard on the tracks of the enemy, and on the front in question had attained an advance of five miles.

Specially marked was the advance on the left of Debeney's army, which reached the left bank of the Oise about Guise, while the outposts were on the road from Guise to Marle. At the same time the Tenth Army pushed back the Germans with great vigour and occupied Crécy, while the Fifth Army on the right, keeping in touch with the enemy, compelled him to retire to a short distance from the line Herpy-Recouvrance.

On October 28, 29 and 30 the forward movement of the French was continued and they drove their troops towards Guise. The Germans opposed vigorously, but the station and château of Guise were dominated. The resistance of the Germans was still vigorous at Verly, on the road to Bohain, and before the Fifth Army, also, the fighting was severe. Nevertheless, the latter advanced beyond St. Quentin-le-Petit to St. Fergeux, overcoming the resistance of the Germans, who had been supported by newly-arrived reserves. The reason



[French official photograph.]

RETREATING GERMANS PASSING THROUGH BRUSSELS.

of this strenuous resistance is evident from the map, because an eruption to the north by the British led direct to Valenciennes and would form a gap through which the French and British could penetrate.

On October 24 the First, Tenth and Fifth Armies attacked the troops of the Crown Prince in the Hunding Line. General Mangin advanced against the Serre, with Guillaumat on his right, and Debeney on the left. The First Army began the action in the afternoon, and pushing in an oblique direction across the road from Ribemont to Crécy, forced back their opponents far to the north of Villers-le-Sec.

On the 25th the battle developed from the north of Sissonne to the country round Porcien, close to the Aisne, and an ardent struggle took place. On the left Debeney increased the advantage gained on the previous day, passing beyond the road to Crécy; Mangin, with the Tenth Army, secured the passages of the Souche and the height beyond it in the direction of Marle. Guillaumat made considerable progress in the difficult country which stretched from Sissonne to Château-Porcien. The Germans offered considerable resistance, showing no signs of retreat, for the line of the Serre was necessary to cover the position in the Ardennes, as the Hunding line was likely at any moment to be taken in reverse by the First Army, which had taken the passages of the Oise.

Before the British attack could be really pushed home, it was necessary to capture Valenciennes, and at the same time it was desirable to commence the fresh attack as soon as possible, so as to fight the Germans before they had time to withdraw any considerable proportion of their forces. The object of the first advance, therefore, was to secure Valenciennes, and for this purpose three corps were detailed, viz., the XXth and Canadian Corps from the First Army, and the XVIIth Corps from the Third Army, and they were directed on a front of about six miles to the south of Valenciennes, and in the course of November 1 and 2, they severely defeated the enemy opposed to them. The 61st Division, under Major-General J. Duncan, the 49th Division, under Major-General H. J. G. Cameron, and the 4th Division, commanded by Major-General C. H. T. Lucas, forced a passage over the Rhonelle River, and, after severe fighting, captured Maresches and Preseau, and seized the upper ground two miles to the south of it. On the

left, the Canadian Division captured Valenciennes, and made further progress beyond the town. This blow led the enemy to withdraw on November 3, from the Le Quesnoy-Valenciennes front, and he was followed up by our troops. But the progress we had made effected more, for the Tournai salient and the line of the Escout there were turned by it, while in the area of the south the irruption of our forces



[Official photograph.]

GERMAN ARTILLERY RANGE-TABLE.
On the top of Mont St. Aubert, near Tournai.

threatened the enemy to the south of them. All was now ready for the main attack; this was delivered by the Fourth, Third and First Armies, over a front of about 30 miles, from the Sambre, north of Oisy, to Valenciennes, on November 4.

The ground over which this advance had to be made was very difficult. In the south it was necessary at once to cross the river; in the centre the great Forest of Mormal still formed a most formidable obstacle, although it had been largely opened up by the great amount of felling done by the Germans to procure timber for their works. More to the north, the fortified town of Le Quesnoy, and the several streams which ran parallel to our line of advance, gave the Germans many opportunities for contesting the movement.

An intensive artillery fire was directed against the enemy for some hours, and at dawn the artillery barrage was put down, was followed up by the infantry, and penetrated the enemy's positions on the whole battle front. The resistance was formidable, but our advance was never stayed, and by the evening the troops had moved forward some five miles, reaching the general line—Fesny-Landrecies—the middle of the Mormal Forest—Wagnies-le-Grand—five miles east of Valenciennes—Onnaing and the

Escaut Canal opposite Thierès. On the right of the attack, the 1st Division from the IXth Corps, starting at 5.34 a.m., captured Catillon, and taking advantage of the passage over the Sambre there, and at the lock some two miles to the south, contrived to cross over with great skill. The 1/Cameron Highlanders and the



MAJOR-GENERAL A. C. DALY.
Commanded the 24th Division.

1/Northamptonshire Regiment reached the east of the river by 7.45 a.m. The Bois l'Abbaye, Autrève and La Groise were taken in succession, and Fesmy was captured about 4 p.m., after rather more resistance than had been experienced at other points, and the troops advanced farther to the east of it. On the left of the IXth Corps, the 32nd Division met with strong resistance all along the line of the Sambre, but, fighting hard, they forced a passage at Ors, and, pressing onward, took Mézières and Heurtebise, and reached the outskirts of La Folie. Somewhat later in the day, other troops of this division, which had succeeded in passing the river south of Landreécies, advanced against La Folie from the north, and the village fell into our hands. Meanwhile, the XIIIth Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir T. L. N. Morland, advancing with the 25th, 50th and 18th Divisions, at 6.15 a.m., speedily turned the Germans out of their position, although at

points the resistance was strong. Thus, at Preux-au-Bois, the garrison resisted until the village was completely encircled by the infantry, supported by tanks. Near Landreécies, a battalion of the 1st Guard Reserve Division, which had been specially detailed to keep the bridge head, came in for some severe fighting; but troops of the 25th Division crossed the Sambre, north and south of these points, by means of rafts, and captured the town. In the centre of the attack the Third Army at first met with considerable opposition, but this did not last long, and the troops then made rapid progress. The 38th and 17th Divisions of the Vth Corps, under Lieut.-General C. D. Shute, pushed far into the Forest of Mormal, and before dawn of the next day, the 38th Division had reached the eastern edge of the forest, while the 17th Division, after strenuous fighting about Loequighol, had advanced a mile to the east of it. On the front of the IVth Corps, the 37th and New Zealand Divisions were attacked by the Germans at an early part of the battle, but they drove off the enemy with heavy loss, and then proceeding onwards, took Louvignies and Jolinetz, captured over 1,000 prisoners, and later in the day pushed on to the centre of the forest. The New Zealand Division by 8 a.m. surrounded Le Quesnoy, which it was unnecessary, for the moment, to assault, so they swept on to the east of it, and captured Erbignies in the evening. The ramparts of Le Quesnoy had, however, been partially captured by 4 p.m. The German garrison of over 1,000 men submitted to the inevitable and surrendered.

The 62nd Division of the VIth Corps attacked Orsinval at 5.20 a.m. and took it. The Guards Division from the same Corps went forward on the left of it, and both divisions, after hard fighting, made considerable progress, captured Frasnoy and Preux-au-Sart, and reached the western edge of Commegnies. On the left of the Third Army, where was the XVIIth Corps, the enemy made no great resistance, though there was some smart fighting about Wargnies-le-Petit. This village, with Wargnies-le-Grand, was taken by the 24th Division, under Major-General A. C. Daly, during the afternoon, while the 19th Division captured Bry and Eth. More to the north, where the First Army was engaged, the XXIInd Corps and the Canadians met with little opposition to their advance, except on the right. At this part of the line the 11th and 56th Divisions

having crossed the Aunello River and taken the villages of Le Triez, Sebourg and Sebourquiaux, were attacked by the Germans on the high ground east of the Aunelle, and pressed back slightly. The 4th and 3rd Canadian Divisions on their left reached the outskirts of Rombies on the eastern side of the marshes north of Valenciennes. In these operations 20 British Divisions utterly defeated 32 German Divisions and captured 19,000 prisoners and more than 450 guns.

While the British were engaged in these operations the French First Army, under General Debeney, had continued the line of attack southwards to the neighbourhood of Guise.

On the right of the Allied advance, Gouraud with Liggett on his right, had pushed forward, gained ground, and penetrated the German defence through the eastern Argonne and by Grand Pré.

At first the enemy offered considerable resistance, but towards the end of the month this weakened and it became evident that a vigorous offensive would push him back through very difficult country, the roads of which were occupied by a mass of trains. These would render all movement difficult, while off

the roads the country was so hilly and wooded that the movements of troops would be almost impossible.*

On November 1, the Fourth French Army, on the east of Attigny, and the First American Army on its right again attacked along their whole front. The French reached the banks of the Canal of the Ardeunes to the south-west of Chesne; the Americans advanced roughly about two and a half miles, and established themselves in front of Dun on the slopes which commanded Buzancy.

The next two days the Allies made considerable progress northwards, the resistance of the Germans being very poor.

The valley of the Bar, which offered a line of retreat between Sedan and Mézières, was flanked by American troops on the north of Buzancy and by the French coming from the defile of Croix-aux-Bois. The Forest of Dieulet was passed through, the heights of Beaumont were occupied and the position of Stenay outflanked. The troops were reaching the outskirts of Rau-

* The crowded state of the German rear and communications may be judged from the fact that the Seventeenth German Army with 22 divisions had only one road available for its retreat to the Rhine through the bare and hilly district of the Upper Wenn.



UNLOADING TIMBER FOR ROAD-MAKING.

[Australian official photograph.]



Official photograph.

BRITISH TROOPS MARCHING INTO Tournai.

court and Mouzon, some seven and a half miles from Sedan. The progress thus made combined with that of the British forces, who had by this time taken Valenciennes, while the British First Army was well on the road to Mons. The Third Army was at Le Quesnoy, having taken the Mormal Forest, while the Fourth British Army, with the First French, had forced the passage of the Sambre Canal and taken Landrecies and Guise. There was only one course open to the Germans—an immediate retreat for a long way back, and by November 5, from the Escaut to the Meuse, the Germans were retreating as hard as they could. The French First Army had taken Vervins, and arrived at the outskirts of Capelle, having passed through the Forests of Regneval and Nouvion; the Tenth Army held Montcornet; the Fifth reached Château-Porcien on the 6th; the left of the Fourth Army was $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in front of Rethel, which was taken, while the right was moving rapidly up the valley of the Bar. The Americans were less than five miles from Sedan, and at Donchéry, where the Meuse could be passed above Mézières.

The progress had been great, the prisoners taken numerous, and many guns had fallen into the Allies' hands. The Americans alone in five days' fighting had captured 150. From the Yser to the Meuse the end was at hand.

The enemy was now falling back along his whole battle front, and throughout the following

days, although the rain was incessant and imposed great hardships on our troops, the cavalry and infantry pressed forward, with hardly a check, keeping close touch with the rapidly-retreating Germans. It was plain that the last days of German resistance had come.

On November 5, the British Fourth Army advanced some four miles farther, reaching beyond Prisches and Maroilles. On its left, the Third Army sent forward the 5th, 21st and 23rd Divisions well to the east of Mormal Forest, while by the evening farther north we were approaching Bavai. On the First Army front the resistance encountered was more determined; here, after regaining during the morning the ridge east of the Aunelle and capturing Roisin, Meaurain and Angreau, the Divisions of the XXIInd Corps were held up for a time in front of Angre and along the line of the Honnelle. The roads along which the Germans were retiring were packed with their troops and transport, which formed an excellent target for our Air Force. Their bombs and machine-guns caused the enemy to abandon over 30 pieces of artillery, which were taken by a battalion of the 25th Division in the fields near Le Préseau.

The next day the Germans still offered considerable resistance along the whole front of the First Army and on the left of the Third. However, our troops made some progress, and Angre was captured, the Honnelle River crossed, and the Canadians took Baisieux and Quièvrechain

During the following night the enemy's resistance weakened, and early on the morning of the 7th, the Guards Division captured Bavai. Next day Avesnes and Hautmont were captured, and our troops reached the outskirts of the important strategical point of Maubeuge. Meanwhile, to the north of the Mons-Condé Canal, the British advance was beginning to take effect on the Germans.

During the night of November 7-8, the VIIIth Corps from the First Army and the Ist Corps from the Fifth Army, were able to move forward to occupy Condé, and pass over the

November 10.—The Fifth British Army continued their advance, with cavalry and cyclists leading the march. There was no opposition to speak of, except near Mons. Here the Canadians, advancing through the town from the south and west, and working round it on the north, were met with a well-organized machine-gun advance. Farther north our cavalry were on the outskirts of Ath, and our line was far to the east of Tournai. Renaix had been captured, and our troops were approaching Grammont.

Early in the morning of the next day, the



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH TROOPS ASSISTING BELGIAN FIREMEN TO EXTINGUISH FIRES IN
TOURNAI.

Escaut on a considerable front to the south of Antoing. More to the north the enemy abandoned Tournai with its bridge head, and the western part of the town fell into our hands.

November 9.—The enemy was falling back as fast as he could on the whole front of the British Armies; Maubeuge was taken by the Guards Division, while the Canadians approached Mons. The pace of the Fifth Army was now accelerated, and Peruwez, Antoing and Tournai were captured.

The Second Army also advanced, crossed the Escaut on its old front, and reached the outskirts of Renaix.

3rd Canadian Division captured Mons, the whole of the German defending force being killed or taken prisoner. At 11 a.m. hostilities ceased.

The right of the Fourth Army was then east of the Franco-Belgian frontier, and thence to the north our troops had reached the general line Sivry-Erquelinnes-Boussu-Jurbise-Herghies Ghislenghien-Lessines-Grammont.

At this time the German resistance was completely broken; the only object of their troops was to escape encounter, and they had become a confused mass, while the congested state of the railroads, crowded with abandoned trains, and the capture of huge quantities of rolling

stock and material showed what had been the result of our decisive attacks. It had been followed on the north by the evacuation of the Tournai salient, while on the south the French forces had pushed forward in conjunction with us and forced the Germans back suffering heavy losses to the line of the Meuse. The strategic plan of the Allies was completely realized; the resisting power of the enemy had been completely shattered, largely by what Marshal Foch describes as the "hammer blows" of the First, Third and Fourth British Armies. Any attempt at the half-hearted resistance which alone the German troops were capable of would have led to unparalleled disaster, to be followed by the invasion of Germany and the infliction on that country of some of the misery she had been imposing on Belgium and France during the past four years.

In the decisive battle which had been fought and won by the British troops between November 8 and 11, the Germans had been beaten wherever they stood. The boasted resistance of the long-prepared fortified lines had been proved to be of no avail; his troops had been unmercifully sacrificed, and now their lateral communications were completely cut. The spoils of battle were great; we had captured 187,000 prisoners, bringing the total amount for the year to over 200,000. Over 29,000 machine-guns and some 3,000 trench mortars had been taken. These great results had been obtained by 59 British Divisions, which, in the three months' fighting had beaten 99 separate German Divisions. The result of our enterprises on the offensive had shown the value of our troops in attack, while the more anxious period which had extended from the end of March to July, when we were on the defensive, the Germans, notwithstanding the large forces they had brought to bear against us, had been quite unable to break through our defences, though for a time they had been bent in.

Hostilities had ceased and in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, the Allied forces had now to move forward to occupy the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine and the bridge heads over it. The French were to pass at Mainz, the Americans at Coblenz, the British at Cologne, and were to occupy bridgeheads, having a radius of 30 kilometres from the crossings at those towns. All German military forces were to be withdrawn between these points to a distance of 10 kilometres from the right bank of the Rhine

For four years and three months the fighting on the Franco-Belgian-German frontier had been incessant, the main point of this war which distinguished it from all others. In former international struggles hostilities had been divided up into alternate periods of battle fighting and others of comparative quiet; in this, the greatest war of all ages, it was one continuous encounter from Verdun to the Yser, marked at intervals by more concentrated battles at various points.

So far as the British were concerned, we had entered on the war, as we always have done, with totally insufficient military forces, and it was not till the summer of 1916 that we really had adequate forces of men and material in the field. Our losses had been proportionate to the magnitude of the operations. On the Western front alone they amounted in killed, wounded and prisoners, to about two and a half millions.

The French do not publish the number of wounded, but according to Field-Marshal Haig's estimate, they seem to have lost, killed, wounded and prisoners, over four millions. The German losses are not accurately known, but probably they were about those incurred by the Entente Powers.

The heavy casualties must be attributed to the enormous increase in the power of weapons. The heavy calibres used in the artillery; the immense numbers of machine-guns supplementing the infantry fire; the trench mortars, which may be regarded as short-range artillery; the formidable character of the fighting in the air, especially the late developments of the intimate action of the aeroplanes with the assaulting troops, and the use of poisonous gas, all added to the deadliness of the contest.

The vast growth in machine-guns may be judged from the fact that whereas in 1914 we had one machine-gun to 500 infantry, at the end of 1918 the number was one to 20, *i.e.*, 25 times as many. In August, 1914, we took the field with 486 pieces of light and medium artillery; at the date of the armistice we had 6,437 guns and howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre. The increase in the artillery is also shown by the relative proportions of the artillery personnel, which had grown in the autumn of 1917 to 85 per cent. of the infantry engaged. The expenditure of munitions was enormous. From the commencement of the offensive in August, 1918, to the conclusion of the armistice, some 700,000 tons



[Official photograph.]

THE FIRST MILITARY BRIDGE ACROSS THE SCHELDT AT TORNAI.

were expended by the British Armies on the Western Front.

Other minor points which affected the war were the introduction of tanks, which had considerably influenced the value of our offensive towards the end, and the use of smoke-shells for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's position.

Artillery fire became much more accurate

with the development of the air reconnaissance, sound ranging and flash spotting, and through the extraordinary care taken to measure the exact capacity of each gun employed, and to take into consideration the effect of weather conditions. These improvements made it possible to do away with preliminary bombardments of any length, and, in the operations in the west of Amiens, on August 8, 1918, in



French official photograph.

CANADIAN TROOPS MARCHING INTO MAUBEUGE.

General Matheson and Staff were welcomed by the Mayor, who is seen in the background.

which over 2,000 guns were employed, practically the whole of the batteries concentrated for the attack and opened fire for the first time on the actual morning of the assault.

The value of the offensive was again most clearly shown; thus in 1918 more than half the total casualties incurred in the fighting took place during the five months March to July, when our armies were on the defensive. Once the defensive line is broken, the defenders in retreat are exposed to the full fire of the pursuing troops. Moreover, the defender does not know, or only vaguely, where the main attack of the assailant is to be made, and consequently is more or less obliged to disperse his reserves and is hence more liable to surprise. The entire collapse of the German Armies at the end of 1918 was due, not only to the losses they had suffered, but to the moral effect of being incessantly driven back from position to position, and the feeling which their troops held that in no place in which they came to a stand were they likely to attain any real success, or even to stem the tide of battle.

The final desertion of the German Emperor was a minor example of the ruin that had overtaken the *moral* of the German Army.

From time to time there has been recorded here the wanton destruction committed by the Germans without, as a rule, any military reason. But they developed their natural

proclivities in another direction, also, by constructing what our men called "Booby traps." These included mines which were arranged to blow up after a certain period had elapsed, when the enemy had been driven far to the rear of the line in which they were placed. But there were others of a more ingenious and still less defensible nature, which the enemy habitually prepared on his retreat. For instance, in the great tunnel through which the St. Quentin Canal ran, there were found behind an apparently innocent boarding, a number of shells with percussion arrangements fixed to the fuse, which would be set in action by anybody leaning casually against the boards. The most innocent looking objects, such as pocket books, pictures, chairs, helmets, bayonets, and similar things, caused explosions when picked up. On two occasions there were found apparent graves marked with a cross and the inscription "Unknown Englishman." There were suspicious circumstances about them, and on examination they were found to conceal a mine, not a body. Loose steps descending into dugouts were arranged, that when trodden on exploded contact mines. Even in churches devices of this kind were prepared. Delayed action fuses were constructed to go off at times varying from 24 hours to three weeks. They consisted of a simple device by which a corrosive liquid ate away the wire retaining the

spring, which fired the exploder. These could be varied in strength so as to prolong the time. It was quite a common plan of the Germans to arrange shells with this fuse in dumps of abandoned ammunition. But German ingenuity did not go so far as to conceal entirely the arrangements. The ordinary fuse was punched on the top, so as to prevent it rotating and unscrewing when fired. These punch-marks were always absent in the specially prepared shells; and hence it was possible to distinguish them. There is no doubt that most of the ammunition dumps which from time to time blew up without apparent cause, had been provided with shells arranged in this manner.

The direct action fuse above described, when referring to the canal tunnel, was also employed in many other positions in which immediate action was required. Thus, on more than one occasion, sleepers on the railroads had placed underneath them high explosive shells which went off when a train went over them, or even the pressure of a wagon or man might set them in action. A favourite place for traps of this kind was the descent into a dug-out. An apparently innocent looking shell would be found on a stair, but really it had a delayed action fuse which would go off when our troops occupied the dug-out.

To meet these devices a special body of troops had been organized; they were taken from the

Tunnelling Companies of Royal Engineers. For when the advance began and open warfare succeeded the siege war which had previously obtained, their duties as mining engineers were largely diverted to the removal of the explosives from our own demolition charges and mine fields. This alone involved dealing with some 300 tons of explosives. But these men had the more onerous task of circumventing the enemy's booby-traps. Men employed on this job wore a broad strip of red tape down each sleeve of their jackets, and the amount of work they did may be judged from the fact that 14,000 German mines and traps of various descriptions containing over 540 tons of explosives were discovered and made harmless by the different tunnelling companies. The procedure was much as follows: Our infantry stormed a German trench in which there were dugouts. On one of the steps of the stairway going down into it a shell would be observed. Taught by experience, nobody attempted to remove this, but the services of a sapper, acquainted with the duties, were obtained. These men were known among the other troops as "Red Tape Merchants"—from the cognizance which they wore on their sleeves. When the sapper arrived he soon saw what the trap was, unscrewed the top of the fuse, took the tube from it, from which a corrosive fluid was seen to be leaking out. He then climbed up the



[French official photograph.]

THE CANADIAN DIVISION MARCH INTO MONS PAST GENERAL HORNE.



A BOOBY-TRAP IN THE COURTYARD OF AN HOTEL IN OSTEND USED BY THE GERMAN HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

stairs, carrying the heavy weight of the shell—probably one of the 5.9 cm. class, and left it outside. He would then write on a field post-card "Examined—found safe," followed by his name, and then go on to fresh woods and pastures new. These men were all put through a course of training so that they knew exactly what to look for and how to deal with each case as it arose, and the result was undoubtedly the saving of a large number of lives in the British Army.

Let us now turn to the war in the air. During the first few days of the period dealt with in this chapter, the weather was disadvantageous; nevertheless, a good deal was done by our aviators.

On October 23 the weather improved and permitted more active cooperation with our attacking forces. Hostile troops and transport were vigorously bombed from the air and fired on from machine-guns. The enemy's aircraft also displayed considerable energy, with the result that they lost 14 of their machines shot down, and 6 driven down out of control, besides one balloon. Ten of our machines were missing.

On the night of October 23-24, the Independent Air Force heavily attacked factories and railways at Burbach, Saarbrücken and various other places, and over 5½ tons of bombs were dropped on these points. The large chemical factories at Mannheim, the railways at Coblenz and near Mainz, and, as usual, the railways at Metz-Sablon were also attacked. The French, too, were active; their reconnoitring machines penetrated to a distance of 40 miles behind the enemy lines and brought back hundreds of photographs. In addition two German captive

balloons and 12 aeroplanes were put out of action. Although the weather was very bad at night, they managed to drop about 14 tons of bombs on the railway stations of Montcornet, Marle, Vervins, Wassigny and Provisy. On the last over 7 tons were dropped, causing extensive fires.

The result of the recent activities in the air had compelled the Germans to withdraw their aerodromes farther from the front. This prudent resolution resulted in keeping their aviators at a greater distance from the fighting line and giving them longer distances to fly if they wanted to get over our lines.

Amongst other successes obtained at this time was the destruction of the very important junction of Launois, where a complete munition train was blown up in close proximity to a troop train, which had just entered the station. The junction was completely wrecked and 900 casualties were caused. Similarly at Valenciennes, two munition trains were hit by British airmen. They were set on fire and continued burning and exploding furiously for about two hours. In another raid the German prisoners reported that a British squadron attacking an aerodrome on the Valenciennes-Famars road, destroyed over 30 aeroplanes and did other serious damage.

On the 25th, in spite of dense fog and rain, the French Air Service rendered great assistance to the French Army, taking part in the actual fighting, regulating the fire of the artillery and making the advance of the infantry. One machine came down as low as 120 feet for this purpose. Another airman carried out a reconnoissance at the height of 900 feet, far behind

the enemy's lines, and was able to signal that important German reinforcements were arriving in motor lorries in the region of St. Fargeux. On receiving the airman's report these were at once brought under artillery fire and suffered heavy losses. The British squadrons, although their operations were restricted by the weather, also did some valuable observing work. Hostile aircraft showed little activity. Six German machines were accounted for, while only one of ours was missing. At night no flying was possible.

On October 26 a great deal of reconnaissance and photographic work was accomplished, and 8½ tons of bombs were dropped on important barricades with good results. The enemy's aircraft showed rather more activity on the northern battle front, with the result that 11 of his machines were accounted for, besides two balloons shot down in flames. Nine of our machines were missing. The weather was very bad at night, but some of our night-flying machines did some good work on the enemy's lines of communications. All our machines returned.

On the 27th the Independent Air Force again bombed Freseaty. And on October 28 the French Air Service acted with great vigour,

120 bombing and 80 chaser aeroplanes being engaged in the work. They bombed important points in the neighbourhood of Seraincourt, which had formed a large supply centre for the Germans fighting against the French Fifth Army between Sissonne and Château-Poreien. Altogether 33 tons of bombs were dropped; 15,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition were fired against various points, such as supply convoys, munition depôts, encampments and on bodies of troops, causing serious losses to the enemy in men and great disaster along his lines of communication. At certain points the traffic was completely stopped. In the course of the day's operations nine hostile aeroplanes were brought down and a captive balloon was set on fire. At night the fog was too dense to allow ascents.

On October 28 the improved weather favoured the operations of our aviators, who carried out important work. Nine of the enemy's aeroplanes were accounted for, and one of his balloons was set on fire. During the night, in spite of the poor visibility, bombers dropped 16 tons of projectiles on important points, in particular on the railway stations at Hirson, Vervins, St. Gobert, Montcornet, Marle and



A BRITISH REPAIR DEPÔT IN FRANCE.

Audun-le-Roman, on the aviation ground of Mars-la-Tours, and on the great depôts of Prévisy. Many fires were started at Prévisy, Hirson and Marle.

During the week, October 19-26, the Royal Air Force acting with the Navy were limited in their work by the unfavourable weather, but they contrived to drop on the German railway communications in the Belgian area 5 tons of bombs, setting a train on fire and causing many casualties among the troops by low-flying machines. Anti-aircraft work on the German side was below normal; they were beginning to feel the effect of moving their aerodromes farther away from the front. On the 28th the Independent Air Force heavily attacked Morhange aerodrome. Eighteen hits were observed and a fire was caused. In the course of the fighting in the air one of the German aeroplanes was shot down and fell upon our side of the lines. Two others were also accounted for. Bombs were also dropped on the Frescaty aerodrome. It seems curious that this attack, which was a daylight one, received so little interruption from the enemy's machines.

On the night of the 29th the Badische Anilin and Soda Factory at Mannheim was attacked by the Independent Air Force, also railways at Trèves and Saarbrücken. The important railway junctions at Longuyon, Ecouvies and

Thionville were also bombed. All of our machines returned in safety.

On the 29th the railway junction at Longuyon was again attacked, and also the aerodrome at Jametz, not far from the last-named point. In both cases good effects were obtained. Three of our machines did not return at once, but two subsequently turned up.

Hostile aircraft were active during the day, and in the air fighting which ensued 24 of them were accounted for and one was shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. Eight of our machines were reported as missing.

The French on the same day also displayed great activity. Their observation aeroplanes traversed the enemy's back areas in every direction, and some of the reconnaissances were pushed as much as 50 miles, and one 75 miles, into the zone occupied by the Germans. In the fighting which took place 20 enemy machines were shot down and three captive balloons were set on fire. During the night of the 30th the French bombed the most important railway stations of the enemy, dropping nearly 19 tons of projectiles with good results on the junctions of Givet, Mézières, Hirson, Vervins, Montcornet and Launois, and on the depôts and bivouacs about Prévisy and Montcornet. The American report was that they shot down 21 aeroplanes and two observation balloons, with



A WORKING PARTY RETURNING AFTER A NIGHT'S WORK IN THE ADVANCED POSITIONS. [Official photograph.]

a loss of two machines missing. The German account of this day's fighting differed a good deal from ours. It stated that on the 29th, 27 Allied aeroplanes and six captive balloons were accounted for. Now, although the French did not record the number of aeroplanes they lost, it is certain that the British and the Americans only had between them 11 casualties. It seems improbable that the French had 16, and it is not unfair to say that the gains recorded by the Germans were largely due to their lively imaginations. At any rate, against them we could set off 66 machines and five balloons.

On the night of the 29-30th, the Independent Air Force again made successful raids into Germany. Mannheim, the blast furnaces at Burbach, the railways at Thionville and Offenburg, and an aerodrome at Hagenau were also attacked, and the chemical factories at Worms.

October 30 saw a great increase in the activity of the British Air Squadrons all along the front. Over three thousand photographs were taken and nearly 22 tons of bombs were dropped. A German aerodrome was successfully attacked, in which two hangars containing machines were completely demolished and two other machines standing near by were destroyed. Many casualties were caused to the crews in these aeroplanes by our machine-gun fire, and horse transport in the vicinity was stampeded. The great feature of the day's work was the heavy and continued fighting in the air, in which we obtained a great advantage. Sixty-four German machines were completely destroyed, 15 more driven down out of control, and one balloon was shot down in flames. After dark our night-flying squadrons brought down another German machine, making for the whole day 65 completely destroyed, to say nothing of those driven down out of control. This does not include any which may have been destroyed in the hangars, and the total is a record for one day's fighting. It is the more remarkable because this great success was accomplished with the loss of only 18 of our machines missing, one of which failed to return from a night-bombing raid. The French on the same day also did a large amount of damage to the enemy by their bombing planes, and they reported that the enemy machines showed very little activity. Three of the German machines were accounted for, and only two of the French were missing. The German account again differs, whereas,



[Official photograph.]

AN OFFICER AND MAN OF THE SIGNAL SERVICE TESTING WIRES.

according to the Allies they only lost 20 machines, the Germans say that they shot down 58 aeroplanes and two captive balloons.

On the night of the 30th-31st, the Independent Air Force successfully bombed the railways at Baden, the chemical factories at Karlsruhe and the blast furnaces at Burbach.

On the 31st the weather conditions were again bad for long-distance work; but, nevertheless, our machines reached Bonn, attacking the railway stations in the centre of the town. Others attacked the railway at Trèves and Frescaty



[Official photograph.]

THE ARMOURY OF A NIGHT-BOMBING SQUADRON.

Aerodrome, and two of our squadrons attacked Bühl.

In the month of October the total number of German machines accounted for by the Belgian, British, French and Americans was 837; against which the British lost 209, the Americans 18. The French casualties are not stated. The Germans claimed 191 machines. Long-distance flying was only possible on 20 days owing to the prevalence of fog and thick mists throughout the Rhine Valley. Yet the Independent Air Force made no fewer than 64 raids over important German towns, exclusive of the very numerous raids made upon the German aerodromes at Frescaty, Morhange, Bühl, Hagenau, Jametz, etc. Upwards of 100 tons of bombs were dropped during the raids.

The following is a list of the important German towns raided (exclusive of aerodromes), showing the precise military objectives attacked, and the number of raids made upon each:—

Town.	Military objective attacked.	No. of raids.
Metz Sahlon ...	Railway junction and triangle	25
Thionville ...	Railway junction ...	8
Mannheim ...	Chemical works and aeroplane factories ...	5
Saarbrücken ...	Factories and railways ...	5
Trèves ...	Railway station ...	3
Kaiserlautern ...	Factories and railways ...	3
Burbach ...	Blast furnaces ...	3
Offenburg ...	Railways ...	2

Frankfurt ...	Factories and railways, near	1
Coblentz...	Railways ...	1
Worms ...	Chemical factories ...	1
Karlsruhe ...	Chemical factories ...	1
Sarrburg ...	Railway junction ...	1
Baden ...	Railways ...	1
Bonn ...	Railways ...	1
Maintz ...	Railways, near ...	1
Rombach ...	Blast furnaces ...	1
Pirmasens ...	Railways ...	1

64

The aerial work went on with great vigour during the early days of November.

On the 5th, both the British and French machines followed up the enemy and dealt heavily with him, and also with various points behind his lines. Fifty-five machines were brought down with a loss of 35 of ours, and in addition, five German balloons were set on fire.

An exceptional piece of gallant work was performed about this time by one of our Canadian pilots, Major W. G. Barker, D.S.O., D.F.C., M.C. He was out by himself when he saw an enemy machine at an elevation of 21,000 feet. He went up and shot it down, seeing the enemy break in pieces in the air. At the same moment he found himself attacked, and was wounded in the right thigh. He lost control, being partially stunned, and when his machine righted he found himself surrounded by about 15 Fokkers; two of these he brought down and a third burst into flames; our pilot was again

wounded, the bullet this time shattering his other thigh. He fainted, and the machine began to spin down out of control. Fortunately, he came to himself before he crashed to the ground, but only to find that he had another 12 of the enemy machines round him. He was faint and dizzy, both his legs useless. Nevertheless, he charged straight ahead for the nearest hostile machine, and when he was almost touching it, fired; the latter suddenly burst into flames and fell, just in time to enable him to clear it. Turning, he prepared to attack again, and a third bullet hit him, breaking his left elbow. He had now only one hand left to manipulate his machine; but again he charged, and again his shot sent his enemy before he reached him crashing alight to the ground. Then he turned to escape towards his own lines. But between him and safety there were still eight new enemy machines. A wonderful fight ensued between the one and the eight. Two of the latter were sent down helpless, and then, seeing a chance, he broke through and dived to the ground. In his helpless state he could not properly control the machine, and landed at too great a speed, crashing into a hedge and ripping the under-carriage off it. Then he fainted.

In the course of his fight he had dealt with some 60 enemy aviators, eight or 10 of which he had sent down either in flames or out of control. Fortunately, his wounds, although very severe, were not dangerous.

On the night of the 5th and 6th, the Independent Air Force again did work against the hostile aerodromes at Morhango, Frescaty, Dieuze and Lillingen. The often-attacked Bühl aerodrome was visited again.

On November 8th no hostile machines were seen during the day; the weather, with low clouds and continuous rains, greatly hampered operations. Still, our men contrived to do some reconnaissance work, and at night dropped 11½ tons on important railway centres.

The 9th was much the same, but we brought down altogether 19 German machines, at a cost of 13 of ours, and at night Liège, Louvain and Charleroi were bombed.

On November 10, which was the last day's fighting on the battle front, our squadrons continued their work in improving weather, actively cooperating in the general advance, and vigorously bombed the enemy's troops and transports.

The enemy showed little activity in the air, and we brought down 17 of his machines and



INSIDE THE GREAT WAR MUNITION FACTORY AT MANNHEIM.

destroyed two others standing on an aerodrome. Nine of our machines were missing. Bombing was continued at night near Louvain, Namur and Charleroi, and several important points were attacked. In one case an ammunition train was blown up and fires and explosions were caused on the siding on which it was standing. It was the last aerial operation of the war in the Western Theatre.



[Swaine.]

MAJOR W. G. BARKER, D.S.O.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* acknowledged, on October 19, that the yielding of the Flanders coast and other strong positions in Belgium was extremely painful to the German people. It adds: "We had to yield very strong positions to an all-powerful adversary. But the value of these evacuated sections is obvious to any German." But it goes on to add: "We must look at this strategic measure from a wider field of vision. The Entente has lost a remarkably good opportunity, and our arms have gained considerably by an exceptionally successful and well-timed retreat!" The man who could write nonsense of this kind was capable of proving to his own satisfaction that a retreat to Königsberg of the whole of the German forces would have been a great success. Yet he must have admitted that this had not proved a success in 1807. In the German writer's opinion the most important thing was the preservation of the continuity of the front. A decisive break-through must be prevented.


How, was a secondary consideration. "As matters now stand the loss of even valuable enemy territory is unimportant, but our front must not be broken through. At suitable points it must be reconstructed with double strength; this could only be successfully done if the retreat were carried out in order and in safety. This seems to have been assured up to date, viz. October 19." Now we know that at this time the Germans were doing their best to end the war, and the object of these idle vapourings was the mistaken notion that they might influence the Entente in the negotiations.

There is, of course, no doubt that a break-through on a large scale is a great blow to the defensive; but it must not be forgotten that to drive the whole defensive line back is even a greater. A break-through is always liable to a counter-stroke, unless the area over which it is accomplished is a very wide one; and, even then to get any real advantage by it—i.e., any greater results than are gained by merely pressing back the part in question—it is necessary to be certain that the wings of the intruding wedge can act decisively against one or other or both of the enemy's forces on the sides of the point of penetration. The truth of this dictum had been shown by the Germans themselves just before on the Marne and on the Lys. To do this on both sides of the wedge requires very large numbers, and the only chance of real success appears to be when the break occurs sufficiently near one flank of the enemy to make it certain that the assailants can bring sufficient force to bear on the part cut off to eat it up. The "intruding idea" was that of Folard and Mesnil Durand, both of whom imagined that if they once got through the enemy line they could open outwards and sweep along either fraction of the disjointed parts. They left out one very elementary consideration:—viz., that the troops who did the penetration would suffer heavily, and, as a practical fact, the tactics they proposed were never adopted by any commander. Its weak point was that of Captain Bobadil's proposition, they forgot the losses the enemy would inflict. Moreover, in these days in which lines are organized in depth, and in which the range of artillery is so much lengthened and the power of infantry fire (rifles and machine-guns) is so much greater than it was, say, 130 years ago, it is far more easy to bring to a standstill troops employed in such an enterprise, than it was in the days when the proposition was put for-

ward. Penetration frightens the enemy, and very often causes a retreat; but the real victory is gained, in these days of lines hundreds of miles long, not by a mere local success at any one point, or even at several, but by compelling the whole to retreat. The armistice prevented a pursuit on a large scale, and although pursuits in past ages have been more talked about than carried out, there seems little doubt that on this occasion, so demoralized were the Germans,

of explosives as a great feat: the reader can contrast this with the record of what our airmen and the French sent down. The statement that our pilots were confined to the rear of their own line was nonsensical; the contrary was the case.

However, on November 2, the German wireless reported that "in view of the numerical superiority of the enemy's aeroplanes it was necessary to shift our aerial fighting forces at times from one army to another, to be numeri-



[French official photograph.]

A FACTORY IN LILLE STRIPPED OF ITS MACHINERY BY THE GERMANS.

that the large force of cavalry, aeroplanes and mobile infantry, machine-guns and tanks which the Entente would have employed must have inflicted such losses on the Germans as would have involved their whole army in ruin. It was this that made them sue for peace.*

Every effort was made to belittle the victory, and the *Hamburger Nachrichten* of October 22 made a great point of the successes of the German air forces in Flanders. The statements made in the article were not true. They claimed the dropping of something over two tons

really equal to the enemy on each of the main battle fronts." This seems to partake rather of the theatrical process of marching troops out at one wing of the stage and in at the other! It is not to be denied that the British Air Forces suffered losses. This was natural considering the extraordinary vigour of their offensive; but there is no doubt whatever that the Allied airmen on the front from the Yser to the Meuse had by November obtained an undoubted superiority over those of the enemy.

Gädke in the *Düsseldorfer Nachrichten*, October 19, admitted the strategic superiority of the enemy for the moment, but declared that

* See footnote *ante*, p. 269, as to the crowded state of the German communications.



[Royal Air Force photo.]

MONSTER BOMB FOR BERLIN.

The Armistice was arranged just in time to save Berlin from a shower of these bombs.

the German arms were still unbeaten and that the enemy had not yet attained his strategic aims. This was no doubt partially true at the moment, but in another three weeks they were to be fully won:

We are not conquered (says Gädke). Let us fight on. Wilson's Note (October 14) shows us whether our journey is carrying us. With the gesture of a victor he is trying to force us to consent to the most severe conditions. The enemy has not succeeded in attaining his strategic ends, and his forces were not capable of continuing week by week, month by month, the fearfully bloody attacks which, in spite of tactical successes, have in their essence been unfruitful. What we need is to regain the initiative and to get the trump cards into our hands. No doubt we are in a position to continue the war with unbroken strength until the winter and, indeed, until the next spring. It is no use looking round to see how things may develop later; they can never be worse than they are at present.

The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* (October 25) described the supposed decline in *moral* of the

Entente troops. "The prisoners were very depressed about their losses, and the small advances made by Foch's great offensive, and there is no doubt that reaction has taken place in the *moral* of the enemy troops. . . . In two divisions, according to the statement of prisoners, the soldiers had to be driven on to the attack by their officers, who threatened them with their revolvers." On the other hand, "Undoubtedly the longing for peace of the German soldier at the front is great; but the French reports make a mistake when they assert that the German soldier does not want to go on fighting." "We are told," says the same authority, quoting what is falsely attributed to French prisoners, "we are told that the longing for peace in Germany was great, but it cannot be greater than our own." And the said prisoners went on to declare that they did not come to the front to make war, but to make peace. And they made it.

The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, on November 2, stated that "our armies are doing brilliantly!" But the logic of facts was too much even for the German papers to continue their boastful attitude, and on November 6 the *Frankfurter Zeitung* admitted that the situation had become more difficult! A few days later it had become impossible, and Germany accepted the Allied terms.

Early in October the German rulers made up their minds that further resistance was useless, although they still kept up in the Press the pretence that all was going well. They then directed attention to getting an armistice which would at any rate save them from further losses. They did not approach the Entente Governments directly, but commenced *pourparlers* with President Wilson.

On October 6 the Emperor addressed the Proclamation given below to the German Army and Navy. This had been preceded on the 5th by a note to President Wilson addressed to him through Switzerland, inviting the opening of peace negotiations, and asking the conclusion of an immediate armistice, for the purpose of taking measures to avoid further bloodshed.

To the German Army and German Navy.—For months past the enemy, with enormous exertions and almost without a pause in the fighting, has stormed against your lines. In weeks of struggle, often without repose, you have had to persevere and resist the numerically far superior enemy. There lies the greatness of the task

which has been set you, and which you are fulfilling. Troops of all the German tribes are doing their part and are heroically defending the Fatherland on foreign soil. Hard is the task of my Navy in holding its own against the united enemy naval forces and in the unwearying work of supporting the Army in its difficult struggle. The eyes of those at home rest with pride and admiration on the deeds of the Army and Navy. I express to you the thanks of myself and the Fatherland.

The collapse of the Macedonian front occurs in the midst of the hardest struggle. Your front is unbroken and will remain so. In accord with our allies I have resolved once more to offer peace to the enemy, but we will only extend a hand for an honorable peace. We owe that to the heroes who have laid down their lives for the Fatherland; we owe that to our children. Whether arms will be lowered is still a question. Until then we must not slacken. We must as hitherto exert all our strength unwearyingly to hold our ground against the enemy's onslaught. The hour is grave, but, trusting in your strength and God's gracious help, we feel ourselves strong enough to defend our beloved homeland.—
WILHELM.

On the 5th the President replied, asking for a better definition of the exact meaning of the Note of the Imperial Chancellor, and whether he agreed to the terms laid down by the President in his address to Congress of the United States on January 8. He added that so long as the invading armies remained on the soil of the Entente Powers, he did not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms. In view of the somewhat kaleidoscopic changes in German administration, the President asked Prince

Max of Baden whether he was "speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the War." To this the German Government replied on October 12, that they agreed to the terms as laid down by President Wilson in the address to which he referred, and that the then existing German Government, "which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace, has been formed by conference and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor is supported in all his actions by the will of this authority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people." This was signed by Dr. Solf, the Foreign Minister, and not by the Imperial Chancellor.

President Wilson replied on the 14th, when he clearly laid down that the terms of the armistice would be determined by the military advisers of the Allied Governments and the United States; and he drew attention to the fact that at the very time the German Government was making approaches for peace, submarines were engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which the passengers and crews sought to make their way to safety; and that



A TALL STORY.

An Australian infantryman describes an exploit to an amused but incredulous company.

[Australian official photograph.]

also in withdrawing from Flanders and France the German Armies were pursuing a course of wanton destruction, which has always been regarded as a direct violation of the rules and



PRINCE MAX OF BADEN.

Nominated Chancellor by the Kaiser, October, 1918.

practices of civilised warfare; and he added that no cessation of arms could be agreed to while such acts of inhumanity, spoliation and desolation were being committed. Further, he reminded the German Government that one of the conditions of peace as contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4, must be the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that could separately, secretly, of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world, or at least its reduction to virtual impotency. However, by this time, the Germans were prepared to swallow everything; what they were afraid of was an absolute disaster, and they wanted as far as possible to escape it.

The Supreme War Council of the Allies was called together at Versailles, when the representatives of the Allied Powers informed Mr. Wilson that they were willing to make peace with Germany on the terms laid down by the President in his message to Congress on January 8, with the following qualifications. They reserved to themselves complete freedom with regard to what was therein defined as

“the freedom of the seas”; and they further announced their intention to demand compensation from Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and to their property by the action of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air. The Allies also stated that they were willing to receive representatives of the German Government and communicate the terms of the armistice to them. Mr. Wilson informed the enemy that he had to apply to Marshal Foch for them.

The *pourparlers* had taken some time, in which, as we have seen, the German position had gone from bad to worse. On November 7 Dr. Solf informed Marshal Foch that plenipotentiaries had been deputed to wait on him. They met the Allied representatives on November 8 at Réthondes, a station on the railway between Compiègne and Soissons. They asked for an immediate cessation of hostilities; this was at once refused; and the Allied delegates handed the Germans the terms on which alone fighting would cease. The German representatives considered these to be too hard, and referred them to their Government for instructions.

The Kaiser had at last begun to understand



DR. SOLF.

German Foreign Minister in October, 1918.

that he had to abandon his supreme power. On October 28 the Emperor issued his celebrated decree to Prince Max of Baden, which transferred the fundamental rights of the Kaiser's

person to the people. "This," remarked the Emperor, "brings to a close a period which will stand in honour before the eyes of future generations." He adds: "In the terrible storms of four years of war, however, old forms have been broken up, not to leave ruins behind but to make place for new and vital forms."

Ebert; the Emperor had abdicated on the same date. The new Government instructed their representatives to accept the terms offered. The Armistice was signed at 5 a.m. on November 11, and hostilities ceased at 11 a.m. on that day.

Having abandoned his army on the previous day and fled to Holland, the Emperor addressed



ZONES OF OCCUPATION UNDER THE ARMISTICE.

But these words were estimated at their proper value and entirely failed to stop the wave of discontent which was about to overwhelm the whole Imperial system.

For by this time (November 10) great changes were taking place in Germany. Prince Max had handed over the Chancellorship to Herr

the Crown Prince as follows: He had left "after the Court Chamberlain had informed me that he could no longer guarantee my safety at Great Headquarters." Thus did the Arch-Conspirator attempt to evade the righteous wrath of those he had deliberately led to slaughter in a war which he had entered on



[Official photograph.]

THE KING AND QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS IN BRUGES.

for the basest motives. He had always admired the great Napoleon, and he imitated him in the abandonment of his army when its need was the greatest. His son had the pluck to offer on November 11 to stay on in his command

and bring back his army in a well-disciplined and orderly manner. But by this time the new Government wanted neither Kaiser nor Crown Prince, and they refused to let him remain. He too fled to Holland.



CHAPTER CCXCVI.

END OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

SITUATION IN JULY, 1918—EVENTS IN FRANCE—SHORTAGE OF RESERVES AND MATERIAL—ENEMY SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS—CAUTIOUS POLICY OF GENERAL DIAZ—RESULTS OF THE SALONIKA OFFENSIVE—OPENING OF THE ITALIAN ATTACK—THE OPPOSING FORCES—ADVANCE IN THE BRENTA SECTOR—BRITISH OCCUPY THE GRAVE DI PAPADOPOLI—THE PIAVE CROSSED—WORK OF THE BRITISH XIV. CORPS—THE MONTICANO FORCED—ITALIANS REACH VITTORIO—ROUT OF THE ENEMY—AUSTRIAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE—RETREAT ON THE GRAPPA FRONT—THE LIVENZA CROSSED—BREAK-UP OF THE TRENTO ARMY—TRENTO OCCUPIED—ARMISTICE SIGNED, NOVEMBER 3—ITALIANS LAND IN TRIESTE—RESULTS OF THE VICTORY.

THE failure of the great Austrian offensive of June, 1918, put an end to the last Austrian hopes of gaining peace by victory, and in the following spring General Ludendorff himself bore witness to the effect of that failure upon the plans and ambitions of the Austro-German alliance. The successful Italian offensive at the end of October, which is known as the battle of Vittorio Veneto, was the final blow to a resistance which had no hope but to delay the inevitable end.

When the last effort of Conrad and Boroévitch had failed, and the troops who had crossed the Piave were driven back in disorder,* the possibilities of an immediate counter-offensive on a large scale were rapidly reviewed by the Italian High Command. It was clear that the enemy troops were very badly shaken, and the temptation to strike back at once must have been strong. But reflection showed that a decisive blow could not be given with the forces which were at the disposal of General Diaz. The enemy losses were calculated at about 200,000 men, but the Italians had lost nearly half that number in killed, wounded and missing. Twenty-seven brigades had lost more than a thousand men apiece, and at least a half of these were unfit for further fighting until they were restored by rest and new drafts. Several

such as the Calabria, Lucca, Sesia, Ferrara, Cosenza, Avellino and Potenza brigades,* had been practically destroyed, and others had lost nearly 50 per cent. of their effectives. General Diaz had six fresh divisions in hand on the Piave front, but of these only three were ready for immediate use. The Czecho-Slovak division was not yet fully organised, and two Italian divisions had been hurried down from the line in other sectors and were already tired. An immediate return blow that promised a chance of decision while the enemy were still demoralized from defeat was not within the power of the Italian Command, even upon a calculation of man-power. It was still less possible when the question of the supply services, and that of guns and shells, were taken into account. The enemy were still superior in artillery, though the Italian factories were now turning out guns at a far higher rate than ever before, and the reserves of ammunition were none too great. The supply and transport services were equally unprepared for offensive operations on a large scale so soon after the strain to which they had been subjected during the enemy attack. It was clear that for lack of means and sufficient elabora-

* The Potenza Brigade, which was mainly responsible for the check of the Austrian direct push for Treviso, and was in action for nine days, marched back to Treviso only 1,800 strong, while the Sesia lost 70 per cent. of its effectives.

* See Chapter CCLXXV.

tion, a counter-blow might be successful within strict limits, but could hardly be far-reaching in its effects. It was resolved to wait, and to urge on preparations for an important offensive later in the year.

The first plan worked out was a development of that which had been under consideration in April and May, before the extent of the Austrian offensive became clear.* Early in



GENERAL DIAZ.

Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Armies.

July the Italian Command resumed the interrupted preparations for an attack in the Asiago sector. But the original plan was extended to include an attack in the Pasubio region, which had for its object the capture of Col Santo and an advance upon the Folgaria plateau, which lies north-east of Rovereto. This operation would naturally help the main attack farther east, by threatening communications and so drawing off reserves. The general plan was obviously limited in scope. It is clear that even a successful attack in the sectors indicated could have had no decisive result. At the most a success might have threatened Trento, for the lie of the ground, the limit imposed upon operations by its mountainous nature and the consequent difficulty of swift communications, prevented the hope of a further immediate result. The enemy might have suffered severe defeat without losing capacity for further obstinate

resistance. On the other hand, success would have greatly improved the position of the Italians for a subsequent offensive operation on a large scale. For it would have removed, or at least lessened, the danger of a flank attack from the north which had handicapped their offensive campaign from the beginning, and still hampered their freedom of action. While the military position of the Central Empires held out a possibility of further offensive action on their part, it was obviously too risky for the Italians to attempt once more a movement eastwards until the northern flank had been better secured.

The report on the final battle, published by General Diaz in the spring of 1919, puts the general problem clearly. "The plan for the offensive, considered by itself, had to aim at assisting the general effort of the Allies to the utmost in accordance with two different and possible solutions; to drive the attack home with all available forces, throwing even the last available man into the scale, in case the possibility presented itself on the fronts of the Entente of obtaining a real superiority of forces and of gaining a decision at one blow; or else to make a preparatory attack as a first phase of a more complex effort, in case the enemy, although already beaten, should succeed in re-establishing a solid defensive front in all the theatres of war."

It is quite clear that in July, in view of the general military situation, extreme caution was necessary. The German failure east and west of Reims in the middle of the month, followed by Mangin's smashing counter-blow a few days later, did put an end to the enemy's hope of victory on the French front. But at that moment other possibilities seemed still open to him. Among them was the chance that he might establish a successful defensive front in France and attempt a last joint blow against Italy. Such an attempt was not, in fact within his power, but this was not clear till later. At the end of July General Diaz had still to consider the possibility of a rapid German concentration upon his front. He had still to consider defence as well as offence. And he had to be the more prudent as he was weak in man-power, as well as in material.

When the losses of the June battle had been made good, the number of reserves in hand was reduced to a figure that gave some cause for uneasiness. Excluding the eighteen-year-old boys, who had been under training for some time,

* See Chapter CCLXXV.

the number of trained men available for drafts was not greatly in excess of that required to make good "the normal losses" of existing units for six months. It was obvious, therefore, that a big offensive action would deplete the ranks of the army to an extent that would more

than exhaust the drafts immediately available. The boys of the 1900 class could only be used as a last resort. They were being trained in readiness for the spring campaign, which at that time seemed probable. There was a further "combing-out" of men employed in



A BLOCK ON THE ROAD.

[Official photograph.]

non-military duties, who were rapidly put through a course of instruction, but the limited supply of reserves still gave cause for anxiety.

In the circumstances, the choice of plan was practically limited to the more modest of the alternatives indicated by General Diaz in the passage quoted from his subsequent report. And even the offensive in the Asiago and Pasubio districts, which would have meant the employment of half his forces, would have trenched very seriously upon his limited reserves. The same reason which led to the choice of the less ambitious alternative imposed caution in carrying it out. It must always be remembered that the enemy were still superior in numbers and had a great advantage in position.

Although the less ambitious plan was chosen the Italian Command kept in mind the possibility of a change in the general situation which should justify a decision to stake everything upon a single supreme effort, which might exhaust all reserves, but should finally do away with the necessity for reserves by dealing a knock-out blow. Preparations were quietly made for such an effort, and a scheme was worked out secretly, though at the time when it was first studied there seemed little chance that it would be carried into effect, at least before the following year.

There was the difficulty of reserves. But there were other difficulties in the way of an offensive on a large scale, which added to the

difficulty regarding man-power. There was the problem of material. At a meeting of a committee of experts, held in Paris in the summer of 1918, it was agreed that two essentials to a successful offensive were tanks and yprite shells. Italy had neither. Nor had she the means of manufacturing either. But it was found impossible to spare either tanks or yprite for use on the Italian front. No doubt the decision was justified by the paramount necessity of beating the Germans in France. This was the main battle front, and it was essential to have there ample reserves of material. But it is worth noting that Italy had to do her work without the aid of what the Allied experts considered necessary for the accomplishment of such work in France. The greater part of the Italian front was impossible for tanks, but there were sectors where they might have been of the greatest use. And there was ample scope for the employment of all kinds of gas. Guns and shells were also, as always, a matter for anxiety. In the June battle the enemy had still been able to show a marked superiority in weight of fire, and though the Italian production was rapidly enabling this superiority to be wiped out, it did not seem to promise any definite advantage over the Austrians. The supply of shells had still to be husbanded carefully. Neither shells nor guns permitted that continuous use of artillery which harasses an enemy's defence and was regarded in France as an essential feature



ITALIAN VOLUNTEER CYCLISTS MUSTERING.



Official photograph.

ITALIANS GETTING A HEAVY GUN ROUND A HAIR-PIN BEND.

of modern warfare. If the Italian artillery had gone in for counter-battery work and bombarding communications to the extent that was taken as a matter of course in France, the Italians would never have had a sufficient supply of shells for a big offensive, nor could they have replaced the guns that would have been worn out by such continuous usage. This, at least, was the case until nearly the end of the war, when production had come near to meeting requirements. But even at the end Italy's production of "75" shells was only one-sixth that of France.

When the brilliant successes of the French in July were followed by the tremendous British offensive which began on August 8, it became evident that the situation was inexorably changing to the advantage of the Entente. It did not yet seem, however, that the time was ripe for General Diaz to stake everything on the big offensive which he had at the back of his mind. Preparations were therefore continued for the Asiago-Pasubio attack, which was projected for the middle of September. By this time the American forces in France had grown to a very large number, and when General Diaz came to Paris early in September to discuss the situation, he urged that a strong American force be sent to Italy, so that he might

feel he was backed by a sufficient reserve. He pointed out that the Austrian army seemed to have recovered its *moral*. Several minor actions undertaken with the object of testing the mood of the enemy had shown that there was no lack of combative spirit in his ranks, and his artillery fire proved to be particularly scientific and destructive. The Austrians had a numerical advantage of fourteen divisions, their positions were very favourable to a defensive, and the Italians could only concentrate a sufficient weight of guns on the chosen sector by largely denuding the rest of their line. Even then the superiority would not be crushing, and very heavy infantry losses seemed inevitable. General Diaz had to consider what his position would be after his offensive, and he was anxious to have an American force as a reserve. His arguments were not considered as being of sufficient weight to counter-balance those in favour of concentrating everything against the German armies, which had now for six weeks been steadily losing ground and prisoners and guns. General Diaz was urged to attack with the forces which he had at his command, and it was pointed out that the internal condition of Austria-Hungary was growing desperate, and that the discontent must be affecting the army. It was the Italian opinion, however, an opinion

since published in General Diaz's report of the situation in the summer, that "no important result was to be expected from such disintegrating influences until a decisive military defeat had been inflicted on the enemy." It was this decisive military defeat that he feared could not be accomplished with the means at his disposal. And there was even



Official photograph.

A CAMOUFLAGED ROAD IN ITALY.

the chance that a failure to obtain a notable success, a failure which had to be reckoned with in view of the various handicaps already indicated, might disappoint and delay these disintegrating tendencies. It was a difficult problem which the Italian Command had to face, and after the Paris visit General Diaz was resolved to delay still further.

There was much discussion during the late summer and early autumn, both in Italy and in the Allied countries, regarding the inaction on the Italian front. Most of that discussion was inspired by a combination of a deep ignorance regarding the military situation and a natural surprise or uneasiness caused by the simple fact that while Italy's allies were fighting hard and successfully against Germany no blow was being struck by Italy. There were other critics, however, in Italy as well as in Allied countries, who, while they admitted the difficulties and were not influenced by the superficial argument of "Italy's absence" from the struggle, thought that General Diaz was over-cautious, and believed that a bold policy would give good results, though they realised the necessity of keeping something in hand. There were others who argued that as things stood at the beginning of September the Allied cause was

better served by simply keeping the Austrian army immobilised and by making the fullest preparations against a more convenient moment, than by attacking simply for the sake of attacking. Others again maintained that while this was a sound enough argument from the strictly military point of view the political reasons against inaction, owing to the criticisms to which it exposed Italy, were too strong to be disregarded. The air was tense with argument and counter-argument, which sometimes descended to the level of recrimination.

September drew to a close and October wore on, and still there was no news from the Italian front. By this time argument had almost entirely descended to the lower level. It was known to a good many people that an attack had been planned and fixed for the middle of September, and, when the date lay so far behind that the question of a delay owing to weather or some temporary hitch in preparations could no longer be considered as a possible explanation a good many things were said in haste which one may hope were repented at leisure. It is to the credit of the Italian Command, at least, that these things could be said. For they meant that the secret of the Italian intentions was excellently kept.

In point of fact the general situation was definitely changed almost immediately after General Diaz's visit to Paris, changed in a way that gave the Italian Command the chance for which it had been watching. In the middle of September the Allied Army of the East, which had almost passed out of men's minds, began its victorious offensive. During the summer a joint Franco-Italian attack in Albania, from the Devil's Valley down to the Adriatic, had caused the Austrians a good deal of trouble. They had lost much ground and several thousand prisoners, principally on the Allied left, where the Italians under General Ferrero occupied both Berat and Fieri. This occupation was only temporary, for the Italians were left too far ahead of the French on their right. When enemy reinforcements arrived in August under General Pflanzer-Baltin, the Italian line was withdrawn to the high ground south of Berat and the Semeni. The French also withdrew slightly, but the Allied operations had served a very useful purpose. They had not only improved the actual position; they had caused much unrest among the Albanians, and they had brought down enemy reinforcements from other sectors where they were badly

required. The time was approaching when the Bulgarian line was to need stiffening which was not available.

With the prospect of a success on the so-called Salonika front, General Diaz finally abandoned his project of a limited offensive. For success in the Balkans meant threatening Austria-Hungary from a new direction, and imposed upon the enemy the withdrawal of forces from the Italian front. There now seemed a chance of carrying out the greater plan. The final details of the scheme of attack were quickly completed by the Staff, and "on September 25, four days before the conclusion of the Bulgarian armistice, orders were issued for a rapid concentration of troops, artillery and technical services in the sector chosen for the attack, which was no longer the plateau, but the middle Piave."* Information showed that the enemy in accordance with anticipation, had been compelled to detach at least seven divisions from the Italian front in order to try to fill the breach caused by the defection of Bulgaria, and, possibly, to maintain order within the Monarchy. For it was obvious that the moral effect of this defection would be very important.

The Austro-Hungarian Armies were still markedly superior in numbers, but Italy had at last obtained a definite superiority in artillery, though this superiority was more evident in large trench-mortars than in guns. The actual figures were as follows: Italians—57 divisions (51 Italian, 3 British, 2 French, 1 Czecho-Slovak, and one American infantry regiment, 709 battalions in all), with 8,929 guns and trench-mortars; Austrians—63½ divisions (827 battalions) and over 7,000 guns and trench mortars. The Italian and Allied combatant troops numbered 912,000, those of the enemy 1,070,000.

The Italian plan was to concentrate every available man and gun on the limited front between the Grappa and Ponte di Piave, east of Treviso, with the object of effecting a break through by way of Conegliano and Valmareno to the town of Vittorio Veneto. The first aim was to divide the Austrian Fifth and Sixth Armies, which held the Piave line, their junction being at Ponte di Priula, where the railway between Treviso and Conegliano crosses the Piave, a couple of miles below the Montello. The main line of communication of the Austrian Sixth Army was based on Vittorio Veneto, and if the break through could be effected, this

army would lie at the mercy of the attacking forces. If the first part of the scheme could be accomplished, the next step was to drive up the valley of the Piave, towards Feltre, so as to turn the Grappa position, in conjunction with a frontal attack, and thence threaten the whole defensive system of the enemy in the Eastern Trentino.

The Austrian troops were organized in five armies or groups, which were aligned as follows.



GENERAL PFLANZER-BALTIN.

Commanded an Austrian Force against the Italians in Albania.

On the left wing was the so-called *Piave Armee*, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Armies, the Fifth holding the river line from the sea to Ponte di Priula, the Sixth lying along the river from Ponte di Priula to above Valdobbiadene, opposite Monfenera. Next came the independent command known as the "Belluno Group," which held the line as far as the Brenta, and was thus interposed between the *Piave Armee* and

* General Diaz's Report.

the *Trentino Armee*. This latter group consisted of the Eleventh and Tenth Austrian Armies, the Eleventh holding the line between the Brenta and the Astico, on the plateau of the Seven Communes, while the front of the Tenth Army stretched from the Astico to the Swiss frontier.

During the Austrian offensive in June the Italian line had been held by six armies.* This number was now increased by three, with the object of securing greater "elasticity." The armies on the right and left of the front, the Third Army on the right and the First and Seventh on the left, were reduced to the utmost. (the 40-mile front of the First Army was held by five divisions and an Alpini Group), and the troops thus made available were sent to reinforce the centre, or rather the right centre, where the main attack was to be launched. The fronts hitherto occupied by the Third and Fourth Armies were slightly reduced in extent, and between them, on a front not greatly wider than the old Eighth Army front, was disposed a group of three Armies, the Tenth, Eighth and Twelfth. Still another new Army, the Ninth, was held in reserve.

During the fortnight which followed the order to concentrate troops and material for the great effort, the battle front from the Brenta to Ponte di Piave was reinforced by nearly 2,000 guns and 500 trench-mortars, bringing the total number of guns to nearly 4,800, including 600 heavy trench-mortars. Forty-one divisions, 22 in line and 19 in reserve, were massed on the front of attack, leaving only 16 on the remaining sectors. To oppose the attack the enemy had 23 divisions in line or immediate support, with 10½ divisions lying farther back as a strategic reserve. Owing to the secrecy with which the Italian preparations had been carried out, the enemy had nearly half his force—30 divisions—concentrated in sectors where the Italian forces had been reduced to a minimum.

The defection of Bulgaria worked fast upon the political situation. The Hapsburg Monarchy was breaking up within. Its south-eastern front was now very seriously threatened. Peace rumours had been coming thick and fast, and on October 4 came the German proposal for an armistice, which was backed by Austria and aroused great popular enthusiasm in Vienna, where it seems to have been thought that a cessation of hostilities on the Italian front, based upon a withdrawal from the occupied provinces, would immediately follow.

* See Chapter CCLXXV.

But the army, largely cut off from news, still held firm.

The main Italian attack was to be entrusted to the Eighth, Tenth and Twelfth Armies, which were placed under the direction of General Cavaglia, commander of the Eighth Army, which was designed to play the principal rôle. The Twelfth Army on the left, which was placed under General Graziani, commander of the French forces in Italy, was to cross the Piave and push northwards towards Feltre,



GENERAL GRAZIANI.

Commanded the French Forces on the Italian Front.

astride the river. This army included the French 23rd Division. The Tenth Army, which was placed on the right of the Eighth, from below Ponte di Priula to Ponte di Piave, included the British XIVth Corps (7th and 23rd Divisions) and was entrusted to General the Earl of Cavan, commanding the British forces in Italy. The duty assigned to the Tenth Army, after crossing the Piave by the long shoal island of the Grave di Papadopoli, was "to advance on the Livenza, forming a defensive flank to cover and protect the principal manœuvre of the Eighth Army in the direction of Vittorio, and attracting towards itself the enemy's reserves, which were assembled in the lowest part of the plains."* Its immediate object of attack was the right wing of the Austrian Fifth Army.

* General Diaz's Report.

General Cavaglia's Army Group was to conduct the main attack, but a very important rôle was assigned to the Fourth Army, which occupied the Grappa sector, under the command of General Giardino. The first idea had been that the Fourth Army should merely fight a demonstrative action, in order to keep the troops in front of it well employed and prevent the detachment of reinforcements to the sectors threatened by the main attack. But the date chosen had to be deferred for a week owing to the heavy rains which fell in the first half of October and caused the Piave to come down in flood. The week's delay made the favourable situation of the Allies still clearer, and justified the decision to transfer still more artillery from the extreme sectors of the line, and so permit the Fourth Army to play a more active part in the forthcoming battle. A scheme for an offensive in this sector had been prepared some time previously, and gun emplacements were ready for the artillery reinforcements, which were hurried to the Grappa sector between October 19 and 23. The programme of the Fourth Army was changed. It was now to open the battle, preceding the main action by twelve hours, so as to draw on to its front the enemy reserves

stationed round about Feltre, and in this way lighten the task of the Twelfth and Eighth Armies. But the attack was to be serious, a definite attempt to pierce the enemy's lines between the Brenta and the Piave, and push up to the Arton-Feltre road.

The disposition of the enemy's troops and guns showed the importance which he attached to the Grappa position, and showed, too, that he had not divined the direction of the main Italian attack. In the Grappa sector the Belluno Group had eight divisions in line and three in immediate reserve, while the infantry was backed by some 1,200 guns. The Austrian Sixth Army, on the other hand, with seven divisions in line and two in reserve, had only about 500 guns as against a mass of over 2,000 which the Italians had concentrated against its front. The enemy were still preoccupied by the idea that the Italians intended to try for a break-through on the mountain front. The Grappa was an obvious field for effort, for there the Italian defensive position was weakest, and called for improvement. Farther west the preparations for the offensive on the Asiago plateau had been noted by the enemy, who had taken measures to meet them. And he observed too late the quick transference eastward of all



[Official photograph.]

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE YEOMANRY TAKING A DITCH ON THE PIAVE.

but the bare minimum of men and guns. The move was very cleverly managed. It was in order not to arouse suspicion that only two of the three British divisions and one of the two French were transferred from their old sector to the Piave front. The British 48th Division and the French 24th Division remained on the plateau, the British division being put under the command of General Pennella, commanding the Italian XIIIth Corps. When the British troops were in line in their new positions, "orders were issued that all troops visible to the enemy should wear Italian uniform, and that no British gun should fire a shot previous to the general bombardment."* In this way it was hoped to lull the suspicions of the enemy. The precautions taken worked very well, and when the blow came, the enemy troops and guns were not well disposed to parry it.

The first difficulty that lay in the way of carrying out the attack, once the preparations had been made, was the river which divided the opposing armies along the greater part of the battle front. The Piave, like all the rivers of Northern Italy, is subject to rapid and violent floods, which made the problem of its crossing very hazardous. The sudden rising of the river in June had handicapped the enemy very seriously, and the flood waters which came down suddenly in the second week in October had already caused a delay in the Italian attack. The flood period had begun, the weather was very uncertain, and there was keen anxiety as to the possibility of carrying out the passage of the river in accordance with arrangements. And, as it turned out, the river did have an effect upon the way in which the battle developed, though the difficulties which it caused were, fortunately, overcome.

By the evening of October 23 all was in readiness, and the first move of the infantry was fixed for the following morning. The main operation was the attack of the Fourth Army in the Grappa sector, but this was to be supported by the left wing of the Twelfth Army and by strong demonstrations by the Sixth Army on the Asiago plateau, while advanced detachments of the Tenth Army were to occupy the Grave di Papadopoli, which was held in some force by the Austrians. The bed of the Piave in this sector, from bank to bank, is roughly one and a half miles in width, but the greater part of this width consists of the island of the Grave di Papadopoli and other smaller

islands, or rather shoals, for in many cases they are simply banks of shingle cut by the various channels of the river. The Grave di Papadopoli was a very useful half-way house, for the main channel flows west of it, and once the island is reached the river is a less formidable obstacle,



[Lafayette.

GENERAL THE EARL OF CAVAN.
Commanded the British Forces in Italy.

consisting of various channels of lesser width and depth, even in time of flood.

At three o'clock on the morning of October 24, the anniversary of the disaster at Caporetto, the Italian artillery opened fire between the Brenta and the Piave, and at 7.15 a.m. the infantry attacked. The weather was very bad. A thick mist shrouded the hills, and a furious rain-storm came on in the early morning. Once battle was joined the artillery activity of both sides was greatly limited, but the infantry fighting was extremely fierce and stubborn. The enemy had a very large number of machine-guns placed in caverns or redoubts, and the limits placed upon the use of the Italian artillery by the weather enabled their fire to be very destructive. The summit of Monte Asolone was taken on the run, Monte Pertica was stormed by the Pesaro Brigade, and a picked body of storm-troops reached Hill 1,481 on the Prassolan. The Lombardy Brigade enveloped Monte Solero and gained a footing on the point known

* Lord Cavan's Report.

as Hill 1,671. The Valderoa was captured by the Aosta Brigade, and though a frontal attack on the steep cliffs of Monte Spinoncia failed before the withering fire of the enemy machine-guns, useful progress was made on the ridge farther to the east. Some of these advantages were only temporary. The summits of the Asolone and Pertica were lost to fierce counter-attacks, supported by raking machine-gun



LIEUT.-GENERAL
SIR J. M. BABINGTON, K.C.M.G.
Commanded the XIV. Army Corps.

barrage from right and left, and the storm-troops had to come back from Monte Prassolan. In the afternoon the action was eased off owing to the blinding mist and rain, but the Italians had gained some useful positions and had taken some 1,300 prisoners and many machine guns. Furthermore, the furious nature of the attack, and especially the rushing tactics of the storm-troops, who in more than one place penetrated far into the enemy positions before returning, confirmed the enemy belief that the first object of the Italians was a break-through between the Brenta and the Piave. This seemed the more likely, as the left wing of the Twelfth Army, acting in support of the Fourth, came down from Monte Tomba and Monfenera, crossed the Ornic torrent, and established a line close to Alano. West of the Brenta, too, the Sixth Army had carried out demonstrative actions in force, occupying various lines of trenches, but retiring when the counter-attacks came, except

in the case of Monte Sisemol, which was brilliantly taken by French troops and held until the evening.

Meanwhile a very fine piece of work had been carried out by British troops belonging to the Tenth Army, under Lord Cavan. The main attack across the Piave had been fixed for the night of October 24-25, 24 hours later than the opening move in the Grappa sector, but General Sir J. M. Babington, commanding the British XIVth Corps, had suggested the advisability of occupying the Grave di Papadopoli as a preliminary step. Lord Cavan agreed, and in the early hours of October 24, when the Italian guns were hammering the enemy lines in the mountains, the "2nd/1st Battalion of the Honourable Artillery Company and the 1st Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, without any previous artillery preparation, crossed the main channel, surprised the Austrian garrison, and occupied the northern half of the island."* The crossing was accomplished in small flat-bottomed boats, each holding six men, and rowed by two Italian *pontieri*. The river was in heavy flood, and the passage of the main channel in particular was very hazardous. In some places no fewer than three channels had to be crossed and relays of boats had to be used. But the arrangements were perfectly made. Italian *pontieri* and British infantry both knew their business, the difficulties were all overcome, and the enemy was caught napping. The greater part of the garrison of the island were captured or killed, and though the Austrians quickly counter-attacked from the left bank of the river they were unable to dislodge the H.A.C. and the Welshmen. There was still an enemy detachment on the southern end of the long island, but for a long stretch the main channel of the river now lay behind the advance-guard of the attackers. A bridgehead had been formed for the offensive, and this was consolidated on the following day.

The original intention of launching the main attack across the river on the morning of October 25 was frustrated by a sudden rising of the river. This was serious enough for those who had to cross the lesser channels in the Grave di Papadopoli sector, or to construct bridges to the island in order to enable the main body and the reserves to come over. It was more serious still for those who had to cross higher up. Between Pederobba and the

* Lord Cavan's Report.



[Official photograph.]

THE REMAINS OF THE BEAUTIFUL BRIDGE ACROSS THE VAL D'ASSA.

Ponte di Prinla the river bed is comparatively narrow and the flood waters, instead of spreading out into numerous channels, separated by islands or shingle banks, were pent up into one or two channels, deeper and swifter. There was no halfway house, such as had been afforded by the Grave di Papadopoli. The bridges had to be made immediately under the enemy's nose. By the evening of October 24 the stream was running at from seven to nine miles an hour, and at the so-called fords the depth was over five feet. The weather was improving and it seemed probable that the floods would soon go down. It was decided to delay the main action.

On the night of October 25-26 the Grave di Papadopoli was finally cleared of the enemy and occupied in strength by the troops who were to attack in this sector as soon as the state of the river allowed the main battle to begin. The occupation was carried out by a joint movement of the British 7th Division on the left and the Italian 37th Division on the right. The preliminary preparations were now completed, and in the words of Lord Cavan's Report, "This very successful operation put the main channel of the Piave behind us and enabled us to begin our bridges and prepara-

tions for the main attack in comparative security, although the garrison of the island was subjected to a very heavy shelling all day on the 26th."

Meanwhile the Fourth Army was deeply engaged on the Grappa front, hammering against an enemy who resisted stoutly, hit back very hard, and showed no signs at all of internal dry-rot. On October 25, after a night's rest, the battle was renewed by attacks on Col della Berretta, the summit of the Asolone, Monte Pertica and the summit of Monte Solarolo. Various detachments of storm-troops distinguished themselves greatly. One column pushed through from the slopes of the Asolone to Col Berretta, took 600 prisoners, and although nearly surrounded by the enemy's counter-attack cut their way back and brought their prisoners with them. Another column of storm-troops and detachments from the Pesaro Brigade took Monte Pertica after a desperate fight which lasted for six hours, and all the efforts of the enemy failed to dislodge the victors. Another important capture was that of Monte Forceletta, north of Monte Pertica, which was taken by the Bologna Brigade. Although Solarolo was assaulted over and over again, the enemy resistance could

not be overcome. The day closed with two important positions wrested from the enemy, and the capture of over 1,400 prisoners. But the desperate fighting had a more important result. The enemy was by now convinced that the attack on the Grappa front was in deadly earnest. He had lost heavily, and there was no slackening in the Italian effort. He brought up not only his immediate reserves, but those which had lain between Feltre and Belluno. The number of enemy divisions in line was increased to nine, who were now opposed to only seven Italian attacking divisions. Although the amount of ground gained by the Italian attack was disappointing to the High Command, enough progress had been made to alarm the enemy and induce him to engage the reserves which might otherwise have been available for the Middle Piave front. The fight continued on October 26, stubbornly, inconclusively, and the Italians captured another 1,200 prisoners.

The moment was now come for the big effort. By the evening of October 26 the weather had improved and the river had begun to fall. The current still ran swift and deep, a very formidable obstacle, but it was impossible to wait

longer. Eleven crossing-points were selected, one for the right wing of the Twelfth Army at the Molinetto (Pederobba), seven on the Eighth Army front, between Fontana del Buoro (beneath the north-western slope of the Montello) and the broken Priula bridges, three for the Tenth Army, at the Grave di Papadopoli. Bridging began with the fall of darkness on October 26, and the bombardment started half an hour before midnight. The violence of the current and the accuracy of the enemy's fire were such that on the front of the Eighth Army only two out of the seven sets of bridges could be established, both of them between Fontana del Buoro and the point where the river turns south-eastwards round the Montello, near Falze. The Twelfth Army bridges at the Molinetto were successfully thrown and the crossing maintained, and the Tenth Army was equally successful with all its three sets of bridges in the Grave di Papadopoli sector. The most serious failure was on the front between Falze and Ponte di Priula, where the bridges thrown by the Eighth Army were all destroyed by flood and shell fire combined before any bridgehead could be established. Repeated efforts failed to effect a crossing,



[Official photograph.]

ITALIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH.

Their characteristic method is to march on both sides of the road.

Only small parties of assault troops reached the left bank of the river.

When the day broke on October 27, three bridgeheads had been established. On the left, facing Valdobbiadene, nine battalions reached the further bank, three battalions of the 107th French Infantry Regiment, three battalions of Alpini, and a regiment (three battalions) of the Campania Brigade. The French and the Alpini belonged to the Twelfth Army, but the Campania Brigade belonged to the Eighth, and was sent across by the Molinette bridges owing to the failure of the left wing of the Eighth Army (the XXVIIth Corps) to establish its own bridges. There was a wide gap between this and the next bridgehead, south east of Sernaglia, where a considerable number of troops had been pushed across the river. On the left was the Cuneo Brigade and other detachments from the XXVIIth Corps, which had moved southwards to cross by the bridges of the XXIInd Corps. On the right were two divisions of the XXIInd Corps, the 57th and the 1st Assault Division, a recently formed unit of picked storm-troops, together with the 72nd Assault Detachment which was attached to the Corps. The VIIIth Corps, which formed the right wing of the Eighth Army, was completely held up, as has been said, except for a few storm-troops who had reached the other side of the river. There was, practically speaking, a gap of six miles between the bridgehead of the Eighth Army and that of the Tenth.

The Tenth Army had been completely successful. Two Corps, the XIVth British and the XIth Italian, had passed the main channel to the Grave di Papadopoli during the night and proceeded to the attack at 6.45 a.m., after enduring a very heavy artillery fire during four hours of waiting. Although the channels east of the Grave di Papadopoli were of no great depth, the fierce current and the uncertain shingle footing caused a number of men to stumble and meet their death by drowning. But the attack of the British XIVth Corps was carried out with the utmost resolution, and though the enemy put up a stubborn fight he could not hold. On the right the XIth Italian Corps, under General Paolini, was unable to make much headway in the early part of the day, but later on they, too, made excellent progress, and the 37th Division on the left, which had been held up in the morning, was able to advance in touch with the British on

the left and the 23rd (Bersaglieri) Division on the right. In the evening the 37th were pushed back slightly by a strong enemy counter-attack, but a solid bridgehead was now established in a curve that ran from Casa Tonon, near the river, through Borgo Malaototte (which remained in the possession of the British after give-and-take fighting), Tezze, Borgo Zanetti,



[Official photograph.]

THE CHURCH OF CIANO ON THE PIAVE,
AT THE FOOT OF IL MONTELLO,
Where hard fighting took place.

San Polo di Piave to below Stabiuzzo. The bridgehead was some four miles wide, and two and a half miles deep at the farthest point of the curve, Borgo Zanetti. Up to 6.15 in the evening, 5,620 prisoners had been counted, 3,520 having been captured by the British, 2,100 by the Italians. Twenty-nine guns were also taken, including 6 nine-inch howitzers which were rushed by troops of the British 23rd Division.

This was the most successful advance of the day. The bridges of the Eighth and Twelfth Armies, under direct fire from the high ground opposite, were all destroyed during the day, and the troops on the left bank of the river were not able to make much headway. The nine battalions who had crossed at the Molinette fought their way forward for nearly a mile, and resisted all the efforts of the enemy to drive them back. The troops of the Eighth Army, who attacked towards Sernaglia, gained a



GENERAL GIUSEPPE PAOLINI.
Commanded the Italian XI. Army Corps.

considerable amount of ground; but they, like their comrades farther north, were in a precarious position, their bridges gone, a roaring torrent behind them and a greatly superior enemy in front. Their own artillery, however, was able to put over a very much greater weight of fire than that of the enemy, and thus supported they could hold their own. In front of them, however, still lay part of the main Austrian lines of defence, the *Kaiserstellung*, backed by the second line, the *Königstellung*. The *Kaiserstellung* was a belt of prepared positions extending a mile and a half deep from near the river bank. The *Königstellung* was a similar belt about two miles farther back, but less well prepared. The Austrians had trusted mainly to the river and their first defensive belt

The situation was not altogether satisfactory at the end of the first day's fighting, though more than 9,000 prisoners and 51 guns had been taken in all. At least it gave ground for anxiety, which was chiefly due to the failure of the Eighth Army, and especially the VIIIth Corps, to overcome the bridging difficulty. The VIIIth Corps had been detailed to push straight towards Vittorio Veneto, and the fact that it had been unable even to start its advance threatened to throw the plan of battle out of gear. This fact had made the work of the troops to right and left of it much harder, for their left and right flanks respectively were in the air. The XIVth British Corps, which had advanced farthest, suffered most, for all day it had to repel flanking attacks from the north. The weakness of its position had been overcome, thanks to the staunchness and determination of the 7th Division, but unless the gap could be filled between the bridge-heads of the Eighth and Tenth Armies, the brilliant advance made by the Tenth could not lead to any important result.

The failure of the VIIIth Corps to establish its bridges led to a certain amount of criticism, especially from its neighbours to right and left, who suffered from the gap in the attacking line. Such criticism was perfectly natural. It occurs in all cases, wherever a check takes place, and for whatever reason. In this case, however, those who know the Piave and the general lie of the ground will hesitate to sustain the criticism. The general conditions of the river from where it enters the plain down to Ponte di Priula have already been described, and the worst sector of all was from the corner of the Montello down to the broken bridges of Priula. Here the river is deepest. Here it flows most swiftly. Here, moreover, it was under direct fire from the hills between Susegana and the Sernaglia plain, looked down upon by excellent observation posts. The swiftness of the current, here even more than elsewhere, meant that a break caused by shell fire was apt to end in the carrying away of the whole bridge. The enemy fire was accurate. There were very heavy casualties among the engineers who worked at the bridges (one engineer bridging battalion was practically annihilated) and much destruction of material. As soon as a bridge was built it was destroyed.

The situation threatened to become critical, for the river had begun to rise again and the rain was falling heavily. General Cavaglia.

detached the XVIIIth Corps from the reserve of the Eighth Army, and placed it under Lord Cavan, to cross by the Tenth Army bridges and push northwards, so as to fill the gap and clear the front of the VIIIth Corps. In the early hours of October 28 the XVIIIth Corps began to cross by the Tenth Army bridges, and at dawn the 33rd Division and part of the 56th Division took over the front from Casa Tonon to Casa La Sega. Many of the Tenth Army bridges had been destroyed during the night, and in consequence the XVIIIth Corps had not been able to deploy all the troops detailed for the attack when the hour for action came, at 9 o'clock. It was urgent that no time should be lost, for the VIIIth Corps had fared no better in their second night's attempt to bridge the river. There was still a space of six miles between the left wing of the Tenth Army and the right of the XXIInd Corps. Both the XXIInd and XXVIIth Corps had succeeded in re-establishing some of their broken bridges and throwing more troops across the river. Although they were not yet in sufficient force to push home an attack they kept the enemy opposite them very

busily employed and enabled the Twelfth Army on their left to take the offensive on both sides of the river. Prospects were notably brighter if the XVIIIth Corps could succeed in its movement northward.

The initial attack was to have been undertaken by a force of nine battalions, the Como Brigade and a regiment of the Bisagno Brigade, which had been the first to cross the river. But the destruction of several bridges had delayed the movement of this force, and only five battalions were ready at 9 o'clock when the general attack of the Tenth Army was timed to start. In his official despatch and in other accounts Lord Cavan bore witness to the "soldierly instinct" of General Basso, commanding the XVIIIth Corps, who did not hesitate to attack at once. The movement of the whole Tenth Army was splendidly successful. General Basso's force pushed boldly northward, rapidly and skilfully reinforced as the rest of the XVIIIth Corps came over the river and got into position. The British XIVth Corps, its left now freed, drove its way through the enemy lines in irresistible fashion, while the XIth Corps on the right, after stiff fighting,



BERSAGLIERI GETTING HAY FOR THEIR MULES.



AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES BY AEROPLANE.

overcame the enemy resistance and widened the breach in the *Kaiserstellung*. At the end of the day the XVIIIth Corps, which had made a magnificent advance of nearly four miles, had crossed the railway north of the Priula bridges and pushed its right wing up to Santa Lucia di Piave. The British XIVth Corps had broken clean through the Austrian positions, and while its main front lay at an average distance of four miles from the Piave, patrols had been sent out towards the Monticano, and in some cases had reached the river. The XIth Corps was threatening to take in the flank the enemy troops opposite the Third Army on the Lower Piave. The bridgehead was now ten miles wide and four miles deep along an extended front, where the enemy's lines were completely broken, a large number of prisoners being captured. And the VIIIth Corps was passing the river between Nervesa and Ponte di Priula.

On the left, too, the day went well. The attack of the Twelfth Army astride the Piave, which was held up for a time after a slight initial success, gradually wore down the enemy's resistance. On the right bank the village of Alano was taken, together with many prisoners, and further progress northward was made, a movement which began to threaten the left of the enemy forces in the Grappa sector. Across the river troops of the 23rd French Division and Italian Alpini battalions stormed the heights west of Valdobbiadene, Monte Perlo and Monte Pianar, the 138th French Regiment capturing Monte Pianar by a very fine attack, while the Alpini did their work in the way that is always expected of them, and seldom in vain. The Eighth Army was still suffering from lack of bridges. As soon as morning broke the enemy guns from the high ground began hitting the bridges, and the stream did the rest. The Austrians made frequent attacks, but with no success, and towards evening the Italians were fighting their way forward, step by step, irresistibly, in the Sernaglia plain. Their left wing, too, was working up towards the right wing of the Twelfth Army, towards the hills that rise to the east of Valdobbiadene. The Italian artillery was giving the enemy a very hard time, and, though there were no bridges over the river Italian aeroplanes were getting over a certain amount of food and blankets, and, above all, ammunition.

The prospects for the following day were fair indeed, for the breach between the Austrian

Fifth and Sixth Armies was made. The right wing of the Fifth Army was gone and the rest of it was cut off from the Sixth by Lord Cavan's troops. The Sixth Army, heavily attacked in front, but still holding the Conegliano hills, was threatened with envelopment by the dashing advance of the XVIIIth Corps, which was now to be backed by the VIIth.

On October 29 the developments were rapid. The Tenth Army continued its victorious advance. A flying column of British cavalry and infantry forced the passage of the Monticano north-east of Vazzola, securing the bridge on the Vazzola-Cimetta road before it could be blown up. According to Lord Cavan's report, "This resolute action undoubtedly saved us many hours of delay in the pursuit." For the battle in this sector was now developing, literally, into a pursuit. The XIth Corps on the right was also rolling up the enemy line. The quick-marching Bersagliere Division (the 23rd) passed to the Third Army in order to attack southward, its place being taken by the 10th Division, which joined the 37th in the eastward advance.

While the Tenth Army was pushing forward in the plain beyond the Piave the Eighth Army was making up for the time lost owing to the bridging difficulties. The VIIIth Corps attacked west of the Conegliano railway, and pushing back the enemy on its front, who were already threatened in the flank by the XVIIIth Corps, quickly occupied Susegana, while troops of the XVIIth Corps, advancing with great rapidity, brushed aside all resistance and occupied Conegliano. The situation of the Austrian Sixth Army was now hopeless. Hard pressed on its front, and with one line of communication gone, it began to retreat, too late. While the XVIIIth Corps, which had been returned to the Eighth Army, held a line running up to Conegliano and pinned the enemy to the hills, the VIIIth Corps pushed with all speed for Vittorio. A flying column of cavalry and Bersaglieri cyclists reached the town in the evening of October 29, with the infantry marching hard behind it. Meanwhile, the right wing and centre of the Austrian Sixth Army were retreating into the foothills, closely pressed by the XXIInd and XXVIIth Corps. At the end of the day the left wing of the Austrian Sixth Army was pinched in the salient of high ground that projects towards the river from Refrontolo and Conegliano, both held by the Italians, and was struggling to get back to

Vittorio, while the main body had been pushed into the hills north of the Sernaglia plain, and was trying to retreat by the Valmarino.

The Twelfth Army had also made splendid progress in its push northwards astride the Piave. West of the river the left wing advanced from Alano, and after stiff fighting crossed the Calcino torrent, thus increasing the threat to the enemy's left flank in the Grappa sector. East of the river the "Belluno Group" was now being menaced with the fate which had befallen the Sixth Army on its left. The Italians were now in strength in this sector, and an advance in force by the 1st Corps, the French 23rd Division and the Alpini of the 52nd Division was brilliantly successful. In spite of the difficulties of the ground (the hills rose steep and frowning on their front), in spite of the tenacious resistance of the enemy, backed by the fire of a great mass of guns, the attack ate deeply into the Austrian mountain positions, and the capture of Monte Cesen (5,197 feet) by the Alpini determined the Italian success. For Monte Cesen dominates the Quero gorge and the road leading to the Feltre basin.

In the Grappa sector, meanwhile, the enemy had passed from defence to attack. Convinced that the chief threat lay in this sector, he brought up his reserves from the Feltre region and counter-attacked on the very day that the main Italian action began on the Piave—October 27. On that day a great effort was made to re-capture Monte Pertica and the Valderoa. On Monte Pertica in particular a long and stubborn fight took place. The Austrians attacked eight times, and more than once they gained a footing on the summit. But in the end, after six hours' fighting, they were finally driven back, and accepted defeat. The attack on the Valderoa was no less unsuccessful, the Aosta Brigade resisting all the attempts of the enemy to drive them off the summit. And next day the Italians kept all the enemy positions under a heavy bombardment, preparatory to a renewal of the offensive. On October 29, while the Armies to the east of it were triumphantly breaking up the enemy resistance, the Fourth Army returned to its heavy and ungrateful task of hammering against fortified mountain positions by a direct frontal attack with inferior forces. Useful gains were made in the direction of Monte Prassolan, and an advance was made from the slopes of the Asolone to Col della Berretta, the scene

of long and stubborn fighting at the end of the previous year. The enemy was holding on grimly, and all the eleven divisions of the "Belluno Group" had now been engaged, but the position was becoming untenable. The Twelfth Army had worked its way up astride the Piave, and was turning the enemy's left. The capture of Pertica and the threat to Prassolan menaced his positions east of the Brenta. The whole line in the Grappa sector was cracking.

Up till the evening of October 29 the Italian Command was engaged in out-manceuvring, and the forces under it in out-fighting, an enemy who resisted stoutly. From the next day onwards the attackers were pursuing and "rounding up" a beaten army, which disintegrated rapidly. On the evening of October 29 the total number of prisoners taken by the Fourth, Twelfth, Eighth and Tenth Italian Armies was 33,000, not yet a great number in view of the large armies engaged and the wide area of the battle. In a few days more the figure was to be multiplied by ten, and that number was to be doubled before the last stragglers gave themselves into Italian hands.

On October 30, the Austrian line from the Brenta to the sea, already pierced in places and cracking in others, began to waver backwards and break up. In the Tenth Army area the Austrians made their last stand on the Monticano, but on the morning of October 30 the passage of the river was forced at various points. In these operations, Lord Cavan reported, "Very gallant work was done by the 8th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment," and, in the words of the British General, "from this moment the defeat became a rout." The Third Army now came into action on the extreme right, on the Lower Piave. Crossings were forced in various places, the frontal attack being helped by the work of the 23rd Division, which had been transferred from the Tenth Army, and took the enemy in the flank. The Austrians were now on the move, and only rearguards contested the Duke of Aosta's advance. It was the same in the Eighth Army sector, where the enemy was striving desperately to get back by means of insufficient communications. For his main line was cut, and he was being manoeuvred and pushed into the hills. His rearguards were putting up a fight in the passes that lead from the Valmarino and Vittorio to Belluno and the Upper Piave, but their task was hopeless. Farther west, the Twelfth



FIGHT FOR A RAILWAY TUNNEL,

Army forced the Quero gorge and definitely turned the Grappa positions.

Late in the evening of October 30, the Austrian command issued the following *communiqué*: "Taking into account the resolve so often expressed to bring about the conclusion of an armistice and peace, putting an end to the struggle of nations, our troops fighting on Italian soil will evacuate the occupied region." On the previous evening the enemy had admitted a withdrawal "to a rearward line," a withdrawal which he confessed was the result of pressure, but the announcement that the occupied territories would be evacuated came unexpectedly to the world and signalled the final breakdown of the Austrian resistance. The manner of the bulletin was sufficiently unsoldierly to have been inspired from Berlin.

In point of fact the Austrians had raised the white flag, literally, the evening before, in a sector far from the field of battle. Towards the evening of October 29 an Austrian officer with a white flag was seen advancing from the enemy trenches in the Val Lagarina, near Serravalle, about half-way between Ala and Roberoto. The officer, whose rank was only that of captain, declared that he had come to broach the question of an armistice, but he had

no authoritative documents to show his quality as an official emissary. He was therefore sent back to the enemy lines with a message to the effect that if the proposal were serious a properly accredited mission should be sent, with a senior officer at its head. Twenty-four hours later the white flag was raised again, and a small group of men left the Austrian trenches. At their head was General von Weber, commander of the Sixth Corps, and the group included eight other representatives, naval and military; they were followed by a dozen attendants.

The night was spent in a villa near Borghetto, between Ala and the frontier, and next day, in closed motor-cars, with the blinds down, the mission was accompanied to the Villa Giusti, not far from Padua. Telegrams flashed to and from Paris, where Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino had gone to attend the Versailles Conference, the Supreme Allied War Council, which had met to discuss the question of a reply to Germany's request for an armistice. But meanwhile the fighting went on.

The next event was the enemy retreat on the Grappa front. This had been clearly foreshadowed by the successes farther east, and it was no surprise when, on the night of



[Official photograph.]

A MODEL BRITISH FIELD AMBULANCE DRESSING STATION ON THE ITALIAN FRONT.

October 30-31, the movement began. The rearguards who were detailed to cover the retreat broke down under the pressure of the Fourth Army, who now at last found their work directly rewarded. Till now they had laboured for others, but at last they too were to join in the general advance. By the evening of October 31 the left wing of the Fourth Army was in possession of Monte Roncone, looking down upon the Val Cison, with patrols thrown out towards Fonzaso; the centre had pushed right through to Feltre, while the right, advancing from Monte Spinoncia, reached Monte Tematico and cut off the Austrians who were still resisting the left wing of the Twelfth Army, north of Quero. Across the river the right wing of the Twelfth Army was coming down upon the Upper Piave from the Monte Cesen region, and farther east the river was reached by troops of the Eighth Army, who had a long running fight in the mountains and were held up for some time in the San Boldo pass. Farther east again Belluno was being threatened from the south and patrols were sent out from the Fadalto pass towards Ponte nelle Alpi, north-east of Belluno. In the hills east of the pass and in the plain equally good progress was made. The right wing of the Eighth Army pushed north and north-east from Vittorio, and the Tenth Army pursued its undeviating way across the plain, extending its front in a northerly direction to keep in touch with the Eighth Army, which had swung to the left into the hills. But cavalry was now being pushed forward between the two Armies north of Sacile, which had been reached almost simultaneously by British troops of the Tenth Army and a detachment of Italian cavalry. The First and Third Cavalry Divisions crossed the Livenza north of the little town and sent out patrols on the roads leading to the Tagliamento. From Sacile down to the sea the Tenth and Third Armies reached the line of the Livenza and in places crossed the river, though they found several bridges destroyed. Here it is apposite to quote Lord Cavan's tribute to his Army, for their fighting was practically over. Indeed, it had really ceased on the previous day with the crossing of the Monticano. Henceforward there were only a few skirmishes; the main work of the Army lay in picking up prisoners and guns. Lord Cavan wrote as follows:—"The energy and determination of the infantry have been beyond all praise. The

difficulties of bridging the Piave led at first to an inevitable shortness of supply. In spite of lack of food and sleep, and in the face of constant fighting, the 37th Italian Division and the 7th and 23rd British Divisions have advanced without relief to their final objectives."*

The *Piave Armee* and the "Belluno Group"



THE AUSTRIAN GENERAL WEBER
VON WEBERNAU,

Who surrendered to the Italians.

had ceased to exist. Their broken remnants were straggling east and north, eastward into Friuli or up into Cadore, retracing the path they had trodden as triumphant victors barely a year before. Their faces were set for home, and it was only from time to time that the stammer of machine-guns showed where groups still resisted. And whether they stood or whether they fled, it was not a great proportion that escaped the quick-following Italians.

It was now the turn of the *Trentino Armee*,

* The 37th was the only Italian division which remained under Lord Cavan's command throughout the battle. The 23rd Bersaglieri Division was transferred to the Third Army on October 29, being replaced by the 10th. The Eighteenth Corps was attached to the Tenth Army for less than two days.

first to give and then to break. The process was much shorter, for the day was already hopelessly lost when serious fighting began in this sector. On October 28 the enemy troops in the Seven Communes (Eleventh Army) had withdrawn to the so-called *Winterstellung*, north of the Asiago basin, a line which ran from the wood by Gallio along the slopes of Monte Interrotto and Monte Rasta. A couple of days later numerous conflagrations and explosions behind the lines seemed to indicate that the enemy was preparing for a move northward, and the Italians decided to attack in this sector also, although they were greatly inferior in numbers. It was on this day, as a matter of fact, that the Austrians announced that they would retire to the old frontier line, in the hope, no doubt, of securing a cessation of hostilities by this "voluntary" withdrawal. They were, of course, too late. It was not likely that proposals based on this withdrawal would be considered when General Diaz was already sure of a great victory.

On October 30 and 31 the Italian Sixth Army was testing the enemy's new positions, and on the morning of November 1 an attack was launched. On the extreme right, immediately west of the Val Brenta, the Italians took full advantage of the successes of the Fourth Army and rolled up the Austrian left. Troops of the Ancona Brigade came up the precipitous sides of Monte Spitz and Monte Chior and took the defenders in the flank. By the end of the day the right of the Sixth Army was on Monte Lisser and ran nearly westward from there. In the centre the Thirteenth Corps with the French 24th Division broke right through the enemy's rearguard, and after pushing up the Val Campomulo turned westward and occupied the ridge dividing the Val Campomulo from the Val di Nos. On the left the Twelfth Corps (Italian 20th Division and British 48th Division) went straight for the enemy's main line of retreat and found a stiffer resistance than elsewhere. A hard day's fighting found the 48th Division held up in front of Monte Interrotto, though progress had been made on the slopes of Monte Moseiagh. The 20th Division on the left crossed the Assa between Rotzo and Roana, but was held for a time by the enemy rearguards, who were strongly posted in prepared positions on the western section of the Seven Communes, the plateau between the Assa and the Astico. The delay was of little use, for in the Brenta valley the left wing of the Fourth Army was

marshaling hard to cut off the retreat of the Austrians in the Asiago district, and by the evening of November 1 the 21st Division had overwhelmed the enemy troops at Grigno and cut off the retreat of large bodies of troops who were coming down from the Seven Communes by the Margesina-Grigno road. On November 2 the enemy resistance broke down altogether. Early in the morning the British 48th Division took Monte Moseiagh and thus turned the enemy positions on Monte Interrotto. This was the end. The Eleventh Austrian Army broke up completely, and its crumbled pieces were for the most part overtaken by the pursuers or picked up without resistance as they came down wearily from their mountain positions and found the valleys already in possession of the victors and their retreat cut off.

The Austrians had put up a good fight the first day, and if the rearguards had held on to their positions with the same tenacity on the second day a much larger number of troops would have got away, though the retreat of many was already barred by the advance of the Fourth Army in the Val Brenta. But on November 2 everything seemed to come to an end at once. Perhaps it was the knowledge of their desperate position that made the commands give up. For they certainly did throw up the sponge. In some cases it seems to have been believed that the mere acceptance of the request to discuss an armistice signified the end of hostilities. A divisional general who was captured with his staff on November 2 by troops of the British 48th Division expressed a lively indignation with the action of his captors. He insisted that the armistice had already been signed, and that he and his men should have been permitted to go their way without interference. It is uncertain how the news that an armistice had been signed had its origin. Probably it arose from the knowledge that a mission had been sent to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and from a calculation how long the discussions would last. Or it may have been a mere rumour, founded on nothing at all save the fact that discussions had been undertaken. That was evidently widely known, and the breakdown in the enemy resistance may be put down as due to a reluctance to go on fighting when the end was so near.

On November 2 the Austrian Eleventh Army crumbled to fragments, and on the same

morning the first attacks were launched against the Tenth Army, which occupied the rest of the Trentino front, from the Val d'Astico to the Swiss borders. In the early morning of November 2 the 6th Division attacked in the Astico valley. The first attack failed. A second broke right through the enemy's resistance and cleared the way up the valley. A column advanced rapidly to Lastebasse, thus driving a wedge between the enemy troops in the Tonezza sector and those who were falling

a stand being made at Pozzacchio. It was only a flash in the pan, but it gave a chance to the Liguria Brigade to distinguish itself. Nearly two and a half years earlier, at the most anxious moment of the Austrian drive of May, 1916, the Liguria Brigade, then newly formed, had won great honour by its heroic resistance on one of the spurs of Monte Pau. At a most critical spot, at a most critical hour, it had stemmed the advance of the enemy. The brigade held for eleven terrible days, and came



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH ARTILLERYMEN IN ITALY HAULING THEIR GUN INTO POSITION.

back from the Seven Communes before the attacks of the Sixth Army. Next to move was the left wing of the Sixth Army, in Val Lagarina. Storm troops and Alpini attacked the enemy lines which ran across the valley near Sarravalle and overwhelmed the defence. The whole of the Twenty-ninth Corps supported this attack, and the enemy line was broken from Garda to Zugna Torta. By nine o'clock in the evening the Alpini were in Rovereto, with other troops hastening after them. Meanwhile the Fifth Corps had attacked on Pasubio and the Borcola Pass, and after overcoming the resistance of the enemy's first line, which was very weak, also pushed for Rovereto by way of the Vallarsa and Val Terragnolo. There was some stiff fighting in the Vallarsa,

out of battle a mere remnant.* It was fitting that it should win new laurels at the very end of the long struggle in the same region as the scene of its first great feat of arms, but across the frontier, well into enemy country.

On the night of November 2 the Seventh Army also joined the general forward movement. Troops attacked Monte Pari, coming up from the Ledro basin, and descended upon Riva from the west, to join with the left of the First Army, which was pushing down upon Torbole from Monte Altissimo, the northern ridge of Monte Baldo. Next day the attack west of Garda became general, and progress was very rapid, as it was all along the line. In the afternoon Trento was

* See Chapter CXXXIX.

reached by a flying column which advanced from Rovereto, and late the same evening cavalry of the Fourth Army, which had pushed up the Val Sngana from Borgo, also entered Trento. One of the goals on which the mind of Italy had been set for so long was reached at last.

In the western Trentino flying columns of the Seventh Army advanced from the Stelvio and Tonale passes, while there was a general move forward in the Val Giudicaria. The troops from the Stelvio came down upon the Upper Adige and effectually blocked the way of those who were trying to retreat by this route. The Tonale column, consisting mainly of cavalry and Alpini in motor lorries, with some mountain artillery, made all speed down the Val Vermiglio till they reached Dimaro, and so cut off the enemy troops retiring from the Giudicaria by way of Madonna di Campiglio. Those who had tried to come back by Vezzano were caught by the advance on Trento.

Similar scenes were taking place all along the front. In the mountains quick-marching columns of Italians pushed through the valleys and picked up Austrians as they came down from their mountain positions. Or, leaving the valleys, picked troops pushed direct across the mountains by hill paths, and came down upon

the slow-moving transport of the enemy and cut off guns and men and material. In the plains of the Veneto and Friuli the pursuit went on, and a flying column of cavalry hastened up the valley of the Tagliamento towards Pontebba. Here and there detachments of the enemy turned at bay and made resistance, but in most cases the weary, starving men laid down their arms without much ado. Prisoners were taken in hundreds, in thousands. When the hour fixed for the cessation of hostilities struck over 300,000 prisoners were already counted. When all those who had been cut off by the Italians were taken and enumerated the total figure approached 700,000. Three divisions which were cut off in the Tagliamento valley, near Gemona, were allowed to pass through Pontebba into Austria after being disarmed. The Italians had, indeed, far more prisoners than they knew what to do with, and the task of feeding them imposed a very heavy strain on the supply services. Nearly 7,000 guns were left in Italian hands.

When the conditions to be imposed upon Austria-Hungary had been agreed upon between General Diaz and the Allied representatives at Versailles, the terms were presented to the Austrian Mission and quickly accepted. On the morning of November 1 General Badoglio,



[Official photograph.]

AN AUSTRIAN LORRY HIT BY A BRITISH SHELL.



[Italian official photograph.]

THE STELVIO.

Sub-chief of the Italian General Staff, first visited General von Weber at Villa Giusti. The next day there was a long conversation between General Badoglio and the enemy mission, when the general lines of the armistice were laid down, and on November 3, at five o'clock in the afternoon, General Badoglio, accompanied by his staff and a naval representative, arrived at Villa Giusti for the final act, the signature of the armistice. The signatures were affixed at 6.30, and it was agreed that hostilities should come to an end the following day, November 4, at 3 p.m.

When the hour struck, and fighting ceased, the Italian line ran roughly as follows:—Schluderns, Spondinig and Prad in the Val Venosta, blocking the western exit from the Upper Adige; Malè, Cles and the Mendola Pass, in the hills south-west of Bozen; Salerno in the Val d'Adige, nearly midway between Trento and Bozen; Cembra in Val d'Avisio and thence in a curve by Monte Panarotta, above Levico in the Val Sugana, to Fiere di Primiero in Val Cison; thence to Cencenighe in Val Cordevole, Chiapuzza and Domegge in the Val d'Ampezzo and Upper Piave respectively; thence in a curve south of the Upper Tagliamento to Tolmezzo and from Tolmezzo up the Val Fella to Pontebba; thence down to the sea in a line

that nearly followed that of the old frontier, passing a little west of Caporetto and east of Cormons to Cervignano, Aquileia and Grado. But before the hour arrived, before even the signature of the armistice, a more distant goal was reached by another route—Trieste.

The following account of the Italian landing at Trieste and of the events which immediately preceded it was given by a special correspondent of *The Times*, who crossed from Venice to Trieste on November 3, and landed with the first troops:—

“Trieste is at last in Italian hands. This evening at dusk I landed with the Bersaglieri,* the first troops to reach the city. On the harbour front were thousands of people, who gave them a wild and unforgettable welcome. There was not any sort of opposition; indeed, for several days the Austrian régime had been at an end in Trieste, dying in a sort of inanition, without glory, and making no fight at all.

“On October 28 all kinds of rumours were circulating of historic events in other parts of the Empire. The Emperor Charles was said to

* The troops which crossed consisted of the 2nd Bersaglieri Brigade and other details. A battalion of Bersaglieri and a company of naval machine-gunners began to land at four o'clock in the afternoon.



CROWDS OF AUSTRIAN PRISONERS.

be in flight; prisoners of war were being liberated everywhere; National Councils were being formed; the Entente Fleet was said to have entered Pola after a battle.

"More immediate signs of Austria's disintegration were not wanting. Disbanded soldiers, joining with some of the criminal elements, had begun to prowl about the outskirts of the city, and even made their appearance at the *Punto Franco*, a part of the docks, robbing and firing rifles and revolvers.

"On the 29th flags were flying everywhere, both the Italian national flag and the flag of the Italian Socialist Party. In the afternoon masses of young men began to parade the city, bearing in front of them a large red, white and green banner. They went through the chief streets, and soon thousands began to join them. Someone hurried off and came back with a band playing airs that had been forbidden for years, 'The Bell of San Giusto,' and other patriotic songs of Italian Trieste.

"Meanwhile some of the principal personages of all parties decided to form a Committee of Public Safety. Twelve members of the Italian Nationalist Party, twelve of the Italian Socialist Party, and four representatives of the Slav population took over the government and issued a proclamation declaring their intention to effect the separation from Austria of Trieste and the country of the littoral. . . .

"On the afternoon of the 29th delegates of the Committee went to the palace of the Lieutenant-Governor, Baron von Fries Skene, and declared that they wished to see him. Soldiers were on guard in the hall and on the great staircase.

"'Who are you?' asked the officer of the guard. 'The Committee of Public Safety, come to take over the government of the city from the Lieutenant-Governor,' answered the spokesman.

"The officer hesitated a moment, shrugged his shoulders, and gave the message to Baron von Fries Skene. The latter said he was ready to receive the deputation, and they were led into one of the upper rooms of the palace. The Governor bowed slightly to the spokesman of the deputation, who, stepping forward, said it was his duty to inform him that a Committee of Public Safety had been formed and was about to take over the government of Trieste.

"The Governor, who had listened calmly, turned to the deputation and said, 'But what am I to do? You must let me communicate with Dr. Lammasch' (then Premier at Vienna).



[Official photograph.]

A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN MORTAR AND DUG-OUT.

The deputation said they would await the reply, and then left the palace.

"They came back before 8 o'clock, Dr. Lammasch's answer having come in the interval. Again they were ushered into the Governor's presence. He said immediately: 'Gentlemen, I shall hand over authority to you.' He asked if they would arrange a safe-conduct for him, and the Naval Commander of the Port, who was present, asked to be included. Both showed, if not an obvious, at least an underlying fear of popular revenge.

"Next morning at 10 o'clock the Governor left his palace quietly in a motor-car and was driven off along the Lubiana road. . . .

"Soon after midday on the 31st there began a dramatic wireless conversation between Trieste and Venice. 'To Commander of Fleet of Entente,' came a telegram out of the blue, 'Committee of Public Safety of Trieste, in view of grave state of city, wish to treat with Entente Fleet. Come and meet us off Point Caorle. Answer if you have received. We are waiting.' Members of the Committee were standing round Trieste's solitary wireless operator as he sent off this message, and waited with an anxiety that can be imagined as he listened for an acknowledgment of the message. It came

almost at once. 'All right; quite all right.' Then the Committee asked for an answer to be given by nine in the evening, as they had only one operator; and at nine punctually Venice sent them a short message saying: 'Very well; to-morrow morning after nine.—Officer Commanding Venice.'

"As soon as they had this reply three delegates boarded an ex-Austrian torpedo-boat and left for Venice. They explained to Admiral Marzolo the great need of Trieste, and he promised to assist them and to give them an answer on the morrow. Here, perhaps, the story may be taken up from the other end.

"In response to the invitation of the delegates it was decided that an expedition should leave for Trieste. In the dark of the early morning I went on board a torpedo-boat from a Venice quay. We were 24 units in all, spread in a long line over the sea, among them all sorts of ships that had been pressed into service by reason of the need of haste.

"Ahead of all the Italian vessels was a destroyer, with General Pettitti di Roreto on board. The Podesta could not wait for him to come ashore, and hastened on board from a small boat. . . .

"All the cordons were broken by the mass of people struggling to approach the ships.



TRIESTE.

When the General put his foot to the ground he said in a firm voice, 'In the name of His Majesty the King of Italy I take possession of the city of Trieste.' With difficulty he got into a waiting motor-car, which, moving at a walking pace, finally reached the Piazza Grande, flanked by high white palaces on every side, and entered that of the Lieutenant-Governor. He and all the officers and soldiers who disembarked after him were cheered and pelted with flowers incessantly. Bersaglieri were embraced by rapturous women, who tore the plumes from the steel helmets and thrust them in their bosoms.

"Stirring speeches followed at an official reception. General Pettitti told the Mayor that he had upon him his appointment not only as Governor of Trieste but also of Venezia Giulia. . . . 'Trieste,' said the General, 'has fulfilled its aspirations. It is henceforward indissolubly united to Italy.' He then dissolved the Committee of Public Safety, and said that he desired that the Town Council should re-enter into possession of those special rights of which it had been deprived in May, 1915.

"The aspect of the city as it faces this evening its unknown future is extraordinary. The tumultuous mixture of its streets can hardly be described. One watches the scene with a sort of stupor, and cannot realize that here, before one's eyes, one of the great war aims stands gained—that an Empire has crumbled away here, and Italy, after three years of passion, has come to her reward."

It was on the same day that Trento and Trieste came into Italian hands. The two ancient Italian cities, whose names, united in a single formula, had formed the symbol and the war-cry of Irredentism throughout two genera-

tions, were finally redeemed. Only ten days before they had seemed still far off, and though their eventual possession had been assured by the common victory which showed clearly on the horizon, few, perhaps none, would have dared to predict their occupation by Italian arms before active hostilities came to an end. But the offensive on the Middle Piave had dealt the final, irresistible blow to the worn-out, tottering Empire of the Habsburgs. The Imperial Army had held out to the last, and till the day was irretrievably lost the troops of the Monarchy fought stubbornly and courageously. But when they were beaten the Armies of the Monarchy crumbled away as the civil power had done before them.

Before the hour came for the arms of the Monarchy to be laid down in acknowledgment of unconditional surrender, another centre of Italian hopes was occupied by a handful of Italian troops. At 2.30 p.m. on November 4 an Italian torpedo-boat entered the little port of Zara, the administrative centre of Dalmatia under the Austrian *régime*, and landed a patrol of infantry. As they landed the Italian flag was run up over the Palazzo Municipale, replacing the Yugoslav flag which had been flown by order of the local Yugoslav representatives recently appointed by the central Yugoslav administration at Spalato, itself acting under directions from the Yugoslav Council, which had formed itself into a Government at Zagreb (Agram). As the torpedo-boat drew near the quay those on board saw a very moving sight. The crowd which had gathered to welcome the first Italian troops to this faithful stronghold of *italianità* fell on their knees. Alone of all the Dalmatian towns, Zara had been able to preserve

its Italian majority. At length its fidelity was rewarded.

The conditions of the armistice, which came into force at three o'clock on the afternoon of November 4, were as follows:—

I. MILITARY CLAUSES.

1. The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea, and air.

2. Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army, and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

It will follow the crest of the Rhaetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisack, passing by the Reschen and Brenner passes and the Oetzthal and Zillertal Alps; the line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach (presumably the Toblacher Feld) and meeting the present frontier of the Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis (?), and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Predil Pass, Mount Manhart, the Tricorno (Triglav), and the passes of Podbrdo, Podlanscam, and Idria. From this point the line turns south-east towards the Schneeberg,



[Italian Naval Official.]

TRIESTE'S WELCOME TO THE ITALIANS.

The photograph was taken from the deck of the Italian destroyer, the fore part of which is seen on the right.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in Clause 3 below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force a maximum of 20 Divisions, reduced to pre-war peace effective. Half the Divisional, Corps, and Army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

3. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of war. Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian Armies behind a line fixed as follows:—

From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio

excluding the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries; from the Schneeberg it goes down towards the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia and Volosea in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Licarica and Trivania (Lissarika and Tribanje), and to the south territory limited by a line from the coast at Cape Planka to the watershed eastwards so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and watercourses running towards Sebenico—namely the Cikola, Kerka, Butisniea, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia, from Premuda Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura in the north down to Meleda in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea,

Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, as well as the neighbouring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, but without the islands of Grande and Piccola Zirona, Bua, Solta, and Brazza.

All territories thus evacuated will be occupied by the troops of the Allies and of the United States of America.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal), belonging to or within these territories, to be left *in situ*, and surrendered to the Allies according to special orders given by the Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage, or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the Associated Powers.

4. The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation. The Armies of the Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order. They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the troops of the Associated Powers wherever they may be.

5. Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days, not only from the Italian and

Balkan fronts, but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within that date.

6. The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be entrusted to the local authorities under the control of the Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation.

7. The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all Allied prisoners of war and interned subjects, and of civil populations evacuated from their homes, on conditions to be laid down by the Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the various fronts.

8. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian *personnel*, who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

II. NAVAL CONDITIONS.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

2. Surrender to the Allies and United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines, completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and



Official photograph.

AN ITALIAN GUN BLOWN UP BY THE ITALIANS ON THEIR RETREAT, RECAPTURED FROM THE AUSTRIANS IN THE ITALIAN ADVANCE.



TRENTO.

of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed, and to remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America.

3. Surrender to the Allies and United States of America, with their complete armament and equipment, of:—

- Three battleships,
- Three light cruisers,
- Nine destroyers,
- Twelve torpedo-boats,
- One minelayer,
- Six Danube monitors,

to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and United States of America.

4. Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of the Allied and Associated Powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to sweep up all minefields and obstructions, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to ensure the freedom of navigation on the Danube, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defence works.

5. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all Austro-Hungarian merchant vessels found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a Commission nominated by the Allies and United States of America.

6. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

7. Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment, and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

8. Occupation by the Allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defences and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

9. All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers to be returned.

10. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

11. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The terms of the armistice were the natural sequel to the crushing defeat which had brought it about. It is clear that Austria-Hungary was on the point of giving up the game when General Diaz attacked, but the conditions on which she was preparing to retire were very

different from those which were finally imposed. Italy won a crushing victory, and as a result the Allies were able to impose upon the representatives of the broken Monarchy conditions which not only left the Habsburg lands at the mercy of the victors, but opened new routes for attack upon Germany if the war should con-



ITALIAN ARMOURED CAR.

tinue. The victory of Vittorio Veneto had far-reaching results, but the breakdown of the enemy was so dramatically sudden and complete that the effort which brought it about was underestimated both at the time and afterwards. It was no wonder that this should happen. The last week of October and the first fortnight of November made up a period so crammed with great events that it was almost impossible for the mind to grasp them. And each nation naturally fixed its attention on the triumphs which touched it most closely. One fact which was not generally appreciated was that the price paid for the final victory over the Armies of the Monarchy was not light, though it did not compare with the very heavy toll of dead and wounded which had marked the other great battles on the Italian front. The Italian losses in killed, wounded and missing were over 33,000, while the casualties of the British troops were some 2,000. By far the heaviest losses

were sustained by the Fourth Army in the Grappa sector, whose casualty list totalled over 20,000. Next came the Tenth Army, which had some 5,000 casualties, including those of the British Fourteenth Corps (close upon 2,000). The Eighth Army casualties were well over 4,000, those of the Twelfth Army about 2,400. The losses in the Third and Sixth Armies were slight, less than a thousand in each case, while those of the other Armies and the cavalry were negligible.

The casualty list is sufficient indication that the troops of the falling Empire began by putting up a stout resistance. If they had been better handled the price of victory would have been heavier still, and there was a moment when the result of the battle seemed to hang in the balance, when the flooded river held up the right wing of the Eighth Army, and threatened to thwart the movement which was the centre point of the Italian plan. The brilliant advance of the Tenth Army could have brought about no more than a local success, and one which it might have been difficult to maintain, if the push through Conegliano upon Vittorio had been further held up. The advance upon Valdobbiadene and that in the Sernaglia plain were equally dependent for their full result upon this push. The difficulty was overcome by General Cavaglia's prompt dispatch of the XVIIIth Corps to attack northward from the Tenth Army bridgehead, and by the quickness and decision with which General Basso carried out this attack under Lord Cavan's orders. This movement eased the whole situation at once, and enabled the general plan to be accomplished successfully. The enemy was fairly outmanœuvred and outfought. His guns and reserves were in the wrong place. The gallant attacks and heavy sacrifices of the Italian Fourth Army were not in vain, for their stubborn fighting kept the way clear for the movement farther south, while the splendid advance of the Tenth Army prevented the reserves in the southern part of the plain from being brought up to the danger point.

Some of these latter reserves, moreover, had little stomach for the fight. They had been more affected than the comparatively isolated troops in the mountains by the news of the political breakdown of the Monarchy. While the troops in line were still held up to the mark by the old discipline, some of those in reserve had already begun to show signs of

the dissolution that followed so quickly upon defeat. To sum up, the troops of the Monarchy fought stoutly to begin with, especially in those sectors which had been regarded as most critical and where the best divisions had consequently been placed. But there was no reserve of *moral*, either among the troops or in the commands, sufficient to bring about a recovery that would have limited defeat and averted disaster.

It was a wonderful achievement, this victory, crowning and complete, that was won a year

but essentially intact. The struggle of the subject races would have been for an autonomy under the Habsburg Crown. If the Southern Slavs had attained union, it would probably have been within the Empire which loosed war upon the world by its determination to crush the Kingdom of Serbia.

It was the resistance of Italian arms, the staying power of the Italian troops and the Italian people, that assured the chance to the subject races to develop their programme of political disruption. The chance was taken,



A JUGO-SLAV DEMONSTRATION IN LUBIANA (LAIBACH).

after the great disaster of Caporetto. It was not Italy's greatest victory. To those who followed the deeds of her Armies, month after month and year after year, her greatest victory was the long struggle and successful resistance between Asiago and the Piave that followed the mournful retreat. But that great triumph over despair, which will always be vivid in the memories of those who witnessed its tragic circumstances, seemed at the time to have only a negative result. The same is true in a lesser degree of the Piave battle six months later, when the offensive power of the Austrians was broken for ever. Yet these were the necessary steps to the victorious battle which brought down the Empire of the Habsburgs to utter ruin. But for the successful defence in the mountains and on the Piave, the political fabric of the Monarchy would have remained—tinkered, repaired and altered, no doubt,

and the summer and autumn of 1918 saw a gradual failure of the central Government of the Empire to cope with the various national movements. Czechs, Yugoslavs and Poles, all pronounced their will. On October 2 representatives of these subject nationalities declared openly that the offer of "autonomy" made by Baron Hussarek came too late. The peoples would decide for themselves.

All through October the news showed that the Monarchy was breaking up, and it was clear that the end could not be far off when Hungary showed a tendency to break away from her partner in the iniquitous Dual System. But it was not until battle was joined on the Piave and in the mountains that the final crack came. While the soldiers of the Monarchy were still fighting stubbornly the civil Government melted away. Revolution, which had been working fast, in secret, or only half in sight, came out

into open day. Not only did the subject races grasp their fate. Austria and Hungary themselves rose against the Emperor, and republics were proclaimed. While the Army still resisted, dissolution overtook the Navy. At Pola the sailors rose against their officers, headed by Croatian officers acting under the orders of the Yugoslav National Council at Agram, and the dying Government of the Monarchy solemnly handed over the Fleet, a considerable part of which was already out of their control, to the newly constituted Southern Slav authority. The crews were largely out of hand, and there was a riot of looting and destruction—so much so, that when the Italians subsequently entered Pola and the other ports very few of the vessels lately belonging to Austria-Hungary were in a condition to put to sea. And there was no one to take them, for the greater part of their crews deserted in the general confusion and made for their homes wherever they could.

Immediately after the fleet had been handed over to the Yugoslavs an incident took place which had the unfortunate effect of exasperating the already unsatisfactory relations between Italians and Southern Slavs. On the afternoon of October 31 two Italian naval officers left Venice with the object of entering the harbour of Pola and blowing up an Austrian battleship. Shortly afterwards the news came from Pola by wireless that the fleet was in possession of the Slavs and would be handed over to the Entente, but it was too late to stop the enterprise. The two adventurers succeeded in entering Pola harbour under cover of darkness, and towards dawn they blew up the battleship *Viribus Unitis*, which was commanded by the senior Yugoslav officer, Capt. Vukotitch, who had taken over the ships in the name of the National Council. It was a daring exploit, but it had an unfortunate effect, and the Italians were bitterly criticized for an unavoidable mistake.



CHAPTER CCXCVII.

FRENCH CAMPAIGN IN 1918.

THE FRONT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1918—THE MARCH OFFENSIVE—GOUGH'S POSITION—THE FRENCH INTERVENE—DOUBLE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN APRIL—MAY OFFENSIVE ON THE CHEMIN DES DAMES—FRENCH RETREAT TO THE MARNE—JUNE OFFENSIVE NORTH OF OISE—THE FRENCH COUNTER-ATTACK OF JUNE 11—PREPARATIONS FOR THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF JULY 18—GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF JULY 15 IN CHAMPAGNE AND MARNE FRONTS—GOURAUD'S SURPRISE—GERMANS CROSS THE MARNE—MANGIN AND DEGOUTTE ATTACK ON JULY 18—ALLIES OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST 8—FRENCH ATTACK SOUTH OF OISE ON AUGUST 18—ALLIES ADVANCE NORTH OF OISE—AND MANGIN AGAIN BETWEEN OISE AND AISNE—END OF THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT—FIRST PHASE OF VICTORY OFFENSIVE: GOURAUD, PERSHING AND BERTHELOT FROM MEUSE TO VESLE—MANGIN FROM VESLE TO OISE—LAON DELIVERED—FRENCH AND BRITISH NORTH OF OISE—SECOND PHASE: GENERAL ADVANCE FROM OCTOBER 17 TO OCTOBER 30—THIRD PHASE: NOVEMBER 1 TO THE ARMISTICE.

IN this chapter* the general *résumé* of the campaigns of the French Armies on the Western Front will be brought to a close with a survey of the events of 1918, the tremendous climax of the 40 months of patient heroism from 1914 to 1917, briefly described in Chapter CCXCIII. The net result of the campaign of 1917 was that the Ypres salient had been slightly extended (the greatest depth of the advance, immediately in front of Ypres, was five miles) along the 20-mile front between Dixmude and Messines, and that between Lens and Berry au Bae the Allies had made an advance 30 miles deep in the centre at St. Quentin, on a front of about a hundred. Over the rest of the front the positions of the opposing armies were almost identically the same as in the middle of November in the first year of the war. The Germans still held the massif of Laon, the principal bastion either for attack or defence of their whole position on the western front, and, on the other hand, Ypres and Verdun were still in the hands of the English and the French. In the language of

sport it was anyone's game. The question was who would start the ball rolling when time was called with the return of Spring, the probability being that the Germans must strike first, since they could not afford to wait till the Allies were reinforced by the arrival of the American legions.

On broad lines the cases of Ypres, the Laon massif and Verdun were strongly characteristic of the main difference between the strategy of the Allies and the enemy. Through the whole war the Laon massif was never directly attacked by the French, whereas the Germans expended an immense amount of their energy in repeated attempts to take Ypres and Verdun by frontal assaults. Till nothing was left for them but retreat they never finally abandoned this policy of the direct objective, partly because time was for them of vital importance, and partly because they had, if possible, to justify in the eyes of the German nation, the aggressive part which they played in the war by victories of sentimental as well as military value. Nancy, Paris, Ypres, and the Channel Ports in 1914, Verdun in 1916, and Paris again in 1918, were for them almost as much idealized symbols of victory as real military objectives. As an inspiration and impulse to further effort

* The record of French achievement given in this chapter and chapter CCXLIII. is based on French official papers and the comprehensive *Chronologie de la Guerre* published by Berger-Levrault (Paris and Nancy).
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[French official photograph.]

A FRENCH NAVAL GUN ON THE OISE FRONT.

they had to be kept before the eyes of army and people by direct and unmistakable attacks, the failure of which was one of the chief causes of the German defeat. The Allies, on the other hand, especially after they had set to work to attack in earnest and in effective combination, after Foch had been appointed to the supreme command, consistently followed the policy of striking right and left of each given objective, on small as well as on big fronts, thereby time after time creating central salients from which the enemy was obliged to withdraw.

That, however, was not till later. At the beginning of the fifth year of the war our armies were still acting on the defensive, waiting for the expected attack. In February the British had taken over part of the French front, extending their right south of St. Quentin as far as Barisis, a few miles south of La Fère, on the Oise, on the west edge of the Laon massif. When the great German offensive began, the British were holding about a hundred miles of the total front, the Belgians twenty-five and the French the remaining two hundred and seventy-five. It was, however, practically certain that the blow would be delivered on

one of the two sides of the obtuse angle Verdun-Barisis-Nieuport, and on this sector the British and Belgians held a hundred and twenty-five miles north of Barisis to the sea, and the French almost exactly the same length of front from Barisis to Verdun. The Germans had the advantage of the interior lines of communications from which they could rapidly move troops to any part of this front by the railway systems centreing round Brussels and Mons in Belgium and Hirson and Mezières north of the Ardennes. Some of the French staff believed that the main thrust was to be on the Champagne front, between Barisis and Verdun. But the general opinion of both French and British staffs was that the enemy would strike exactly when and where they did, on the line between Barisis and Arras.

As regards time and place, therefore, the Allies were ready for the attack. What they were not prepared for was the overwhelming numerical superiority of the forces which the enemy, by an extremely clever and elaborate system of night marches and swift and secret transport, had concentrated almost at the last moment on the front held by the armies of Gough and Byng.

Although this is the story not of the British but of the French Armies, a few details must be recalled here of the opening phase of the offensive. The front of the attack was about 55 miles long, from the Scarpe, a few miles east of Arras, to La Fère on the Oise, and was divided into three equal parts by the Bapaune-Cambrai road and the river Omignon, which runs into the Somme eight miles south of Peronne. From north to south these three sections were occupied by the armies of von Below, von der Marwitz and von Hutier. By the eve of the attack 75 fresh divisions had been brought up to reinforce the 15 originally posted between the Scarpe and the Oise, and of the whole 99 (about half the total German force on the west front) from 40 to 50 were placed in the first line. They had gone through a course of intensive training in the tactics employed and rehearsed by von Hutier in his attack on Riga at the end of the previous August, the main features of which were a short preliminary bombardment of intense severity chiefly with gas shells, a continuous advance, without any pause after the first attack, of successive waves of troops in mass formation which passed each other as they came up, each battalion and division

being echeloned in depth, and a heavy bombardment up to two thousand yards range of our positions and the ground behind them by the light field guns and light and heavy *minenwerfers* and machine-guns, which moved forward with the infantry in unprecedentedly large numbers. On the first day the brunt of the

was upon them almost before they knew that it had started, and, by the evening, though they fought with fine courage and inflicted heavy losses on the close ranks of the assailants, they were driven back to the Crozat canal (which runs from the Oise canal near Tergnier to the Somme, near Ham) an average distance of six



[Demay.]

MARSHAL FOCH.

attack fell on Gough's army, south of the Omignon and St. Quentin. The eight divisions in his front line, far too slight a force for the length of front which they were called upon to defend, were hopelessly outnumbered, they had not had enough time to make strong positions of the rather slight entrenchments which they had taken over from the French, the morning fog was so thick that the attack

miles from their original front, leaving behind them a large number of dead and prisoners.

It was at this point that the French intervened to come to their assistance, as we should have done for them if the positions had been reversed. Though some of their staff still thought that the Oise-Somme attack might be a feint, and that the real German effort was to be made on the Champagne front, every-

thing was done that could be done to meet the emergency of the moment. On the 22nd three divisions from south of the Oise were pushed up to the Crozat canal between Tergnier and St. Simon; on the 23rd, fighting hard all the time, they fell back with the retreating British to the north of Chauny; the next day, abandoning Chauny, to Guiscard, and the next to Noyon, nearly 20 miles down the Oise from the point where the attack started five days before at La Fère. On the 26th they again retired a mile behind Noyon to Mont Renaud, a little rounded hill which from that moment was held by prodigies of valour as the pivot of the line on the Oise. East of Mont Renaud to the edge of the Laon massif between La Fère and Barisis the French still held the south side of the river. On the other side the front swung back behind Lassigny and the Divette in a straight line running almost due west to the south of Montdidier, 20 miles to the left.

In the meantime, while those particular divisions were trying to stem the attack along the north bank of the Oise, other French troops had been rushed up across their rear, battalion by battalion, to the front north of the line between Mont Renaud and Montdidier. The

shattered remains of Gough's army were retiring north-west in the direction of Amiens, and the danger was that as they fell back a gap might be opened between them and the French on their right, through which von Hutier would be able to drive a wedge separating the two armies. One or two small gaps actually were made, but in each case they were filled mostly by French cavalry before the attack could press home its advantage, and French and British together managed as they retreated to present a continuous front to the enemy, till on the 31st they occupied a position in front of Amiens, a little way behind the line from Montdidier, through Albert to the Scarpe east of Arras. From this front no efforts of the enemy were afterwards able to dislodge them. The sector held by the French began just north of Moreuil, halfway between Montdidier and the Somme, and ran in a shallow curve round Montdidier eastwards to Mont Renaud. No praise can be too high for the part which their troops had played in the battle. The cavalry fought for once as real cavalymen, and the infantry hurried up to the front in motor lorries, unit by unit, without waiting for their supply trains or their guns, and with hardly any rifle ammunition beyond what they



[French official photograph.]

THE BRIDGE AT LA FÈRE, BLOWN UP BY THE GERMANS IN THEIR RETREAT.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH INFANTRY RETURNING AFTER BEING RELIEVED.

carried in their pouches, plunged straight into action the moment they reached the field. Each day and almost every hour it was a question of touch and go. Near Montdidier one of the French army-commanders arrived at the front before his troops had come up, and an officer of his staff, going forward to prospect, was captured by an enemy patrol. From the papers which he carried the German general concluded that there was a strong French force behind him, and that there was therefore no immediate necessity to press the attack. It never for a moment occurred to him that the French general could be there without his army, and with sublime unconsciousness of what he was doing he threw away the opportunity which fate had placed in his hands. When he did attack the army was there to stop him, and the situation was saved. By the eleventh day of the offensive, French and British between them had stopped the gap and barred the way to Amiens, and at the same time, on the south side of the salient the French had firmly held the line of the Oise against all attacks, and on the slopes of Mont Renaud had shut the door of the corridor leading to Paris in the enemy's face.

As the result of the March fighting, which the French call the Battle of Spring, the Germans had regained the whole of the ground which they gave up in their retreat of the previous

spring and about a third as much again. But though that in itself was a great achievement, the victory was dearly bought, and because of the threefold failure to reach Amiens, to divide the French and British Armies, and to open the way to Paris, was only a partial success. Moreover, it clinched the question of the supreme command. On the third day of the battle the Germans startled the world by producing a gun which, from the woods near Barisis, was able to drop shells in Paris, 70 miles away. Just a week later the French and the Allies went one better. They produced not a gun but a man. The gun had no effect on the people of Paris, except, if possible, to stiffen them in their determination to fight on till the victory was won. The man, guiding and using and depending on the whole-hearted and loyal cooperation of the Allied forces under his command, was destined to win the war.

At present, however, the initiative was still in the hands of the enemy. All through April, after a few days to rest and reorganize their armies, they carried on a double attack against the Allies, one on the Lys against the British, over a 20-mile front between Ypres and La Bassée, the other in front of Amiens, north and south of the Luce, against British and French. In the first part of the battle of the Lys, from the 9th to the 15th, the French took



[French official photograph.]

ARTILLERY HORSES WAITING BEHIND THE GUNS.

no part, but from the 15th to the 27th, when the battle ended, two or three of their divisions fought side by side with our men in the district of the Monts between Bailleul and Ypres, where on the 25th one of their regiments after a magnificent resistance was only driven off Mont Kemmel by the combined efforts of three German divisions.

But the real sphere of the French operations in April was south of the Somme, where they and the British together stopped the thrust of the Germans towards Amiens, just as in the battle of the Lys they had finally checked the attempt, to reach Béthune and Hazebrouck on the 27th, by which time, since the beginning of the offensive on March 21, the enemy had used 125 of their divisions, or three-quarters of their available force. The first attack on the French positions in front of Amiens came on April 4, on a 10-mile front from Cantigny to Hangard, close to the junction of the Luce and the Avre, half way between Montdidier and Amiens. Fifteen German divisions, seven of which were fresh, took part in the attack, and at the same time 10 divisions attacked the British in front of Villers-Bretonneux on the north side of the Luce on their left. Both attacks realized a small advance of about a mile and a half, but the attempt to break the liaison between the two armies and to cut the

stretch of the Amiens-Clermont line which runs south from Amiens up the valley of the Noye was completely foiled.

By the middle of April this part of the Allied line, from Albert south-west round the Villers-Bretonneux plateau, across the Luce at Hangard and from there by Castel on the Avre down to Grisvesnes, five miles north-west of Montdidier, where it joined the line of March 31, was stabilized: it was ready for the further and extra pressure sure to be brought to bear against it as the sector where the British right and French left met. On the 15th the French anticipated the expected German thrust by themselves attacking on a six-mile front between the Luce and Grisvesnes, and made a small but useful advance. Four days later the enemy tried without success to take Hangard, just north of the Luce, and also struck at the liaison of the two armies right and left of the Luce between Villers-Bretonneux and Rouvrel, and then followed up these preliminary efforts by a particularly determined attack north of the river, when they concentrated 12 divisions on a front of only four miles. Although, however, they managed to advance about a mile and to take Villers-Bretonneux they lost it again to the British two days later, and after that reverse attempted no further serious attacks.

The fighting all through April had been very severe. Hangard, for instance, a position of great importance to the enemy for their wished-for advance on Amiens because it controlled the line of the Luce, was four times taken and retaken between March 31 and April 13. But every day made it clearer that the enemy's offensive powers were losing their sting, and by the end of the month, though they were still only eight miles from Amiens, the attack on the Luce, like that on the Lys,

had come to a standstill. The crisis was past, Amiens was saved, and the most trying and anxious time that the Allies had known since the retreat from Mons was at an end.

During nearly the whole of May there was a prolonged pause of rest and preparation. Both sides were worn out by their prodigious exertions. Amiens was constantly shelled, Paris was shelled and bombed, and there was a good deal of artillery activity in the sectors between Ypres and La Bassée and the Somme



FRENCH MACHINE-GUNNERS IN ACTION AT HANGARD WOOD.



GERMANS DEPORTING THE CHURCH BELLS OF A FRENCH VILLAGE.

and the Oise. But of infantry attacks there were none, for all three armies were nursing their wounds and getting ready for another struggle. Along the whole front there was an eerie hush between the two storms, the storm that had been and the storm that was bound to come. Once again it was the Germans who were expected to and did attack. Foch could afford to wait, but they could not. The Americans were coming over at the rate of 50,000 a week, mostly in British ships, and later on these numbers were greatly increased. On the other hand the number of German divisions on the eastern front had been reduced to 34, so that they now had a total of 206 available for use against the Allies on the west. Of these about 80 were being put through a course of intensive training, in readiness for the next big move. Once again the Allies had to reason out the probabilities as to which particular sector the enemy would choose for their attack. They still had the advantage of the interior lines; though this time the angle of the front, from Ypres to Montdidier and from Montdidier to Verdun, was acute instead of obtuse. The fighting of the last two months had concentrated the greater part of the French and British forces between Ypres and Barisis, on the sectors immediately north and east of the Montdidier angle of the salient—across the roads to Amiens and Paris—and

Foch decided that they must be kept there, because of the vital importance of the two positions, till it was quite certain which way the cat was going to jump. All other considerations were outweighed by the urgent necessity of thwarting a possible second attempt by the enemy to burst through the Allied front in the Amiens district, and so to part the armies of Petain and Haig. On the other hand it was obvious that the screen of French troops on the front east of Barisis, already in any case seriously weakened by the necessity of guarding the 60 miles between Barisis and the Luce which they had taken over since the beginning of the offensive, was still further reduced by the extra large number of divisions deemed indispensable for the defence of that particular sector. The inevitable corollary of a strong screen on the Oise and in front of Amiens was a very weak one on the Chemin des Dames and the Aisne.

Not unnaturally therefore it was this sector of the front that the enemy chose for their third offensive of that year. On the side of the Allies the front attacked was 16 miles long from the forest of Pinon (that is to say from the beginning of the Chemin des Dames, six or seven miles south-west of Barisis) to Craonne, and another 16 from there on to Reims. It was held by five French and British divisions, sent there, by the irony of fate, to rest, because

since the end of the fierce fighting in 1917 it had been considered a "quiet" sector. Against them the Germans had in position the armies of von Boehn, south of the Laon massif, and Fritz von Below, from the Aisne at Berry au Bac to Reims. On the nights previous to the offensive they increased this force by side-slipping in a south-easterly direction a number of fresh divisions which were being trained behind the line towards the front of the attack, and in the early morning of the 27th, after a violent bombardment of about three hours,

swept down from the Laon massif across the Ailette on the French, between Pinon and Craonne, and by eight o'clock had passed the Chemin des Dames. On the right at Craonelle they were swarming round the farthest left of the British divisions posted on the 10-mile front between there and Berméricourt, and attacked them from the rear almost before they knew that they were there. By 12 o'clock they were beyond the whole line of the Aisne between Vailly and Berry au Bac. In eight hours they had advanced six miles on



[French official photograph.]

REFUGEES FROM THE BATTLE AREA ENCAMPED.

they advanced to the assault with an overwhelming strength of 40 divisions, echeloned in depth, 15 of them in the front line, supported by strong squadrons of tanks and great numbers of light and heavy machine-guns.

The result was a foregone conclusion. The French and British divisions, at least two of them holding fronts of over six miles, were submerged and swept away like a child's sand castles by the incoming tide. Wherever they saw an opening (and there were many) the first line of the enemy's infantry infiltrated and pressed straight ahead, leaving the scattered islets of defenders, fighting desperately to the last, to be dealt with by the troops that followed. On the Allies' left they

a front of nearly 20, besides taking two rivers in their stride, and by the evening their centre had pushed on another five miles over the plateaux south of the Aisne, and had reached Braisnes and Bazoches on the Vesle, the valley of which approximately follows the line from Reims to Soissons, between which and Vailly it joins the valley of the Aisne.

On the two wings the pace was by now beginning to slacken, the French on the left, to the east of Soissons, and the British at the other end of the line (on the massif of St. Thierry, to which they had fallen back on the west of the road from Reims to Berry au Bac), both making a strong resistance to the enemy's repeated attacks. But the French reserves,

though they were being hurried up, had not yet arrived, and the odds were still far too great to enable them to make a proper stand. The next day the enemy crossed the Vesle in the centre and occupied the plateau of Crouy north of Soissons on one wing, and the St. Thierry heights near Reims on the other, at the same time bombarding Soissons and Reims till both were in flames. On the 29th Soissons was taken, after some hard street fighting, for the second time in the war, and the attack pressed down on the Château-Thierry road to the

the failure of this effort their advance on the Marne sector came to an end for the time being, the line running from Château-Thierry along the river to Dormans and then straight across to Béthény, a few miles north-east of Reims. The British force occupied a position about halfway between Reims and Dormans.

Meanwhile the German right had been extending their advance eastwards, across the little stream of the Crise, south of Soissons, and along the valley of the Oureq and south of it, towards the great forest of Villers-



SANATORIUM FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN THE WOODS AT BLIGNY ON THE MONTAGNE DE REIMS.

Oureq, reaching Fère-en-Tardenois in the centre, and on the Alhes' right up to the valley of the Ardre (a tributary of the Vesle which joins it at Fismes) as far as the lower slopes of the Montagne de Reims. From that time on till June 4 the enemy kept up a constant pressure in two directions south of the Aisne, and still continued to advance, though more and more slowly as fresh French reserves came up and joined in the battle. Their left and centre kept pushing southwards towards the Marne, which they finally reached on the 30th at Jaulgonne, seven miles east of Château-Thierry, making a total advance in four days of 30 miles. On the 31st they occupied a stretch of 10 miles along the north bank of the Marne from Château-Thierry to Dormans, but their efforts to cross the river at Château-Thierry were defeated, largely owing to the fine work of a strong body of American machine-gunners, who had come up the evening before. With

Cotterets. When they were at last brought to a standstill on June 4 the front from south to north ran from Château-Thierry across the Oureq's tributary the Clignon near Belleau, across the Oureq itself at Troesnes, and then along the east side of the forest and just into it at Corey and Longpont, and from there across the plateaux south of the Aisne by St. Pierre-Aigle and Amblény to a point on the river near Fontenoy about six miles west of Soissons. The May offensive had pushed as far as the Marne, but there and in front of the two great bastions of the defence, the Montagne de Reims and the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, its dash and spring had died away.

The next move of the enemy, the fourth of the five offensives of 1918, begun by von Hutier on June 9, was made north of the Oise, on the old front, rather over 20 miles in length, between Montdidier and Noyon. A week before, during the last stage of the advance

south of the Aisne, the French had fallen back between the Aisne and the Oise, withdrawing their left from Manicamp, at the junction of the Ailette with the Oise, six miles down the Oise to Mont Renaud and Pontoise (three miles south-east of Noyon), from which the new line ran along the north side of the forest of Carlepont in the direction of Soissons, over the heights west of Audignicourt to Fontenoy on the Aisne. Instead of following in detail the intricate moves of von Hutier's offensive on the opposite side of the Oise we will try to get an idea of its broad lines by studying the lie of the ground on both sides of the river between Noyon and Compiègne. The Aisne, flowing west from Soissons, joins the Oise at Compiègne, 15 miles N.N.E. of which the line from which von Hutier was to attack ran west from Mont Renaud on the Oise just south of Noyon to Rubescourt, south of Montdidier. In the angle north of the Aisne and east of the Oise a little way above Compiègne lies the forest of Laigue, and immediately above it, still on the east bank of the Oise, the forest of Carlepont, with the new French line, as we have just seen, running south-east from Pontoise on its northern border. On the other bank,

opposite the forest of Carlepont, the tiny river the Divette runs into the Oise a few hundred yards south of Mont Renaud, five miles from the point where it rises close to the line of the front between Lassigny and another famous and much fought-for height called Plémont. Four miles lower down the Oise lies Ribécourt, through which ran the old trench line of 1914-1917, the same distance below it again another small stream, the Matz, runs into the Oise opposite the forest of Laigue, and four miles farther still the Aronde, a third tributary of the Oise, joins it almost at the same point as the Aisne. The whole of the area between the Divette and the Matz is covered by the broken high ground of the thickly wooded massif of Thiescourt, with Plémont as a sort of outlying tower looking out over the plain of the Avre towards Lassigny and Guiscard on the north.

Von Hutier's left lay between Mont Renaud and Lassigny along the Divette valley behind the Thiescourt massif. His right stretched from there in a straight line past the source of the Matz at Canny over the open ground of the Avre valley to Fretoy and Rubescourt, a mile or so south of Montdidier. The imme-



[French official photograph.]

M. CLEMENCEAU WITH GENERAL BERTHELOT IN THE FOREST OF THE MONTAGNE DE REIMS.

diate objective of the offensive, which began in the early morning of the 10th and practically broke down on the 15th, was Compiègne, the next milestone on the road to Paris and the Promised Land. At first, though the enemy made very little progress on the Rubescourt wing, and the French still held the lower mile or two of the Divette on the other flank, they were driven off the northern half of the Thiescourt massif by von Hutier's centre, and pushed back across the Matz and nearly to the Aronde, barely five miles from Compiègne. The threat not merely to Compiègne but to their troops on the other side of the Oise was so serious that this force was once more withdrawn, this time behind the forest of Carlepont, between it and the forest of Laigle, back to the old line of the trench period running from Bailly through Traey le Val to Fontenoy.

The danger was, however, only momentary. It was brought to an end by a French counter-attack on the 11th on an eight-mile front, from Rubescourt to St. Maur, half way between the Aronde and the Matz. Measured by the number of troops employed in it the counter-attack was not a particularly big affair. But it was in the hands of one of the greatest apostles of the attack, except possibly Foch himself,

that the French Army or any other has produced during the war. General Mangin was one of the heroes of Verdun, and one of the scapegoats of the Aisne. Called back to the army by M. Clemenceau, a civilian with a similar belief in the value of the first blow, he still had, when von Hutier began his offensive on the Oise, no command. "I want you," Foch said to him on the evening of June 10th, "to attack to-morrow." "Entendu, mon Général," he answered, "but I have no army, and no staff." "They are on their way, coming up in lorries." "Then I will attack to-morrow afternoon." "No, to-morrow morning." "Bien, mon Général, to-morrow morning," said Mangin, and attack he did, before mid-day, with an army that he had never seen till the evening before. The immediate results of the action, superficially considered, were not particularly startling, though a fair advance was made and a fair number of guns and a thousand prisoners were taken. But the movement which it started threw the enemy back across the Matz, nipped in the bud a fresh German effort south of the Oise, saved Compiègne, and showed the French soldier that even after the defeats and retreats of the previous three months he was still a better



IN CHATEAU-THIERRY: FRENCH OFFICERS DISTRIBUTING FOOD TO THE INHABITANTS AFTER THE RELIEF OF THE TOWN.

man than the German, especially when he was attacking. For that reason the French counter-attack of June 11th may be looked upon as the turning point of the war. "Attaquez, attaquez, attaquez," had always been Mangin's motto, the root principle of all his ideas on the theory and practice of war. From the time that Foch became Commander-in-Chief, though he had to wait for four months before he judged that the time had come to carry it out

June 15 and July 15 great masses of supplies and ammunition were quietly concentrated under cover of the Villers-Cotterets forest in readiness for "the day." But something else had to be got ready besides ammunition and guns and tanks. The ground had to be prepared. A considerable part of Mangin's line, especially north of the forest, lay on the west side of a series of ravines running north and south, which not only provided the enemy's



[French official photograph.]

GENERAL MANGIN.

Commanded the French Tenth Army.

on a big scale on the field, it was the motto and policy that governed all the Allied Armies.

Looking back on the last summer of the war in the light of after-events, some critics (and even some experts) have hazarded the suggestion that Foch purposely allowed the German advance to the Marne in order that he might be able to attack their exposed west flank south of the Aisne. We have high French authority for denying the truth of this ingenious theory. It was by no wish of his that the enemy were on the edge of the forest of Villers-Cotterets, little more than 40 miles from Paris. On the other hand when the opportunity came it was quickly seized. Even while the salient was forming the French were beginning to think out their preparations for assailing it. Between

troops with excellent shelter in the numerous caves hewn in their sides, but presented to the French, and especially to their tanks, a serious obstacle to be crossed before any offensive on a large scale could be attempted on the flat ground beyond them. So right up to the day of the attack, here a little and there a little, line upon line and trench upon trench, without exciting any suspicions in the minds of the enemy, he quietly and gradually by a succession of small and apparently purposeless attacks worked away at this chain of ravines till at last he was on the right side of all of them and had a flat starting ground for his tanks beyond what would, in the hands of the enemy, have proved a most deadly barrier for his infantry to carry on the day of the attack.

On the farther side of Reims, too, in Champagne, preliminary work of the highest value was being carried out by the army of Gouraud, another of the great fighting generals of France, who, like Mangin, had done most of his soldiering before the war in Africa. Day after day, all through that month of waiting, his working

reached its most interesting stage. One after the other the four German offensives of March 21, April 9, May 27, and June 9, had been checkmated and brought to a standstill. In March the enemy had failed to reach either Amiens, Paris, or the Channel ports; in April he made another attempt to strike towards the



GENERAL GOURAUD.

Commanded the Fourth Army under General Maistre in Champagne.

parties were putting the finishing touches to a huge system of trenches, machine-gun pits, dugouts and craftily disposed wire entanglements, not along the actual front line but two or three miles behind it, in readiness for the masterly coup which was to bring the great German offensive to nothing by making them advance on a vacuum, like men beating the air.

The campaign on the French front had now

Channel, and failed again; in May he got to the Marne and the forest of Villers-Cotterets, but the door to Paris was still closed; and in June once more his efforts to clear the road to Compiègne and Paris came to nothing. It was obvious that he must make one more attempt to coordinate and exploit the results of these partial successes, and to press the advantages which he had gained in a last and still more

resolute effort. By this time the rank and file of his army could no longer be deluded by the fable that the American Army was either non-existent or of no account. They had been seen fighting on the Yser, on the Somme, on the Marne, and at Verdun and in Lorraine, and if a decision was to be reached before their increasing numbers definitely turned the balance the blow must be delivered at once. It was fixed therefore, for July 15, and every means was taken to convince the armies that the great Peace-Offensive, with the Crown Prince at its head, must infallibly end the war. Positively for the last time, they were to march to certain victory. On the first day Verdun was to be cut off by an advance along the west side of the forest of the Argonne through the valley of the upper Aisne by St. Menchould and Révigny on Bar le Duc, while another force was to reach Châlons by the valley of the Suippe; on the next day the Montagne de Reims was to be turned, the Marne crossed, and a descent made on Epernay and Montmirail, all the objectives being places where there had been no fighting since the first battle of the Marne. And always there was the mystic name of Paris looming in the background.

All these plans were anticipated by the French staff well in advance of the appointed day, and their own plans made in accordance. But this time they were not merely going to wait for the attack, they were going to counter it by an offensive of their own, the scheme of which was decided on at a meeting of Foch, Pétain, Fayolle, Mangin, and other generals, held on July 13, two days before the Germans' offensive began. That was the measure of the progress made by the Allies since Foch had assumed the command in March. They were actually stronger than they were when the first of the enemy's four great hammer-strokes fell upon them, and were ready to strike in their turn. And when they began there was to be no leaving off.

But first the Germans were to do their worst. For their offensive in Champagne and on the Marne they had ready the three armies of von Boehn, von Mudra, and von Einem, the first north of the Marne on the front between Château-Thierry and Bligny on the west slope of the Montagne de Reims, the second from Bligny round the north of Reims to Prunay, close to Fort Pompelle, and the third from Prunay eastwards across the Champagne plain to Tahure, half way between the Suippe and

the Argonne forest. East of Reims there were 25 German divisions, and south-west of it, on the Montagne de Reims and Marne front, 30, or roughly about a division to each mile of front, and against them were the two armies of Gouraud and Berthelot, both belonging to the group of armies commanded by Maistre.

The attack, for which the enemy had been studiously preparing for a month, was mounted in the grand style with a lavish profusion of guns and tanks and aeroplanes and picked shock-troops. It began in Champagne at dawn, after a particularly fierce bombardment which lasted from midnight to about four in the morning. Gouraud, who knew to a minute when it was due, forestalled it at half-past eleven with a heavy artillery counter-preparation all along the line, and when the guns of both sides were going all together the illumination of the flashes was so tremendous a spectacle that it was visible over a hundred miles away, in Paris.

When the German infantry and tanks began to advance they found in what till the eve of the attack had been the French front line nothing but scattered posts of machine-guns, manned by heroes, most of whom were almost inevitably sacrificing their lives for France. From Pompelle to Tahure, a distance of 25 miles, Gouraud had withdrawn the whole of the rest of his front line troops to a new line from a mile and a half to two miles farther back; even the dearly bought positions which they had won the year before on the upper slopes of the crests of the Moronvillers massif were given up. The surprise which he had prepared for the enemy cut both ways. It diminished the number of his own casualties and greatly increased those of the attacking force. When they at last reached the real line of the defence they had been so badly hammered in crossing that exposed zone of two miles more than they expected that the vigour of their assault was gone. They were like a man who stumbles on setting his foot on level ground where he expected to find a step. All their plans were upset because the premises on which they were based no longer existed. The force had gone out of them, and neither that day nor afterwards could they advance a foot beyond the zone of which, with Grecian cunning, the French general had made them so deadly a present. On Gouraud's front the full-dress Peace-Offensive, so lavishly and so carefully prepared, had ended almost before it began in a dismal

failure, and that could be said of no other big offensive on either side during the whole war.

On the front west of Reims the same principle was to some extent adopted, but on the whole the battle was fought on more stereotyped lines. The Marne was not like a system of trenches which could be voluntarily given up



GENERAL FAYOLLE.

Commanded a group of Armies West of Reims.

for an equally strong position farther back. Nor was it advisable to make the enemy a free gift of any considerable part of the position on the Montagne de Reims, where some Italian troops, afterwards relieved by two fine British divisions, were fighting gamely with the French under Berthelot's command. In the first rush on the Marne the Germans, from their position along the north bank east of Château-Thierry managed to throw some temporary bridges across the river, by which they moved to the south bank a fair body of artillery, and under cover of smoke-screens on boats and pontoons worked on wire cables they also pushed across a considerable force of infantry. Neither the guns nor the infantry were, however, in a very happy position during their stay on the south bank. At Fossoy, three miles east of Château-Thierry, the Americans chased some of them back to the other side on the morning of the attack, and though the others succeeded in pushing up the slopes and establishing a bridge-head of rather more than 15 miles long by five deep from Fossoy by St. Agnan (14 miles north of Montmirail) to Boursault along the east side of which they advanced up the

valley on the south side of the Marne to within eight miles of Epernay, the defence always had the upper hand of them. Here, too, and on the other side of the river, across the foothills of the Montagne de Reims and the upper Ardre, between Marfaux and Ste. Euphraise to Vrigny, five miles west of Reims, the great offensive was pulled up short. The German soldiers had fought with their usual courage and devotion, but their generals were out-generalled from the start. They had taken their last chance and lost. From now onwards the initiative passed entirely out of their hands. The change began with Mangin's counter-attack of June 11 north of the Oise, it was crystallized on July 15 by the abrupt check of the Crown Prince's great Peace-Offensive by Gouraud and Berthelot, and now it was to be exploited by



[Meloy.]

GENERAL MAISTRE.

Commanded a group of Armies East of Reims.

the attack of Mangin and Degoutte on the west flank of the Vesle-Marne pocket on July 18.

The mouth of the pocket, 40 miles long, ran from Champigny, close to Reims, up the valley of the Vesle through Fismes, Braine and Soissons to Fontenoy, six miles west of Soissons on the north bank of the Aisne. The flank to be attacked, from Fontenoy to Château-Thierry, measured as the crow flies, was divided into two equal sections of 15 miles each by the Oureq. The left wing, north of the Oureq,



GENERAL DEGOUTTE.
Commanded the French Sixth Army.

was Mangin's. From the south bank of the Aisne, opposite Fontenoy, it skirted the ravine of Amblény, and continued due south past Laversine to St. Pierre Aigle at the north-east corner of the forest of Villers-Cotterets. From here it curved for eight miles round the right side of the forest in front of Longpont and Corey and up the valley of the Savières to its junction at Troesnes with the Ourcq at the south-east corner of the forest. Along this line the way had been prepared for the assault by the series of small actions which from June 28 to July 13 put the French on the right side of the ravines at Laversine, St. Pierre Aigle, Longpont, Corey and the Savières. Degoutte's front ran from Troesnes in a hollow curve by Dammard, Belleau (where it crossed the Ourcq's southern tributary, the Clignon) and Bouresches to Château-Thierry, where the pocket reached its maximum depth of 20 miles. On the German side this front was held by 11 divisions under von Eben and von Boehn, besides which von Eben had another three north of the Aisne close to Soissons at the left-hand of the mouth of the pocket. On the other side of the pocket von Boehn had 15 divisions between Château-Thierry and Reims, and three or four farther back in reserve, so that altogether between the Marne and the Vesle there was a German force of well over 30 divisions. On the French side, besides the two protagonists, Mangin and Degoutte, the battle was in the hands of Fayolle, commanding the group of armies to which the Tenth and Sixth Armies belonged.

The north side of the forest of Villers-Cotterets,

which is shaped roughly like a horseshoe, with the rounded end pointing east, lies parallel to the Aisne and six or seven miles to the south of it. Villers-Cotterets itself is at the east end of the open space in the centre, with a belt of forest six miles deep between it and Corey; the two sides of the shoe stretch back north and south of it towards the west for another six miles. It was an ideal place for the concealment of big bodies of troops and artillery and tanks, and Mangin, who had the harder task and, therefore, a larger force at his disposal than Degoutte, had crammed every available man and gun into it during the three previous nights. On the night of the 17th its ravines and roads and copses were swarming with infantry, cavalry, field and heavy artillery and machine-gunners, waiting in tense stillness for the moment of the attack. Just before it was due a violent thunder storm burst on the forest, and under cover of the rolling of the thunder the tanks were able to get well up to the front without attracting the enemy's attention. Suddenly, at 4.30, without any preliminary bombardment (that was Mangin's little surprise), the whole force, the cavalry and tanks and aeroplanes leading, poured out of the forest and swooped on the enemy's lines, to the accompaniment of a tremendous roar of artillery. The surprise was complete. Large numbers of Germans were literally caught napping in their dugouts and caves and farm blockhouses, and by the evening Mangin's left, which included some American divisions,



GENERAL VON EBEN.

had made an average advance of five miles between the Aisne and Longpont, over the open plateau across which the Paris-Villers Cotteret road runs diagonally north-east to Soissons, and were within two miles of the town. Between Longpont and Corey a spine of high ground strikes due east from the forest through Plessier Huleu to the Bois d'Are, some miles north of Oulchy-le-Château and Fère en Tardenois. For the advance along this important ridge Mangin had placed on the left of his right wing some of his best troops, but it was a particularly difficult bit of country, and from here to Norroy-sur-Ourcq the depth of ground covered on the first day, though considerable, was not as great as farther north. South of the river, on a 10 mile front, Degoutte pushed forward a good three miles.

On the 19th the German force in front of Soissons, with the help of strong reinforcements, counter-attacked and won back a little of the ground they had lost, but on the rest of the line the advance was continued, and that night, threatened by the danger of being caught between Degoutte on the west and Berthelot on the east of Château-Thierry, all the enemy troops which had crossed the Marne on the 15th were brought back to the north bank.

Two days later, on the 21st, the Sixth Army, south of the Oureq, made as big an advance as the Tenth had on the first day of the attack, crossed the Soissons road, and re-occupied Château-Thierry, and the Tenth, along nearly the whole stretch from Soissons across the Longpont-Plessier Huleu ridge to the Oureq, also got right up to the Soissons-Château Thierry road. As the result of the first four days of the attack, the width of the mouth of the pocket, between the Aisne and Reims, had now been reduced by about six miles, and a rather broader strip has been cut off the whole length of the west side of the salient from the Aisne to the Marne, besides the ground recovered south of the Marne. On the right a slight advance had also been made from the Marne to the Montagne de Reims, where Berthelot, in the valley of the Ardre, like Mangin in the valley of the Crise, was faced by an especially stubborn resistance. In the centre the enemy were in full retreat, but it was essential for them, if the retreat was not to become a rout, that they should hold to the last moment the two ends of the mouth of the pocket, so as to be able to withdraw as large as possible a proportion of their divisions and guns and stores south of the Vesle. A good



[French official photograph.]

OULCHY-LE-CHÂTEAU: LA GRANDE RUE.



THE BURNING OF REIMS.

share in the glory of overcoming that resistance fell to the fine American and Italian divisions attached to the Tenth, Sixth and Fifth Armies, and to the two sections of Godley's British corps, consisting in each case of one English and one Scotch division, the 15th and 24th on the west, and the 51st and 62nd on the east, who, under Mangin, up to the Soissons road and at Buzancy, and under Berthelot, on the Ardre, did some of the very hardest of the fighting.

Although the enemy's retreat in the centre was conducted with great tactical skill, they were hard pressed by Degoutte and De Mitry, and were obliged to leave many guns and large quantities of stores, besides those which they burnt, in our hands. There were few good roads in the interior of the pocket, and only the one railway which runs from Villers Cotterets up the Ourcq valley past the south of Oulchy le Château to Fère en Tardenois, where it turns north to Bazoches on the Vesle, from which point one branch turns east to Fismes and Reims, and another west to Braine and Soissons. But by this time the railway was useless, as the greater part of its three branches were under French fire either from the right or the left of the salient. On July 25 Oulchy le Château, about half way between Château-Thierry and Soissons, and barely eight miles west of Fère en Tardenois, the most important town in the whole plain, was taken, and after that, though there was a temporary pause on

the last two days of July, a further attack of Mangin's on August 1 started the tide of the advance flowing again. On his right Degoutte, De Mitry and Berthelot pressed steadily forwards, on August 2 Soissons was once more in French hands, and by August 5 Fismes was also captured (a fine piece of work carried out by the Americans) and the whole pocket from the Marne to the Vesle and on the left beyond it to the Aisne had been cleared of the enemy. The second battle of the Marne was won, four years, almost to a day, from the beginning of the war, and the next day Foch was created a Marshal of France—the second of the war — and Pétain received the *Medaille Militaire*, a coveted decoration only given to privates and sous-officiers and to Commanders-in-Chief of victorious armies in the field. It was a great victory for France and her Allies.

Nor was this all. Two days after Oulchy le Château was taken, there was another significant proof of the reality of the Allies' triumph, which from that day, though much strenuous fighting lay between us and the final victory, went on continuously without any pause or a single setback. Far away to the east of the immediate battle-field, Gouraud and the Fourth Army set the seal to their magnificent stand of July 15 by completing as the final result of a series of small local attacks the re-occupation of practically the whole of the positions in

Champagne which they had held before the offensive of July 15th.

One important result of the victory was that the Château Thierry-Epernay-Châlons section of the main line from Paris to Nancy and the east was once more open for through traffic, and before very long the main line to the north by Amiens was also freed by the battle of Picardy, beginning with the August offensive north of the Oise, which was started by the Fourth British Army under Rawlinson, on August 8, and developed into one of the finest strategical movements of the whole war. From Rawlinson's right it was carried on by a progressive extension of the battle front southwards first by the First French Army, under Debeney, and then by the Third under Humbert, till after the middle of August it was taken up south of the Oise by Mangin and the Tenth and north of the Somme by Byng and Horne.

The first object of the attack in the battle of Picardy was to get rid of the Amiens salient, the front of which ran south for 20 miles from Albert on the Ancre across the Somme, near Sailly le Sec, to the junction of the Luce with the Avre at Thennes, and then forwards in a shallow curve for another 30 past the

west of Montdidier to Thourotte, a little south of the point where the Matz joins the Oise, opposite the forest of Laigle. On the first day, August 8, first Rawlinson, with his right resting on the straight road which runs south-east from Amiens to Roye, and then, three-quarters of an hour later, Debeney, between the Roye road and Braches half way to Montdidier, made a rush advance of about seven miles, which they carried on almost as far the next day, the British centre to within two or three miles of Chaulnes, the French to a line between Bouchoir on the Roye road on the left, and a point between Gratibus and Cantigny, four miles short of Montdidier and still a little behind it, on their right. On the same day, Humbert joined in the attack and advanced on a short front south-east of Montdidier, with the result that the ruined town, surrounded by the two French Armies on three sides, was abandoned that night by the enemy, and another big advance was made by Debeney and Humbert on the 10th. During the next few days the resistance of the enemy, under von Hutier and von der Marwitz, stiffened. But the three armies still pressed on, though not so quickly, and by the 15th had driven the Germans nearly back to and north of the Roye road,



[French official photograph.]

RETURNING HOME IN MONTDIDIER.



GENERAL DEBENEV.

Commanded the French First Army.

beyond their old 1916 front stretching from the Oise at Ribécourt, north to Chaulnes and Albert. In front of the British, Chaulnes, and in front of the French Roye and Lassigny were now the next important objectives. The Amiens salient was a thing of the past, and the main railway north and south of the town was finally freed, and 35 enemy divisions had been decisively beaten and forced to retreat, leaving behind them an immense amount of stores and ammunition together with 40,000 prisoners and 700

guns, making, since the beginning of the Marne battle on July 18, a total of 68,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns. The enemy were constrained to admit that "they could no longer count on winning the war in 1918."

After the 15th, there was a pause for a few days in the advance on the Allies' centre, between the Oise and Albert, where the enemy were able to make a temporary stand in the strong positions which they held for the first two years of the war, still in many places pro-



GERMANS DESTROY THEIR AMMUNITION AT GURY.

tected by the old wire entanglements. But Foch gave them no peace, and, having straightened out the Amiens salient, at once proceeded to press the attack on the two wings, south of the Oise and north of Albert. The assault on von Eben on the right, between the Oise and the Aisne, once again carried out by Mangin and the Tenth Army, was the completion on the right of the masterly series of attacks in echelon from the left begun by Rawlinson on August 8, and continued by Debeney and Humbert. In the same way, on the other wing, Rawlinson's advance was simultaneously followed by an extension of the attack on his left, between the Somme and Arras, by Byng, and then again on Byng's left by Horne, while a few days later, from August 30 to September 5, another attack by the British still farther north flattened out the salient between La Bassée and Ypres. Strictly speak-

ing these movements of the British lie outside the scope of the present chapter, but it is necessary to refer to them in order to present a complete picture of the methodical and irresistible plan by which Foch drove the enemy back to the Hindenburg line. Acting in perfect combination, and playing into each other's hands like the backs of an International football team, with each operation perfectly timed, the French and British generals, with Rawlinson's army as the pivot in the centre, swung the attack forward first on the right and then on the left, till they had straightened out their line from Ypres to Soissons and were ready for a fresh start. Later on, the same process, repeated again and again on the broad principle of simultaneous attacks on the wings, followed by the crumbling away of the enemy's defence in the centre, extended the front from the sea to the Meuse, and won the war.

But this is to anticipate. Keeping in mind the general principle we will take up again the August attack of the Tenth Army, between the Oise and the Aisne. On the north bank of the Oise, Humbert's advance on the 15th had brought his right forward to Ribécourt, exactly opposite Mangin's left at Bailly on the south, between which point and Fontenoy the Tenth Army still occupied the front, past Tracy le Val and Autrèches, to which it had been withdrawn after the German offensive of May 27.



GENERAL VON HUTIER.

Humbert's right had already retaken the greater part of the Thiescourt massif, but still had in front of it its continuation, the massif of Porqueurcourt, on the other side of the Divette, and beyond that again, to the east of Noyon, Mont St. Siméon, and the Autrecourt heights running from it along the north side of the river as far as Chaunny. It was obvious, therefore, that if

left to the Divette valley, and occupied Plémont, the bastion height on the north edge of the Thiescourt massif, and also Lassigny lying out in the plain at its foot. The next day Mangin still pressed on, till by the evening he had pushed his left along the river as far as Manicamp, in the angle between the Oise and the Ailette, 10 miles in a straight line from Bailly



(French official photograph.)

A BIT OF THE HINDENBURG LINE ON THE OISE.

Mangin could clear the enemy from the forest of Carlepont and the whole extent of the plateaux between the Aisne on the south and the Oise and Ailette on the north and north-east, he would be able to enfilade von Below's left, on the other side of the Oise from Ribécourt to Chaunny, and so help forward the advance of the Third and First Armies. He began his operations on the 18th, with an attack on a small front between Tracy le Val and Nouvron, just north of Fontenoy, where his right rested on the Aisne. After extending this front westwards to Bailly by another small advance, he pushed forward the next day along the whole line from the Oise to the Aisne, foreseeing and refusing to walk into the trap which the enemy had prepared for him on the model of Gouraud's surprise for them in Champagne on July 15. On the 21st, he added another good strip along a front stretching 15 miles east of the Oise, including Carlepont and its forest, while at the same time Humbert on the opposite bank advanced in line with his

and nearly twice as far along the river bank, and from there held the left bank of the Ailette to a point opposite the forest of Coucy and Coucy le Château. In five days he had chased von Eben out of the whole Aisne-Oise-Ailette angle, a tract of ground about 20 miles long by 10 deep, had gained a position along 10 miles of the Oise between the mouths of the Divette and the Ailette from which he dominated von Hutier's positions on the north bank, and was ready for the advance eastwards along the plateaux north of the Aisne.

This brilliant operation was followed on August 27 and the following days by a general advance of the French and British Armies on Mangin's left. By the 29th the British had in two days crossed the whole field of the first battle of the Somme, had taken Bapaume and Combles, and from Peronne southwards were close up to the Somme, and with the French had surrounded and passed Chaulnes. Once more, but for the last time, all the old familiar names of the Somme and Oise and Aisne

campaigns of the first four years were written in blood across the map. By the same date south of Chaulnes Debeney had taken Nesles, and advanced 10 miles beyond Roye, and Humbert had crossed the Porquericourt massif and once again entered Noyon. Up to now it had escaped the common fate of all the stricken towns and villages of this desolated area, but this time it was little more than a smouldering heap of burned and shattered ruins sown with mines, so that the entrance of each street leading into the town had to be guarded by sentries and large notice boards bearing the inscription "Défense d'entrer: Danger de Mort."

The Allies were now approaching the Hindenburg line, the one position west of the Meuse where the enemy could hope to make any kind of a stand. Without a day's delay the whole line pressed on, for, in spite of the desperate efforts of courageous squads of machine-gunners left behind to hold up the pursuit, the Germans north of the Oise were in full retreat. On August 30 they began to fall back from the salient in our line south of Ypres, the remains of their advance in April, and by September 5 our front between La Bassée and Ypres had advanced nearly up to the Hindenburg line. Fifteen miles south of La Bassée

on September 2 Horne had already assaulted one of the northern bastions of the Hindenburg position on a front of 10 miles, from the Scarpe east of Arras to Quéant, and had crossed it to a depth of about five miles, and three days later his advance beyond it had reached the Canal du Nord, from La Sensée to Moeuvres, seven miles short of Cambrai. By the 7th, following the now familiar manœuvre, the British on his right had struck after him and advanced to the same alinement, seven miles east of Peronne, while south of Peronne Debeney had crossed the Somme, and in two strides had passed first Ham and then St. Simon, at the north end of the Crozat canal, the position to which Gough's army had been driven back on March 21. On Debeney's right Humbert in his turn had first overrun Mont St. Siméon, north-east of Noyon, and then moving along the roads from Noyon to Ham, away from the Oise, and Noyon to Chauny along it, in pursuit of the enemy, had in three days taken Guiscard and Chauny, and by his progress along the two roads turned the big Autrecourt massif which rises steeply from the north bank of the river and stretches for 10 miles from Mont St. Siméon to beyond Chauny. By the 7th he had taken Tergnier and joined Debeney on the Crozat canal, and



[French official photograph.]

M. CLEMENCEAU VISITS THE RUINS OF NOYON.



[French official photograph.]

GERMAN GUNS CAPTURED ON THE SOMME.

by the 10th their joint line stretched from opposite La Fère behind the Oise to within four miles of St. Quentin, from which the British were the same distance away on their left.

Meanwhile, farther south, Mangin had been equally busy to the west and south of the Laon massif, which was to the whole German position what the forest of Villers Cotterets had been to the French under Mangin and Degoutte during the May offensive. The high ground held here by the Tenth Army was of particular importance and interest because it overlooked two of the enemy positions. On the left it commanded a direct view over the Oise to the Autrecourt massif, up to Chauny, and on the other flank, from the great bare plateaux north of Soissons, it looked down half-right on to the positions still held by von Eben between the Vesle and the Aisne. From the end of August onwards Mangin's definite objective was the capture of Laon. It is built on a conical hill which rises from the plain a few miles east of the Laon or St. Gobain massif. From the beginning of the war, when it was occupied during the retreat to the Marne, it had remained in the enemy's hands. The spires of its cathedral were clearly visible from the Chemin des Dames, but the French had never been able to get near enough to attempt its deliverance, although it was whispered that that was the real and final objective of Nivelle's Aisne offensive in 1917. In any case it is certain that the realization of that baffled purpose, which might conceivably have been

carried out the year before if Nivolle had been allowed to go on with his attempt, was at this time never out of Mangin's mind. Like Queen Mary's *Calais*, it was written on his heart, and on the eve of one of his attacks on the Laffaux plateau, many days before there seemed any immediate chance of reaching the distant goal, the orders for the battle ended with the concise and laconic phrase, "*Direction Laon.*"

On August 30 the idea of reaching Laon, in the minds of most Frenchmen, could have been little more than a pious hope. The way to it was barred north and south by the Hindenburg line, to the west lay the impenetrable massif of St. Gobain, and east of Soissons the enemy were still on the wrong side of the Aisne, 15 miles south of the town, with the Aisne itself, the fatal plateaux that topped its heights, the Chemin des Dames, and the valley of the Ailette as the formidable series of natural defences across which they had to be driven before the desired end could be reached. On the right of the French position facing these obstacles the work of forcing the enemy away from the Vesle plateaux was the business of Berthelot and the Fifth Army, and by September 6 they had been driven back to the Aisne on a front of 20 miles from Soissons to Revillon, a little way north-east of Fismes. On the centre and left, between the Aisne and the Oise, the work that lay before the Tenth Army was twofold. From the Oise to Coucy le Château they had to strike north-east across the Ailette and the lower forest of Coucy on an eight mile front, and drive the enemy back



[French official photograph.]

A TRESTLE BRIDGE ON THE SOMME.
Erected by French Engineers.

to the Hindenburg line on the edge of the St. Gobain massif. South of the Ailette they were facing due east along a front of the same length which crossed the plateau between Crécy au Mont and Juvigny, and ran down the heights of the Aisne to Pommiers, a small village just west of Soissons, on the north bank. The left wing between Manicamp and Guny had the canal as well as the Ailette to bridge under the direct fire of the bombers and machine guns that lined the trenches, sometimes only 30 yards away, on the opposite bank. The enemy were disputing every foot of the advance, and it was only by engineering work and fighting of the finest quality that they forced their way across, and then gradually cleared the woods of Coucy beyond and climbed up past the glaring white ruins of Coucy le Château (no longer a chateau since the Germans blew it up during their retreat in 1917), and on up the slopes to Fresnes and Barisis, right on the Hindenburg line.

The men on their right, fighting over the exposed and devastated plateaux, thickly sown with underground cave-quarries, which made machine-gun posts of extraordinary strength, had even stiffer work before them. Their first advance on August 30 gave them a new

front that ran in a shallow curve from Crouy, north-east of Soissons, on the right, across two big ravines cutting up into the Aisne heights, to Chavigny and Juvigny, and then up north across the plateau to Crécy au Mont. From here their immediate object (though always with the idea of Laon in the background) was to work their way along and on to the plateaux at the head of the ravines running up from the Aisne valley to the line Vauxaillon-Laffaux-Missy sur Aisne, five or six miles in advance of Juvigny and Crécy au Mont. From the north end of this line at Vauxaillon there was a clear view of Laon, less than 15 miles away up the couloir of the Ardon valley, between the St. Gobain massif on the left and the Chevreigny heights, north of the valley of the Ailette and the Oise-Aisne canal, on the right. The resistance of the enemy was particularly stubborn, and the next eight days of fighting was a severe trial for the men of the Tenth Army. They were so worn out by their almost continuous exertions since July 18, that they often nearly dropped asleep as they stood, and it was only in some cases by personal example of the most fearless self-sacrifice that their officers could expect day after day to lead them to the attack.

But with such men to lead and such men to follow there was no fear of the work not being done, if, humanly speaking, it could be done. Tired as they were, the French infantry had gone on for four years learning more and more of the science of war, and now that the supreme moment had come, they were better fighters than they ever had been yet. "Only the finest and most seasoned soldiers in the world could possibly go through that barrage," said General Daugand, the officer commanding one of the

its capture was mistakenly claimed for the Americans, though, as a matter of fact, they had that day come out of the line, after doing splendid service at Juvigny and elsewhere on Mangin's front.

In the next week the French still kept on advancing, slowly and painfully, but with unsurpassable courage and endurance, till on September 8 they had reached the line from Vauxaillon to Missy sur Aisne, and once more brought their front within sight of Laon and the



GENERAL BERTHELOT.
Commanded the French Fifth Army.

famous Moroccan divisions, as he stood with the special correspondent of *The Times* near Juvigny, on the afternoon of September 2, and watched the magnificent men of the Zouaves and Tirailleurs and the Foreign Legion quietly marching up the slope to Terny Sorny through a blinding storm of black and white and yellow smoke and spouting fountains of earth and stones thrown up in all directions by thousands of bursting shells. "Only the best . . . but my men will do it." Terny Sorny was, of course, nothing but a heap of ruins, just one out of hundreds of villages taken and retaken by the Allied troops. But it is worth noting that it actually was taken by the Moroccan division on September 2, since

beginning of the Chemin des Dames. The country over which they had advanced was thus described by the same correspondent, in a message dispatched on the day of the taking of Terny Sorny:—

"The plateaux on which these engagements are being fought are most extraordinary scenes of desolation. Right away from Morsain and the Audignicourt ravine, up to Margival and Laffaux, the whole country as far as we can see to the left and in front consists of bare rolling plains of uncultivated land, a dirty yellow grey in colour, covered with rank wild vegetation, thistles, cow-parsley and other scraggy weeds, now run to seed and smothered in dust. The only green visible is in the ravines, from 50 to

100 feet deep, by which the plateaux are often broken, in which trees and grass still flourish except where they have been swept by avalanches of shells. Round these islands of green the battle has everywhere rolled backwards and forwards, leaving masses of ugly jetsam and flotsam behind it, and blotting out almost all traces of life, except that in all directions soldiers and convoys are passing to and from the front, raising huge clouds of dust as they go. You see dust, you smell dust, you breathe the dust, and over and over again clouds of dust hide everything from view and settle down like a pall over the whole dreary expanse. But the sun overhead is shining proudly, and far away to the right, half-way to Château-Thierry, a line of low hills bounds the horizon, and you feel that all that great tract of country, and far more besides that you cannot see, has been won back from the enemy since the retreat from the Marne began in July."

Between August 8 and September 12, the Allies had now made four separate but correlated advances, the northernmost of which had gained a depth of about 10 miles on a front of 20, between Ypres and La Bassée, the second and third together an average advance of nearly 40 on a front of 50 between the Scarpe and the Aisne, and the

third a smaller one of five on a front of 20 south of the Aisne on the east of Soissons. As the general result of these advances the Allies' front, from Ypres to the south-west corner of the Laon massif, was close up to the Hindenburg line.

On the day that this result was reached Foch suddenly attacked in Lorraine on both sides of the St. Mihiel salient with a Franco-American Army under the command of General Pershing. This was the first time that American troops had taken the field as an American Army under their own leaders, and though the plan of the attack was drawn up, or at least revised, by the French Staff and there was a considerable stiffening of French veteran troops on the Verdun-St. Mihiel side of the salient and at Apremont, while none but French troops took part in the entry into St. Mihiel itself, the operation, which was completely successful, and brought in a large number of prisoners, was a fine performance on the part of the young army. Their task was simplified by the fact that the enemy, who had held the salient from September 21, 1914, with a view to an offensive which the French never allowed them to make, began to withdraw as soon as they saw that it was to be attacked in force. The method adopted for



AN IMPROVISED WAY ACROSS THE MEUSE, ST. MIHIEL, SEPTEMBER 13, 1918.



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH TANKS DETAINED.

the attack was a good example of the typical Foch manoeuvre of battering at the sides of each salient towards the base and so forcing the enemy to evacuate the angle and centre. It had been tried on that particular sector before, by means of repeated assaults from Thiaucourt on the right and Les Eparges on the left, but never till now with sufficient man-power to carry it through, and France was duly and becomingly grateful to the Americans for removing from her side a peculiarly unpleasant thorn.

The reduction of the salient brought to a close the preparatory period of the great general offensive by which Foch was about to drive the invader neek and crop out of France and Belgium. The battle-front had once again become, as it was before the March offensive, a huge obtuse angle, the vertex on the edge of the Laon massif and the sides stretching from there to the sea and Switzerland.

For the present he was content to leave out the sector of the line east of the Meuse, and to attack (just as he had done on a smaller scale east and west of St. Mihiel) at the two extremities of the sides of the Dixmude-Meuse salient, each about a hundred miles

from the corner of the Laon massif, and also at a nearer point on the left side, only 50 miles distant. On September 26, the American Army under Pershing and the French Fourth Army under Gouraud attacked in the Argonne and Champagne, on the 27th the British joined in on the front behind Cambrai, and on the 28th a composite Anglo-Belgian Army between Dixmude and Armentières took up the running north and south of Ypres. At the same time Debeney, Humbert, and Mangin renewed their assaults in the centre. This was the great assault on the Hindenburg line and its prolongations. It was to prepare the way for the final pursuit to the Meuse, or rather for another and still more decisive ending, which was prevented by the intervention of the Armistice. Its conception was the work of a master strategist and a born attacker, and its enormous extent made it a fitting climax to the world's greatest war. On so prolonged a front—for very soon the battle was raging fiercely over the whole range of it—it is only possible to review the *ensemble* by taking each of the several attacks separately one by one, paying, of course, most attention to those in which the French were engaged. We will begin then with the French-American attack on September 26. The



[French official photograph.]

GENERAL GOURAUD DECORATING A STRETCHER-BEARER.

American front extended 22 miles from the Meuse to the Aisne, which forms the left boundary of the Argonne forest, but, as the plan agreed upon was to attack in force only on the right side of the forest as far as its boundary, the Aire, the actual fighting front was practically reduced by the width of the forest. Gouraud's front on the American left, between the Aisne and the Suippe, was exactly the same length as Pershing's from the Aisne to the Meuse. In a recent article published in the *National Review*, Mr. Warner Allen, the *Morning Post* War Correspondent at American G.H.Q., says that the attacking forces consisted of 22 American divisions (506,652 men) and four French divisions (36,000) while the special artillery and other arms employed brought up the total to 631,405 Americans and 138,000 Frenchmen, or 769,405 men in all. The French view at the time was that Pershing had exactly the same number of divisions as Gouraud on an equal front, but that as the strength of the American division was at this time to that of the French in the proportion of about 23 to 9 the Americans had in the field more than twice as many men as themselves, and were, therefore, too thick on the ground. The actual number of divisions which attacked on the first day was said to be nine French and nine American, but whatever the totals of the divisions engaged the disproportion between the numbers of men remained the same, and undoubtedly was one of the causes that helped to tie up the American

transport. "At Avocourt, the critical point," says Mr. Allen, "there was a jam in which not a wheel turned for 17 hours. The men in the first line, who had advanced four miles or so, were in many cases without supplies for four days."

In spite, however, of these transport difficulties and the increase in casualties to which they led, the American Army, which about a fortnight after the beginning of the attack extended its front to the right bank of the Meuse, fought with splendid dash and great courage, though their numerical superiority over the Germans in front of them delayed rather than quickened their advance, and their line up to the beginning of November lagged some way behind the French on their left. The main points reached in the first week of the advance were Montfaucon by the Americans and Challerange by the French, an advance of about seven miles in each case. A month later Pershing passed Grand Pré, at the head of the Argonne forest near the junction of the Aire and the Aisne, and the French got close up to the Aisne south of Rethel, 45 miles north-west of Verdun.

This combined French and American movement at the east extremity of the right side of the big salient formed by the whole front was, as we have seen, complementary to the two big British and Anglo-Belgian attacks on the other side of the salient, north of the Oise. But it had also a more local purpose to fulfil. It was to

help Berthelot and the Fifth Army in squeezing the enemy out of the position which he held on Gouraud's left, from the Suipe across the plain of Champagne to Reims and from there to the south bank of the Aisne. By the advance of Gouraud's left and centre on October 4 across the Suipe close to Auberive and up to St. Etienne on the Arnes (a little tributary of the Suipe running parallel to the original front on its right bank) this position had been converted into a shallow salient, with the Monts de Champagne in its lower right hand corner. In order to make the salient more pronounced the Fifth Army on the other side of Reims at the same time crossed the Aisne canal to the north of Brimont, half way between Reims and the Aisne, marching north-east in the direction of the Suipe. The combined manœuvre at once had the desired effect. On the night of the 4th there was a hasty general retreat of all the German troops between the two armies, to a crescent-shaped front between Berry au Bac on the Aisne and St. Etienne. In one day Reims was freed for good from the enemy's pressure and the great forts of Briment and Nogent l'Abbesse and the massif of the Monts evacuated, together with a big strip of

French territory 30 miles long by five deep. Still keeping up the pressure on the 6th, the French flattened out the crescent into a straight line, and drove the Germans back to the valley of the Suipe, where for the next day or two they made a short stand. But it was not to last. On the 11th and 12th the two armies made another great push along the whole 40-mile stretch from Berry au Bac to Vouziers, and carried their line up to the Aisne, an advance at its deepest cross-section of 15 miles.

Nor was this all. For the time being the Germans were routed all along the line. The advance to the Aisne at Berry au Bac had created another salient with its angle on Mangin's front between Laon and Soissons. On October 12 that too disappeared. North of Berry au Bac the line was pushed five miles beyond the Aisne, and from there westwards past Craonne and the Chemin des Dames and the valley of the Aillette and still farther north across the heights south of Laon to Chivy, only three miles from Laon itself, and then on to the east of the Laon massif, evacuated, so to speak, without a shot being fired, right up to the Oise within a mile or two of La Fère. On that one most glorious day, from La



[American official photograph.]

AMERICAN RESERVES AND SUPPLIES ON A ROAD IN THE ST. MIHIEL DISTRICT.



THE TRICOLOUR ONCE MORE IN ST. MIHIEL.

Fère to Vouziers, on a front of nearly 70 miles, the soldiers of France, one army after the other joining in the advance with the regularity of a *corps de ballet*, had won back about five hundred square miles of French territory, the whole of which had been in the possession of the enemy from the beginning of the war. At last the disintegrating effects of four years of ceaseless pressure were beginning to tell. Great strips and chunks were peeling away from the front, as the surface of the priceless statues on the western façade of Reims cathedral flaked away after the fire, and of the two structures behind front and façade the one was now much more sure to collapse than the other. Then, on the 13th, Mangin had his desire. There was another big advance from La Fère, now at length re-occupied, to Rethel, and soon after 10 in the morning the flag of France was floating from the spire of the cathedral at Laon. Early in the afternoon, accompanied only by two officers and the special correspondent of *The Times*, the commander of the Tenth Army walked into the town which he and his men had laboured so long and with such unquenchable heroism to deliver. "The approach to the town," wrote our correspondent, "across the Laffaux plateau, past the barely distinguishable beginning of the Chemin des Dames and the crumbling remains of the Malmaison fort, and then across the Ailette and the canal down to the swampy meadowlands of the Ardon valley, where every shell-hole is filled with stagnant water and the

broken road is pestilent with the carcases of dead horses, is as horrible a picture of the desolation of war as any that I have seen. From the crest of the plateau as far as you can see for miles and miles right and left stretch after stretch of bare dreary wastes are pitted with the dumb unsightly mouths of shell-holes, and the road in front and behind and on each side is littered with the hideous rubbish that battles leave in their wake. Across the top of the plateau every tree-stump that is still standing is a naked and stunted skeleton. For the heroism of the human flesh and blood that for month after month faced those hurricanes of steel and fire and poisoned gas, and pressed on through them to victory, no praise and gratitude can be enough. The real monument to those fearless devoted soldiers of France, living or dead, must be written in our hearts. You cannot put it into words."

The informal entry of General Mangin into the liberated town was the first foretaste of the moving scenes that were to come later on in Lille and Bruges and Metz and Strassburg, and all the other towns and villages of France and Belgium and Alsace and Lorraine that had so long borne the galling weight of the German yoke. He made a formal entry into the town, a day or two later, on horseback at the head of his troops, and had a wonderful reception. But that first day, when he came in quietly on foot, and the people at first hardly grasped who he was, and crowded round, many of them in tears, whispering "Is it the General?"

or "Ce sont les Français"—so long was it since they had seen any but German soldiers—stood out by itself as the great day of deliverance.

All this time, from September 26 to October 13, while French and Americans had been reducing the right side of the big central salient, as a carpenter's plane whittles long thick shavings from the edge of a plank, the same thing was going on the other side, from the Oise to the Scarpe. The attack here was begun by the First and Third British Armies, under Horne and Byng, on a front of 16 miles striking in the direction of Cambrai, and by October 1 they were in its western suburbs and had got beyond it on both north and south. They had taken Le Catelet, five miles to the south, and 28,500 prisoners and 380 guns, and at several points had crossed the Hindenburg line. The attack was then taken up on their right by the British Fourth Army under Rawlinson, and by Debency and the French First Army, the Siegfried line was passed, and on October 4 the French entered St. Quentin, which, till then, had resisted all the Allies' attacks. On the 9th Cambrai was taken by the British, and there was a general advance along the whole line of the British and French Armies, from the Scarpe to Moy on the Oise, rather more than half-way

from St. Quentin to La Fère, and on the 10th, after another big move all along the front, the British reached Le Cateau, six miles in front of Cambrai, and the French occupied a long stretch of the left bank of the Oise to the north of La Fère. Farther north in Flanders the combined attack of the Belgians and British under Plumer, which started on September 28 between Dixmude and Armentières, had been just as successful as all the others from the Scarpe to the Meuse, and by October 15 an advance of six or seven miles had been made, thus leaving two big salients behind the general line of the front of the attack, from which the enemy were inevitably bound sooner or later to retire.

At this point in the general offensive of the Allies, on or about October 16, it is worth while to pause and review the progress made since it started on September 26. Before September 26, south and west of the front at that date, the Allies had already won back, in the two months that had passed since July 18, a huge tract of ground, very nearly the whole (except for the strip between the Chemin des Dames and the Vesle Valley) of what they had lost during the five German offensives between March and July. The recovered area consisted of the



M. CLEMENCEAU VISITS LAON.

[French official photograph.]

Ypres—La Bassée pocket, lost in April, approximately 20 miles long by 10 deep, and the great double pocket, resulting from the Amiens, Compiègne and Marne offensives, of March, May and June, which extended 90 miles from Arras to Reims in two sections north-west and south-east of Soissons, with a maximum depth respectively of 40 and 30 miles. These, with the narrow strip 25 miles long, across the plain of Champagne between Reims and Massiges, which Gouraud recovered before and on July 27, were the result of the Allies' counter-offensive of July, August and September, which was delivered only on these particular sectors (the rest of the line remaining tranquil), with the specific object of getting back what had been lost since the war had settled down into the trench period in November, 1914. On September 26, having destroyed the formidable Arras-Reims pocket, which the enemy had hoped to make the base of their advance on Paris, and having got back approximately to the siege or investing line held by the Allies from the end of the German retreat in the spring of 1917 before they made their last desperate sallies of the spring and summer of 1918, Foch was ready for the last and grandest and conclusive offensive of the war. It was to

be a simultaneous attack along the whole of the crescent-shaped front, measuring roughly in a straight line 100 miles from the Channel to the Oise at La Fère, and 100 from the Oise to the Meuse. The result of the first three weeks of the attack we have seen. There was no attack north of Dixmude till October 16, and exactly at La Fère there was a short five-mile section where the line remained unchanged. But otherwise along the whole 95 miles from Dixmude to La Fère and the 95 from there to the American right there was an advance along the whole face of the crescent, varying in depth from eight to 20 miles, except for one short stretch on the Scarpe where for five miles or so it was only about two deep. During the enemy's advance from the Chemin des Dames in May and June the German newspapers began rather heavily chaffing the French. Why, they asked, didn't they produce another miracle of the Marne, and so on. By this time they had had their miracle, and a supermiracle to cap it. And there was more to come.

The attack of September 26 and the following three weeks had left, as we have seen, three German re-entrants cutting back behind the general front of the Allies. All three of them



[French official photograph.]

UNLOADING SUPPLIES FROM BARGES BY MEANS OF ENDLESS BELTS.



CAPTURED GERMAN TANK AND GUNS IN THE PLACE DE LA CONCORDE, PARIS.

were swept clean away by the second phase of the offensive, which lasted from the 17th to the end of the month. The first and most southerly was a very narrow one, in the acute angle between the Oise and its tributary the Serre, its south side 25 miles long from La Fère to Sissonne along the Serre, its west 20 miles from La Fère along the Oise to Lesquielles, near Guise, where the river, which up to that point flows from east to west, makes a sudden turn nearly due south. On the 18th, attacking from south and west, the two French Armies carried the angle of the salient and advanced a distance of about 10 miles along each face, but after that had a week of very severe fighting across the angle and along the Serre, and it was not till the 30th that they straightened out the line from Guise to Sissonne. During the same period the French between Sissonne and Rethel and the French and Americans east of Attigny were also met by a particularly stubborn resistance.

The second re-entrant, from Courtrai to Solesmes, over 40 miles long by 15 deep, was a much larger tract of ground, but by the 20th the British had carried the whole of it and liberated Tourcoing, Roubaix, Lille, and Douai, while in the third German re-entrant, north of Dixmude, the left wing of the army under the

command of the King of the Belgians had in four days, from the 17th to the 20th, swept 30 miles along the coast from Nieuport to the Dutch frontier, freeing Ostend, Zebrugge, and Bruges as they went, and by the end of the month the whole force north of the French on the Oise, consisting of British, French, American, and Belgian troops, had made a further big advance, bringing the general front up to a line which from the Dutch frontier ran south past the west of Tournai and Valenciennes to Guise.

The third and concluding stage of the grand offensive began on November 1. The opening moves were made by the Belgians on the north and Gouraud's right and the American Army between Attigny and the Meuse far away to the east. On the 4th and 5th the French and British in the centre from Condé on the Scheldt to Rethel took up the attack, on the 9th the armies on the 25 miles section north of Condé crossed the Scheldt and also joined in the advance, and by the 11th, when the enemy were forced to sue for an armistice, the whole Allied force had moved forward with such giant strides that the Belgians were in Ghent, the British in Mons, the French in Mezières, and the Americans with the French in the suburbs of Sedan, from which point they held the line nearly up to Metz. At 11 o'clock on the morn-

ing of November 11 the last shots were fired and the war was over. By asking for the armistice the enemy had escaped the attack east and west of Metz with a strong French and American Army, under Mangin, which Foch had prepared for their final undoing, to say nothing of the additional huge losses in prisoners which they must inevitably have suffered if the advance had been continued. But the main fact was that they were hopelessly and helplessly beaten, and that France and her Allies were in a position to impose what terms they chose, without firing another shot or sacrificing another life. Never was victory so conclusive or triumph so glorious.

Some attempt was made by German apologists to camouflage their collapse by representing it as a voluntary withdrawal of their armies from the battle-front in order to quell the outbreak of the revolution at home. That was manifestly not the case. The revolution was the result and not the cause of the defeat, which had long been felt by the German High Command to be inevitable. They asked for the armistice lest a worse thing should befall them. From humane motives their request was granted, though from a military and political point of view it

may seem now that it would have been advisable for Foch to make assurance doubly sure by administering the *coup de grace* he had prepared, from which, humanly speaking, there could have been no escape. But for that mercifully there was no real need. The enemy were beaten to their knees, their hands were up, their surrender was unconditional. No possible decision could have been clearer or more conclusive. It was worth a hundred Sedans. The victory was not won on points, but by a series of knock-out blows which brought the struggle to an end, because the side that had issued the challenge could fight no more. They were beaten to the world.

It is not necessary, even if it were possible, to decide in what proportions the credit of the wonderful victory is to be apportioned between the various Allies. But this much is certain. From beginning to end it was France that had to bear the heaviest part of the burden of the war on the western front, and in fighting for the common cause as well as for her own existence her soldiers showed a devotion and her military chiefs a grasp of the science and principles of war that have never been surpassed by any warrior nation in the history of the world.



CHAPTER CCXCVIII.

WAR VOLUNTEERS.

THE OLD REGIMENTS—EARLY DIFFICULTIES—THE BRASSARD—UNSETTLED CONDITIONS—“SPECIAL UNITS”—THE HONOURABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY—THE LONDON SCOTTISH—A STRIKING OBJECT LESSON—THE NATIONAL RESERVE AND ROYAL DEFENCE CORPS—SERIOUS EFFORT—TRENCH-DIGGING—A GREAT TURNING POINT—THE FOUR CLASSIFICATIONS—DEFAULTERS—A REMARKABLE INCIDENT—CAMP LIFE—THE NATIONAL GUARD—THE VOLUNTEER TRAINING CORPS—VOLUNTEER OFFICERS AND CADET UNITS—AMBULANCES AND HOSPITALS—THE ARTISTS’ RIFLES—STATION WORK AND MOTOR CYCLISTS—SPECIAL RECOGNITION.

THE purely Volunteer movement in connexion with the war began with serious enthusiasm as soon as hostilities opened. Men of all ages and all classes who were not already members of a corps joined one, while old citizen soldiers set zealously to work either to become more efficient or to train recruits. There was no age limit, and the man of seventy drilled in the same platoon as the youth in his teens. An active private of one battalion was a former Solicitor-General who had reached his 75th year. The ardent spirit of the old Volunteer was well shown in the case of Mr. Richard Watson, who, at the age of 80 years, died suddenly at his home in Lancaster. He had the reputation of being the oldest Volunteer in the North of England, and at the time of the outbreak of the war he had attended no fewer than 52 annual encampments.

There existed throughout Great Britain many fine regiments which under the old system of volunteering had become very serviceable, the Territorials being their direct followers. By an almost natural process of evolution the Volunteer had become the Territorial, and so it seemed to those who saw the earliest of the Territorials mobilized that they were the same men who had gone to camp at certain seasons, and at other times had exercised in

strategy and tactics and had industriously played the German game of *Kriegspiel* which was so much in vogue, especially in the North, in the 'nineties. Associations like the Manchester Tactical Society undoubtedly did beneficial work in educating Volunteers in field operations, amongst the moving spirits in this enterprise being Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, a well-known Volunteer officer, subsequently Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford.

Chaotic conditions prevailed in the earlier stages of the war Volunteer movement. There was no organization, no acknowledged plan of training, and discipline was almost a matter of choice. A corps was fortunate, and exercised its privilege of boasting, if it had an ex-Guardsman as drill instructor, and nothing more clearly showed the excellent spirit of such a body than the willingness of the members to subject themselves to the inflexible discipline which the old Grenadier, Coldstream or Scots Guardsman delighted to impose. Other units which had not the advantages of training from ex-Regulares of any sort had to make the best of well-meaning but incompetent men. The result was that an elderly man might be—and was—called upon, though he had never previously handled a bayonet, to show other elderly men, equally ignorant, how to do the



LEARNING TRENCH-DIGGING ON THE SITE OF THE OLD POST OFFICE,
ST. MARTIN'S-LE-GRAND.

bayonet exercise. Not knowing the "shoulder" from the "present" he would be required to tell his comrades what to do with their old Martinis. These things actually happened in a well-known London battalion of which the writer was a member, in the early days of the war, when the Volunteers were cold-shouldered at every turn and left to work out their own salvation.

But nothing damped the ardour of the citizen who had enrolled. He paid his subscription, he hired or bought his Martini or dummy, he paid for his uniform, and if he went in for a little camp work or firing practice at a range, he bore his own expenses. He was derided in the public parks and elsewhere when he failed to carry out the impossible orders which had been given to him. In Hyde Park, on a hot day, a London battalion was being drilled by an old Guardsman. Two privates of the Grenadiers who were watching the evolutions maintained an impassive silence until the battalion, through the excusable inability of untrained members to execute certain movements, got tangled up, then the

silence was broken by one of the Guardsmen turning to his companion and exclaiming, with slow solemnity, "My God! Isn't it fun!" Such criticism was often heard from onlookers by Volunteers who were turned out into London streets and open places and called upon to do things which they could not hope to achieve. The inevitable result was that resignations came from men who could not endure ridicule, and felt that precious time was being wasted, but the great majority held tenaciously to their self-imposed task and in the end became thoroughly well trained and useful auxiliaries or joined the fighting forces.

The drawbacks which have been referred to were doubtless inevitable, in view of the terrible and unprecedented strain which was thrown upon military headquarters. The grave crises of the earlier months of hostilities made it impossible for adequate attention or support to be given to the Volunteers. They were to a great extent left to themselves, to sink or swim, and it was to the lasting credit of a vast body of citizens that they kept afloat in very turgid waters. One of the minor

miracles of the war was the developing and perfecting of a considerable Volunteer force which in case of urgent need would have been of undoubted service in fulfilling the specific purpose for which the Volunteers had always existed—home defence.

At an early stage Volunteers were provided with a brassard—a red armlet bearing the letters "G.R." in black—a badge which became very familiar. The initials, representing *Georgius Rex*, gave rise to some unseemly witticisms, and as "Gorgeous Wrecks" men who had passed their prime were lampooned and belittled, but the annoyance soon ended with the taking of official measures to suppress it.

There were no definite rules as to uniform, and a man might consider himself sufficiently like a soldier if he wore his armlet. The fact was that a large number of the men who readily joined the force were not in a position to provide uniforms at their own cost, nor were they able to bear other and not inconsiderable charges which were inseparable from efficiency as it was then understood. An unattractive greenish grey uniform was common at the beginning of the war Volunteer movement, but gradually, as improvements were made, and as stern need demanded, and more especially as the force was put under definite military control, khaki became general, and the Volunteer paraded for his duty clad and equipped on the lines of the actual fighting man. Throughout the war, however, and after Peace was signed, the original greenish grey uniform was used, especially by older members and such bodies as the National Guard.

While drills were being done and men paraded or did not parade, according to inclination, the majority of the officers and men worked earnestly to qualify themselves as first-class Volunteers. In those early days great numbers of young men were members of the corps, but as the war grew more serious, and there was no prospect of an early finish of it, many of these members voluntarily joined the combatant forces, and the time was not far distant when compulsion claimed the rest. To an appreciable extent these young members had benefited by their Volunteering, for by the time they entered upon their serious soldiering they had had opportunities of trench-digging and becoming more or less familiarized with life in the field. Many of the early Volunteer

battalions became admirable feeders of the regiments which were on active service, and which made an almost insatiable demand on the resources of the manhood of the country.

A considerable number of what were known as "Special Units" came promptly into existence, amongst them being the Business Men's "Friends" Battalion, the Athletes' Volunteer Force, the National Association of Local Government Officers' Special Battalion and various reserve regiments of Yeomanry, Artillery and Infantry, as well as public school and other corps. The old London Volunteer Defence Force, which had existed to encourage recruiting and to induce men disqualified for service in the ranks to drill and learn musketry, and for co-ordinating existing organizations with similar objects, became the Central Volunteer Training Force. The War Office



THE RED BRASSARD,
Lettered in black, G.R.



UNIVERSITY AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS BRIGADE: THE MUSTER IN HYDE PARK FOR THE TRAINING CAMP AT EPSOM.

authorized the formation of a Colonial Infantry Battalion, for men who were or had been associated with the Oversea Dominions and Colonies, the headquarters of the battalion being at the White City, Shephord's Bush. In addition to these bodies great business houses set to work to form their own voluntary organizations, before compulsory service was established, and in innumerable other ways means were taken to enrol, equip, and train men, and women, too, for the purpose of sharing in the defence of the country. Much of this early effort was sporadic and of little value, much energy was uselessly expended, and it became necessary in not a few cases to bring authority to bear to check the ardour of well-meaning people of both sexes and to direct effort into channels where there was a reasonable probability of successful result. The Chairman of the National Patriotic Association (Sir George Pragnell) publicly begged, in the columns of *The Times*, those responsible for the many unauthorized Volunteer corps, civilian forces, town guards, etc., in course of formation to "mark time," in view of a definite request from the War Office that such schemes should not be proceeded with for the time being. Amongst the Volunteers—including riflemen and local scouts—who in August, 1914, were guarding bridges in Surrey were Lord Onslow, Lord Lovelace, and the High Sheriff of Surrey (Mr. St. Loe Strachey). A conference of 50 Surrey

rifle clubs at Guildford approved the principle of forming town and village guards, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton saying that the scheme would lead up to what they would undoubtedly be asked to do all over England in a week or two—prepare themselves for raising a million men under the Militia Act.

At a very early stage that distinguished and essentially volunteer body the 'Honourable Artillery Company volunteered for foreign service, and on Saturday, September 12, 1914, it was inspected by the King, the Captain-General and Colonel. The ceremony took place at the Headquarters in Bunhill Fields, Finsbury, where for more than two centuries the regiment had trained and practised arms. The famous vellum roll of the H.A.C. was signed by the King, whose signature kept company with those of Charles II., Queen Victoria, and Edward VII., each of whom had also been Captain-General. Long afterwards, on the same parade ground, a rousing welcome was to be given to two young officers of the famous corps to whom the Victoria Cross had been awarded. The H.A.C. were merely typical of the old Volunteer corps, turned Territorial, which rose to such splendid heights of patriotism and ended by gaining great distinction. Some of the finest of the achievements for which the greatest of all military honours was awarded were credited to Territorials.

In the first weeks of the war many Terri-

torial battalions volunteered for service in various parts of the world and were sent to India, Egypt, Aden, and elsewhere, releasing Regular battalions for service in France. Many of these officers and men of the old Volunteer corps served abroad for long periods, and showed in distant lands the patriotism which had distinguished them at home.

The London Scottish were the first Territorial battalion that went to the front, and by June, 1917, no fewer than 12,000 men had been recruited through the London Scottish Headquarters. This was the first Territorial regiment to add a third battalion, and it supplied the London Scottish Company of the National Guard. Many members of the London Scottish had retired, but had come forward again to serve, and at one time there were large queues of waiting Volunteers at the regimental headquarters.

A Volunteer battalion provided a striking object lesson in securing efficiency from apparent chaos. In the beginning the obstacles which have been mentioned had to be overcome, and for a long time men were left to their own resources and put to considerable expense. Then, as the war progressed and the drain on men became severe, only the older and poorer material was left for officers commanding to do the best with they could do, but undismayed they plodded on, and in course of time a com-

pletely clothed and equipped battalion, with an efficient band which had been evolved from a few discordant bugle-blowers, was regularly to be seen, on Sundays in particular, drilling, marching, or carrying out more important work in the field. As men voluntarily joined the active combatant forces, or were called up, they gave, in not a few instances, the uniforms which they had paid for, to be used by members who were not well able to afford to buy their kit—and there were cases on record of this generosity not being officially acknowledged by even so much as the sending of a formal note of receipt or thanks. Volunteers bore an honourable part in the strenuous work which was done in the evenings and during week-ends in connexion with the defences of London and the East Coast. Officers and men alike became enthusiastic in their devotion to a duty which put a considerable strain upon them, but proved a real help to the military authorities. No amount of apparent lukewarmness, discouragement or neglect had weakened the determination of Volunteer officers to secure efficiency and usefulness, and at the end of the war they were at least able to look back on many serious difficulties which had been surmounted, and on efforts the success of which was clearly enough shown by the high effectiveness of their battalions.

Conscious of their own sincerity the Volun-



INSPECTION OF THE HONOURABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY BY THE KING,
September 12, 1914.

teers could only carry on. The suggestion that men joined a Volunteer corps as a "funk-hole" to evade real military service was obviously inapplicable to those corps which accepted only men over military age, and the small minority of shirkers in other corps were soon eliminated by the requirements that men of military age should sign an undertaking to enlist if called upon. One organization, the National Volunteer Reserve, formed under the auspices of the Earl of Essex, endeavoured to resist this regulation upon the not unreasonable ground that it was unfair to impose such terms upon men who were willing to do something, while leaving those who undertook nothing scot free. But the N.V.R. had to fall into line with the rest. As a matter of fact the men of military age who became Volunteers were mainly sufferers from some complaint or defect which debarred them from the Army, according to the severe medical standards then enforced, or men whom their employers could not or would not release, or who were engaged upon work of national importance, or so situated that enlistment would be a serious hardship. This was shown as time went on

by the way in which they passed into the Army as circumstances permitted, before the Derby scheme as after it, and the boast of a London Volunteer battalion that every non-commissioned officer who went from it to the Army held within a few weeks at least as high a rank in the Army as he had held in the Volunteers, illustrated the soundness of the training generally received; for many battalions could say as much. In itself the National Reserve was not, perhaps, in the nature of things, of very great value, but it served the useful purpose of bringing together men who might, and did, become of real use later. The original scheme was considerably modified to meet altered circumstances, and the National Reserve became to a great extent the Royal Defence Corps, which was leavened with ex-members of the Regular Forces who were no longer able to serve more actively. The members of the R.D.C. proved very serviceable in doing guard work at places like Alexandra Palace and various internment camps and at similar centres throughout the country.

Those early Volunteers unquestionably took their work seriously. They bought "Infantry



DEFENCE WORKS: BUILDING A PARAPET.



LONDON SCOTTISH IN TRAINING IN SURREY.

Non-commissioned officers taking down instructions for the day's manoeuvres.

Training, 1914," and other official manuals, and were to be seen in Tubes and elsewhere industriously studying them. They pegged away at their recruit drill with tireless devotion, and proceeded to higher developments as arms, opportunity and instruction offered. Men practised assiduously at miniature ranges against the time when shooting on real ranges would be possible. The proportion of "marks-men" became considerable, and enthusiasts knew all about the construction of the Service rifle and everything the books and blackboards could teach them about trajectories long before there was any opportunity for actual range practice.

The route-marching and physical exercises of the early months did much to restore to many a middle-aged man a great part of the suppleness and grit of his youth, and the Volunteers found themselves surprisingly fit when they proceeded to the business of trench-digging, which was all the rage for a long time with the London Volunteers. Sunday was the great day for this task, being the only full day that most of the Volunteers could afford. One, two or three evenings in the week they gave to the drill-hall and the miniature range, Saturday afternoon to manoeuvres of some sort on an open space in or close to London, but on Sunday they went farther afield and were soldiers all day long.

It was interesting to see the City of London National Guard and strong platoons of other corps to whom they extended invitations parading at Liverpool Street on a Sunday morning for the journey to Ongar, where that crack Volunteer corps had its own trench area. No time was lost when the digging began, and this trench work was so well done on the whole that the competent military authorities were fully justified in their praise of it. But the trench-digging was not left only to the Sunday parties. Men went into camp for a week or two at a time and spent all their days at the trenches, which were the real thing, designed and superintended by engineering sections of the Volunteers and finished off in every detail. The greater part of these Home Counties trenches were the real thing in every sense, not merely a playground for imitation soldiers, but part of the actual last defence of London, backing other systems of trenches nearer the coast, planned by the higher authorities against the possibility of invasion.

It was repeatedly impressed upon the Volunteers that Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Lloyd, commanding the London District, who from the first took them seriously, wished it to be known that he attached great importance to this trench-digging, and he and other eminent officers frequently visited the Volunteers at



A CYCLIST CONTINGENT OF THE VOLUNTEER TRAINING CORPS.

work. Battalion commanders told their men that the Germans were doing exactly the same thing upon the Rhine. At one time there was even a project to send a select number of Volunteers to France for such work, but that was found to be impracticable. There were always, of course, incredulous Volunteers who could not conceive that matters could ever come to an enemy march on London, but it was no longer possible to scout the vision as ridiculous when the War Office studiously prepared for the contingency.

Easter, 1916, was the great turning point in the history of the war Volunteers, that being the time when the War Office at last decided to give them the recognition which had been so eagerly desired and so long talked of. To some Volunteers who were trench-digging Sir Francis Lloyd suddenly appeared and, the order to cease work having been given, he mounted a heap of earth and addressed them as "Soldiers! For you are soldiers now!" The officers immediately ordered the men to take off the "G.R." brassard, once much esteemed but for some time much disliked, and never to wear it again except when they happened to be drilling or on duty in mufti.

Recognition of the Volunteers had arrived at last, the great public act which marked it being a review of the London Volunteers in Hyde Park by Lord French. But there were still difficulties of fitting them properly into the

military scheme, and months had to pass before they could be duly sworn in or before a certain number of the officers could receive commissions. It was not found easy at the War Office to deal with the cases of men who would be under military discipline part of the time and civilians in the intervals, or to solve the problem arising from the Volunteer's power to resign altogether at short notice. All this, however, was eventually achieved sufficiently for working purposes. The various corps and organizations, which had been gradually coalescing, were formed into territorial regiments—for instance, the City of London Volunteer Corps, the National Guard, and others became battalions of the City of London Regiment. Rules were laid down to secure efficiency and discipline as conditions of recognition; and finally there was the division of the individual Volunteers into various categories.

At the end of three years of war there were four classifications of Volunteers—"A," "B," "C," and "D." "A" men were those who had fully undertaken an obligation to serve as Volunteers until the end of the war and to make themselves efficient by attending the authorized number of drills and passing the recognized tests. These were fully recognized by the Government and provided with equipment, and eventually with uniform. The "B" class consisted mostly of men who were under military age but exempted from service for the time being as munition workers, miners, and for

other causes. These men were liable to be withdrawn from the Volunteer Force and sent abroad almost at any moment. The "C" class were boys under military age, and the "D" class were those who had taken no obligation at all and could leave the Force at two days' notice.

It was clear, therefore, that the only men who could be absolutely counted upon for the defence of the country were the "A" men, and Lord French made a strong appeal to men who were physically fit and over the military age to join that section for home defence. He pointed out that it was not possible to make an efficient plan for the defence of the country in case of invasion unless the number available at a given time could be counted upon with certainty. Existing Volunteers were urged to do their utmost to induce every available man to join the Volunteers and make that addition of strength really effective by getting "D" men to take service as "A" men.

The Government's intention in re-establishing the Volunteers on this basis was solely to provide efficient home defence in case of invasion. All men of military age were required at the front, and it was expected that the duty of defending

the country would be undertaken by the men who, though over that age, were still physically and mentally fit. Lord French emphasized the fact that the Volunteers were not asked to go out of the country in any circumstances whatever.

It was inevitable, in the circumstances, that there should be no want of defaulting Volunteers, and it became a matter of increasing difficulty to take effective disciplinary action. An officer, Major G. R. Gallaher, commanding a Surrey Volunteer battalion, pointed out that if a tribunal granted exemption simply on condition that a man "joined the Volunteers" he was under no compulsion to sign the necessary agreement and the officer commanding had no power of punishment if the man failed to attend drills. Even if a tribunal's order was to join "Section B," the C.O. had no power until after the recruit had actually joined the section by signing the agreement. Unless and until he did so a Volunteer officer was powerless to enforce attendance or to award punishment for absence. The major suggested that a tribunal's order should be to join Section "B" of the Volunteer Force, and to produce within a week official evidence that he had signed the



CITY OF LONDON NATIONAL GUARDS ON A ROUTE MARCH.
Some in uniform for the first time.

required agreement, the alternative being Army service. At the same time Lord Rosslyn suggested that the number of drills a week the men had to attend, the distance they had to go, and the time occupied for such purpose, should receive equal consideration. All these points, which were discussed at even so late a



[Swaine.]

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS LLOYD.
Commanded London District.

period as the autumn of 1917, indicated how prolonged and incessant were the difficulties which had arisen in connexion with the Volunteers, and were reminders of the innumerable vexations with which members of the old Volunteer force were familiar, due to official failure to get a thorough comprehension of the real spirit of Volunteering and the best means of reconciling military duties with the essential civil work of which so great a part had now fallen upon men who had little or no time for other calls upon them. It had to be remembered that owing to the strain of war conditions many men found it almost impossible to bear any other burden than their daily work.

Many remarkable incidents arose in connexion with tribunals and Volunteers, amongst them being the case of the Mayor of Daventry, who was ordered by the Daventry Borough Tribunal to join the Volunteers as a condition of exemption. This action was taken after the receipt of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby, commanding the 1st Battalion

Northamptonshire Volunteers, who was Town Clerk of Daventry and clerk to the tribunal. Colonel Willoughby drew attention to the failure of the Mayor to join, his worship replying that he could not join during his year of office, adding that the position of mayor was not respected in Daventry, otherwise he would not have been subjected to what he called an annoyance and insult.

Life in camp for Volunteers at this time had become more really soldiering than at any previous period in the history of the citizen soldiers. The Volunteer Force had taken the place of the old Territorial Force, and the gradual recognition and help from the Government went far to encourage officers and men to strive to reach greater efficiency. London Volunteers who in August, 1917, encamped at Tadworth spent their days in hard work. About 6,000 men were under canvas, the rank and file of one of the groups including 10 King's Counsel. Bad weather gave an understanding of what the gallant troops at the front, especially in Flanders, were forced to



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DESMOND
O'CALLAGHAN, K.C.V.O.
Colonel-Commandant Royal Artillery.

endure, for the Volunteers had to wade through liquid mud and trench their bell tents. Qualified instructors directed physical drill, all kinds of field work were done on the stretch of Downs near Tadworth, and officers had the uncommon advantage of a special instruction course conducted by Guards officers who had seen active service. The encampment was divided into six groups, and on the average there was the equivalent of a battalion on the days of greatest attendance in each of them.

A battalion was composed of four or five different Volunteer corps, so that additional value was attached to the experience which came from handling the mixed bodies on parade and in the field. In all work of this description Lord French took the warmest interest, and Sir Francis Lloyd, Major-General Sir Desmond O'Callaghan, and other distinguished officers in the London district and elsewhere helped by personal inspection and advice to further the

good work which the Volunteers were doing and emphasize the supreme need of the work being extended and consolidated.

Excellent work was done by the National Guard. The members did 24 hour turns of duty, two hours on guard, four hours off, first at the Thames Tunnel and afterwards at the Central Telephone Office of the General Post Office, and that the duties involved peril was shown by the fact that the Telephone



CITY OF LONDON NATIONAL GUARD MARCHING TO BUCKINGHAM PALACE TO BE INSPECTED BY THE KING.

Office suffered severely in an air raid. The National Guard also provided men to attend at St. Bartholomew's Hospital during the air raid period, ready to help to remove the patients to the lower storeys when necessary—as it often was. The City of London Volunteer Corps for some months provided a nightly and all-day Sunday guard for certain valuable barges at the West India Doeks, upon which Royal Engineers were at work on weekdays. These barges were in due course to proceed to Flanders, and some of them, which were understood to contain special water-condensing apparatus, required particular attention. Upon one of these a lonely Volunteer sentry would crouch for his two hours, a trying enough experience on a pitch dark, soaking night. This region was not without its excitement in the way of air raids, but no casualty resulted from these to any Volunteer. One night, however, a man going off duty fell between the doek side and the barge which served as guardhouse and was drowned before he could be extricated. The inquest revealed to some high authority that guarding had been going on for which his consent was necessary, but had not been given, and it was therefore stopped.

The invaluable services of many kinds of the Motor Volunteers stood in a class apart. Various Volunteer corps established machine-gun sections, which did not at first seem likely to find much scope for their skill, but in time they took their station among the defenders of London against air attacks. General O'Callaghan expressed his appreciation of the members of the London Volunteer Motor Corps who, with rescue cars and ambulances, drove with him "round the wreckage in East London" after the daylight raid by German aeroplanes in June, 1917.

Another special section which became popular was the signallers, with Post Office experts at their head. They were ready, among other things, to sally forth and rejoin the wires of the railways in the event of air-raid damage. Two of the Post Office men unfortunately met their death when out for air-line practice one Sunday, the heavy Post Office motor van which conveyed the party being precipitated down an embankment in avoiding collision with a tricycle, with the result that the men were crushed beneath the apparatus. London Volunteer Rifles earned warm praise from Lord Crewe, Chairman of the London County Council, for



LONDON VOLUNTEERS IN CAMP AT TADWORTH.
The Editor of *Punch* (Sir Owen Seaman) is in the centre of the group.



MOTOR VOLUNTEERS AT GOLDER'S GREEN.

They were requisitioned to carry a force of Volunteers to Potter's Bar for Field Day Exercises.

the help they had given to the Fire Brigade during air raids.

In the earliest days of the war the ultimate development of the Volunteers could not be seen except by the very few, and it is doubtful if any soldier, however far-sighted, could have foretold the perilous situations which arose, and the helpfulness of the Volunteers in relieving them, not only in the supply of men for the actual fighting forces, but also in providing a solid backing for the home defence troops. When in time the Volunteers became established as the Volunteer Training Corps—familiarily known as the V.T.C.—a great number of men were sent into the units by the tribunals which were established throughout the country and had the strictest orders to provide men for the Army. Exceptional circumstances were necessary to secure exemption from the Army, and very often it became an essential condition of such exemption that a man should join the V.T.C. A minimum of drill and discipline was insisted upon, but even this proved more than some of the more or less derelict Volunteers could carry out, and at the earliest moment, when the final great danger had passed and it was known that there was no hope for Germany, these auxiliaries, who, truth to tell, had been of no more than paper value, were finally released.

In little villages far from a railway station Volunteers in uniform could be seen walking, cycling or driving to the nearest town, or semblance of it, to put in the necessary drill,

and some of these men were undoubtedly fine fit specimens, though farming, grazing, and other nationally essential tasks made it far more helpful that they should remain at their own work than that they should be drafted to the fighting line or the next nearest thing to combatant duty. It was strange for the Londoner, who, whatever his position might be, was at all times in close touch with the most significant actualities, to visit these remote districts and find the local Volunteer taking life and the war placidly.

Soon after war broke out a number of officers of "the late Volunteer force" undertook duty with cadet units, and proved of considerable value in training the splendid material on which such a terrible and continuous drain was subsequently made. The Honorary Colonel was Sir W. Watts, who had received the Volunteer Decoration; there were two lieutenant-colonels, one major, twenty captains, eighteen lieutenants, thirteen second lieutenants, four quartermasters, four medical officers and three acting chaplains. The cadet units in which the officers were serving were representative of the best known regiments and some of the preparatory and other schools. The corps were the London, Manchester, Cheshire and Liverpool Regiments, Highland Light Infantry, and the King's Royal Rifle Corps, the Beeches Cadet Corps, R.F.A., the North Berwick Cadet Corps, Westerham and Chipstead Cadet Corps, the Haddington Cadet Corps and the 1 C.B. of Hampshire. The



COLONEL SIR WILLIAM WATTS, K.C.B., V.D., INSPECTING IMPERIAL CADET YEOMANRY AT REGENT'S PARK BARRACKS.

educational establishments comprised Scaford College, St. Leonards Collegiate School, University School, Hastings, and Brighton Preparatory Schools. The Queen's Westminster Cadet Corps completed the list.

The Volunteers' pre-war work had proved a valuable preparation for the organization of the home defence forces generally, and in no respect more so than in connexion with medical matters. Civilian doctors had associated themselves for many years with the citizen soldiers and had not only taken up the actual medical work with enthusiasm, but had also in many cases shown a real interest in the purely military aspect of the movement. These medical men had organized ambulance sections and trained them far in excess of official requirements. The personal element entered very largely into the matter, and a popular medical officer could be assured of the zealous help of smart resourceful men who were determined to follow his good lead. First and foremost came the adjutant, the Regular officer who left his own battalion for five years, and who, if he did not intend to do what was known as a five years' "slope," exercised a very great influence over his officers and men, from the commanding officer downwards. Such an adjutant would usually attract to his corps, or keep there, efficient medical men, and he could be, and was, of particular help if he had experience of India or other foreign service. His special knowledge enabled him to take a broad view and to suggest pioneer work, and there were adjutants who at the end of their five years returned to their own regiments to

the real regret of the Volunteer officers and men who under their guidance had gained much valuable experience which would not have been otherwise secured. Many of the medical officers who had been associated with these keen adjutants were subsequently of uncommon value in the Territorial Section of the Royal Army Medical Corps, with its field ambulances, general hospitals, sanitary service, casualty clearing stations and schools of instruction. There were mounted brigade field ambulances with headquarters in London, Luton, Inverness, Glasgow, Birmingham, Nottingham, Margate, Stony Stratford, Hereford, Swindon, Frome, Chester, and Wakefield, and there was the Scottish Horse. The districts represented by these towns were Eastern, Highland, London, Lowland, North Midland, Notts and Derby, South Eastern, 1st South Midland, 2nd South Midland, South Wales, South-Western, Welsh Border and Yorkshire. There were field ambulances and general hospitals throughout Great Britain, drill halls, barracks and all sorts of premises, private and otherwise, being utilized. The Sanitary Service, 1st and 2nd London Companies, were located in the Metropolis, with headquarters at the Duke of York's School, Chelsea. The Casualty Clearing Stations were at Ipswich (East Anglian), Aberdeen (Highland), Surbiton (Home Counties), Manchester (East Lancashire), Kendal (West Lancashire), Duke of York's School (London), Leicester (North Midland), Birmingham (South Midland), Newcastle (Northumberland), Leeds (West Riding), Cardiff (Welsh),

and Exeter (Wessex). The schools of instruction numbered fourteen. All these establishments, organized, developed and conducted as part of the general colossal scheme of war, yet had their special significance, as time went on, in all the plans that were evolved for home defence, and in connexion with them much quiet and unostentatious work was done by Volunteers throughout the country, especially by men who had seen the most active days of their life. Such men found openings in hospitals which would otherwise have not been available, and old Volunteer medical officers found opportunities for help which was not always either rightly appreciated or adequately recognized financially.

An illustration of the development and achievement of what was originally a Volunteer corps was given by that famous body the Artists' Rifles, on whose original roll the names of many celebrated men were written. In October, 1914, the Artists were fewer than 700 strong, but by the end of the war more than 14,000 recruits had joined. Out of 5,642 casualties, 1,745 represented killed in action or died of wounds. The large number of military distinctions won by the corps included no fewer than eight Victoria Crosses and 625 Military Crosses. The Artists, who were officially the 28th (County of London) Battalion, The London Regiment, already possessed "South Africa, 1900-01" as a battle-honour, added many historic names to their record. Many of their officers, whose training had been of the purely Volunteer character, did excellent service throughout the war both at home and abroad, many of them being selected for Staff appointments and other special duties. The Artists were in this respect representative of a number of old Volunteer regiments whose officers and men joined the combatant forces at the outset of hostilities and bore heavy burdens with spirit and complete success. In the case of the Artists, as in so many other instances, a memorial service was held for members who had fallen in the war. The Bishop of London preached at the ceremony and exhibited as a treasured possession an officer's stick presented to him by the Artists at the front on Good Friday, 1915.

There was one special service which the Volunteers discharged with steady loyalty, and one which proved of the greatest value to the hosts of men who were going to or returning from the Continent. This work was done at railway stations which were extensively used

by the troops, and particularly at Victoria. Tired soldiers who were bewildered because of their ignorance of London had the help of Volunteers to direct them to their proper stations and tell them the best way of reaching them, and this help enabled many a man to make a better use of his short leave than would otherwise have been the case. These duties were at an early stage undertaken by members of the National Guard and were discharged long after the Armistice was signed by wearers of the familiar uniform of the corps, who still



[Elliott & Fry.

COLONEL SIR WILLIAM WATTS,
Commandant of Cadet Volunteers.

retained the brassard. This service became very completely organized and in connexion with it Volunteers who possessed motor cycle sidecar outfits were invaluable in conveying soldiers across London to the northern termini from the stations at which the men arrived. Many a man who would have missed his train caught it through the friendly help of these Volunteer motor cyclists, and it happened occasionally that a soldier who had come from the warfare of France or elsewhere would reach London during an air raid and be driven along the streets to the accompaniment of the familiar sound of gun and bomb. Many of these station



ENGINEER SECTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD TESTING A BRIDGE THEY HAD BUILT IN HYDE PARK.

Volunteers were men of long service in the old force who had taken up the new duties imposed by war conditions. Their knowledge of London and the railway stations made them particularly helpful to the soldiers. Admirable work was done by the City of London Motor Transport Volunteers and other kindred organizations in enabling limbless, paralytic and wounded soldiers to get away from the hospitals for a change in the town or open country.

At the end of March, 1919, a new Army Order was issued which showed special recognition of Volunteers' services and related to honorary rank for retired Volunteer officers. The Order stated that in special recognition of the services rendered by officers of the existing Volunteer Force it had been decided to grant them the privilege of honorary rank on retirement, and the right to wear uniform on certain special occasions. The privilege was to be granted only to those officers who had completed a minimum aggregate period of six months' com-

missioned service, which should reckon from the date of first appointment. It was essential to certify that the officer's service was good and satisfactory, and that he was qualified to hold his rank. The honorary rank accorded was to be that which the officer held on relinquishing his commission. Until further orders uniform might only be worn by an officer granted the privilege under the Order when he was employed in a military capacity or on ceremonial occasions of a military nature, in which case the letters V.R. were to be worn on the collar of the service dress jacket below the collar badges. This Order was soon followed by *Gazette* announcements of the granting of

honorary rank in the Volunteer Force equivalent to that held by officers on the termination of their commissions. Rapid demobilization ended the military career of a considerable number of officers more abruptly than they had anticipated, and they appreciated the opportunity to take honorary rank and its privileges.



A VOLUNTEER BADGE.

CHAPTER CCXCIX.

SPECIAL CONSTABLES.

CITIZEN ORGANIZATIONS—OFFICIAL APPRECIATION—A SPECIAL RESERVE—A MOTLEY CROWD—DIVISIONS' WORK—FORMATION OF THE METROPOLITAN FORCE—VOLUNTEER RIVER POLICE—EQUIPMENT AND DUTIES—"SPY FEVER"—THE DAILY TASK—"VULNERABLE POINT DUTY"—BOOTS AND UNIFORM—THE LUSITANIA RISING—DETECTIVE WORK—THE AIR RAIDS—PATROLLING—THE POLICE STRIKE AND SPECIALS—THE PALACE GUARD—PROVINCIAL SPECIALS—FOOD QUEUES—WORK IN DARKNESS—THE HELP OF HUMOUR—SHROPSHIRE MEN—THE KING AND THE LONDON SPECIALS—THE RESERVE—WATCHERS AT ST. PAUL'S.

NO men were called upon to discharge more thankless and personally unprofitable work than that which was done by special constables throughout the country. There were some points of resemblance between the Special Constabulary and the Volunteers. Both bodies were essentially citizen organizations, charged with the preservation of the homeland, but while at the outset of the war the Volunteer was very much in the position of a go-as-you-please person the Special was bound by terms of service which only ill-health or other urgent reason could nullify. In some parts of the country the service was easy, nominal and pleasant throughout hostilities, but in London and other raid areas the task of the Specials was consistently trying and dangerous. So severe was the strain that some of the Specials were unable to endure it, and breakdown in health compelled them to resign, but on the whole the members of the force held to their duty without deviation, and unpromising material became in course of time a very finished article.

Public and authorities alike realized how great was the debt which was owing to the Specials, and official appreciation of the auxiliary police of the London district was expressed at the beginning of June, 1919, in an order issued by Sir Edward Ward, the Chief Staff

Officer of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary. He stated that by direction of the Commissioner of Police all ranks of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary were released from continuous service as from noon on Monday, June 16. The Chief Staff Officer, in making this intimation, conveyed to every member of the force the Commissioner's thanks for their steady, loyal and devoted service during the war. They had earned the esteem and admiration of their fellow citizens by their patriotic unselfishness, and the Chief Staff Officer congratulated them upon their success.

Simultaneously the announcement was made that the King had approved of the issue to the members of the Special Constabulary of a medal, with ribbon, to be called the Special Constabulary Long Service Medal.

A further notification stated that authority had been given for the establishment of a Metropolitan Special Constabulary Reserve, the members of which were to be called up and employed only in cases of emergency. Those who wished to join this reserve were required merely to intimate their willingness to the officer in charge of the station at which they served and sign a declaration to that effect, the declaration clearly showing the conditions of their future service.

This important order did nothing less than

justice to men who had ungrudgingly given their time and money to the service of their fellows, and the appreciation was expressed at a period when, owing to the unwarrantable action of the regular police in London in threatening to strike for the second time within a short period, there was a strong probability of a further heavy call upon the Specials in the public interest.

When, at the beginning of the war, men flocked to the ranks of the Specials, they did so in spite of many discouragements. Like the Volunteers they were required to work out their own salvation to a very large extent, but no drawbacks daunted them, no want of proper support prevented them from doing their best to help the regular constabulary. As soon as war was declared swarms of men hurried to the police stations and were sworn in for a service which many believed would not



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR EDWARD HENRY, Bart., K.C.B.
Commissioner of Police in the Metropolis, 1903-1918.

be prolonged, but which lasted unbrokenly for nearly five years.

A fine enthusiasm filled all ranks of the more or less motley crowd which heralded the uniformed and disciplined body with which Londoners became familiar by the end of the war. In one great Metropolitan district—Wandsworth—the newly-enrolled Specials sallied forth on a night in August, 1914, to do work of which most of them had no knowledge

and for which they were not properly equipped, for "they were clad in every variety of overcoat and hat; some were armed with truncheons, some with walking-sticks, and some were leading or being led by dogs." These men had been told off to guard what were considered to be "danger spots," places likely to be attacked, in those early days, by organized bands of aliens, and it was humorously said by Chief



[Elliott & Fry.]

COLONEL SIR EDWARD WARD, Bart., K.C.B.

Chief of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary.

Inspector F. O. Robinson, of the Wandsworth Section, that diligent search revealed only two such danger spots, the Aqueduct and the Oil Company's premises at Point Pleasant. No alien assault on these points was even attempted, and the Inspector readily admitted that the only deadly peril encountered at them was the smells, which were of "astonishing pungency."

The Wandsworth Section of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary was one of the first to make known its record of service, and the history of that unit served as an epitome of the work of the London bodies generally. The earlier duties included the conveyance of alien enemies to internment camps, one of these being a wealthy Austrian baron who had a hundred sovereigns in his possession when taken. The air raids put extra heavy calls upon members, a squad being detailed for duty at the Fire Tower. The first time these

Specials were summoned for raid duty was on a Sunday in January, 1915, and the last was in August, 1918, though by that time it had been officially declared that air raids on London were a thing of the past. Between the times mentioned the Wandsworth Section was called out on no fewer than 65 occasions, though, fortunately, the area for which the section was responsible "was never visited by a shell." A detachment was sent to the anti-aircraft gun on Wandsworth Common—a weapon which, known as "Barking Lizzie," became, like so many of its fellows, a horrible but essential neighbour—and, so great had been the change in equipment by this time, they were provided with the service steel helmet. The total number of duties performed by the Wandsworth Section was more than 62,000, the most individual duties discharged being to the credit of Constable J. A. Harper, with a total of 575, which involved street patrolling of between 3,000 and 4,000 miles.

This particular Section, taken haphazard, as an illustration of what an important London unit was called upon to do, included Specials who had served in previous years. One of these members had done duty in the 80's, once at the Guildhall, when the Specials were ordered to

go on duty in hats stuffed with paper, presumably to counteract any blow that might fall upon the head.

At this period another announcement regarding a London body of Special Constables, showed that since August, 1914, the "F" Division (Paddington) had done 1,500,000 hours' police duty, or 171 years and 85 days, reckoning 24 hours to the day. This popular method of calculation showed an impressive aggregate. More than 1,150 officers and men of the Division had also served with the colours.

When in his seventieth year a chief inspector of the Metropolitan Specials—Mr. D. Maynard Taylor—completed his third year of service in the force. That was in August, 1917, and, with the exception of one day, when he was absent on sick leave, he had been on duty every day. This meant that he had been at work 1,095 days out of a possible 1,096 (1916 being Leap Year), with an average of more than four and a half hours a day.

As soon as war was declared there was extraordinary activity in connexion with the Special Constabulary, especially in London, where it was certain that the heaviest burden would fall upon these voluntary and valuable helpers. Sir Edward Henry, the Commissioner



“SPECIALS” IN STEEL HELMETS.



THE AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION'S SECTION OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION MOTOR POLICE.

of Police, and his staff, with Lord Montagu as Director of Organization, arranged to form a force for the Metropolitan area. The only qualification for membership was fitness. Going to the nearest police station the citizen registered his name and address and was told where he could be sworn in. Motor and ordinary cyclists were urgently wanted, and these men proved of the utmost value in patrolling scattered areas, carrying dispatches and in giving warning of air raids and announcing the glad tidings that all was clear. Prominent actors interested themselves in the undertaking, and at a meeting on the stage of the Playhouse Theatre, London, a few days after the war began, about 30 or 40 actors present agreed that the most suitable hours of duty for actors would be from midnight to 4 a.m. Lord Goschen promised to make arrangements amongst bankers, and Mr. John Ward, M.P., made helpful suggestions regarding work in the East End, where it was estimated that there were no fewer than 100,000 aliens. A knowledge of German or Yiddish was considered particularly useful to Specials employed in that arduous and dangerous area.

The numerous locks, bridges, wharves and

waterworks between Deptford and Teddington had to be guarded, and in this respect men with motor boats were asked for, the first batch of volunteers numbering about a dozen. Others came forward, but the Volunteer River Police had little chance of distinguishing themselves, as the ordinary patrols, strengthened, continued to do this highly specialised and difficult work. More than one enthusiast who hastened to Scotland Yard to volunteer for river duty registered and then confidently awaited the call which never came.

The Home Office controlled the Special Constabulary. In the beginning each member was called upon to take duty for four hours in every twenty-four. He was provided with a truncheon—the only weapon permissible, except under special authorization—a whistle, a notebook and an armet, which was to be worn only during his turn of duty; and a warrant-card bearing the number by which he would be known. Members came within the scope of the Police Act and were required to obey all orders from superior officers. It was arranged that they should be, as far as possible, employed near their homes. Companies were allotted to divisions according to each area's requirements,

each company consisting of one inspector, three sub-inspectors, 10 sergeants and 90 constables. Inspectors, sub-inspectors and sergeants were appointed by the members of their company, squad or group, subject to the approval of the commander. The Special Constabulary's headquarters were at Scotland House, New Scotland Yard, and district commandants were stationed at the district headquarters, which were at the Vine Street, Kentish Town, Kennington Lane and Old Street police stations.

Within two months of the establishment of the Metropolitan Specials it was possible to submit to the King a most gratifying statement as to the numbers and composition of the force and the services undertaken and performed by them. In a letter sent from Buckingham Palace on September 21, 1914, to Mr. George Cave, M.P., who, on behalf of the Home Secretary had been supervising the formation of the Specials, Lord Stamfordham said that His



LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU, C.S.I.
Director of Organization of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary.

Majesty expressed his appreciation of the whole-hearted manner in which the call to this particular service had been met by upwards of 30,000 inhabitants of the Metropolis, adding, "The King gratefully recognizes the patriotic spirit evinced in the performance of their duties, which are not unattended by personal risk and sacrifice."

The appeal for Specials for London met with a quick and gratifying response, formal enrolments taking place at 84 appointed buildings—police stations, public libraries, town halls, petty sessional courts, the Kingston Assize Court and the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. Professional, business and working men of every sort joined, amongst them being



SIR GEORGE CAVE, M.P.

Supervised the formation of the Special Constabulary on behalf of the Home Secretary; afterwards himself became Home Secretary (1916).

a former judge of the King's Bench, Sir Thomas Bucknill. More than 100 Specials were furnished from the members of the Whitechapel and Spitalfields Costermongers' and Street Sellers' Union. The following oath was taken:

"I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lord the King in the office of special constable for the Metropolitan Police district and the City of London without favour of affection, malice, or ill will, and that I will to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept and preserved and prevent all offences against persons and the property of his Majesty's subjects, and that while I continue to hold such office I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge the duties thereof faithfully, according to law."

Amongst the earliest of the London Specials to enrol was a German who, on being discovered,

was at Bow Street sentenced to the maximum term of six months' imprisonment and recommended for deportation, the probable effect of which was internment until the end of the war.

The predominant feeling among the men who were sworn in as Specials in those early days, apart from general patriotic eagerness to respond to the Government's appeal, was a vague anticipation of romantic adventure. "Spy fever" infected millions of the population and the Special was not exempt from it—he cherished secret visions of personal encounter with and triumph over the "enemy in our midst."

The first duty assigned to the London Specials, the guarding of "vulnerable points," such as railway arches, canal banks near tunnels, and bridges, electricity works and reservoirs, tended to stimulate such expectations. German desperadoes provided with bombs for the railway arch or poison for the reservoir might come along any night—or day, for at first the watch was maintained throughout the 24 hours, although the sergeants often found it difficult to secure full squads for the daytime. The bulk of the Specials were not men of leisure, but had their own private daily business

tram flashes, or at best actual signals exchanged between London's own protecting forces. Sometimes patriotic alertness did score a minor success. A keen young Special, strolling on Parliament Hill Fields, observed two or three men who had the German look, and, seating himself near them, overheard enough to discover that they came from South London, and to secure their conviction as uninterned enemy aliens transgressing their limit.



THE SPECIAL CONSTABLE'S BRASS WHISTLE.

One or two tragic incidents, also, occurred to show that Special Constabulary work was no child's play. A North London Special was found dead in a reservoir, and, although it was clear that this fatality was a misadventure due to darkness, and that the chief moral was the imprudence of allotting lonely duties at night in dangerous places to elderly men, his Division felt the thrill of it. Ordinary police experiences, again, such as occurred in peace no less than in war, naturally befell the Specials. A Special would receive official police thanks for stopping a runaway horse or helping to tackle a drunk and disorderly; a whole sub-division was praised for its promptitude and efficiency on the occasion of a big fire, or the daily S.C. report recorded how a Special had helped a regular policeman to round up a burglar or had found a suicide's corpse in a canal.

But even these glories were rare, and the fading of the glamour was seen for a time in a falling-off of enrolments and attestations, a dropping away of excitement-hunters with no staying powers, and a wearying even among the resolute, who went to "see it through," even if it lasted as long as Kitchener had said it would last. An ex-policeman, enrolled as paid clerk, put the position clearly to his amateur colleague in the Divisional Headquarters when he said, "The fact is, they're finding out what any regular policeman could have told them. The general public think a policeman's life is full of excitement and adventure, but the truth is that from year's end to year's end it's nearly always just dull monotony."

"Vulnerable point duty" proved worse



BADGE OF THE METROPOLITAN SPECIAL CONSTABULARY AND MEDAL FOR LONG SERVICE

(Reduced in scale).

to do, and could only serve their country by sacrificing hours of rest and sleep between one day's work and the next.


Disillusionment as to the prospects of stirring individual achievements in frustrating enemy outrage or espionage was inevitable. Tactful commanders were sometimes puzzled to determine whether they should encourage or damp down the spirit of romance. There were those mysterious lights, for instance, which to the eye of the vigilant Special seemed so regular that they must be signals, but had a very disappointing way of proving to be merely

than disappointingly tame as the months rolled on and the bad weather set in. The Specials appreciated the value of the water-proof capes that were lent to them and the braziers that helped them through the winter nights; but it was proving a longer and more wearing business than many of them had bargained for, and the average unimaginative man could not always realize how valuable he was by relieving the regular police and by merely being there to prevent mischief.

London's gratitude was not stinted to those 1914 men who doggedly endured those dullest months. There was inevitable grumbling over such matters of the internal politics of the force as the canteen question or that of equipment and uniform, more especially as there was from time to time a feeling that, while the relations between regulars and Specials at the stations, and between Police Superintendents and Special Constabulary Commanders, were all that could be desired, the Scotland Yard bureaucracy and the Treasury were not quite so alive as they might have been to the natural sentiments and susceptibilities of men who were not professional policemen with training behind them, pay

in the present, and pensions in the future, but busy men giving their "spare" time for nothing.

All that, however, came right in time, and the first great concession was the boots. This was a very serious matter in view of the severe



DIVISIONAL LETTER AND COLLAR BADGE.

exhaustion of shoe-leather entailed by standing and tramping about for hours at a stretch in all weathers through many months, and to many of the poorer men the question became desperate. It required a vigorous and prolonged struggle to overcome the idea that compromise would serve whereby boots should be found for men who needed assistance and that those who could afford it should buy their own. The invidiousness of such a scheme was only too obvious to the Commanders and



GUARDING A RAILWAY BRIDGE.

Inspectors who would have to carry it out in practice; but happily it was eventually decided that every Special of all ranks, including the office staff, should have his boots. When the thing was done it was done well, admirable boots being provided, with a sufficiency of choice in respect of sturdiness and appearance.

The greater question of the uniform remained. The equipment provided at the outset and the warrant-card (the all-important document, which was to be produced to show the Special's authority to anybody who might challenge it), served fairly well for a time, when once the problem of the truncheon had been solved.

It was impressed upon the men that they must not exhibit their truncheons, for fear of creating alarm in the public mind, unless and until indisputable necessity for their use should arise, which would only be in extreme cases. One enthusiast, inspired by the romantic gleam, carefully loaded his truncheon with lead, which had to be removed by order. The 1914 men did not forget the various uncomfortable ways in which they conveyed their truncheons home when they were first equipped, and the devices for the construction of secret pockets in their ordinary garments for the

accommodation of the intractable weapon. The only addition to the equipment in the early days was the badge, for wear if the constable pleased (as most properly he usually did) at all times. Of all war badges this became in due course one of the most popular and respected, and the experienced eye delighted to pick out the rank of the wearer from the colour of the crown.

From the very start, however, it was felt that the Special would not truly find himself until he was put into uniform. There was a convenience, no doubt, in a man's being able to transform himself in a moment from an ordinary citizen into a fully dressed constable by merely slipping on his armlet; but the armlet went with a discretionary variety of suits and headgear; there was always the makeshift air, the absence of smartness, about it, and, although the public tired quite as soon as could be expected of its jokes about Specials and "real" policemen, the Special still felt himself at some disadvantage, even by the side of his invaluable auxiliary, the Boy Scout. There was also, of course, the simple economic argument, much as in the case of the boots. But difficulties of supply, finance



"SPECIALS" CALLED OUT FOR AIR-RAID SERVICE.

and so on, stood in the way, and it was not until the war had evidently come to stay indefinitely that the caps and overcoats, with the "pips" on the shoulders of the officers, were served out, and the complete uniform came later still.

Long before that time the Special Constabulary had earned and received public gratitude and confidence and the uniform was scarcely needed then to give them their standing; but it certainly strengthened them, both as towards the public and in their own proper self-esteem. Their officers and those of the regular police unanimously admitted that the effect of the uniform upon all-round smartness and efficiency was as unmistakable in this case as it always was.

The first occasion on which the London Specials as a whole felt their serious value was the break in the monotony caused by the explosion of feeling against German bakers and others in consequence of the Lusitania crime. The Specials were called out in force to protect the bakers' windows and to prevent the spread of the trouble. It was idle to pretend that they altogether liked the task. While they recognized that order must be maintained and hooliganism checked, they did not feel delighted, after encouraging visions of "doing their bit" against Germans in their midst, to find themselves summoned to protect those very people some of whom had been highly provocative in their offensive tone and action. In fact, the state of mind among the Specials was exactly the same as among the regular police; but they had their duty to do, and they did it well, and helped the police and the weather to stop the trouble. In one disturbed London district where the Specials were maintaining cordons in a much troubled street two zealous constables triumphantly seized a man who insisted upon crossing prohibited ground, and were disconcerted to find that their prisoner was the Divisional Police Superintendent in plain clothes.

Some select sections suffered less from tedium than the mass, but of their work the ordinary Special knew little or nothing, and a good deal of secret service was done by "Central" Specials, work which remained till the end buried in mystery, but was undoubtedly of sterling value. An instance of the detective work which occasionally came the way of ordinary divisions was the observation that was kept upon various

public-houses during the autumn of 1915. Further war-time regulation of the liquor traffic was under consideration and it was desired to ascertain how many women customers entered the selected premises during the last two hours before closing on Saturday nights—then from eight to ten o'clock. For various reasons it was felt desirable not to put the regular police upon the work, and accordingly a number of sub-inspectors and sergeants of the Specials were asked to undertake it.



THE EARLIEST TYPE OF ANTI-GAS RESPIRATOR.

Served out to Special Constables at Southend.*

They went in couples and reported their count to the best of their ability. One who did this duty on seven successive Saturday nights testified that he did not find it the most agreeable work he had had to perform as a Special. Naturally the watchers were not supposed to attract attention, consequently they had to station themselves or stroll about at some distance from the doors under observation, and the task of keeping anything like an accurate account in the darkened streets involved a severe strain, nor did the ordinary Special easily reconcile himself to the "sneaking" spirit of the enterprise.

London's great debt to the Specials was in

* Hundreds of thousands of these respirators were hurriedly made by the people and sent to the Western Front after the second battle of Ypres, where the Germans first used poison-gas. They were, however speedily replaced by more efficient gas-masks.



SWANSEA SPECIAL CONSTABLES DRILL ON THE ROOF OF THE EXCHANGE BUILDINGS.

connexion with the air raids. In course of time the calling out of the Specials became the universal intimation that a "first warning" had been received and was the signal for the Tubes and shelters to fill; but often the Specials were called out to wait for long hours for a raid that did not mature, and this when they were tired out after their own day's work, or coming straight off patrol duty, or with the prospect of going upon it afterwards.

Some districts had terrible experiences of death, fire and destruction from the first raid onward, and the raid death-roll of the Specials began with the killing in the Strand of one who was hastening to his duty. To other districts the raids for a time meant nothing but monotonous waiting, finally rewarded, at one station, which had kept many barren vigils, by an unexpected privilege. All the other men had been dismissed. One squad, dispatched to search a neighbouring open space for bodies, upon a false report that bombs had fallen there, returned very late in no happy humour, just in time to learn that a "Zep." was down just outside London and that help was wanted at once. A motor omnibus took them to the spot immediately and they were in the thick of the memorable scene. Later, when the

Gothas had succeeded the airships, practically every district in London had its bombs and all needed the reassuring and helpful presence of the Specials for the frightened shelterers.

The provision of the shrapnel helmet was the significant final touch to the Special's equipment. At many of the stations the splendid organization of the Specials for raids won the outspoken praise of the regular police. First came the call, carried out mainly by cyclist messengers, for whose work it was impossible to say too much. In many instances their duties were carried out while the guns were firing and the bombs bursting. Specials were distributed as need demanded, a reserve being kept at the stations for emergencies. It was generally agreed that nothing too good could be said of the steady, self-possessed men who at shelters or in the Tubes helped to pull the people through and sustain them. The Specials saw enough of the pitiful and the tragic on those awful nights, but they mostly preferred to dwell on the humorous memories.

In the later period "vulnerable points" had practically vanished. The Special's normal duty was to relieve the regular police by patrolling in couples, a much more agreeable and sociable duty than the former tasks. The duration,

too, of a patrol gradually came down from four hours to three and then to two. After the Armistice patrolling ceased quite early in the small hours, then it stopped altogether. Perhaps to the majority of the Specials the most distasteful of all their tasks was to replace the regular police at the time of their strike in the autumn of 1918, for the relations between the two bodies had been very pleasant, and great persuasive tact on the part of their officers was needed to get the Specials out in force. They did their duty, however, and were ready to do it again whenever need arose.

The strike of the regular police was regret-

table in many ways, and in no respect more deplorable than because a body of disciplined and highly respected men acted harshly towards the Specials. The feeling of the voluntary force towards the regulars was frankly expressed in a letter from a "London Special," published in *The Times* of September 10, 1918. "I do not know," he said, "whether you are aware of the bitterness and resentment which obtain amongst the great majority of Specials at the treatment they received at the hands of the regular police during the strike, and I venture to believe that if the public were aware of the insults and violence given to the London



CONTROLLING TRAFFIC DURING THE POLICE STRIKE.



LONDON CITY SPECIAL CONSTABLES AT DRILL.



HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL DETACHMENT OF SPECIAL CONSTABLES.
Selected for the guarding of Royal palaces and public buildings.

Specials their anger would be equal to the quietude and loss of confidence which, I fear, they feel at the present moment in regard to a force they have looked up to and trusted. During the last four years the Specials have given their time and, indeed, money in the honest belief that they were not only serving their country, but were also giving relief and rest to a splendid body of men. I think that the Specials now have the right to ask what their position is to be in the future—blacklegs, or an honoured and helpful force of colleagues with the regular police, whether as amateurs or as a properly constituted, and, if needs be, conscribed, body of Crown servants?"

The answer to that question was made plain by the public appreciation of the invaluable services which the Specials had performed and the continued calls that were made upon them in connexion with all sorts of ceremonies and duties throughout the country—calls which were met with unflinching willingness and discharged with steadfast adherence to duty. In helping at London functions particularly the Specials were a most admirable auxiliary.

A very interesting feature of the work of the London Specials was the formation of a body whose particular duty it was to guard Buckingham Palace. There was naturally competition for the honour of sharing the responsibility for the protection of the King and his family and home, with the result that there came into being a picked body of men, most of whom were of considerable professional and business importance. The extent of the palace and the grounds made this extra help necessary, especially as it was not possible to foresee what might happen through alien or other disturbances. The added dangers arising from air raids made it still further desirable to have extra assistance. This force was known as the Headquarters Central Detachment of Special Constabulary, with Lord Claud Hamilton as Commandant. It was formed in November, 1917, from volunteers belonging to the principal London clubs, and in the first instance took the place of the Yeoman of the Guard and regular police who had patrolled the palace gardens from sunset to sunrise. Each section's turn came on one night out of eight, but other duties were quickly imposed on the section. The members were called out at every air raid on London, they lined the roads near Buckingham Palace during processions and public ceremonies, and were on street duty during the police strike and the

influenza epidemic which followed that disturbance. Most of the members of the section, who provided their own uniforms, were well over military age. On May 14, 1919, they dined together, for the first and last time, under the chairmanship of their Commandant.

There were numerous calls on the Specials during the war of which the public had no knowledge, amongst them being emergency duty in connexion with alien disturbances



[Russell.]

LORD CLAUD HAMILTON, M.P.
Commandant Headquarters Central Detachment
of Special Constables.

in centres like Manchester and Leeds. At one critical period there was a feeling of great hostility to Jewish inhabitants in connexion with military service, and more than once it seemed likely that serious disturbances would arise. Prompt measures were taken by the Chief Constables and others concerned, and some ingenious plans were evolved for dispersing threatening crowds. In London it had been the custom for many years to rely on the mounted police for work of this sort. In the provincial cities, however, these disciplined and excellent bodies were not available, but a method was adopted which proved as successful. This plan was to make use of the Specials who owned motor cars and organize them into a mild form of what might be called shock or "storm" constables. Just as the mounted policemen had been employed to exercise a



COLONEL SIR EDWARD WARD PRESENTING A CUP WON IN A DRILL COMPETITION BY V. DIVISION SPECIAL CONSTABLES (WIMBLEDON).

breaking up and scattering pressure on unwanted assemblages, so the Specials in their cars were used to disperse alien crowds, and this was done with a maximum of effect at a minimum of cost in collisions and bruises. This work, in the intense darkness which prevailed on moonless nights, due to raid precautions, was by no means easy or pleasant, and it spoke well for the forbearance of the motor car Specials that they obeyed orders without unduly punishing the disturbers of the peace. A very helpful element in the case was that these Specials were in many instances employers of the aliens who were causing trouble, and had a sound understanding of their peculiar temperament and the best means of dealing with them when they became a danger to the community. For these particular purposes, when motor cars were employed, a limited amount of petrol was supplied to the Specials free of charge.

There was an extraordinarily wide difference in the duties which fell to the lot of the Specials, due almost entirely to the part of the country in which the Special happened to be serving. Undoubtedly the heaviest burden fell on the London man, because of the existence in the capital of so many dangers from which the

rest of the country was practically free. There was the constant menace of air raids, involving ceaseless strain on the Metropolitan auxiliaries, and the work imposed by the presence of aliens and the establishment of internment camps added to the heavy demands on the force. To a greater or less extent this strain was felt throughout the raid area, which comprised a large section of the East Coast and many inland towns, though the inland places were much better circumstanced than London and the greater part of the East and South-East Coasts.

Villages and hamlets far remote from railway stations had their Specials, perhaps a farmer or carrier or private resident, whose duty was to sound the alarm of a possible visit from air raiders by ringing the church or other bell or even delivering a verbal warning, and great indeed was the commotion and excitement in little communities in England which scarcely knew from actual experience that war was in progress when the warning came that an airship was somewhere overhead or in the neighbourhood. Tales lost nothing in the telling and were amusing enough to the listeners who knew from a too wide experience what the real thing was. The story went that in a London club an excited visitor from a remote country

district was telling how near a Zeppelin had dropped some bombs. "I heard them distinctly," he declared, "they were not more than 20 miles away!" "The other night," observed a hardened Londoner quietly, "five dropped just around my front door!"

In the windows of village inns or post offices written slips of paper announced the names of Specials and the steps that would be taken to intimate the approach of hostile aircraft. As a measure of precaution warnings were telephoned, telegraphed, or otherwise despatched from central police headquarters to outlying districts, but it occasionally happened that by the time the warning was received the danger had passed, and it was sometimes the case that a Special who was sleeping did not know of the hostile visitor until he heard of it from friends who had heard the whirr of the engines or the sound of distant explosions—and made the most of their wonderful experience.

One of the most trying of all the duties that fell to the Specials was the regulation of the food queues in London and the large towns, but especially in the Metropolitan area, where difficulties had to be overcome which were far more acute than in the provinces. Very many

of the Specials knew from actual experience what the shortage meant at home, and they had the greatest sympathy with the patient crowds of poor women and children who were forced to take their places and wait in wet and cold weather for the chance of getting a small share of such wretched meat and margarine and any potatoes as might be available. When on queue duty in a provincial city an officer of the Specials had many children brought to him who had been lost whilst their parents were waiting, and in all such cases, instead of sending the children to the police stations, he deputed a person from the crowd to take them, and he retained the vacated positions until the parents returned. This was merely an illustration of the general resourcefulness of the Special and his quick understanding, as an ordinary citizen, of any little emergency matter and the best way of dealing with it. The food queue work of the Specials was of the utmost value not only to the actual human beings in them and the harassed shopkeepers but also to the regular police, whose depleted numbers made it impossible to provide the men necessary to regulate crowds which, as things were, were well under control but which might so easily have become



EDMONTON SPECIAL CONSTABLES' MOTOR AMBULANCE

Built by one of themselves.

unruly and got entirely out of hand. Much of this duty was done by the Specials in exposed places in weather which at times was exceptionally bad, rain, snow, sleet and wind putting their fortitude and endurance to the severest test, but in this respect, as in others, the members of the force won through triumphantly.

Long before the general public had even a faint idea of some of the calamities which befell London and the country generally owing to the war the Special became painfully familiar with them. Only the vaguest reports were circulated of the extent of the disaster at Silvertown, though residents many miles away realized from the terrible boom and glare that something exceptionally bad had happened; but the Special had prompt and first-hand knowledge of the extent of the catastrophe, for he was summoned from all parts of the Metropolis to help to regulate the traffic and in other essential ways. In the coast and inland towns raided by German airships, too, the Special had stern and dangerous work to do, work of which nothing could be openly said or written until the war had ended. London and provincial people grumbled because of the lighting restrictions, but they lived in a brilliant illumination at night compared with some of the places on

the coast, which were in utter darkness and in which it was a serious offence, quickly and severely punished, to strike even a match in the street. It was mostly a matter of instinct to make one's way about a town where a false step meant precipitation into a river, canal or dock, but this personal pilotage became a matter of habit to the Special, though even he at times found it no easy thing to make his way home by feeling the adjacent walls and doorways and doing his best to localize the invisible pavement. When, under such unfavourable and unfamiliar conditions raid and other urgent duty had to be done great risk of personal mishap had to be run by the Special, but he became accustomed to take it philosophically as part and parcel of the great adventure into which the war had plunged him.

In London and elsewhere the Special brought to the discharge of his monotonous and often irksome and unpleasant duties the priceless help of humour. Many stories were in circulation of happenings to Specials which would have been intensely annoying if a serious view had been taken of them. Tips—sometimes of contemptuous dimensions, to add to their inappropriateness—were offered to uniformed men who in private life were held in high esteem,



CHURCH PARADE OF ABOUT 10,000 SPECIAL CONSTABLES AT THE ALBERT HALL, APRIL 30, 1916.



SIR EDWARD WARD PRESENTING SILVER STARS TO SPECIAL CONSTABLES
Who had served since 1914, Regent's Park, May 26, 1918.

especially by themselves. Amongst these victims of well-meaning foolishness was a professional man who, being called to a suburban house by a smart maid, was asked by the lady of the establishment if he was a Special, and upon saying, "I am, madam. Why have you sent for me?" was told, "I want you to take my two little dogs out for an airing!" And before the dignified constable could recover there had been thrust into his hands a lead, attached to which were "two poisonous-looking pugs." The admirable relations which existed between heads of police and the Specials permitted exchanges of pleasantries which under sterner conditions would not have been all w-able. In a Yorkshire city a Special said to the Chief Constable, "Well, Sir, I've been a Special now for six months, and I haven't even got a gold watch!" Whereupon the Chief replied, with sinister significance, "Then you're a poor policeman, Mr. Blank!"

The view that Specials might be entirely disbanded was not held throughout the country. There were heads of police who felt that in such times of unrest and discontent as prevailed it was more than ever needful for the auxiliary

force to be maintained. This opinion was held by the Chief Constable of Shropshire (Major J. Becke), who, so far from decreasing his force, augmented it, so that the number of Shropshire Special Constabulary rose from about 300 to 547. In the cases of these Specials who had been serving certificates were distributed at Ellesmere in June, 1919.

At noon on Monday, June 16, 1919, the Metropolitan Special Constabulary ceased to exist. On the preceding Saturday afternoon the members to the number of more than 17,000 made their last public appearance in the form of a march past at Buckingham Palace, before the King and Queen and other members of the Royal Family. The weather was brilliantly fine and a crowd of privileged and other spectators watched the Specials march past to music played by massed bands of the Brigade of Guards. A raised dais had been placed outside the gates of the Palace and on this His Majesty stood and took the salute of the various sections as they went by in fine order, a uniformed, disciplined body which was a forcible reminder of the creation of a most efficient force out of what had appeared to be very

unpromising material. The King was attended by Sir Nevil Macready, Chief Commissioner of Police, and Captain Sir William Nott-Bower, Commissioner of City Police, who were joined by Colonel Sir Edward Ward, Chief Staff Officer of the Metropolitan Specials, and Colonel Dunfee, commanding the City Police Reserve,



[Vandyk.]

**GENERAL SIR NEVIL MACREADY,
G.C.M.G.**

Chief Commissioner of Police.

after they had led their respective divisions in the march past; and the Home Secretary and the Lord Mayor were present with the Royal party.

The Specials had assembled in Hyde Park and marched off to the memorable "All clear" call of the Boy Scouts' bugles. Precisely at half-past two o'clock they reached the saluting base and headed by the Chief Staff Officer marched past in column of eight, the large body of men taking an hour to pass the King. The imposing procession was headed by the Headquarters Central Detachment, commanded by Lord Claud Hamilton, M.P. and twenty-one divisions followed in alphabetical order. The London General Omnibus Company's detachment and the General Post Office and Automobile Association's sections, with a section of Headquarters Transport and several hands took part, all giving an admirable object lesson of the extent and composition of the force, which had reached the stage of dissolution.

The King offered personal congratulations on the excellence of the men's turn out and march, and at the close of the review each member of the Specials received a copy of a message from his Majesty, in the following terms:—

"BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

"On the conclusion of your services as Special Constables, I desire to express my appreciation of the splendid public spirit which you have evinced in the performance of a high civic duty.

"Your conduct as a body has been exemplary.

"At the commencement of the Great War you, who were unable to join the Colours, loyally came forward in thousands and voluntarily



[Russell.]

**CAPTAIN SIR J. W. NOTT-BOWER,
K.C.V.O.**

Commissioner of Police of the City of London.

took up the arduous work of the regular police force, thereby freeing many of its members to join the fighting ranks.

"By devotion to duty and sacrifice of your own often scanty leisure you gradually became a most efficient force, on whom your fellow-citizens were proud to rely.

"With steadfastness and courage you carried out the obligations you undertook; you faced the responsibilities of that police routine duty necessary for the maintenance of law and order, and also the perils of the air raids to which London was so constantly subjected.

"Men of the Metropolitan and City Special

Constabulary, you have to your credit a clean record of work well done.

"It is in recognition of such efforts throughout the country that I have instituted with much pleasure a Long Service Medal.

"I am glad to inspect you to-day, and, personally to assure you of my satisfaction at the way in which, to a man, you have served your Sovereign and helped your country in her hour of need.

"June 14, 1919. GEORGE R.I."

The new conditions of service for the Metropolitan Special Constabulary Reserve were issued to all old members of the force, and showed that they were only required to do duty when the Commissioner of Police declared an emergency. Members retained clothing and equipment which had been issued to them as members of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary, clothing and equipment being issued to other members upon their signing a declaration to serve in the force for three years. Nine years' satisfactory service entitled a member, on the recommendation of the commandant, to a Long Service Medal, time served in the Metropolitan Special Constabulary, 1914, to count. No greater or more significant proof of the invaluable work of the London citizen constables during nearly five unprecedented years could have been paid than this establishment of a reserve of Specials.

In recognition of services in connexion with

the Metropolitan Special Constabulary various members of the force were appointed to the Order of the British Empire, the distinction being conferred also upon Specials who had done work in various parts of the country. The first published list of recipients contained the names of the following members of the Metropolitan body:—Mr. E. N. J. Jacobson (Commander), Lieut.-Col. W. T. Reay, Inspector General of Divisions (Officer), Mr. Geoffrey Marks, Finance Officer (Officer), and Captain Montagu Wemyss Stuart, Senior Commander (Member). Subsequently other Specials who had distinguished themselves were appointed to the Order.

In addition to the work which was done by Volunteers and Special Constabulary various bodies came into existence to undertake particular duties, amongst these being the Watch at St. Paul's Cathedral. The vast building itself had a very thorough system of protection against fire, and it was believed that during the war the principal danger was to be apprehended from incendiary bombs. The Watch was organized in 1915 by Canon Alexander, treasurer of St. Paul's, and Mr. Mervyn Macartney, the architect, with the help of the Clerk of the Works and Mr. L. A. Turner as Secretary. It was formed of architects and other professional men, with guides, vergers and workmen of the cathedra staff. Trained by the London Fire Brigade these men



PARADE AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, JUNE 14, 1919.

were on guard every night for more than three years, 10 or 15 being often present at one time, stationed, with fire hose ready, at their allotted posts, when an air raid warning was received. Many of the Watchers attended two or three nights weekly, a devoted service which can be readily appreciated from the fact that not seldom it was necessary for them to spend a dark cold winter night in the cathedral between two busy days of work. Beds were provided to enable the men to get such sleep as the alarms allowed. For the purpose of united action a system of telephones from the crypt to the various roofs was installed.

Danger to the national cathedral first became pressing in September, 1915. At a quarter to 11 on the night of the 8th the Watchers on the roof saw a German airship rapidly approaching, the searchlights clearly showing the hostile craft. In Wood Street, close to the cathedral, a great fire began which, for two and a half hours, illuminated the vast building so luridly that thousands of people swarmed up Ludgate Hill "to see St. Paul's burning." They were, happily, disappointed in that expectation, though they had a view of the fire and the airship and the searchlights, while on the following day people swarmed to gaze upon as much as they were allowed to see of the

enormous damage which the raider had caused in the Wood Street locality.

In June and July, 1917, St. Paul's had very narrow escapes from the bombs discharged by the Gothas, which came over in broad daylight, and twice the building was struck, at night, by anti-aircraft shells, one of these penetrating with great force but comparatively little damage the roof of the South Transept. On June 13, 1917, a fragment of an explosive bomb, which fell within a few yards of the north side of the cathedral was thrown up on to the Stone Gallery, where the impact slightly dented the asphalt, this being the only mark left on St. Paul's by the Germans.

Canon Alexander was said to have missed only one of the raids on London. On the eve of the Armistice—Saturday, November 9, 1919—he paid his last visit to the Watch, and the men on duty were then reported high up above the dome, looking out from the Golden Gallery across the City. "The Lord Mayor's Show had passed by during the day with tumult and shouting; but now in the deserted streets everything was still. Between the river mists and the quiet stars Wren's great masterpiece, untouched by the ravages of a cruel war, stood out safe and serene." The Watchers' work was done.



THE SPECIAL CONSTABLE'S TRUNCHEON.

CHAPTER CCC.

THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE WEST (DEC. 1917—NOV. 1918).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AS WAR PREMIER—CAPORETTO AND THE RAPALLO CONFERENCE—THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21—THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE CHANNEL PORTS—UNITY OF COMMAND—THE STRATEGY OF MARSHAL FOCH—THE ALLIED COUNTER-OFFENSIVE—THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH ARMY—THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO VICTORY OF THE CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN ARMIES—THE ARMISTICE—SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S REVIEW OF THE WAR.

IN a former chapter of this History (Chapter CCLXXXVI) the achievements of the British Army in France and the general course of British military policy were reviewed down to the Battle of Cambrai and the end of the 1917 campaign. This chapter takes up the review from that point and continues it down to the end of the war. As far as possible the details of the operations are excluded from the review, for not only have they been set forth at length already, but our object in this, as in the chapter of which it is a continuance, is to get far enough away from the facts to be able to see them in some sort of perspective. We are still too near to see them with the coldly critical eyes of posterity; but already we can form a clearer idea than was possible while they were in progress of the general plan of the operations, and a better knowledge of the general design is beginning to help our understanding of the details.

The period covered by the chapter is in many ways the most difficult in the war. The pitfalls of controversy are on every hand, and the transitions from danger to security and from the imminent risk of defeat to assured triumph were so sudden that much bewilderment mixed with both the joys and the sorrows of the people. They were prepared neither for the bad news of the early part of

the year nor for its triumphant close. In no part of the war are the masses of fact so difficult to sort out and reduce to order. Three figures dominate the period. The first is that of Mr. Lloyd George, the second is that of Marshal Foch, the third is that of the British soldier. Round each of these figures the great events of the year group themselves successively. In the first part of the year the main interest is in the political and administrative organization of victory, and here interest centres round the work of Mr. Lloyd George and his long struggle for the principle of unity of command. The second part of the year opens with the German offensive, which finds the Allied Armies with unity of military control still unachieved, but by bringing our armies within measurable distance of defeat helps to achieve that unity. In this part of the war the interest centres round the strategical ideas of Marshal Foch and their application by Sir Douglas Haig and his staff. The third and concluding part of the period under review is the apotheosis of the British soldier.

Lord French's book, "1914," brings out very clearly the real cause; of any divergence there may have been between the British and French strategical ideas. The British Army wanted to dress by the left, so to speak, the French Army by the right. Thus, after the

Battle of the Aisne, Lord French persuaded Marshal Joffre to allow him to transfer the British front to Flanders, and it was well that he did, for if he had not we should have lost the Channel ports. For the same reason, after the first Battle of Ypres, Lord French was anxious to begin, with the cooperation of the Navy, an offensive along the coast in Flanders, an idea that was only defeated by the opposition of Marshal Joffre and his insistence on the plan that he had formed of a double offensive in Champagne and in the Arras région. Even after his project for an offensive along the Belgian coast had been set aside, Lord French still continued to cherish hopes of an amalgamation between the British and the Belgian Armies, with the British in supreme command. The old idea of an independent British command in Belgium operating on the flank of the German Armies still persisted like a throw-back to the Wellingtonian strategy, which before Elba operated independently in Spain and Portugal while the main struggle was going on in Central Europe and after Elba finished the war at Waterloo. Joffre's plans failed in 1915, and the modified version of them in which the British and French Armies fought the Battle of the Somme side by side produced no decisive results either. At the beginning of 1917 Sir Douglas Haig hoped to revert to the Belgian strategy favoured by Lord French, but the breakdown of the French offensive under General Nivelle and the accession to the command of the French Armies of General

Pétain, whose military policy—invariably under the political conditions that prevailed in France—was Fabian, so delayed the Belgian schemes of Sir Douglas Haig that he could not begin them until late in the year, when the weather had broken, and the result was the terribly expensive and profitless campaign for the Passchendaele Ridge. These operations east of Ypres quite ruined the prospects of what may be called the Belgian solution of the problem of a break-through on the West.

Mr. Lloyd George had come into power in consequence of Mr. Asquith's constitutional unfitness to control a storm as a war Premier should. This failure had been evidenced everywhere, but more particularly in the East. Shaken by the Serbian débâcle in 1915, the Coalition Ministry of Mr. Asquith was finally brought down by the ruin of Rumania in the following autumn. It was known that the new Premier was quite out of sympathy with the military ideas that had been dominant up to the present. Always under the influence of French military thought, he regarded the failure of General Nivelle at the beginning of his term of office as proof that no military settlement of the war was to be had for the present in France; he sympathized with the Fabian policy of General Pétain, and though unable to change the military plans of Sir Douglas Haig, backed as they were by the strongest military section of the War Office at home, he watched the rising costs of the British offensives in 1917 with gradually increasing



[Official photograph.]


BRITISH INFANTRY ARRIVE AT A COUNTRY STATION IN ITALY.

[*M. Olive Edis, photo.*]**MR. LLOYD GEORGE IN 1918.**

dismay. He himself at this time would probably have called himself an Easterner. Never identified as Mr. Churchill was with the disastrous Dardanelles campaign, he, like the French, had great hopes of an offensive from the direction of Salonica, and persisted in maintaining our army there during a long period in which it seemed as though it would never be of any use. Also he had visions in 1917 of a British offensive in conjunction with

the Italians against Austria, but was never able to obtain any support for this idea from his principal military advisers. All through the first year of his Prime Ministership he was compelled to countenance a war policy of which he did not approve.

Passchendaele, Caporetto, and the defection of Russia moved him to strong action to bring about a change. After Caporetto we had to face the alternatives of moving troops from



THE THEATRE OF WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1918.

France to the support of the Italians or of letting Italy go the way of Serbia, Rumania, and Russia. It might be, and was, argued that the Balkan and the Turkish East was a "side-show" which did not influence the course of the war in the main theatre and could not decide its result. But when the crumpling up of our fortunes in the East extended to Venetia something had to be done, and Mr. Lloyd George's power of rapid decision showed to very great advantage in this crisis. There was a conference between English, French and Italian representatives at Rapallo at the beginning of November at which the whole policy of the Allies was passed in review, and it was decided to establish the principle of the united front, by which Belgium, France and Italy were to be treated as one single front and troops were to be moved along it independently of their nationality as occasion required. The speech made by Mr. Lloyd George in Paris on November 12, 1917, four days after the Rapallo conference ended, was the frankest speech that had yet been made in public on the military problems of the war. Our failures, he said, had been due to the absence of real unity in the war direction of the Allied countries. There had been plenty of talk about unity, but so far the plans proclaimed as evidence of that unity had been like a patchwork quilt. But stitching was not strategy. He went on to compare the war with the Central Powers to a great siege in which our main object should have been to complete our lines of circumvallation, and showed how our failure to succour Serbia had left open a way to the enemy by which he could break through. Half the forces sent to Salonika, if they had been sent in time—nay, half the men who fell in the futile attempt to break through on the Western front in the summer and autumn of 1915—"would have saved Serbia, would have saved the Balkans, and completed the blockade of Germany." In the same spirit he reviewed the fate of Rumania and the misfortunes of Italy now. It was the manifesto of one who during the past year had seen his doubts of the wisdom of these attempts to break through on the West confirmed beyond his worst fears, and an attack, though a veiled one, on the policy that had been persistently pursued by our War Office. The British strategy had been keen on the Belgian solution, the French strategy, under Joffre and Pétain, on a break-through in Champagne or across the Chemin des Dames,

and the Russians and Italians had each been concerned in the defence or offence from their own several fronts. Now, he explained, there was to be one single control, and Europe was to be treated as one single battlefield.

The natural corollary of this speech would have been the establishment of a single general command over all the armies in France and Italy, and that is what French and American opinion would have preferred. But the only thing of that kind attempted was the establishment of an Army of Reserve under the com-



[Barnett.]

**GENERAL SIR HENRY HUGHES WILSON,
K.C.B.**

**Chief of Imperial General Staff and Member of
War Council.**

mand of Marshal Foch. The unity that was secured at Rapallo was a unity not of command but of control. A Supreme War Council was created composed of the Prime Minister and another member from each of the Governments of England, France and Italy. This War Council was assisted by one military representative from each of the three countries. The military representative of France was Marshal Foch, chief of staff to Pétain, so that there was no question of rivalry and discordant aims in the direction of French war policy. But the military representative of England was Sir Henry Wilson, who was not a member of the Staff, and was not in sympathy with the ideas of the extreme Westerners as they had been exemplified in the campaign of 1917.

Between him and Sir Douglas Haig and the conservative wing of the War Office hierarchy, represented by Sir William Robertson, there was thought to be serious risk of collision, and both the manner and matter of the Paris speech, praised in France and in America, were violently attacked here. The *Spectator* called for the "compulsory retirement" of



GENERAL VON LUDENDORFF.

Commanded the German Armies in the West during 1918.

Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons declared that the new Council could do nothing that was not already done unless it was to override the General Staff, which had not deserved such supersession. These criticisms show how difficult was the opposition that the Prime Minister had to overcome in order to secure the adoption of ideas which now seem a matter of course. They explain why it was difficult at the end of 1917 to adopt the simple and logical plan of a united command which was established later after the reverses of the spring. The insularity, or rather (if we may coin a word which suggests the traditions that dominated the General Staff) the *peninsularity* of British strategy died very hard, and the divergencies of view about the course of strategy in the early months of the war that are revealed in Lord French's book had a continuous history right down to the Rapallo Conference and even later. Fortunately, tact and forbearance on both sides and the alarming nature of the events in the spring of 1918 prevented any conflict of view between the new Supreme Council of War and the General Staff at home; between Sir Henry Wilson, the British military adviser to the

Council, and Sir Douglas Haig and his staff in France.

It is now time to turn from the arguments in which Mr. Lloyd George took so distinguished a part about the military coordination of the Allied resources to the problems of the war as they presented themselves to the German General Staff. Not until we have full accounts of the war from the German side shall we understand fully the motives and calculations of the enemy in beginning his offensive of March last year. It was his fourth attempt to end the war by a breakthrough on the West front. The first ended with the Battle of the Marne, the second with the first Battle of Ypres, the third with the



GENERAL VON HINDENBURG.

failure at Verdun. The first two failures had ruined von Moltke, the third failure von Falkenhayn, and Ludendorff was a man of great resolution to hope to succeed where they had failed.

That Ludendorff should have been able to persuade the General Staff to take the risk of a general offensive in which failure infallibly meant ruin is the more remarkable because Hindenburg, still the popular idol, is believed to have been opposed to it. How far he committed himself in opposition is not known, and he may have been content merely to express doubts about Ludendorff's policy of attack at this stage of the war and after all the losses that the German Army had suffered.


But certain it is that the policy of the March offensive was Ludendorff's own, that he was only able to carry it in the face of opposition from other members of the General Staff, and that Hindenburg in particular never allowed his reputation to be bound up with the project.

When Von Kühlmann made that celebrated speech in the Reichstag, declaring that military victory was impossible, he was obviously expressing not his own opinion only, but that of soldiers in the highest place, perhaps that of Hindenburg himself. There were two alternatives before Germany at the beginning of 1918. The first was to work for a compromise peace by remaining on the defensive on the west and hoping that the heavy losses that the Allies would suffer in their attack would weaken their resolution. The second was that of Ludendorff. And behind each of these alternatives there was a distinct political school. Those who would have refused to take the offensive were prepared to make political "concessions" on the west for the sake of the prospective gains in Russia. Those, on the other hand, like Ludendorff, who were anxious to put everything to the test of an offensive in France, were the soldiers who were most under the influence of the plutocracy of Westphalian magnates and preferred the chance of an out-and-out victory to a compro-

mise peace of stalemate which, if it were to be had at all, must infallibly mean the sacrifice of the notorious ambitions of the industrial magnates for expansion towards the west. The purely military arguments for and against an offensive on the west were fairly evenly balanced. A defensive policy meant a war of utter exhaustion; offence might fail, but it would at any rate hasten the decision. Defence, again, would expose Germany to the full fury of the war from the air, in which element she now recognized that she was beaten. Moreover, if the war was prolonged, America would develop her full military strength. Was it not better to make a final bid for victory before that happened? Would the results of failure be worse than the position of Germany after a year of waiting in which the Allies, taught by their experience of 1917, might abstain from ambitious offensives and content themselves, unless the Germans forced their hand by attack, with economizing their resources until America was ready—it might be in 1919? But the decisive arguments, one suspects, on the offensive of March were not purely military, but political. Three times during the war the choice between the same alternatives that confronted the German General Staff in the spring of 1918 had to be made, and each time the same decision was reached. The Germans might at the beginning of the war have put



GUNNERS DRILLING IN GAS MASKS BEHIND THE BRITISH LINES.



STUBBORN DEFENCE OF THE SUSSEX MEN ON THE SOMME, BETWEEN AMIENS AND PERONNE, MARCH 25, 1918.

their whole offensive strength against Russia and left France and Belgium alone, and on purely military grounds there was much to be said for that course. They took the other course with all its risks not merely because German military conceit knew no bounds, but because one of the dominant motives for the war was the desire for territorial and industrial expansion at the expense of France and Belgium. In 1916, again, they need not have attacked Verdun but might have finished their job in Russia once and for all, but, again the decision was for offence in the west, because there alone were to be had the gains for which Germany had begun the war. Once more, in 1918, the same alternatives and once more the same decision. It is curious to see running through German policy the same conflict between eastern and western strategy which runs through our own.

The transference of German divisions on a great scale from the Russian to the French front began in November, 1917, and both the British and French Staffs believed that this strengthening of the German front in France was a preliminary to attack. The French Army under General Pétain had abstained from offensive operations since the spring of 1917, and having failed in our offensives in 1917 against weaker German forces we had nothing to hope from a policy of attack in 1918 against much stronger forces. The view of Pétain, that our true policy in 1918 was to remain on the defensive until the United States Army could cooperate in an offensive, had definitely been accepted. Neither the British nor the French Armies, at the beginning of the year, had any idea of conducting offensive operations, and the growing strength of the American Army, which determined the Germans to attack at once, reconciled us to wait, if necessary, till 1919 before we attacked. But the transference from the tactics of offence which we had hitherto pursued to those of defence is no easy matter. A different system of training is required for offence and for successful and economical defence, and, what is still more important, a different system of field-works and communications. Sir Douglas Haig points out that the constant capture of new ground by us from the enemy had prevented our rear-line systems from being developed as they required to be if we were to fall back on the defensive and meet a determined series of attacks. Every man that

could be spared was put on the construction of new works in anticipation of the new defensive policy, with the result that it was difficult to carry out an elaborate course of training in defensive tactics.

The difficulties of the transition were not understood at home, and they accounted for some of our failures in the Spring of last year. They were increased by our heavy losses in the constant fighting of 1917—losses that had not been made good. At the same time, we had sent reinforcements to Italy and we had, in addition, taken over an additional front of 28 miles between St. Quentin and the Oise. In these circumstances there was no real justification for the confidence with which our prospects in a great German offensive were generally regarded. It was, on the contrary, only to be expected that ground would be lost and heavy losses incurred, both of men and material, for of all the operations of war retreat is perhaps the most difficult. The Germans, in their retreat from the area of the Somme battlefield in the spring of 1917, had shown how carefully they had studied its problems, but it was one of the penalties that we had paid for our exaggerated optimism in the early years of the war that it made us assume that we were only going forward and would never have to retreat again. The fact that the Germans caught us in this difficult period of transition from the offence to defensive tactics was responsible more than any other single cause for the initial success of their attacks in March and April. Had we seen farther ahead and made up our minds to follow defensive tactics earlier, our losses need not have been so heavy, for we could have elaborated the necessary defensive system and trained our men in the tactics of defence.

If we had neglected this special training, the Germans had not. Some 64 German divisions were engaged in the attack, on the opening day, and the majority of them had spent weeks and months in concentrated training for offensive operations, and, as Sir Douglas Haig knew, had reached a high pitch of technical excellence in the attack. Ludendorff had worked out a new system of offensive tactics based on elaborate specialization of function in the various duties of attack. Speed, as he recognized, was a prime condition of success; but if the advance was stayed until all the little knots of defence had been untied, the attack lost all its impetus. On the other hand, as we dis-

covered on the opening day of the Somme battle, it was dangerous to overrun defensive works before they had been reduced. What Ludendorff did was to train storm troops to keep up the initial impetus, and to leave the reduction of the works which they had passed by to other and specially trained companies, thus obtaining security against an attack from the rear without compromising the speed of the advance. This specialisation of function was elaborated for all the different operations of attack, and is the distinguishing characteristic of the Ludendorff tactics. It was, in fact, carried too far. Manœuvres done to perfection in training became impossible in the stress of a rapid advance, and the machinery tended to break down from its over-complexification. But this elaboration of tactics ensured initial success and enhanced the shock of surprise.

The main object of Ludendorff's offensive was to separate the British and French Armies. Below Amiens the Somme broadens into a wide river, with few or no bridges, and the capture of Amiens by the enemy would have cut all communications by road or rail between the Allied Armies. That accomplished, Ludendorff could have concentrated against either

group of armies or against them both in turn. He did, in fact, after failing to capture Amiens, concentrate first against the British between Arras and Ypres, and then against the French on the Aisne and the Marne. The first of these movements was an echo of the German attempts in the autumn of 1914 to capture the Channel ports. The second was a repetition, with variations, of the strategy of the first invasion of France, which was brought to a standstill on the Marne. Both these secondary movements failed as (and largely because) the first attempts on Amiens had failed. But had Amiens fallen, they would both in all probability have succeeded.

The main lines of Ludendorff's strategy were thus exceedingly simple, and, as has been seen, the conditions were not, as has commonly been imagined in this country, favourable to the defence. On the contrary, instead of asking, as most people did, why the Germans gained a measure of success, we ought rather to ask how it came about that with all their preparations and with all their elaborate tactical training they failed so signally in the end. Simple as the general design is, the details of the operation are very difficult and complicated, and a general review, such as this



LOADING SHELLS FROM A DUMP.

[Official photograph.]



EXAMINING A CAPTURED ANTI-TANK GUN.

chapter is attempting, must avoid entangling itself in their discussion. Our difficulties with regard to the German offensive would seem to be summed up in three questions. Why was the break in the British line so bad in the region south of St. Quentin, where it joined on to the French? Why did the enemy, after coming so near to success at Amiens, change his area of attack? And, lastly, what, apart from the stubbornness of the defence, were the chief causes of the enemy's failure?

General Gough, who commanded the Fifth Army, where the Germans made their principal break, was not one of the ablest of the British generals, but he was not incompetent, and though he was removed from his command after the break-through, no definite mistake of leadership was brought home to him. In the retreat his dispositions were skilful, and this rupture of our line, though very grave, was not fatal. Indeed, thanks to the assistance of the French, General Gough may be said to have stopped the original German advance, which, if it had been continued, would have carried the enemy down the Oise on the main north road from Paris and to have deflected it towards Amiens. The initial success of the



THE ANTI-TANK BULLET COMPARED WITH AN ORDINARY BRITISH RIFLE BULLET.

enemy on this front would appear to have been mainly due to the extraordinary turn of speed that he developed in his offensive, and to the fact that we had our first experience of the new tactics in a thick fog. Strategic surprise there was none, for a German attack was expected on this part of the line and even about this time; the enemy had always shown a fondness for delivering his attacks near the point of junction between Allied commands. But tactical surprise there certainly was, and it was exploited with a rapidity hitherto

unknown in the war. It was a great success for the new tactics, and on the other hand, the inexperience of the British at this point of the line in the tactics of defence was much more marked than elsewhere. For that, however, General Gough was not to blame, but rather the suddenness of the change from the offensive tactics hitherto pursued to those of defence. Another important cause of the German defeat of the Fifth Army was its inferiority in numbers. The Fifth Army was much weaker than the Third Army of General Byng, on its left. On the whole front of the Fifth Army, there was one division to 6,750 yards, whereas the average length of line held by the Third Army was some 2,000 yards shorter per division. The calculations of General Gough's friends make the disproportion still greater. If the enemy's attack was expected, as is always said, to fall with exceptional weight on the Fifth Army, it certainly requires explanation why its line should have been held more weakly. Sir Douglas Haig gives two explanations. One is that the marshes in front of General Gough's army assisted the defence. They seem, in fact, to have been exceptionally dry and to have given very little assistance to the defence. The other reason given by Sir Douglas Haig is that whereas farther north our defences were stripped to the bare bone, and we could not afford to lose any ground at all, here there was room to retire under pressure, without the risk of disastrous consequences. There is a great deal of substance in this argument, and it is evident that Sir Douglas Haig expected the enemy to make ground here, and was prepared to run risks there rather than elsewhere. But neither he nor anyone else expected the enemy's advance to be so rapid as it was, and the risks taken were, as the event showed, dangerously great. On the whole, the popular idea that the reverse suffered by the Fifth Army must have been due to faults of leadership does not seem to be borne out by the facts. The German successes were due to the new Ludendorffian tactics, here tested under highly favourable circumstances. Sir Douglas Haig quite realized the importance of the part of the line held by the Fifth Army, but the bias towards the left had become almost second nature with the British Army, and it may sub-consciously have caused the command to take disproportionately heavy risks on the right of our line where it joined up

with the French. There seems to have been very little substance in the explanation of the defeat, of which so much was heard at the time, that the defences in the line held by the Fifth Army, having just been taken over from the French, were in a bad state.

It is sometimes said that the Germans made a great mistake in desisting from their offensive towards Amiens and beginning their new offensive north of Arras. No doubt if they had captured Amiens it would have been worth very much more to them, failing at Amiens, Ypres and on the Marne, but the Germans, fortunately for us, had very good reasons for what they did. If they gave up the attacks towards Amiens, it was not because they did not realize its importance, but because they were incapable of pressing them farther. For the first condition of success in attack is surprise, and when an attack has continued for a certain length of time in one direction the chances of surprise are reduced, and can only be revived by starting a fresh attack at a new point. Add to that the enormous losses that the Germans had suffered in their attacks towards Amiens, the confusion and exhaustion of the units, the congestion of the roads, and the increasing stubbornness of the defence, and it will be seen that the change in the direction of attack was not so much a mistake as a necessity and the symptom of failure.

That the Germans failed so often after getting so near, must be put down not only to the vigour of the resistance offered by the army, but also to the action of the British fleet and the efficiency of the blockade. Everything points to some persistent breakdown in war material, and above all in transport. They were unable, owing largely to the shortage of rubber, to make as good use of the roads as we did. It took them longer to prepare an attack, and in spite of the excellent railway systems, they could not move their troops so rapidly from one part of the line to another. The persistency of the Allied attacks in their offensive later in the year, contrasts very favourably with the considerable intervals which the Germans allowed to elapse between the successive stages of their attacks and between the cessation of an old offensive and the beginning of a new. When all is said, much of the credit for Allied superiority must go down under the head of material, and to the credit of the Navy. Of their deficiencies in

these respects we shall learn more when the German accounts of the history of the war in the last 12 months come to be published.

Looking back on these anxious times, from March to June, we can see now that the danger was not really so imminent as many thought, and that the successes that the Germans did win were only the measure of their exhaustion later. Laymen always attach excessive value to mere gains of territory, whereas the winning or losing of a battle is always in the mind of the soldier, not in the possession or loss of that piece of ground or in the statistics of casualties.

the amphitheatre of hills below Kemmel. On April 13, Sir Douglas Haig issued his famous "Backs to the wall" order. "Every position must be held to the last man," he wrote, "there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical hour." Never before had such an order been issued to British troops, and though the language is strained, it was justified by the situation. The great



A GERMAN INFANTRY HEADQUARTERS IN THE OFFENSIVE OF MARCH, 1918.

Une bataille ne se perd matériellement. The moral of the British Army was never shaken, but on the other hand for the Germans less than everything was less than nothing, because they were only so much the weaker for the still worse struggle that lay ahead unless they could give a knock-out blow to one or other of their enemies. But there were several days in which we seemed near to grave disaster. In the March offensive, the capture of Montdidier was the high-water mark of the enemy's success, and it looked as though, with salients biting deep into our line north and south of Amiens, the city must fall. But as at Ypres, where the same thing happened, the centre of the line held and the town was saved. Still more grave was the situation in the north in the second offensive during the fighting in

danger on this section of the line was that it ran so near the coast. A few miles farther and our Army would have been in such a confined space that it would have been impossible to manœuvre. We should have been forced to allow our armies to be cooped up in the narrow space between the hills at the back of Boulogne and the sea, or to effect a retreat down to the mouth of the Somme. Of the two alternatives, the preferable one would have been to abandon the ports. That, as Sir Douglas Haig said, would have jeopardized the homeland, for the coasts of England could have been bombarded from the heights on the French coast, and perhaps the southern suburbs of London itself might have been reached by a big gun like that which was bombarding Paris at this time. Moreover, the loss of the Channel

*Official photograph.*

BRITISH AND AMERICAN OFFICERS CONSULTING A MAP.

ports would gravely have complicated the work of the Navy in dealing with the submarines and increased the danger of air raids. Yet even these dangers would have been less grave than the cutting off of the British Army from connexion with the French, for then the Germans could have concentrated their whole strength against either of the divided armies. Happily, the choice never had to be made, but had the fortunes of the war continued to go against us, there is reason to believe that we should have abandoned the ports rather than allow our communications with the French to be cut. The abandonment of all the ground won in the hard fighting of the previous autumn east of Ypres clearly points in that direction.

Mr. Lloyd George rose to the height of the great emergency. On April 16, three days after Sir Douglas Haig's order, it was announced that Marshal Foch had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. The appointment should have been made after Rapallo, but could not, owing to the opposition at home to the much less drastic proposals that were made. Much of this opposition was undoubtedly inspired, if not by the British Army in France, by soldiers at home. It is just, however, to add that when once the

appointment was made no one cooperated more loyally with Marshal Foch than the generals commanding the British Army. So well, in fact, did the combination work that they forgot that they had ever opposed the policy that led up to it, and convinced themselves that what they had objected to was not union of the armies under a single Commander-in-Chief, but unity of control by a Supreme Council which was mainly composed of civilians. However that may be, the particularism of the British Army, against which Mr. Lloyd George had waged so long and so hard a struggle, was now at an end. About the same time, the American Government took a decision the value of which has never been sufficiently appreciated. It agreed that American battalions should be used to fill up the gaps made by the fighting in British and French divisions. That was carrying the principle of unity farther than even we had done. For the appointment of Marshal Foch as Commander-in-Chief did not affect the local British commands; the brigades and divisions and several armies remained under their old commands, who were left the greatest amount of freedom in the execution of the general strategic scheme as laid down by Marshal Foch. But the measures now sanctioned by President Wilson meant the

breaking up of American divisions almost as soon as they were trained, and the sinking of their individuality in that of the other Allied armies. That was indeed a sacrifice of natural pride and ambition to excel which cannot be praised too highly. The new Conscription Bill, raising the military age to fifty-one, was mainly symbolic in its value, and added directly very little to the strength of the army in France. It did, however, enable the Government to use for

foreign service the army that had been retained in England for home defence. One of the beliefs that had been held most obstinately by the War Office was that the enemy would attempt a serious invasion of this country. Of serious invasion there was never any danger, so long as our Navy held the seas, and a raid or series of raids would have been most easily dealt with, not by a large and imperfectly trained army, but by a small picked corps. In Ireland



A CAMOUFLAGED HOWITZER IN ACTION.

[Official photograph.]

the threat of conscription was a failure and produced little but political mischief.

The appointment of Marshal Foch as generalissimo suggests some general questions that may conveniently be discussed at this point. The Germans made three main attempts to break through on the West, in 1914, in 1916 at Verdun, and in 1918. All three failed. The Allies made attempts in 1915 which were clearly premature, and yet another in the second half of 1916, on the Somme, which met with a great measure of success, but never looked like breaking the German line, and probably cost us more men than the enemy. In 1917 the British offensives were towards the end of the year even more costly in proportion to the numbers engaged, and such success as they gained was purely local. How came it that, when the counter-offensive of the Allies began in July, our success was immediate, and continued almost without a break from August to the conclusion of the Armistice? How much of this success is to be put down to the unity of command under Marshal Foch? And in what way did his solution of the problem of the offensive differ from that of Ludendorff? We may avoid the repetition of details already set forth at length in this history, and gain some clearer idea of the principles at work in the

glorious last five months of the war by attempting to answer these questions.

The first means by which it was hoped to effect a breakthrough was by manœuvre, particularly against the flanks. This was the means employed by the Germans in their first offensive when by a double turning movement they attempted to roll up both flanks of the defending armies. It was also the idea in Lord French's mind when he moved into Flanders from the Aisne. It never yielded decisive results in the Western theatre, whether employed by us or by the Germans. General Allenby's final victory over the Turks in Palestine was a beautiful example of the victory of enveloping manœuvre, but in France the magnitude of the armies, the elaboration of the defensive works, and the abundance of lateral communications, especially behind the German lines, all combined to make such a victory impossible except under very favourable circumstances such as did not exist after the first month.

The next formula for effecting a breach was "blasting a way through" by means of concentrations of heavy artillery. When the munitions campaign was started, weight of artillery was thought to be a panacea for our military ills, and it was certainly an indispensable condition of their cure. But, like most



CRATER OF A HIGH EXPLOSIVE SHELL.

[Official photograph]

panaceas, it did not work according to expectation. In the battle of the Somme we attained local superiority in weight of artillery metal over the battle front, and breaches were effected from time to time. But they were too narrow to be serviceable, and the battle resolved itself into a series of siege operations. The German experience at Verdun was much the same. Their tactical idea was to drive a wedge in the defences by a concentrated attack, and when one wedge stuck, to drive in a second and a third from other points on the periphery. At Gorlice, against the Russians, these shock artillery tactics succeeded in bringing about a general retreat, but everywhere else their effect was only local. Nor was the British offensive in 1917 more successful, and in the waterlogged soil of Flanders it was found that the heavy bombardment of the whole countryside actually helped the defence. As fast as it destroyed the enemy's earthworks, it created new and even more formidable centres of defence in the craters of the shell-holes.

Already, in 1917, observers began to suspect that the long preliminary bombardment tended to defeat its own object for another reason, namely, that it advertised the point of attack. General Nivelle, in the unfortunate offensive of the spring of 1917, shortened the bombardment, but failing either to surprise the enemy or to destroy his earthworks suffered accordingly. Surprise, and speed in following up initial successes, were recognized now as the indispensable to success. At the same time, manœuvre began to come into its own again, for it was recognized that if surprise was to be maintained, there must be constant changes in the point of attack, and the freedom of manœuvre for which well-developed lateral communications were necessary. General Sir Eric Geddes, as he then was, did excellent service in France, in multiplying our military railways and in improving the working.

The first battle which exhibited the working of the new military ideas and fully embodied the experience so far gained in the war was Cambrai. That the Germans in the second half of the battle should have succeeded in repeating our success of the first half, showed that both sides were feeling their way to the same solution of the problem of attack against strongly fortified positions.

What Ludendorff did was to work up the two great essentials—surprise and speed—into an elaborate system of new tactics, of

which the leading features have already been noticed. He failed through the excessive complication of the tactics, through overspecialization and also, it is to be supposed, through faults and shortages of material. It now remains to be seen what Marshal Foch added to these ideas and how he improved their working out.



[Russell.]

SIR ERIC GEDDES, K.C.B.

Honorary Major-General, 1917; Director-General of Military Railways and Inspector-General of Transportation, 1916-17; Member of Imperial War Cabinet, 1918.

Marshal Foch, in his "Principes de la Guerre," quotes the saying of Napoleon that "the art of war consists in having more forces than the enemy, with an army weaker than his, wherever he attacks you or you attack him." For this reason, he lays down as the first condition of a successful offensive that you must have what he calls "strategic security." Success can only come by attack, and depends on having greater forces than the enemy at the point chosen for attack. With armies approximately equal elsewhere that superiority at the point that matters can only be obtained by inferiority at points that do not matter or matter less, and this inferiority will be dangerous and invite counter-attack unless a state of equilibrium or strategic security has been established beforehand. The lack of this security



Official photograph.

TANKS EQUIPPED WITH APPARATUS FOR CROSSING THE HINDENBURG LINE.

was the cause of many of the German failures. The first invasion of France in 1914 left open the flanks of the invading army to counter-attack. The German operations in Belgium in the same year, again, were an attempt to obtain this security by her campaign on the Belgian coast, which was only partly successful, for the British Army at Ypres remained as a thorn in his side. Again, the offensives of Ludendorff were faulty because Foch was able to form his reserves and use the moment of the enemy's exhaustion to deliver his counter-attack. Ludendorff never had the strategic security which Foch postulates as the condition of success in attack. To take an earlier example, had the French General Staff fully grasped this teaching at the beginning of the war, it would never have authorized the offensive into Lorraine before it had reasonable security for the defence of its Belgian frontiers.

But Ludendorff, by the failure of his attacks, made Foch a possessor of this security. In beginning his own counter-attack Foch knew that the enemy had now so exhausted himself that he was no longer in a position to continue his attacks. It is literally true that the successes of the second part of the year were built on the failures of the first part. We knew when our counter-attack opened that the German had done his worst and could do no more, that he was fighting with the knowledge that he had lost all chance of victory, and that his *moral* was in danger of going. The very energy and recklessness with which he had pressed his offensive now told against him. He had advertised to his men—nay, it had been

proclaimed in the Reichstag in June—that they could not possibly win the war by military means. And when he was thrown back on the defensive, the specialization of function, of which he made a fetish, told against him. His army had been squeezed dry of its best elements by the losses amongst the storm troops. He suffered, as we had done at the beginning of the year, by the sudden change from offensive to defensive—suffered worse, for with him the specialized training in attack had been carried much farther. His only asset was that he had behind him the famous Hindenburg lines.

At the beginning of the year our intention had been to defer our formal offensive until 1919, by which time the American troops would have become a great and formidable army. The great question that Foch had to decide was whether he should continue his own offensive without delay, and take the risk of repeating the German failure, or whether he should abide by the original plan of an offensive deferred to the spring.

It is, of course, one of the first maxims of war to press an advantage and to refuse the enemy time to recover from a defeat. But it was easier to enunciate the doctrine than to apply it, and Marshal Foch had very carefully to consider whether he could safely call on his troops to begin a long offensive after the trials that they had gone through. The French Army had taken a very important part in defeating the German offensive, and in addition to helping us in Flanders and on the Somme they had themselves been bitterly

assailed by the enemy in the second Marne battle and had suffered heavily. Moreover, ever since the failure of General Nivelle it had been necessary to consider the temper of the French troops very carefully. The American Army, again, was composed of magnificent material, but as yet it was untried. For some time the main field army of the Americans under General Pershing had been in the Woivre plain between St. Mihiel and Nancy, a comparatively quiet part of the line where the fronts had lately been stable. But heavy drafts had been made on the other troops training in France to fill gaps in the Allied divisions, and high as were the hopes of the military quality of the Americans, they had yet to prove their value in the field. As for the British Army, for a year and a half, from the middle of 1916 to the end of 1917, it had been engaged in an almost continuous and very costly offensive. That offensive had ceased for three months only to be followed by the most anxious time that British troops had had since the first battle of Ypres. Their losses alike in men and in material had been enormous. Could he call on them now to begin a counter-offensive which, if it went well, ought to be kept up till the winter? Would flesh and blood be equal to such an ordeal? He decided to ask the troops to make the attempt. Only a man of tremendous moral courage and imagination

would have taken such a risk, and it is hard to say what is most to be admired in his leadership, the patience with which he waited until the enemy had exhausted himself, the judgment with which he timed his counterstroke, or the superb and, as it turned out, fully justified confidence with which he called on his troops for their supreme effort.

His general plan was simple. Strategically, it was a double encircling movement. His centre was to press forward slowly, containing the enemy but avoiding heavy fighting unless the enemy so weakened his front that a chance offered of brusquing the attack on the extremely strong natural positions that he held in this part of his front. This was the rôle of the French Army. On the left the British Armies and on the right the Americans in the St. Mihiel district were to press the enemy back with all the vigour at their command, and if possible drive in his flanks so far as either to compel a precipitate and disastrous retreat or, if he refused, to force him to run the risk of a super-Sedan. Tactically, Foch followed on the lines first indicated at Cambrai and later improved upon by Ludendorff. Surprise he hoped to achieve by his superiority in the air and by frequent and sudden changes of the sector of attack. For speed in following up success he relied on the excellence of his communications, especially by road, and the abundance of the transport



BRITISH TROOPS PASSING THROUGH BAPAUME
After its capture in August, 1918.



THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY FROM AUGUST 8 TO THE ARMISTICE.

material. He had also great assets in the tanks and in a weight of artillery now definitely superior to that of the enemy.

From August 8, when the general offensive proper began, as distinguished from the counter-stroke on the Marne in July, down to the conclusion of the Armistice in November, the fighting was continuous and the brunt of it fell on the British Army. This long offensive falls quite naturally into some eight battles, or rather groups of battles, for most of them lasted for more than a week. The mere

switch line, and a total of 18,850 prisoners and 200 guns

A week later, on September 12, began the American offensive in the St. Mihiel region, with a toll of 15,000 prisoners; it was followed by a steady pressure by the American Army in the difficult country of the Argonne; and all this time Generals Debency and Mangin were advancing in the centre on our right.

On September 18 began the fourth, and in some ways the most important, of the British battles, the battle for the Hindenburg line.



Official photograph.

A BURSTING SHELL: MEN STOOPING TO AVOID SPLINTERS.

catalogue of these battles gives, perhaps, the best idea of the general plan, especially if it is studied with the help of the map that we give of the stages of the offensive on the British section of the front.

The first battle, which began on August 8 and ended on August 12, disengaged Amiens, opened up the railway to Paris, and lost the Germans 21,850 prisoners and 400 guns.

On August 21 began the battle of Bapaume and went on to the end of the month. It gave us 35,000 prisoners and 270 guns.

On August 26, and therefore overlapping with the battle of Bapaume, began the battle of Arras which ended on September 3 by the breaching of the famous Drocourt-Quéant

Épéhy fell on the 18th, and the Canal du Nord was triumphantly crossed on the 27th.

On the following day, the 28th, the Second Army—the Army of Ypres—with the Belgians to their left, forced the enemy back from before Ypres and achieved an advance of 4 miles on a 23-mile front.

On the 29th, the battle for the Hindenburg line developed into a battle of Cambrai on a 30-mile front from the Sensée to St. Quentin, and ended with the line from end to end completely in our possession besides 22,000 prisoners. The series of battles before and immediately behind the Hindenburg line gave us in all 50,000 prisoners and more than 600 guns.

On October 14 began the advance of the



[Australian official photograph.]

A COLUMN OF PRISONERS.

Second Army in the Lys valley towards Courtrai, which, in conjunction with the operations beyond Cambrai farther south, gave us Lille, Roubaix and Douai with 21,000 prisoners. And, finally,

In the first ten days of November, which brought us to Maubeuge, Mons and the Armistice the number of German prisoners was increased by another 19,000.

Altogether the losses of the German Armies in this fighting with left, centre and right of the Allied Armies amounted to 385,000 prisoners, of which the British share was 188,700, besides nearly three thousand guns. These losses probably represented a total casualty list of some three-quarters of a million of men. Add this number to the casualties suffered by the Germans in their offensives since March 21, and we cannot put the German casualties in the eight months at less than a million and a quarter to a million and a half men. No army was ever so soundly defeated in the whole of history before. The Germans blamed the revolution for their failures. But the revolution was the consequence, not the cause, of the defeats.

Whether the Germans could have kept up the struggle over the winter is a question that has been debated already and is likely to be debated often in the future. Ludendorff himself changed his mind on the possibility of further resistance. After giving up the struggle as quite hopeless and advising his Government to surrender on any terms it could get he later

came round to the conclusion that the German Army might hold out defensively and even, by prolonging its resistance, get better terms. That the rapid advance of the British Army away from railhead would sooner or later have got it into serious difficulties and forced it to pause until its communications were re-established; that the work of destruction on the railways was done with extraordinary efficiency by the retreating army; and that its *moral*, though diminished, was not entirely destroyed, must be admitted. It is also possible that the German Army, if there had been no proposals for an armistice, or if they had been rejected, might have been rallied for the defence of the Rhine, and that the forcing of the passage would have been an operation attended with great losses. But the only result of prolonging the war after defeat would certainly have been to complete the ruin of Germany and make it impossible that she should ever recover and become a great power again. Granted that the advance to the Rhine through the Meuse valley and over the Ardennes would have been a costly business, it did not follow that this was the route that our main attack would have taken. The surrender of Austria opened up a new route into Southern Germany which the Allied Armies might quite conceivably have made their main line of attack. The armies in France would have been given a rest while this southern movement was developing, and when they moved forward again it would have been against



[Official photograph.]

A CAMOUFLAGED ROAD, LENS.

an enemy whose rear was threatened. Had the German Army under these conditions kept up its resistance to the advance from the west, destroying communications and devastating the country as it retreated, the Allied terms would have been even more severe than they were, and with justice. Nothing but harm, both to Germany and to the rest of the world, could have resulted from the prolongation of the war, after it had been decided in a military sense. Moreover, even if it had been prolonged, it is quite certain that neither Ludendorff nor any member of the General Staff would have been in command of the defence. It would have been a revolutionary war, in which Germany must inevitably have disintegrated. That was not a war that was desired by any of the Allies, and the decision to agree to an armistice when it was asked for by Germany was wise both for military and for political reasons. It was, also, due to the army.

The war must infallibly have gone over into another year but for the efforts of the British Army. Full justice even now has still not been done to the prodigies of its endurance. If its offensive had not followed immediately on the failure of the German offensive and been kept up without intermission till the enemy sued for peace, he would have rallied, held the

Hindenburg line through the winter, constructed similar lines behind it, and used the respite to raise the cry of the "Fatherland in danger." "There might have been no revolution, and in the skill with which it conducted the defence of the Fatherland the old régime might even have made its reconciliation with the people. The whole political atmosphere in which the war terminated would have been different and the change would not have been to our advantage. From this danger, both on the political and on the military side, the British Army saved the world. No other army was at the time in a position to do this service, and the British Army may justly claim the credit—not for ending and winning the war, but at any rate for ending and winning it in 1918 instead of in 1919, which was the date that seemed most probable in July. Indeed, if an interval had been allowed between the defeat of the German offensive and the beginning of our own, and the German Government, in order to save itself, had used that interval to change the conception of the war from one of offence to one of defence of German territory (and that it would certainly have tried to do), the war might even have trailed into 1920, with losses to life and an amount of political and material destruction that are appalling to contemplate.

To this most salutary hastening of the end of the war all ranks and all the British "tribes" contributed, but especial recognition is due to the troops from the self-governing Dominions, who gave us of their best without stint, and for whom this war has marked their coming into full nationhood. United as they are in their common devotion to the Allied cause, there are still well-marked differences between the character of the Dominion troops and their military methods. The Canadian troops are distinguished by a seriousness in the field which contrasts both with the apparent non-chalance of the British private soldier and the ardour of the Australians. They did nothing in the war that was not good, and as their numbers and experience grew, they became, with the Australian *corps d'élite*, always sure to be there when there was particularly difficult work afoot. In the last three years of the war their numbers were kept up to a quarter of a million men, and their casualties from first to last—more than 50,000 officers and men killed and nearly 150,000 wounded—show the character of the fighting in which they were engaged. In the last year of the war they distinguished

themselves most. When the German offensive began the Canadians were holding the Lens sector and the two main thrusts of the German offensive passed on either side of them, north and south. They held their ground and at one time were defending a salient comprising nearly 20 miles of front, or more than one-sixth of the whole British line. Withdrawn to reserve for some two months after the beginning of May—a period which General Currie utilized to strengthen his engineers, to form special battalions of machine-gunners and to train his infantry in offensive tactics, they returned to the front line in the middle of July and were then engaged in operations right down to the end of the war. The Canadians took part in the first offensive from Amiens, and it was in preparation of this attack that General Currie used one of the few deliberate ruses in this war that succeeded in deceiving the enemy. The Germans knew that Flanders was an obsession with the British High Command and were always ready to credit us with the intention of offensive operations in the north. In order to encourage the enemy in that belief, the High Command, before



[Canadian War Records.]

SOME OF THE PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE CANADIANS.

the offensive from Amiens, sent a couple of Canadian battalions to Ypres. The word was passed round that what was intended was a great offensive in Belgium, and the two Canadian battalions sent up to Ypres took care to be in evidence, so that the Germans should think that our real attack was intended there, and not at the southern end of our line. After the Battle of Amiens had been won, the Canadians returned to their old sector and attacked astride the Arras-Cambrai road. It was the breaching of the Drocourt-Quéant line by the Canadians that first gave people at home the idea that the Germans might be driven out of France by the end of the year. Later the Canadians captured Bourlon Wood, and took a great part throughout the Battle of Cambrai. They engaged the enemy during his retreat in the difficult country round Valenciennes, and when the armistice was concluded they were on the western outskirts of Mons. From August 8 to November 11, the Canadian Army captured more than 31,000 German prisoners and 634 guns, besides more than 2,800 machine-guns. Apart from the valour and tirelessness of the troops, these operations were distinguished by the excellent leading of General Currie, an excellent tactician who combined originality with industry in the working out of his ideas. There is no suspicion of boastfulness about General Currie, but he was able to say when he returned to London that in all the years of

the war the Canadians had never lost a gun; that in the last two years of the war they never failed to take an objective and never lost an inch of ground once consolidated; and that there were brigades in the corps in whose trenches a hostile foot had never stepped.

Compared with the Canadians the Australians had less steadiness and phlegm, but more brilliancy and dash. The Canadian took his fighting like the Englishman without any display of enthusiasm, and, perhaps, on that very account was the more dogged and stubborn in defeat. The Australians undoubtedly had more of the fierce joy of battle than any of the troops engaged on the Western front, and Macaulay's celebrated description of Cromwell's Ironsides has been not inaptly applied to them by one of their recent historians, Mr. Cutlack. "They moved to victory with the precision of machines while burning with the wildest fanaticism of Crusaders. . . . They inarched against the most renowned battalions of Europe with disdainful confidence. Turenne was startled by the shout of stern exultation with which his English Allies advanced to the combat and expressed the delight of a true soldier when he learned that it was ever the fashion of Cromwell's pikemen to rejoice greatly when they saw the enemy." It would hardly be true to credit the Australians with the "rigid discipline" of the Ironsides, but their indiscipline was more in the forms than in the essentials



[Australian official photograph.]

AUSTRALIANS COLLECTING USEFUL MATERIAL LEFT BY THE GERMANS.



[Australian official photograph.]

AN ABANDONED GERMAN GUN.

Marked in chalk "Not to be touched—believed to be mined."

of military life, and it expressed the free democratic spirit of their country, not any indifference to the value of obedience and cooperation in the moment of danger. Nor was their zeal for the fight mere recklessness. On the contrary they fought cleverly as well as valiantly, had the keenest respect for the intellectual side of war, a good eye for ground, and a rare instinct for all the craftsmanship of their new job. In spite of their tendency to go out of hand when they had no serious work on hand, they were liked as well as admired in France. It struck the imagination of the French people, that these men from the other side of the world should be fighting the battle of freedom on their soil. M. Clemenceau in a speech that he made to them just before the beginning of the Allied offensive showed a keen appreciation of the political romance of their appearance on the battlefields of France. "We have all been fighting," he said, "the same battle of freedom on these old battle-grounds. You have all heard the names of them in history. But it is a great wonder, too, in history that you should be here fighting on the old battlefields which you never thought, perhaps, to see. . . . We knew you would fight a real fight, but we did not know that from the very beginning you would astonish the whole continent with your valour." His praise was richly deserved.

The work of the Australians has repeatedly been mentioned in the general narrative, but one or two examples of their work may be singled out for mention here. When the German offensive began on March 21, the Australians were holding the line between the

Menin road and Armentières. They were brought down south and first came into action opposite Albert on the 27th. From then onwards to the end of April they were in the hottest of the fighting in the Somme valley, and on the heights overlooking Amiens from the west. Their counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux on April 24, was perhaps, the most memorable of their doings in this fighting, and it marked the end of the German offensive towards Amiens. Marshal Foch described this battle as the turning point of the German offensive. The Australians, he had said on an earlier occasion, were "shock troops of the first order." Another battle, in which the Australians won even more than their usual distinction was that of Hamel, on July 4, the first victory in the spring campaign, which, by its ease and completeness, suggested that we were capable of taking the offensive on a great scale, and defeating the Germans. Other battles up to now had been won by sheer hard fighting: the losses on both sides had been approximately equal. This was the first battle of last year, in which we did exactly what we wanted, and everything went according to programme, the first forecast of the overwhelming victories that were to come in the late summer. "It was by the lessons learnt at Hamel," said General Rawlinson, "that they were able to organize and carry through the extraordinarily successful offensive of August 8. This was the only instance he remembered in the war when a corps who had been allotted certain difficult and highly important objectives were able to carry out a complete success by winning those objectives, exactly as previously arranged, and

half-an-hour before the scheduled time." More remarkable still as a combination of valour and skill, was the capture of Mont St. Quentin, the citadel of Peronne. General Rawlinson has described it as a Gibraltar, commanding the passages of the Somme and the access



MONT SAINT QUENTIN.

to Peronne. So strong was the position that he could not bring himself to order troops to attack it, and the suggestion that they should be allowed to make the attempt came from the Australians themselves. The German Commander of Peronne, who was captured in the fighting, expressed his admiration of the feat. He had believed his position, which was held by picked volunteer troops, to be absolutely impregnable. But the story of Mont St. Quentin, told a dozen times already, would need a volume to itself to have full justice done to it.

Great as the achievements of the Canadians and Australians were it must not be supposed that they surpassed those of very many divisions in the British Army. It must always be remembered that the colonial troops tended to get mentioned in dispatches because their mention conveyed no information to the enemy that he had not already. But the mention of English divisions by their number might have done us that disservice. Later in the war the suppression of the names of regiments that

did great work was discontinued and (though not before a certain injustice had been done) some attempt was made to give their due to those divisions that particularly distinguished themselves. In a dispatch dated September 13 dealing with the battle, Sir Douglas Haig mentioned no fewer than 21 British divisions as having distinguished themselves in those operations. "Most of these divisions," he wrote, "have been advancing over the same ground on which they met and ultimately checked the enemy's great offensive in March. During the past few weeks they have shown without exception that the tremendous strain sustained by them earlier in the year with so much courage and resolution has in no way diminished their splendid fighting spirit." Unfortunately, his account of their achievements is a bare catalogue of place-names, and it is only now that individual regiments are being given their place in the development of the general plan. It is impossible to mention all, and to single out divisions runs the risk of seeming to underrate the achievements of others. But if one had to select two English divisions as typical of the rest it would be the 55th and the 46th Divisions. If the Australians saved Amiens, the 55th Division by its defence of Givenchy saved the Channel ports, for if this division had broken, and the southern end of the crescent overlooking the Lys valley had gone after the breaking of the Portuguese lines, nothing could have saved us from disaster:—

South of the Portuguese sector the 55th Division was heavily attacked on its whole front and by 10.30 a.m. on April 9 its left brigade had been forced back from its outpost line. The main line of resistance was intact, and a defensive flank was formed facing north between Festubert and a strong point just south of Le Touret, where touch was established later with troops of the 51st Division.

Throughout the remainder of the day, the 55th Division maintained its positions against all assaults, and by successful counter-attacks captured over 750 prisoners. The success of this most gallant defence, the importance of which it would be hard to over-estimate, was due in great measure to the courage and determination displayed by our advanced posts. These held out with the utmost resolution though surrounded, pinning to the ground those parties of the enemy who had penetrated our defences and preventing them from developing their attack. Among the many gallant deeds recorded of them, one instance is known of a machine-gun which was kept in action although the German infantry had entered the rear compartment of the "pill-box" from which it was firing, the gun team holding up the enemy by revolver fire from the inner compartment.

That was a typical example of stubborn defence, no better perhaps than what was done



FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

[Bassano.]

A post-war portrait.

at other points, but noteworthy because of the great effect that it had in embarrassing the enemy's plans and holding up his advance. As an example of brilliancy in the attack, the records of the war have nothing better to show than the performance of the 46th Division at Bellenglise, on the Canal du Nord :—

The village is situated in the angle of the Scheldt Canal which, after running in a southerly direction from Bellicourt, bends sharply to the east towards the Le Tronquet Tunnel. Equipped with life-belts and carrying mats and rafts, the 46th Division stormed the western

arm of the canal at Bellenglise and to the north of it, some crossing the canal on footbridges which the enemy was given no time to destroy, others dropping down the sheer sides of the canal wall and, having waded or swum to the far side, climbing up the farther wall to the German trenches on the east bank. Having captured these trenches, the attacking troops swung to the right and took from flank and rear the German defences along the eastern arm of the canal and on the high ground south of the canal, capturing many prisoners and German batteries in action before the enemy had time to realize the new direction of the attack. So thorough and complete was the organization for this attack, and so gallantly, rapidly, and well was it executed by the troops, that this one division took on this day over 4,000 prisoners and 70 guns.



Russell.

GENERAL SIR HENRY SEYMOUR RAWLINSON.
Commanded the Fourth Army.

More than one high authority has been heard to maintain that, of all the exploits done by British troops on the offence, this was the most daring and skilful. The 46th Division was composed of Lincolns, Leicesters, Staffords, and Sherwood Foresters.

Nor must it be forgotten that both in the attack and in the defence the British Army was usually in inferior numbers, not necessarily at the crucial points of the battles, for it is the part of good generalship to be in superior strength at points that matter most even with inferior total numbers—in other words to convert a gross inferiority in numbers into a net superiority. But, except in so far as good leading redressed the adverse balance against

them, our troops won their victories against odds. At the beginning of the German offensive on March 21, there were 64 German divisions against 29 British, including those held in reserve; and even at the end the odds against us were two to one, 73 German against 37 British divisions. The proportions in the fighting on the Lys were little less desperate. There 42 German divisions attacked 25 British. Nor when the British attacked later in the year was the numerical disproportion redressed. In the battle of Bapaume the Germans had 20 divisions against our 15, and the victory of the Selle River was won by 20 British divisions against 32 German. Never has the superiority of one European army over another

been more conclusively demonstrated than in the last five months of the war.

Even more remarkable than the stubbornness of the defence and the brilliancy of the attack was the power of endurance shown by the British Army. The first German offensive in France was over in about a month; their second offensive against Antwerp and Ypres lasted perhaps five weeks, and the second set of operations round Ypres some six weeks. Verdun lasted longer, but that was a very local operation, and the number of troops that could be employed at any one time on this narrow front was limited and the opportunities for relief were therefore greater. Even the great German offensive of March 21 ceased to be dangerous within six weeks, and the Lys battle lasted no longer. Moreover, between the various attacks, there was usually an interval of a month or more. Contrast that with the endurance of the British troops. They fought on the Somme almost continuously for six months, except for an interval of six weeks in August and September. Our 1917 offensives lasted all through the year, and the British offensive that began on August 8 continued without intermission until the armistice. No sooner was one offensive over than another began elsewhere, and, instead of weakening, the

strength of the attacks seemed cumulative. No army in history has ever equalled the feats of endurance of the British Army in the last two years of the war, and of all the armies on the British front—not even excepting the Second Army of Ypres—none worked so hard or so continuously as the Fourth Army of General Rawlinson. And certainly none was able to undergo such long and varied trials only to reach the zenith of its brilliancy at the end. Marshal Foch was lost in admiration of the quality of the British Army, and far less praise has been given even yet to the performance of the British troops in France than was to be heard in high French military quarters. It is the British way to criticize our failures and to take our successes as a matter of course. It would be juster to regard our failures as inevitable under the conditions and to reserve our surprise for the splendour of the final victories.

In a dispatch published in April Sir Douglas Haig passes in review the whole course of the war on the Western front. It is in the main a defence of the Western strategy against its critics, a defence which at some points is not successful. But the whole argument is of great value and importance and may almost be described as a military manifesto of the old



THE MARCH OF PART OF THE BEATEN ARMY TOWARDS GERMANY.



ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY FOLLOWING UP THE RETREATING GERMANS.

professional army, and some account of it may be given, the more so as its conclusions on many points are not those expressed in the two chapters in this history in which the war on the Western front has been reviewed.

Sir Douglas Haig begins by saying that the war on the Western front should be regarded as a single, long-drawn-out battle passing through the same stages as the battle of a hundred years ago, and differing from it only in its duration. The first stage of this battle of the west ended with the creation of a continuous trench line from the Swiss frontier to the sea. This period corresponded to the deployment and manœuvres with which the old battles were prefaced. In the next stage each commander seeks to wear out his opponent and to pin him to his position while accumulating in his own hands a reserve force with which he can deliver his decisive attack when the enemy shows signs of exhaustion. This period, which used to last a few hours, lasted in this war from the winter of 1914 to the summer of 1918. As it wears to its close, the commander who is losing will have to choose between breaking off the engagement, while, and if, he can, and staking what reserves are still left to him. He compares Ludendorff's offensive in March to the launching by Napoleon of his last reserves at Waterloo, only, whereas this phase of the battle then was over in a few minutes, now it is the work of months. Finally there is the attack of the victor, which in this battle of the west began in August and continued till the Armistice. The parallel drawn thus elaborately by Sir Douglas Haig is interesting and just. But does it not err in representing as all "according to design" the course of a four and a half years' battle on the Western front which was surely full of miscalculations of the military situation? The offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917 were most of them delivered in the belief that the supreme crisis of the struggle had come. In fact, it did not come until the full summer of 1918, and even then only when the enemy had first exhausted himself by an effort of unparalleled violence. The real question is whether we should not have done better to reserve our final efforts until the time when they could be made with a surer prospect of success than we had before 1918. Was not the decision at the beginning of 1918 to stand on the defensive an admission that we should have been wise to do the same in

1917? General Pétain reached that decision at the beginning of that year, and if we had done the same we should have been spared the losses of Passchendaele.

Sir Douglas Haig, anticipating, it would seem, some such objection, proceeds to defend the policy of attack. He points out very justly that defence can never bring about a successful decision. "The idea that a war can be won by standing on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous fallacy which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of victory." It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can only be gained by a vigorous offensive." The point at issue, however, was not whether we should attack or defend, but where we should attack and where defend, and this issue is evaded. There is substance in the argument that a defensive policy on the Western front would have deprived our armies of the initiative and injured their *moral*; but in spite of that there would have been a great saving of life and economy of material in a prudent and wise defence until such time as we were able to take the offensive with reasonable certainty of success. It would be an overstatement to say that all attack is more expensive than all defence, but unsuccessful attack is certainly more expensive. But was there an attack on a large scale before the summer of 1918 which could be described, without qualification, as successful? If not, the whole argument that the attrition that went on in 1915 to 1917 was in our favour and a necessary condition of victory is considerably weakened.

Sir Douglas Haig lays the blame for the long duration of the war mainly on the politicians. We were unprepared for a war of such magnitude. Not only were we deficient in trained men and military material but, what Sir Douglas Haig justly points out is still more important, we had no machinery ready by which these deficiencies could be made good promptly. It was not until the midsummer of 1916 that the number and calibre of our guns was even approximately adequate to the conduct of major operations, and even then during the Somme battle the expenditure of artillery ammunition had to be carefully watched. As for the numbers of our infantry, the war had been in progress for two years before we could pull our weight, and by that time the French Army was beginning to be

exhausted by its efforts—insufficiently assisted by us, at the beginning of the war. Further, when we were ready, the French Army needed to husband its resources. The main cause of the long duration of the war in Sir Douglas Haig's opinion was precisely this, that at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior man-power. If at the beginning of the war a disproportionate share of the burden was borne by France, the inequality was as a consequence shifted on to the British Army at the end of the war. The logic of this passage is invincible and is hardly affected by speculations on whether the war might or might not have been shortened if we had given greater attention to the war in the east, had effectually succoured Russia and Serbia, and prevented the Balkans from falling into the hands of Germany. For even if the war could have been shortened by these means, it is obvious that it could have been shortened still more had France and England been able simultaneously to devote their whole strength to the business in hand. Lord Kitchener made the best of his military brief at the outset of the war when he spoke of the advantages of a gradual augmentation of our strength until at the end of the war it reached its maximum when the enemy's was at its lowest. But such a policy carried with it grave penalties. It was largely responsible for the overrunning of industrial France and for the disproportionately heavy burdens that our army had to carry in the last two years of the war, and it added months, perhaps years, to its duration.

This, in fact, would seem to be the principal moral to be drawn from Sir Douglas Haig's review—and it applies no less to the future than to the past—that our military organization must be adapted in peace time to meet all the possible developments of our general policy, and that if it is not we pay for it in the lengthening of the war and in the increase of the human and material damage to the country. Had our policy been so adapted, and even it, without possessing the requisite number of men ready trained and equipped, we had had an organization capable of supplying them with the minimum of delay, there is no reason why the war should not have been shorter by a couple of years.

"There can be no question," writes Sir Douglas Haig, "that to our general unpreparedness must be attributed the loss of many thousands

of brave men." It follows that the first principle of our military policy in the future must be to put us in a position to exert our full strength as nearly as possible simultaneously with the occasion that requires it. If we can only exert it two years after the occasion arises, as was the case in this war, the duration of the war, its losses in men, its financial burdens, and its political complications are all correspondingly increased.

The duration of the war considered, Sir Douglas Haig does not think that our casualties were excessive for the amount of work done or compared with those of the other armies engaged. He puts our casualties in all theatres of war at (approximately) three millions, of which total two and a half millions were incurred on the Western front. The French casualties, making an estimate for the number of wounded of which no returns have been published, he puts at 4 800,000, of which over four millions belong to the Western front. The Italian casualties, exclusive of prisoners, amount to 1,400,000, and with prisoners would reach not far off two millions. The losses of the three Allies on the West front were thus as 4 (Italian) 5 (British) and 8 (French), a comparison in which considering its record the British Army comes out well. The German losses are put at six and a half millions (a number that Sir Douglas Haig thinks is under the mark) and the Austrian losses, including an estimate for wounded, at four and a half millions. The "vastly greater proportion" of the German losses must have been incurred on the Western front, but even if we ascribe five and a half to the west out of the six and a half millions, the result is still a million less than the combined British and French casualties on the west. That again reinforces the argument that the early deployment of the full strength of a military coalition is economy of effort and sacrifice.

What, apart from the quality of the British soldier, the skill of the British Staff work towards the end of the war, and the brilliancy of Marshal Foch's strategical conceptions, are the chief causes of the British victory? Allusion has already been made to the work of the Navy, which not only made it possible for our army to take part in the war, but by the stringency of the blockade which was established—only, unhappily, after the war had been in progress for some time—directly, as we have seen, contributed to the

breakdown of the German offensive. But there were other causes of which insufficient acknowledgment has been made. One was the political constancy of the British people. To a greater degree than any other peoples, the English and the Americans have the gift of political concentration. All the great accomplishments in the history of the world are due to this power of distinguishing between the essential and the non-essential in a situation. To say that the British people became united in the face of the enemy, hardly does justice to this quality. The sinking of differences was a deliberate act of subordination to the one great end, and one of which only a great nation that had a long history of self-government

of Eton. The vast majority of the people—so small were the British Armies in the struggles with Napoleon—watched and paid their taxes without complaint, but took no more active part in the national work. This war was the first ever waged by England in which the whole manhood of the country took part, and that not with its muscle only but with its civilian and industrial intelligence. In the last two years of the country the whole of its mind and energy was concentrated on the one object of victory. Our industry contributed on a scale never before dreamt of, our science, our inventiveness, and the national genius for the adaptation of means to ends. That, far more than its mere magnitude, is what gives this war



CIVILIAN WARRIORS: LORD FRENCH REVIEWS VOLUNTEERS IN HYDE PARK, JUNE 17, 1916.

could have accomplished. The differences did not cease to exist, but were thrust down out of sight and out of mind for the time being. To this voluntary self-discipline of the people there were singularly few exceptions, and these not important.

But not all the valour and accomplishment of the army and the political experience of the people would have won the victory if the war had not become a national war in the truest sense. Our former wars were won by a comparatively limited social and professional class. It may be true that there were very few Eton men in high command at Waterloo, but for all that it is dramatically, if not literally, true that Waterloo was won on the playing fields

its distinctive character in our history. It was the first war in which trained civilian intelligence was mobilized for the one national object. Characteristically, this is not the feature on which imagination has most fastened. For one eulogy of the achievements of the civilian mind in military matters—and, after all, the bulk of our army, for all its training, remained essentially civilian in its modes of thought—there are a dozen eulogies of the old professional ideals of war. Yet it was the civilian mind that contributed the new ideas to the war, and by its invention of the tanks and its development of air-power stanchied the flow of blood which otherwise would have bled the country white. People learned in

this war that there are no water-tight compartments in national energy, no distinction between home and foreign affairs, no essential difference between civilian and military virtues. The discovery came on people as a revelation, and even now its full implications have not yet been grasped.

No British general has been more severely criticized than Sir Douglas Haig, not for his conduct of operations but rather for his general attitude to the military problems of the war. The criticisms all boil down to the charge that his offensives were premature and that the same amount of energy that was expended in France would have produced greater results elsewhere. The controversy between east and west after the principle of the united front was established became a very barren one and, in fact, the course of the war was such that

neither one side nor the other could lay claim to a decisive victory for its views. Another complaint sometimes made against Sir Douglas Haig is that he tended to undervalue the mechanical aids to victory and the amount of excellence that the arts of war and of peace, of military and civil life, had in common. These things it is just to set down if only as a foil to the splendour of Sir Douglas Haig's achievement. In the scale of his military operations the command of every other general in English history sinks into comparative insignificance. It is to his lasting fame that under his command the British Army, which began the war as little better than an auxiliary army on the Colonial scale to that of France, finished it with a higher prestige than it had ever enjoyed in history. It did not win the war, but it did win it a year earlier than it would otherwise have been won.



CHAPTER CCCI.

THE ARMISTICE.

MILITARY COLLAPSE OF GERMANY—THE TURKISH ARMISTICE—AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FOLLOWS—GERMANY'S ISOLATION—PRINCE MAX OF BADEN MAKES OVERTURES FOR PEACE—PRESIDENT WILSON'S REPLY—ALLIED MILITARY CONFERENCE IN PARIS—GERMAN ARMISTICE DELEGATES ARRIVE AT RÉTHONDES—THE ARMISTICE SIGNED—ITS TERMS—RECEPTION IN GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

THE Armistice began in an immediate sense in the mentality of Marshal Foch during the month of July, 1918. Since the decision at Doullens on March 25 he had been in supreme command of the Allies. In July Foch's hour had come, and he launched the counter-offensive between Soissons and Château-Thierry which effected a complete change in the military situation. The German offensive had beaten itself out and the best that von Boehm could do was to beat a skilful retreat to the Vesle, leaving prisoners and guns on the way. On July 23 Foch disclosed his plans and gave each army its task. The French and American Armies were to attack towards Metz. The British Army was to make for the Hindenburg line by way of St. Quentin-Cambrai. The British divisions were again approaching the fifty to sixty active and effective infantry divisions which they had formerly maintained. Ludendorff could not ignore Haig and Foch. The Germans, however, had been so busy between 1860 and 1870 that they strangely overlooked the inexorable fighting force of the Americans. Over a million were already in France—another million as fit, fresh, fierce, were steadily, inevitably moving from the training camps. The grim spectre of British sea power had come to haunt the feckless

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boasters (before Jutland) of the Tag, and its nightmare was ever apparent.

Foch and Haig, with Debeney, Mangin, Gouraud and Pershing in support, had their great arpeggio now to bring off—the linked Allies against the linked defences on an enormous front aimed to secure the integrity of the Hindenburg line. On the British front four great battles, involving the capture of hundreds of guns and over a hundred thousand prisoners, had to be fought in this formidable approach. Their hammer blows followed in quick succession, brilliantly supported by Allied advances—Mangin on the Aisne, Gouraud in Champagne, Pershing at St. Mihiel—culminating in the great blow at the end of September, in which the north section of the Hindenburg line was shattered and an advance of 7,000 yards made. Cambrai and St. Quentin were secured; more than that, the German resistance was broken. "No attack in the history of the world was ever better carried out," said Foch. "Nothing could stop the British. They swept right over them." It was the climax of the great combats which began with Amiens (August 8-12) and was followed up by Bapaume, and Arras, and Epéhy and Ypres. The two American divisions in the vanguard of this attack fought like lions. A great risk was taken, but it was more than justified by success. Germany awoke



BRITISH SHIPS STEAMING UP THE DARDANELLES.

and demanded some sort of cessation or cease fire at the earliest possible moment. It was not quite the fall of the leaf the Kaiser had portended.

There was no Jena or Leipsie, at any rate yet ; but what determined the need of an Armistice and made its urgency apparent was the succession of events, the steady convergence of shattering blows upon the "Reich" from every quarter of the theatre of war. On September 1-2 Péronne was recovered and the Drocourt-Quéant line breached. On September 12 the Americans made their not-to-be-forgotten murderous onslaught at St. Mihiel. Three days later, the Austrian Peace Note was circulated. On the 19th came our triumphant advance in Palestine. On the 29th came the Bulgar surrender, followed within 24 hours by the fall of Damascus and the opening success of the decisive battle near Cambrai. On October 1 St. Quentin was gained, on October 5 Germany made its first significant appeal to President Wilson. Five days after, Cambrai and Le Cateau were taken by the British ; on the 13th Laon, on the 17th Ostend-Lille, on the 19th Bruges. On October 28 and 29 arrived in London the most paralysing budget of news for the Central Powers. Germany, crushed and hopeless, asks somewhat haughtily still for a definition of terms. Ludendorff, surviving adherent of the military-industry which we had set out to undermine, resigns. Aleppo, the key to the communications of Asia Minor, was occupied by Allenby and our troops. The Italians cross the Piave. The Croats now were in full revolt. Next day we hear of a Piave success, attended by Austria's unconditional appeal for Peace. On October 31 we hear of

Tisza's assassination ; the Ausgleich is shattered and the Austrian Ludendorff is no more. Simultaneously, we hear that General Townshend has been released and is adjusting terms of an armistice with Turkey through our Admiral Calthorpe. The terms were : (1) Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus and Allied occupation of forts ; (2) Minefields to be indicated ; (4) Prisoners to be handed over unconditionally, at Constantinople ; (5) Demobilization of Turkish Army ; (6) Surrender of war-ships ; (10) Occupation of Taurus tunnel system ; (11) Cables and railways to pass under Allied control ; (19) All Germans and Austrians to be evacuated within a month ; (22) Turkish prisoners detained ; (23) All relations with Central Powers to cease. Hostilities were to cease at noon on October 31. The collapse had been discounted for some weeks. The consummation destroyed Enver's influence which had Germanized the Young Turks. Incidentally, it saved the Allies anxieties in the Black Sea. It was followed almost immediately by more stirring events. The armistice granted to Austria. Valenciennes-Belgrade. The abdication of Boris of Bulgaria. The Kiel mutiny, and the unrest at Berlin which preceded the abdication on November 9.

How long would Germany face isolation ? Such was the problem of October. Her application for an armistice was by many regarded as a trick. She could outlast the desertion by her satellites if she chose to make a final effort. The German Army leaders still controlled an immense and still powerful army, shaken but not demoralized. The Fleet as such had not "shown" since Jutland, but was still in being. There had been no Jena. An

invaded country fights at a certain advantage. What was to gain by surrender? Ludendorff might continue the struggle.

What happened, apparently, was that the events of the end of September, the crash of the Hindenburg line, the surrender of Bulgaria, and the brilliant conduct of the campaign in Asia (not to speak of the wholly unpleasing prospects in Turkey and Austria) descended upon the German General Staff in the semblance of a drizzling panic, taking the form of a military loss of nerve which spread backwards almost instantaneously from the front. There was no intervening step among the mass of Germans between arrogance and shame. Throughout the exchange of Notes between Berlin and Washington there was no relaxation in our advance, so that at the close of the correspondence the Allied position was infinitely better from every point of view than at the beginning.

At the end of October Germany became feverishly anxious for peace.

Turkey's surrender was due to two causes, the victorious campaign of General Allenby and the collapse of Bulgaria. Aleppo was a decisive keypoint, and when Allenby reached

it the front gate into the Black Sea through the Straits of the Dardanelles was turned and the back door into the Bosphorus opened. Constantinople came between the double fire of Allenby's army advancing from the East and of D'Esperey's army threatening the capital from the West. With only the army of Thrace, much reduced in strength, available for the defence of her western frontier, Turkey had no alternative but to surrender.

The surrender of Turkey, following that of Bulgaria, was the beginning of the end. Its immediate effect was to bring Rumania back into the war, and create a new battle-front for attacking Austria-Hungary. The corner-stone of Germany's position in the Middle East was broken, and the Black Sea ceased to be a German lake. The mouths of the Danube were closed to the enemy and the route to Persia through the Caucasus was opened to the Allies. Communications were established with the Cossacks in Southern Russia, and fresh bases were opened for operations against the Pro-German elements in Russia.

Austria-Hungary came out of the war a few days after the Turks signed the armistice. On October 24, 1918, the Allied General Diaz



THE BRITISH IN POSSESSION AT CHANAK ON THE DARDANELLES.

assumed the offensive along the whole Italian front, from the mouth of the Piave to the west of the Brenta. The Commander-in-Chief's plan consisted of a combined attack northwards in the Trentino and eastwards from the Piave front, his intention being to separate the two groups of enemy armies, those in the plains from those in the mountains, and then to drive a wedge between them, compelling them to retire in divergent directions. The plan was well conceived and admirably executed. The offensive movements began with an attack on October 24 by the Fourth and Twelfth Italian Armies advancing up both banks of the Upper Piave towards Belluno. Next day the Tenth Italian Army and the XIVth British Corps, composed of the 7th and 23rd Divisions, under the command of Lord Cavan, seized the island Gravedi Papa Ispoli, south of the Montello ridge, and on October 27 crossed to the left bank of

the Piave, the Third Italian Army on the right moving over the river at the same time. The Austrians put up a brave resistance at first, but hearing of the intended armistice they lost heart and began to surrender in large batches. By the evening of the 31st the whole Austrian Army east of the Piave was in disordered flight to the Tagliamento, and on November 3 General Diaz was able to announce a decisive victory. In his bulletin he stated: "The gigantic battle begun on October 24, in which 51 Italian Divisions, 5 British, 2 French, 1 Czecho-Slovak Division, and 1 American regiment took part, against 63 Austro-Hungarian Divisions, is ended. The Austro-Hungarian Army is destroyed. It suffered very heavy losses in the fierce resistance of the first days of the battle, and in the subsequent pursuit it has lost an immense quantity of material of all kinds and nearly all its stores and depôts."

Partly as a result of this victory, partly owing to the internal disintegration—Hungary assuming an independent line of policy, Bohemia openly mutinous, and the Slovenes and Southern Slavs in more or less overt revolt—the Austrian General von Weber came into the Italian lines under a flag of truce on October 30, and on November 3 an armistice was signed, to come into operation at 3 p.m. on November 4, Central European time.

Towards the evening of Tuesday, October 29, an Austrian officer was seen coming from the enemy trenches, close to Serravalle, above Ala, in the Adige Valley. It became evident at once that the white flag was genuine, and Italian officers went forward to meet him.

The officer, who was a captain, declared that he had come to discuss conditions of an armistice. Taken to a neighbouring command and questioned, he was found not to have any authoritative papers, and was sent back with a message that a more representative and duly accredited mission should be sent if the matter was to be pursued.

On Wednesday evening a white flag was again hoisted, and the Austrians having evidently determined to make due sacrifice of their pride, this time more fitting personalities appeared. At the head of the small group that approached the Italian trenches was the Austrian General von Weber, a corps commander. The party consisted of eight persons, and included another general and naval and military officers. There were also civilians (either diplo-



ENVER PASHA.

Turkish Generalissimo and Minister of War.

matic or Government representatives) and secretaries and typists.

They were treated with every courtesy, and when General von Weber had formally stated his mission and shown that he was the bearer of proper credentials, he and his party were driven next day in motor-cars to the Villa Giusti, a seventeenth-century house close to General Diaz's headquarters.

On Sunday, November 3, at 9 a.m., General Badoglio, the Chief of Staff, drove with an escort of cavalry to the villa, and on his arrival all the troops present saluted and bugles were.

Meanwhile telegrams were exchanged with Versailles, and during the afternoon the precise details under which the armistice would be granted were received from Signor Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, and, again in written form, handed to General von Weber.

During the evening one of the Austrian envoys left by motor-car for Serravalle with a draft of the conditions to communicate to the Austrian Government.

The Austrian plenipotentiaries were very much depressed and did not show themselves outside the villa nor walk in its ample garden.



[Official photograph

ITALIANS WITH AN AUSTRIAN GUN TAKEN IN THE MOUNTAINS.

sounded. Entering the villa, General Badoglio found all the Austrian mission standing in a line in the drawing-room awaiting him. General von Weber was in full uniform, wearing the stars and ribbons of his orders.

General Badoglio saluted him and without seating himself, asked him his errand. General von Weber replied that he had come to ask conditions upon which an armistice would be granted. General Badoglio answered that within an hour he would let him know the general lines of such an armistice, contained in a written message. He then left the room, and the written message in question was at once sent to the villa.

Even they, men of position, who might have been supposed to have avoided the worst straits of their compatriots, betrayed the need of food.

Some fear had been expressed that the armistice might be made a cloak for a neutrality on the part of German Austria which would permit her to continue her services to Germany by interposing her dead body between the Allies and a vulnerable enemy front. This obviously would have neutralized the chief advantage accruing to the Allies from Austria's breakdown - that is, a new front on which to deploy our superior numbers should Germany elect to continue the struggle. These fears were superfluous in view of the drastic terms

of the armistice, which clearly portended the knowledge dawning upon the Germans themselves that they were hopelessly beaten, and that they would have under pain of death to submit to precisely such terms as the Allies might propose. During the month of November the conception of a "peace-table" entirely disappeared and was replaced by the certainty of a dictated peace.


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Up to this line Allied troops were to be in occupation with full use of all railway and other equipment and coal—all of this to be left intact. The Allies were entitled to occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary as might be deemed necessary to enable them to

conduct military operations or to maintain order, with the right of requisition on payment. The complete evacuation of all German troops was demanded within 15 days under pain of internment, and the immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all prisoners of war and interned Allied subjects, the sick and wounded who could not be removed from evacuated territory being cared for under a special clause.

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The collapse of Austria-Hungary left Germany



BRITISH TROOPS LANDING AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

[Official photograph.]



A BRITISH TORPEDO BOAT (No. 19) WELCOMED AT FIUME DURING THE ARMISTICE.

alone in the field, and gave the Allies possession of a new battle front, which they might have obtained long ago had they decided to concentrate effort in this direction. As it was, the influence had radiated from Salonika, which had sapped entirely Germany's stranglehold on the Near East. Now Austria was reduced to impotence and it was in the power of the Allies to make use of Bohemia, which juts out like a huge bastion into German territory, and to carry the war into the enemy's territory. This would have meant the strategy of 1813 over again, when the Russian General Wittgenstein joined forces with Prince Schwarzenberg in Bohemia, and marched down the Elbe to fight Napoleon at Dresden. The Bohemian frontier is only 120 miles from Berlin, which after the signature of November 3 was at the mercy of Allied aircraft. The effective defence of the new front, extending for over 400 miles from Lake Constance to Silesia, could only have been undertaken by detaching troops from the west, which would have meant the abandonment of the line of the Meuse and a retreat to the Rhine.

The Kaiser's infelicities as a prophet culminated at the end of September, 1918, in a speech to the troops in Alsace, when he said that "the last drop of blood of every Austrian and Hungarian, the last drop of blood of every Turkish and Bulgarian soldier, will be shed before our enemies wrest from us land which

belongs to Germany." No country has ever been known to shed the last drop of its blood or anything remotely approaching it. But it was gratuitous to make such a boast about Allies who were already upon the verge of capitulation.

The Emperor seemed dazed. Supplies of all kinds, and especially of aircraft, were running short. The temper of the people was becoming more mutinous and irresponsible every day. The well-known character for pertinacity of the Anglo-Saxon, most reluctant to arm of all the Western peoples, was beginning to re-penetrate the hardened shell of German arrogance. Von Moltke and Falkenhayn, who, according to Herr Cohn's speech in the Reichstag at the historic sitting on October 25, both recognized that Germany was defeated so long ago as the first battle of the Marne, had learnt the fickleness of Imperial favour. Shadowy Chancellors had followed one another into oblivion. Ludendorff was thrown to a deluded and angry populace calling for a victim. Old Hindenburg, whom the Emperor always disliked, and who had formed long ago a pretty correct estimate of Wilhelm's character, sat tight, and as soon as the revolution came put his sword at its disposal. He was not the Emperor's friend—thus he escaped misfortune. The troops fought well, even in their despondency, but the German people were fearful of reprisal, and had lost all hope of any sort of patchwork

peace or indirect compromise. They were more pacifist even than the English Government and the English Liberals had imagined themselves to be before the war. The wheel had gone full circle. Look where Hindenburg might, there was no salvation in any direction.

Communications between the German Government and Headquarters at Spa led



PRINCE MAX OF BADEN.
German Chancellor, 1918.

to the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, making the first probing overture from which the Peace of July, 1919, eventually developed as early as October 6, 1918, when this note was transmitted through the Swiss Government to President Wilson:

"The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all belligerent States with this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations.

"With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate

conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air."

The hit dog yelps, was the average comment of American papers upon the Note, which was regarded in Europe as an indication that the state of Germany was even worse than was supposed. Apprehension was expressed lest the Allies should be imposed upon by German bluff. But imposture was no longer possible. The military situation alone convinced us that what had hitherto been an article of faith was now literally true—namely, that we could impose our will upon the Germans. Germany might save her armies by a white-flag manoeuvre; we could ensure that she should not achieve peace by dramatizing a shan suicide of Militarism. The President's reply of October 8 was to the effect that he could not recommend the Allies to negotiate with the representatives of the old régime in Germany, while, moreover, that country was still in occupation of portions of Allied territory. Meanwhile our answer to the German Note was being given in the form of hammer blows between Cambrai and St. Quentin. Hardly anyone as yet believed that the Germans were so hard pressed as they really were. This became more apparent when the evasive character of the German reply, signed "Solf, State Secretary of Foreign Office," was made known on October 14. Victory was now in sight, if not yet in reach. In America, Mr. Roosevelt, faithfully reflecting the mood of the vast majority, hoisted the banner of "unconditional surrender." The Germans still clung to the idea of armistice before evacuation, the internationalization of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, and to their own vision of a Peace Table Conference. In Vienna faith was still pinned to the notion of driving a wedge between America and the Allies. "What do London and Paris matter now; they must ask Washington. There is the strong man. The palaces in Downing Street and Paris are only the little side doors of peace policy. The big front door is at the White House in Washington."

The President's answer defining conditions precedent to peace came promptly on October 14, in a Note which laid down in the most polished language that as a guarantee of good faith Germany must cease her outrages—submarines, deportations and the like—and prepare a trustworthy, democratic form of government, so that the Allies might know exactly with

whom they were dealing. This resolution was sympathetically summed up and corroborated by the American Press. "If the German people are as sincerely desirous of peace as we believe they are, they must begin at home by establishing a Government with which honest men can deal. Mr. Wilson's response to the German proposals was more than a diplomatic paper. He called it a decision—a decision of the great self-governing democracies of the world. The President at one stroke swept away the whole German structure of a paper peace without guarantees. Germany is beaten and Germany knows it is beaten. What is left now is to make defeat so decisive and so convincing that every German for generations to come will know that Germany was beaten, how it was beaten, why it was beaten." In their approval of the Note the Americans translated its purport into something like "the Hohenzollerns must go." The Germans, however, still clung to illusions and deplored the spirit of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, which the President had incautiously allowed to infect his speech. "The spirit breathed by the note," said the *Tageblatt* of Berlin, "is worse even than the demands written in it. With every Note Wilson raises his demands, and still continues to hold a dagger under his cloak!" "The President," said the *Rundschau*, "erects a Caudine Forks for us and wishes to drive us under it with insulting words!"

A considerable pause intervened. Whether the Germans still hoped that a diversion might intervene, or that the Allies would fight themselves out, is problematical. The answer to the second supposition was, "Voilà, les Américains qui arrivent." Their approach was, at least, as decisive as that of the Prussians at Waterloo. President Wilson was criticized at the time for answering the German Notes at all without consulting the Allied Governments. The President's motive in pursuing these negotiations without reference to the Associated Governments was his desire to preserve consistency in the diplomacy he had pursued from the first. He had laid down in the celebrated 14 points the conditions precedent to a just peace, as he conceived it. It was this unchanging ideal of a peace with justice which he wished, above all, to affirm. Public opinion in England remained unexcited. The idea of a war cessation seemed distant and unfamiliar. We were as unprepared for peace

as we had been for war. As before we were attaining essential objects with little conscious perception and next to no outward manifestation of the fact. The tension in Berlin, on the other hand, was compared to that of the early days of the war mania four and a quarter years back.

A long, evasive reply from Berlin (October 21) evoked a strong clamour of "no more parley" in America, and the President responded, on October 23, by deeming it his duty to say that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should "leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted



DR. SOLF.

German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1918.



A SITTING OF THE CONFERENCE OF VERSAILLES.

On the right from fireplace: General Belin, Marshal Foch, M. Pichon, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Milner, Sir Douglas Haig.

his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion

that if these Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the



THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

Left to right: Colonel Nagai, General di Robilant, Baron Sonnino, Signor Orlando, Colonel House, General Bliss, Mr. Auchincloss, M. Venizelos, M. Vesnitch.

Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the people involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from a military point of view." The principles of the subsequent armistice, which came into being three weeks later, were implicit in this declaration of October 23, 1918. This represented the last word of the President's deliberate Peace Offensive.

It is somewhat doubtful whether Germany even yet would have discovered a unanimity sufficient to stomach the word surrender had it not been for the incidence of diversions from quarters in which they were neither expected nor welcomed—the Turks throwing up the sponge, the resignation of Ludendorff, the Croat revolt, the Italian victories, the revolutionary symptoms in the German seaports and in the front line trenches, the dismemberment of the *Ausgleich* and the complete collapse of the Dual Monarchy.

Now on November 1 Germany was standing alone.* The unlucky Wilhelm, a more complete exponent of the clothes philosophy than the *Roi Soleil* himself, had at last found his Fontainebleau. There, sensible of the lives "put in peril by himself; and finding amid such reflections, little comfort in fanaticism, or in his fancied call; sat the unhappy author of all."† "Germany is celebrating a dark jubilee. It is 10 years to the day since the *Daily Telegraph* published the mischievous interview with the Kaiser. Nothing can now silence the whispering and muttering among the people. What will the Kaiser do? When will he do it?" The newspapers afforded him cold comfort. "The Emperor Karl," said the *Lokalanzeiger*, "is homeless. He flies from Austria to Hungary, and from Hungary to Austria, and wherever he goes is greeted with shouts of 'Long live the Republic.'" A few days later the Kaiser could judge by the terms offered to and accepted by Austria-Hungary what sort of provisions the armistice proffered to Germany would contain.

Things were now moving with lightning rapidity. The German were being driven on the field into a narrowing pocket, and their

military position, despite the losses they were still able to inflict, was getting more and more desperate. On November 4 we heard that an armistice had been granted to Austria, that Boris of Bulgaria had abdicated, that Belgrade had been occupied by the Serbs, and that Valenciennes had fallen to the Allies. On November 6 the Americans captured Sedan.



THE KAISER IN 1918.

The peace movement was growing. The President's last note had indicated that if the Germans wanted an armistice they must appeal to Marshal Foch. A Military Conference was to assemble at the Trianon Palace Hotel, Versailles, to draw up the necessary proposals. M. Clemenceau occupied the central position in the Conference Room, having Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, and Lord Milner on his left, with M. Pichon, Marshal Foch, and General Belin on his right. Opposite sat Colonel House, General Bliss, Signor Orlando, Baron Sonnino.

On November 6 it was announced that a commission had been appointed in Germany to devise means of agreement concerning an expected armistice. This delegation consisted of General von Gündell, former military delegate at the Hague and Director of the War Academy in Berlin, General von Winterfeldt, former military attaché in Paris, Admiral von Müller, Chief of the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet since 1906, and the ex-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Admiral von Hintze. Official intimation as to their route upon entering the war zone

* Bulgarian Armistice, September 29; Turkish, October 30; Austrian, November 3.

† Barnaby Rudge.

was conveyed in Marshal Foch's communication to the German Headquarters prescribing the course of their journey. It stated that if they wished to meet him to ask for an armistice they were to advance to the French outposts



HERR ERZBERGER.
German Finance Minister, 1918.

by the Chimay-Fournies-La Capelle-Guise road, where they were to be received and conducted to the place fixed for an interview. There they were to be met by the Allied Generalissimo and by Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, who was appointed to act with Marshal Foch as his naval associate. On the morning of Friday, November 8, at the Allied General Headquarters, the Plenipotentiaries of Germany received the conditions of the Armistice, as well as the formal demand that they should be accepted or refused within 72 hours expiring on Monday morning at 11 o'clock (French time). The German proposal for the immediate conclusion of a provisional suspension of hostilities was refused by Marshal Foch. A German courier bearing the text of the conditions of the armistice was sent to Spa to communicate the terms to the German Headquarters there located. The delegates, now including Secretary of State Erzberger and Naval Captain Vanselow, arrived in the French lines at 11 on Thursday night (November 9).

Erzberger at once informed Marshal Foch that he had been instructed to ask for an immediate suspension of hostilities. After refusing this, Marshal Foch, with cold military

precision, read the full text of the terms. Before sending their courier to Spa, in reaching which place he had great difficulties to encounter, the Germans expressed amazement at the severity of the terms, but their general attitude was that they would have to bow to fate.

The interview took place at Rethondes station, in the Forest of Compiègne, on the Compiègne-Soissons line, where Marshal Foch's special train was lying. The terms were communicated to Spa, and thence disclosed to a conference of Secretaries of State at Berlin, by whom they were accepted. The delegates were instructed to act accordingly, and the Armistice was signed at 5 o'clock in the



GENERAL VON WINTERFELD.
One of the German Armistice Delegates.

morning (French time) of Monday, November 11, 1918. The signatures were:—

F. Foch.	Erzberger.
R. E. Wemyss.	Oberndorff.
	Winterfeldt.
	Vanselow.

The Kaiser was not there to face the music as Napoleon III. had been at Donchéry on September 2, 1870. The event was far more momentous, perhaps the most momentous in modern history. The environment has been vividly portrayed by one of the German delegates.

“When, on November 8, we reached the French lines, coming by motor-car from Spa, carriages were ready, in the November fog, to convey us to the unknown place of negotiations. The motor journey, with French officers, lasted 10 hours. It appears to me probable that it was intentionally prolonged in order to take us, right and left, through the ruined province, and so prepare us, by our own inspection, for what hate and revenge would demand of us in the form of the sharpest possible conditions. A Frenchman silently pointed out the ruins and then mentioned a name—‘Voilà St. Quentin!’

“In the evening a train stood ready for us somewhere. The blinds were drawn, and when we awoke in the morning the train stood still in the middle of a wood. We now know we negotiated in the Forest of Compiègne. We did not know it eight days ago. Possibly it was a precautionary measure for us also that we were not taken to the city. Perhaps they feared acts of violence on the population’s side, for the hatred accumulated in its heart was unbounded. We were in a wood, without houses or tents, entirely shut off by troops.

“Only two trains stood on the railway—one was Foch’s and his companions’, the other was ours. In these two trains we lived, worked and negotiated. Our train was provided with a sleeping car, a large saloon, and a restaurant car, and was very comfortably fitted up. We were amply supplied with everything necessary. The officer who had the supervision of our train caused everything we wanted to be brought. We have nothing to complain of, either, in the way in which the guards, of whom there were a large number round our train, greeted us; the great hatred and revenge which they seem to cherish against our country found expression only in the form of negotiations and the sharpness of the conditions.

“These of us who were soldiers wore uniform, with the Iron Cross. The introduction of the half-dozen French officers with whom we negotiated was a very formal ceremony. Marshal Foch, who only showed himself twice, at the beginning and at the end—a severe, calm man—bestowed on us no word in the courtly



[Russell.]

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROSSLYN WEMYSS,
G.C.B.

British Naval Representative at the Rethondes
interview.

tone which formerly distinguished the most chivalrous nation, nor did his officers. He received us with the words, ‘Qu’est-ce que vous desirez, Messieurs?’ and invited us to sit down in the large working compartment with tables and maps. As each spoke in his own language, and everything was translated, the reading out of the conditions alone occupied two hours. It is an invention that Marshal Foch replied to us that there was no question of negotiations but only of imposing conditions. However cool his behaviour, Marshal Foch showed himself by no means tactless or brusque, as General d’E pérey did towards Count Karolyi at Belgrade.

“We went back to our train. As we were still commissioned by the old Government, and were by no means charged to sign everything unconditionally, we divided the various points under Herr Erzberger’s guidance into three categories—military, diplomatic and naval

conditions, and negotiated thereafter separately with the members of the enemy Commissions, which consisted exclusively of officers. All these officers exhibited the same cool bearing, untempered by any humane word, which Marshal Foch had assumed. One could at the most observe somewhat more politeness from the Chief than from the General Staff. The British Admiral took his tone absolutely from the French.

"We really had nothing to negotiate; we pointed out the technical impossibility of some of the conditions. We might, indeed, send cipher telegrams to Germany *via* the Eiffel Tower, but we were cut off from all connexion with the world in this lonely wood. Marshal Foch himself went away twice, apparently to Paris, and couriers could bring newspapers in two hours.

"Thus our enemy was able silently to give us the Paris newspapers of Sunday

morning, the newspapers in which the Kaiser's abdication was announced. We read no smile, no triumph on their faces, but we looked into their heart. Our work was really undisturbed by the revolution. Our letters of credit, which were signed by the 'German Government,' retained their validity. We could also already speedily consult with Herr Ebert, and soften somewhat, by small concessions from the enemy, the new Government's unconditional subjection.

"Just before the end of the second and last general sitting, we produced our protest in German, which has been published, but were eventually obliged to sign the document forced on us, with its inhuman conditions."

It seems probable that the Germans hoped to wear out the Allies' offensive in the Hindenburg zone in order to secure an unmolested retreat to the Meuse; or at the worst to effect the movement by easy stages during the winter. It is clear that they had made no preparations, as they easily might have done during August and September, for an early abandonment of that zone, which in consequence changed its rôle as a battle position and became a new line of resistance to cover the evacuation of stores. Having failed in the delaying tactics of their original design, they sought from the first week in October to gain time by involving the Allies in the discussion of peace terms on the basis of President Wilson's message to Congress. In this way they hoped to gain three months, prolonged by two months of winter, during which the armies would be reorganized and the German people prepared for the resumption of war as a national struggle for existence. In the meantime differences might arise amongst the Allies, or one or other of them might decline to resume hostilities. All were tired and war weary to utmost surfeit, with the exception of the Americans.

With the miscarriage of this scheme, which has been progressively outlined, the position became fairly desperate. It became hopeless when demoralization began to spread like a rot among the army group of von Gallwitz on the Western Front engaged in holding back the Allies at the critical point west of the Meuse. This was precipitated no doubt by the revolutionary outbreaks at Kiel and Essen. The surrender of Turkey and Austria, news of the impending revolution in Vienna, and the



[Official photograph.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.
The Grand Hôtel Britannique, Spa.

feeling of utter hopelessness, aggravated by hunger, pervading the mass of the people across the Rhine. The fate of the German Armies would have been sealed in any case. From a military point of view regret was expressed that the Armistice should have been accepted and that Foch should be docked of his "Victory." The Allies, it was urged, were thus deprived of their final and decisive victory, and the enemy was permitted to cherish the belief that their armies were still and ever unbeaten.

I have met no soldier and hardly any civilian, writes Sir Sidney Low,* who does not regret that hostilities were allowed to cease on November 11. If they had been prolonged for a few weeks or even a few days, the war would have been carried to Berlin by an unprecedented aerial bombardment, and the German Armies of the west, utterly disorganized and partially outflanked, would have either been destroyed or compelled to deliver up their arms in a surrender which would have dwarfed that of Sedan.

The Briton was so obtuse, according to George Meredith, that he needed a very severe kick in the lower part of the back to apprise him that anything was dislocated or unscrewed in his trigonometry. The German had been so long and so vociferously assured that he was top-dog that he required a compendious bludgeoning before he could be convinced to the contrary. The Armistice supplied the bludgeon.

The faith in victory remained general in Germany up to the day when the news of Bulgaria's downfall and unconditional surrender fell like a thunderbolt. Then the scales fell from the eyes of the people. They were not prepared for failure, and still less for utter defeat and disaster. The shock was too great to be borne. They became a prey to despair. Their sinews were melted. The strength of the nation and of its army was suddenly broken. The Armistice registered the extent of the collapse. A demonstration after the manner of Sedan would have cost us dear. The flower of young England had been "wede awa'" in 1916. And in the end could the proof have been more complete, more circumstantial, than that afforded by the Armistice?

The conditions of the armistice were severe and even humiliating. But there was no alternative. Defeat had to be brought home to Germany in a form in which it could not be

ignored or explained away by the discredited military caste, or the hope of her repentance and redemption would have been remote. A slight blow to her pride might have irritated her, but it would not have gone to the root of her malady. Only an overwhelming demonstration that not only her aggressive schemes but also her military power had been shattered could have destroyed the spirit of arrogance



GENERAL VON GALLWITZ.
Commanded a German Army Group.

and boastfulness with which she had forced and precipitated the conflict in 1914.

The 34 clauses were stringent, therefore, but not, as was affirmed by Dr. Solf, oppressive. They were, in fact, without exception necessitated by the principles laid down by President Wilson on October 23, 1918, for the purpose of security against a renewal of the war if Germany rejected the peace terms which would be dictated to them. Neither Armistice nor Peace were made at Berlin, as sentiment in 1914 had so unmistakably prescribed; but the two great objects of smashing the great military machine and the prestige of the German Imperial Government were, nevertheless, effectively achieved.

As to the two ulterior purposes of destroying for the Germans themselves the illusion of their superiority, and of asserting in the most conclusive manner that the use of force by a great power to further particularist aims is no longer to be tolerated in Europe, time alone can decide how far effectual our treatment has been. The final aim of military operations is psycho-

* *Fortnightly*, January, 1919.

of the armistice, which clearly portended the knowledge dawning upon the Germans themselves that they were hopelessly beaten, and that they would have under pain of death to submit to precisely such terms as the Allies might propose. During the month of November the conception of a "peace-table" entirely disappeared and was replaced by the certainty of a dictated peace.

Cessation of hostilities was made dependent upon the immediate withdrawal and demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian forces and the evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war. The Austrian Army was to be limited to a maximum of 20 divisions, reduced to pre-war effectives. Half the divisional corps and army artillery and equipment was to be handed over to the Allies. Such troops as were allowed to remain under arms were to be withdrawn behind a line specified in Clause 3, well on the Austrian side of the pre-war frontier.

Up to this line Allied troops were to be in occupation with full use of all railway and other equipment and coal—all of this to be left intact. The Allies were entitled to occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary as might be deemed necessary to enable them to

conduct military operations or to maintain order, with the right of requisition on payment. The complete evacuation of all German troops was demanded within 15 days under pain of internment, and the immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all prisoners of war and interned Allied subjects, the sick and wounded who could not be removed from evacuated territory being cared for under a special clause.

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The collapse of Austria-Hungary left Germany



BRITISH TROOPS LANDING AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

[Official photograph.]



A BRITISH TORPEDO BOAT (No. 19) WELCOMED AT FIUME DURING THE ARMISTICE.

alone in the field, and gave the Allies possession of a new battle front, which they might have obtained long ago had they decided to concentrate effort in this direction. As it was, the influence had radiated from Salonika, which had sapped entirely Germany's stranglehold on the Near East. Now Austria was reduced to impotence and it was in the power of the Allies to make use of Bohemia, which juts out like a huge bastion into German territory, and to carry the war into the enemy's territory. This would have meant the strategy of 1813 over again, when the Russian General Wittgenstein joined forces with Prince Schwarzenberg in Bohemia, and marched down the Elbe to fight Napoleon at Dresden. The Bohemian frontier is only 120 miles from Berlin, which after the signature of November 3 was at the mercy of Allied aircraft. The effective defence of the new front, extending for over 400 miles from Lake Constance to Silesia, could only have been undertaken by detaching troops from the west, which would have meant the abandonment of the line of the Meuse and a retreat to the Rhine.

The Kaiser's infelicities as a prophet culminated at the end of September, 1918, in a speech to the troops in Alsace, when he said that "the last drop of blood of every Austrian and Hungarian, the last drop of blood of every Turkish and Bulgarian soldier, will be shed before our enemies wrest from us land which

belongs to Germany." No country has ever been known to shed the last drop of its blood or anything remotely approaching it. But it was gratuitous to make such a boast about Allies who were already upon the verge of capitulation.

The Emperor seemed dazed. Supplies of all kinds, and especially of aircraft, were running short. The temper of the people was becoming more mutinous and irresponsible every day. The well-known character for pertinacity of the Anglo-Saxon, most reluctant to arm of all the Western peoples, was beginning to re-penetrate the hardened shell of German arrogance. Von Moltke and Falkenhayn, who, according to Herr Cohn's speech in the Reichstag at the historic sitting on October 25, both recognized that Germany was defeated so long ago as the first battle of the Marne, had learnt the fickleness of Imperial favour. Shadowy Chancellors had followed one another into oblivion. Ludendorff was thrown to a deluded and angry populace calling for a victim. Old Hindenburg, whom the Emperor always disliked, and who had formed long ago a pretty correct estimate of Wilhelm's character, sat tight, and as soon as the revolution came put his sword at its disposal. He was not the Emperor's friend—thus he escaped misfortune. The troops fought well, even in their despondency, but the German people were fearful of reprisal, and had lost all hope of any sort of patchwork

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German Chancellor, 1918.

to the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, making the first probing overture from which the Peace of July, 1919, eventually developed as early as October 6, 1918, when this note was transmitted through the Swiss Government to President Wilson:

"The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all belligerent States with this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations.

"With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate

conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air."

The hit dog yelps, was the average comment of American papers upon the Note, which was regarded in Europe as an indication that the state of Germany was even worse than was supposed. Apprehension was expressed lest the Allies should be imposed upon by German bluff. But imposture was no longer possible. The military situation alone convinced us that what had hitherto been an article of faith was now literally true—namely, that we could impose our will upon the Germans. Germany might save her armies by a white-flag manoeuvre; we could ensure that she should not achieve peace by dramatizing a sham suicide of Militarism. The President's reply of October 8 was to the effect that he could not recommend the Allies to negotiate with the representatives of the old régime in Germany, while, moreover, that country was still in occupation of portions of Allied territory. Meanwhile our answer to the German Note was being given in the form of hammer blows between Cambrai and St. Quentin. Hardly anyone as yet believed that the Germans were so hard pressed as they really were. This became more apparent when the evasive character of the German reply, signed "Solf, State Secretary of Foreign Office," was made known on October 14. Victory was now in sight, if not yet in reach. In America, Mr. Roosevelt, faithfully reflecting the mood of the vast majority, hoisted the banner of "unconditional surrender." The Germans still clung to the idea of armistice before evacuation, the internationalization of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, and to their own vision of a Peace Table Conference. In Vienna faith was still pinned to the notion of driving a wedge between America and the Allies. "What do London and Paris matter now; they must ask Washington. There is the strong man. The palaces in Downing Street and Paris are only the little side doors of peace policy. The big front door is at the White House in Washington."

The President's answer defining conditions precedent to peace came promptly on October 14, in a Note which laid down in the most polished language that as a guarantee of good faith Germany must cease her outrages—submarines, deportations and the like—and prepare a trustworthy, democratic form of government, so that the Allies might know exactly with

whom they were dealing. This resolution was sympathetically summed up and corroborated by the American Press. "If the German people are as sincerely desirous of peace as we believe they are, they must begin at home by establishing a Government with which honest men can deal. Mr. Wilson's response to the German proposals was more than a diplomatic paper. He called it a decision—a decision of the great self-governing democracies of the world. The President at one stroke swept away the whole German structure of a paper peace without guarantees. Germany is beaten and Germany knows it is beaten. What is left now is to make defeat so decisive and so convincing that every German for generations to come will know that Germany was beaten, how it was beaten, why it was beaten." In their approval of the Note the Americans translated its purport into something like "the Hohenzollerns must go." The Germans, however, still clung to illusions and deplored the spirit of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, which the President had incautiously allowed to infect his speech. "The spirit breathed by the note," said the *Tageblatt* of Berlin, "is worse even than the demands written in it. With every Note Wilson raises his demands, and still continues to hold a dagger under his cloak!" "The President," said the *Rundschau*, "ereets a Caudine Forks for us and wishes to drive us under it with insulting words!"

A considerable pause intervened. Whether the Germans still hoped that a diversion might intervene, or that the Allies would fight themselves out, is problematical. The answer to the second supposition was. "Voilà, les Américains qui arrivent." Their approach was, at least, as decisive as that of the Prussians at Waterloo. President Wilson was criticized at the time for answering the German Notes at all without consulting the Allied Governments. The President's motive in pursuing these negotiations without reference to the Associated Governments was his desire to preserve consistency in the diplomacy he had pursued from the first. He had laid down in the celebrated 14 points the conditions precedent to a just peace, as he conceived it. It was this unchanging ideal of a peace with justice which he wished, above all, to affirm. Public opinion in England remained unexcited. The idea of a war cessation seemed distant and unfamiliar. We were as unprepared for peace

as we had been for war. As before we were attaining essential objects with little conscious perception and next to no outward manifestation of the fact. The tension in Berlin, on the other hand, was compared to that of the early days of the war mania four and a quarter years back.

A long, evasive reply from Berlin (October 21) evoked a strong clamour of "no more parley" in America, and the President responded, on October 23, by deeming it his duty to say that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should "leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted



DR. SOLF.

German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1918.



A SITTING OF THE CONFERENCE OF VERSAILLES.

On the right from fireplace: General Belin, Marshal Foch, M. Pichon, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Milner, Sir Douglas Haig.

his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion

that if these Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the



THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

Left to right: Colonel Nagai, General di Robilant, Baron Sonnino, Signor Orlando, Colonel House, General Bliss, Mr. Auchincloss, M. Venizelos, M. Vesnitch.

Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the people involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from a military point of view." The principles of the subsequent armistice, which came into being three weeks later, were implicit in this declaration of October 23, 1918. This represented the last word of the President's deliberate Peace Offensive.

It is somewhat doubtful whether Germany even yet would have discovered a unanimity sufficient to stomach the word surrender had it not been for the incidence of diversions from quarters in which they were neither expected nor welcomed—the Turks throwing up the sponge, the resignation of Ludendorff, the Croat revolt, the Italian victories, the revolutionary symptoms in the German seaports and in the front line trenches, the dismemberment of the *Ausgleich* and the complete collapse of the Dual Monarchy.

Now on November 1 Germany was standing alone.* The unlucky Wilhelm, a more complete exponent of the clothes philosophy than the *Roi Soleil* himself, had at last found his *Fontainebleau*. There, sensible of the lives "put in peril by himself; and finding amid such reflections, little comfort in fanaticism, or in his fancied call; sat the unhappy author of all."† "Germany is celebrating a dark jubilee. It is 10 years to the day since the *Daily Telegraph* published the mischievous interview with the Kaiser. Nothing can now silence the whispering and muttering among the people. What will the Kaiser do? When will he do it?" The newspapers afforded him cold comfort. "The Emperor Karl," said the *Lokalanzeiger*, "is homeless. He flies from Austria to Hungary, and from Hungary to Austria, and wherever he goes is greeted with shouts of 'Long live the Republic.'" A few days later the Kaiser could judge by the terms offered to and accepted by Austria-Hungary what sort of provisions the armistice proffered to Germany would contain.

Things were now moving with lightning rapidity. The German were being driven on the field into a narrowing pocket, and their

military position, despite the losses they were still able to inflict, was getting more and more desperate. On November 4 we heard that an armistice had been granted to Austria, that Boris of Bulgaria had abdicated, that Belgrade had been occupied by the Serbs, and that Valenciennes had fallen to the Allies. On November 6 the Americans captured Sedan.



THE KAISER IN 1918.

The peace movement was growing. The President's last note had indicated that if the Germans wanted an armistice they must appeal to Marshal Foch. A Military Conference was to assemble at the Trianon Palace Hotel, Versailles, to draw up the necessary proposals. M. Clemenceau occupied the central position in the Conference Room, having Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, and Lord Milner on his left, with M. Pichon, Marshal Foch, and General Belin on his right. Opposite sat Colonel House, General Bliss, Signor Orlando, Baron Sonnino.

On November 6 it was announced that a commission had been appointed in Germany to devise means of agreement concerning an expected armistice. This delegation consisted of General von Gündell, former military delegate at the Hague and Director of the War Academy in Berlin, General von Winterfeldt, former military attaché in Paris, Admiral von Müller, Chief of the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet since 1906, and the ex-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Admiral von Hintze. Official intimation as to their route upon entering the war zone

* Bulgarian Armistice, September 29; Turkish, October 30; Austrian, November 3.

† Barnaby Rudge.

was conveyed in Marshal Foch's communication to the German Headquarters prescribing the course of their journey. It stated that if they wished to meet him to ask for an armistice they were to advance to the French outposts



HERR ERZBERGER.
German Finance Minister, 1918.

by the Chimay-Fournies-La Capelle-Guise road, where they were to be received and conducted to the place fixed for an interview. There they were to be met by the Allied Generalissimo and by Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, who was appointed to act with Marshal Foch as his naval associate. On the morning of Friday, November 8, at the Allied General Headquarters, the Plenipotentiaries of Germany received the conditions of the Armistice, as well as the formal demand that they should be accepted or refused within 72 hours expiring on Monday morning at 11 o'clock (French time). The German proposal for the immediate conclusion of a provisional suspension of hostilities was refused by Marshal Foch. A German courier bearing the text of the conditions of the armistice was sent to Spa to communicate the terms to the German Headquarters there located. The delegates, now including Secretary of State Erzberger and Naval Captain Vauselow, arrived in the French lines at 11 on Thursday night (November 9).

Erzberger at once informed Marshal Foch that he had been instructed to ask for an immediate suspension of hostilities. After refusing this, Marshal Foch, with cold military

precision, read the full text of the terms. Before sending their courier to Spa, in reaching which place he had great difficulties to encounter, the Germans expressed amazement at the severity of the terms, but their general attitude was that they would have to bow to fate.

The interview took place at Rethondes station, in the Forest of Compiègne, on the Compiègne-Soissons line, where Marshal Foch's special train was lying. The terms were communicated to Spa, and thence disclosed to a conference of Secretaries of State at Berlin, by whom they were accepted. The delegates were instructed to act accordingly, and the Armistice was signed at 5 o'clock in the



GENERAL VON WINTERFELD.
One of the German Armistice Delegates.

morning (French time) of Monday, November 11, 1918. The signatures were:—

F. Foch.	Erzberger.
R. E. Wemyss.	Oberndorff.
	Winterfeldt.
	Vanselow.

The Kaiser was not there to face the music as Napoleon III. had been at Donchéry on September 2, 1870. The event was far more momentous, perhaps the most momentous in modern history. The environment has been vividly portrayed by one of the German delegates.

“When, on November 8, we reached the French lines, coming by motor-car from Spa, carriages were ready, in the November fog, to convey us to the unknown place of negotiations. The motor journey, with French officers, lasted 10 hours. It appears to me probable that it was intentionally prolonged in order to take us, right and left, through the ruined province, and so prepare us, by our own inspection, for what hate and revenge would demand of us in the form of the sharpest possible conditions. A Frenchman silently pointed out the ruins and then mentioned a name—‘Voilà St. Quentin!’

“In the evening a train stood ready for us somewhere. The blinds were drawn, and when we awoke in the morning the train stood still in the middle of a wood. We now know we negotiated in the Forest of Compiègne. We did not know it eight days ago. Possibly it was a precautionary measure for us also that we were not taken to the city. Perhaps they feared acts of violence on the population’s side, for the hatred accumulated in its heart was unbounded. We were in a wood, without houses or tents, entirely shut off by troops.

“Only two trains stood on the railway—one was Foch’s and his companions’, the other was ours. In these two trains we lived, worked and negotiated. Our train was provided with a sleeping car, a large saloon, and a restaurant car, and was very comfortably fitted up. We were amply supplied with everything necessary. The officer who had the supervision of our train caused everything we wanted to be brought. We have nothing to complain of, either, in the way in which the guards, of whom there were a large number round our train, greeted us; the great hatred and revenge which they seem to cherish against our country found expression only in the form of negotiations and the sharpness of the conditions.

“Those of us who were soldiers wore uniform, with the Iron Cross. The introduction of the half-dozen French officers with whom we negotiated was a very formal ceremony. Marshal Foch, who only showed himself twice, at the beginning and at the end—a severe, calm man—bestowed on us no word in the courtly



[Russell.

**VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROSSLYN WEMYSS,
G.C.B.**

**British Naval Representative at the Rethondes
interview.**

tone which formerly distinguished the most chivalrous nation, nor did his officers. He received us with the words, ‘Qu’est-ce que vous desirez, Messieurs?’ and invited us to sit down in the large working compartment with tables and maps. As each spoke in his own language, and everything was translated, the reading out of the conditions alone occupied two hours. It is an invention that Marshal Foch replied to us that there was no question of negotiations but only of imposing conditions. However cool his behaviour, Marshal Foch showed himself by no means tactless or brusque, as General d’Espérey did towards Count Karolyi at Belgrade.

“We went back to our train. As we were still commissioned by the old Government, and were by no means charged to sign everything unconditionally, we divided the various points under Herr Erzberger’s guidance into three categories—military, diplomatic and naval

conditions, and negotiated thereafter separately with the members of the enemy Commissions, which consisted exclusively of officers. All these officers exhibited the same cool bearing, untempered by any humane word, which Marshal Foch had assumed. One could at the most observe somewhat more politeness from the Chief than from the General Staff. The British Admiral took his tone absolutely from the French.

"We really had nothing to negotiate; we pointed out the technical impossibility of some of the conditions. We might, indeed, send cipher telegrams to Germany *via* the Eiffel Tower, but we were cut off from all connexion with the world in this lonely wood. Marshal Foch himself went away twice, apparently to Paris, and couriers could bring newspapers' in two hours.

"Thus our enemy was able silently to give us the Paris newspapers of Sunday



[Official photograph.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE COMMISSION.
The Grand Hôtel Britannique. Spa.

morning, the newspapers in which the Kaiser's abdication was announced. We read no smile, no triumph on their faces, but we looked into their heart. Our work was really undisturbed by the revolution. Our letters of credit, which were signed by the 'German Government,' retained their validity. We could also already speedily consult with Herr Ebert, and soften somewhat, by small concessions from the enemy, the new Government's unconditional subjection.

"Just before the end of the second and last general sitting, we produced our protest in German, which has been published, but were eventually obliged to sign the document forced on us, with its inhuman conditions."

It seems probable that the Germans hoped to wear out the Allies' offensive in the Hindenburg zone in order to secure an unnoledsted retreat to the Meuse; or at the worst to effect the movement by easy stages during the winter. It is clear that they had made no preparations, as they easily might have done during August and September, for an early abandonment of that zone, which in consequence changed its rôle as a battle position and became a new line of resistance to cover the evacuation of stores. Having failed in the delaying tactics of their original design, they sought from the first week in October to gain time by involving the Allies in the discussion of peace terms on the basis of President Wilson's message to Congress. In this way they hoped to gain three months, prolonged by two months of winter, during which the armies would be reorganized and the German people prepared for the resumption of war as a national struggle for existence. In the meantime differences might arise amongst the Allies, or one or other of them might decline to resume hostilities. All were tired and war weary to utmost surfeit, with the exception of the Americans.

With the miscarriage of this scheme, which has been progressively outlined, the position became fairly desperate. It became hopeless when demoralization began to spread like a rot among the army group of von Gallwitz on the Western Front engaged in holding back the Allies at the critical point west of the Meuse. This was precipitated no doubt by the revolutionary outbreaks at Kiel and Essen. The surrender of Turkey and Austria, news of the impending revolution in Vienna, and the

feeling of utter hopelessness, aggravated by hunger, pervading the mass of the people across the Rhine. The fate of the German Armies would have been sealed in any case. From a military point of view regret was expressed that the Armistice should have been accepted and that Foch should be docked of his "Victory." The Allies, it was urged, were thus deprived of their final and decisive victory, and the enemy was permitted to cherish the belief that their armies were still and ever unbeaten.

I have met no soldier and hardly any civilian, writes Sir Sidney Low,* who does not regret that hostilities were allowed to cease on November 11. If they had been prolonged for a few weeks or even a few days, the war would have been carried to Berlin by an unprecedented aerial bombardment, and the German Armies of the west, utterly disorganized and partially outflanked, would have either been destroyed or compelled to deliver up their arms in a surrender which would have dwarfed that of Sedan.

The Briton was so obtuse, according to George Meredith, that he needed a very severe kick in the lower part of the back to apprise him that anything was dislocated or unscrewed in his trigonometry. The German had been so long and so vociferously assured that he was top-dog that he required a compendious bludgeoning before he could be convinced to the contrary. The Armistice supplied the bludgeon.

The faith in victory remained general in Germany up to the day when the news of Bulgaria's downfall and unconditional surrender fell like a thunderbolt. Then the scales fell from the eyes of the people. They were not prepared for failure, and still less for utter defeat and disaster. The shock was too great to be borne. They became a prey to despair. Their sinews were melted. The strength of the nation and of its army was suddenly broken. The Armistice registered the extent of the collapse. A demonstration after the manner of Sedan would have cost us dear. The flower of young England had been "wede awa'" in 1916. And in the end could the proof have been more complete, more circumstantial, than that afforded by the Armistice?

The conditions of the armistice were severe and even humiliating. But there was no alternative. Defeat had to be brought home to Germany in a form in which it could not be

ignored or explained away by the discredited military caste, or the hope of her repentance and redemption would have been remote. A slight blow to her pride might have irritated her, but it would not have gone to the root of her malady. Only an overwhelming demonstration that not only her aggressive schemes but also her military power had been shattered could have destroyed the spirit of arrogance



GENERAL VON GALLWITZ.
Commanded a German Army Group.

and boastfulness with which she had forced and precipitated the conflict in 1914.

The 34 clauses were stringent, therefore, but not, as was affirmed by Dr. Solf, oppressive. They were, in fact, without exception necessitated by the principles laid down by President Wilson on October 23, 1918, for the purpose of security against a renewal of the war if Germany rejected the peace terms which would be dictated to them. Neither Armistice nor Peace were made at Berlin, as sentiment in 1914 had so unmistakably prescribed; but the two great objects of smashing the great military machine and the prestige of the German Imperial Government were, nevertheless, effectively achieved.

As to the two ulterior purposes of destroying for the Germans themselves the illusion of their superiority, and of asserting in the most conclusive manner that the use of force by a great power to further particularist aims is no longer to be tolerated in Europe, time alone can decide how far effectual our treatment has been. The final aim of military operations is psycho-

* *Fortnightly*, January, 1919.



[Canadian War Records.]

GERMAN OFFICERS UNDER A WHITE FLAG.

Passing through the British lines to reveal the whereabouts of German mines and delay-action fuses, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.

logical. They aim at producing a state of mind in the adversary. They aim at making him feel that it would be better to accept the terms we offer than to continue the struggle. That the 34 clauses of the Armistice of November 11, with its various Annexures and Rectifications, effectually performed this will be generally admitted.

The first clause provided for the cessation of hostilities by land and in the air six hours after the signing; that is hostilities were to cease on all fronts at 11 a.m. on the eleventh of the eleventh month. It was the eleventh hour so far as a national united Germany was concerned.

The second provided for the immediate evacuation of the invaded countries—Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine—so ordered as to be completed within 15 days from the signature of the Armistice. German troops failing to leave these territories within the period fixed were to be made prisoners-of-war: the Allies were to occupy these districts in three successive zones or stages. Repatriation at once (within 15 days at the outside), without reciprocity, of all prisoners-of-war and civilian Allies, including hostages, persons under trial, or condemned, was a matter

of course. Our prisoners found their way, often with great difficulty, across Germany and over the fighting lines, great efforts being made at home to provide for their provision and comfort, in marked contrast with the straggling return of captives from Verdun and elsewhere in 1814. The number of missing found and identified was lamentably small. The German prisoners remained in England, where they did work, often very valuable, until after the ratification of the Peace in July, 1919.

The Germans had hitherto retained the bulk of their guns and equipment, but they were by Clause 4 compelled to surrender in good condition 5,000 guns (half heavy, half field), 25,000 machine-guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 1,700 aeroplanes. This war material was to be handed over *in situ* to the Allies within 20 days, in proportions from each army group to be determined by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. More vital still as a means of incapacitating the enemy for offence was the demand, under Clause 7, for 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, 5,000 motor-lorries, all within 31 or 36 days, together with the whole of the railways of Alsace-Lorraine in working order, complete with the necessary coals, sheds, and repair

shops. All communications, as far at least as the Rhine, were to be placed under the supreme and absolute authority of Marshal Foch. The fulfilment of this clause evoked bitter protest from the Germans, who complained that the most essential arteries of communication were being crippled. It was, however, adhered to. Large numbers of trucks were seen in December on the French and Belgian lines, while a few penetrated to the S.E. & C.R.

Under Clause 8 the German Command were made responsible for revealing within 48 hours after signature all mines or delay-action fuses disposed on territory evacuated by German troops, and were enjoined to assist in their discovery and destruction. Under fear of reprisals, this was carried out with energy and success. There were, however, victims, especially among the child population in Belgium, and warnings of every kind had to be multiplied and extended. All these clauses were more or less a matter of course, though they were on the whole more strenuous and far-seeing than amateur armistice makers had given the Supreme Command credit for.

Other measures not less essential as a guarantee of good faith were the occupation of Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne, with the bridge-

heads across the Rhine at these important strategic points, the establishment of a neutral zone on the right bank, and the evacuation by Germany of the whole of the left bank. This involved the maintenance of British, American, and French Armies, approximately at first of 200,000 rifles each, respectively based on Cologne, Coblenz and Mainz. The honour of acting as Army of Occupation was assigned in the main to the Second and Fourth British Armies, with the addition of Guards and other contingents.

The following Special Order of the Day was issued by G.O.C. Fourth Army:—

TO ALL RANKS OF THE FOURTH ARMY.

The Fourth Army has been ordered to form part of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine in accordance with the terms of the armistice. The march to the Rhine will shortly commence, and, although carried out with the usual military precautions, will be undertaken generally as a peace march.

The British Army, through over four years of almost continuous and bitter fighting, has proved that it has lost none of that fighting spirit and dogged determination which have characterized British Armies in the past, and has won a place in history of which every soldier of the British Empire has just reason to be proud. It has maintained the highest standard of discipline both in advance and retreat. It has proved that British discipline, based on mutual confidence between officers and men, can stand the hard test of war far better than Prussian discipline, based on fear of punishment.

This is not all. The British Army has, during the last four years, on foreign soil, by its behaviour in



MEMBERS OF THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT SPA.
Generals Sir R. Haking (British), Nudan (French), and Delobbe (Belgian).

billets, by its courtesy to women, by its ever-ready help to the old and weak, and by its kindness to children, earned a reputation in France that no army serving in a foreign land torn by the horrors of war has ever gained before.

Till you reach the frontier of Germany you will be marching through a country that has suffered grievously from the depredations and exactions of a brutal enemy. Do all that lies in your power by courtesy and consideration to mitigate the hardships of these poor people, who will welcome you as deliverers and as friends. I would further ask you, when you cross the German frontier, to show the world that British soldiers, unlike those of Germany, do not wage war against women and children and against the old and weak.

The Allied Governments have guaranteed that private property will be respected by the Army of Occupation, and I rely on you to see that this engagement is carried out in the spirit as well as in the letter.

In conclusion, I ask you, one and all, men from all parts of the British Empire, to ensure that the fair name of the British Army, enhanced by your exertions in long years of trial and hardship, shall be fully maintained during the less exacting months that lie before you.

I ask you to show the world that, as in war, so in peace, British discipline is the highest form of discipline, based on loyalty to our King, respect for authority, care for the well-being of subordinates, courtesy and consideration for non-combatants, and a true soldierly bearing in carrying out whatever duty we may be called upon to perform.

H. RAWLINSON, General.

Headquarters, Fourth Army, Nov. 11.

The details of this, perhaps the most important constructive clause in the Armistice, are contained in Clauses 5 and 6, which run as follows:—

5. Evacuation by the German Armies of

the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States Armies of Occupation.

The occupation of these territories will be carried out by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30 kilometre [about 19 miles] radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.

A neutral zone shall be set up on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn 10 kilometres [6½ miles] distant, starting from the Dutch frontier to the Swiss frontier. In the case of inhabitants, no person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the Armistice.

No measure of a general or official character shall be taken which would have, as a consequence, the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their *personnel*.

Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhineland shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signature of the Armistice.



BRITISH CAVALRY ENTERING SPA.

[Official photograph.]



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH CAVALRY CROSSING THE GERMAN FRONTIER.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the Note (Annexure 1).

6. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

No destruction of any kind to be committed.

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way, and their *personnel* shall not be moved.

The barbarous methods of militarism resorted to by Germans compelled the Allies to insist that the enemy command should disclose any such measures as the poisoning or pollution of wells which they may have ordered, and should refrain from further acts of destruction(8).

On the East Front the Allies required free access to the former territories of Russia, through Danzig or by the Vistula, for the purpose of provisioning the population and for the maintenance of order and also free access to the Baltic and the right to occupy the German fortifications at the entrance to

that sea. The evacuation of South-Eastern Europe and Russia by German troops was demanded within the year. The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, by which the Germans had sought to bridle and fetter Russia and Rumania, were to be abrogated and annulled. The clauses in which the Armistice proclaims the policy of the Allies in the East of Europe run as follows:—

12. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Rumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once; and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilians as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914) to be recalled.

14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures, and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia, as defined on August 1, 1914.

15. Abandonment of the Treaties of Bukarest and Brest-Litovsk and of the Supplementary Treaties.



THE GERMANS EVACUATE LIÈGE.

16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order.

The financial clauses demand reparation for damage done, and full and immediate restitution of the gold looted from Belgium, Rumania and Russia. It was also provided that the Allied troops occupying the Rhine provinces should be a charge upon Germany. No loophole was left for her to escape from the obligations imposed, and Heligoland itself might be occupied by the British fleet should mutiny or other cause preclude the delivery of the prescribed ships. The insolent message issued by some of the mutineers, bidding their comrades to resist, proved the wisdom of this measure of precaution. The enemy was indeed laid low, as Mr. Lloyd George said, while we stood higher than we ever stood before. But the utter and irrefutable submission of Germany is seen most clearly perhaps in the Naval Conditions.

20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information given as to the position and movements of all German

ships. Freedom of navigation to all neutrals.

21. All naval prisoners to be returned without reciprocity.

22. All existing submarines, with equipment, to be handed over. Those ready to put to sea to sail within 14 days to port of surrender—indicated by wireless.

23. The following German surface warships to be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral or allied ports, only care and maintenance parties being left on board: 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers (including 2 minelayers), 50 destroyers of most modern type [Most of these were subsequently scuttled by the skeleton crews at Scapa Flow]. All other warships and auxiliaries to be disarmed and placed under Allied supervision. Vessels for internment to leave German ports within seven days.

24. The Allies entitled to sweep for mines and obstructions, nature and positions of which to be indicated by enemy.

26. Existing blockade conditions to remain unchanged and German merchant ships found at sea to remain liable to capture. Germany to be provisioned by Allies if needed during Armistice period.

27. Aerial forces to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases.

29. All Black Sea Ports to be evacuated by Germany, and all Russian warships seized to be handed over to the Allies.

30. All merchant ships in German hands to be restored to ports specified by Allies.

31. No destruction of ships or materials.

33. No transfers of German merchant shipping to any neutral flag after signing of Armistice.

So ended, at the close of two feverish decades,

Allies. This portended the total wreck of the last rose and gem of the German Colonial structure of 1884-1899, one of the most glaring faults (and horrors) of the post-Bismarckian era. The surrender eventually released Count Lettow von Vorbeck, great partisan leader, hero of the defence of "German East."

The duration of the Armistice of Nov. 11 was to be 36 days, with option to extend. (The prolongations of Dec. 13, 1918, January 16, and February 16, 1919, were printed as an Army Paper in March, 1919.) To ensure the



ENTRY OF THE KING AND QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS INTO LIÈGE.

the fallen Kaiser's efforts to grasp the trident. The flagrant departure from the traditional caution of Bismarck led first to our abandonment of the pro-German ideal (for us) of splendid isolation and then to the formation of Ententes which eventually encircled the globe against a threatening Triplice. In order to keep a complete hold of Germany by sea, it will be seen that the lifting of the blockade was postponed until after the ratification of the Peace. Alterations, alleviations were framed, however, and food was transported into Germany, mainly from America, early in 1919.

Finally, Clause 17 provided for the evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be specified by the

execution of the convention under the most favourable conditions, the principle of a permanent International Armistice Commission was recognized, such Commission to act under the supreme authority of the High Command, military and naval, of the Allied Armies. A postscript provided that if the German ships were not handed over within the period specified, the Governments of the Allies and of the United States shall have the right to occupy Heligoland to ensure their delivery.

Protests and pleas for a mitigation of terms were drawn up and addressed to America (via Dr. Solf): "A people of 70 millions suffers but it does not die." The Allies were unmoved. Threats of chaos, anarchy, starvation, were not fulfilled. European order had


to be maintained. The terms of the Armistice were rigidly fulfilled. It was a question of obey or perish. People were sceptical as to whether the final "Cease Fire" could possibly have arrived—but it had.

The Armistice of Rethondes was something more than a military convention. It was bound in some measure to foreshadow the Peace Treaty which the Allies were about, seven months later, to dictate to Germany.

and turned back. The Hohenzollerns were supposed to be the most firmly rooted dynasty in the world—the Prussians were regarded as the most docile and loyal of subjects.

The unexpected and unexampled defeat of Germany destroyed four or five hundred years of dynastic endeavour and almost unparalleled dynastic success. It destroyed the Hohenzollern legend and the Hohenzollern creed.

The future of Germany must be henceforth indicated in darker colours. Up to 1914



U-BOATS ON THE WAY TO SURRENDER.

Vae Victis. This is true in all the world's history and signifies the penalty which nation: must pay when they bid for power and lose the stakes. Onerous as were the terms of the Armistice, they were less so by far than those proposed to France (then more exhausted probably than Germany ever was) in 1708; and less drastic than those which Germany imposed upon France in 1871 by the Convention of Versailles. It is humiliating for a proud nation to pass through the Caudine Forks, but humiliation and defeat are synonymous terms. It is by humiliation that a nation is punished for wrong doing, and through humiliation that its crimes are purged. Justice is inflexible. The false gods of the Germans were calcined. The cream of their Kultur was curdled. The stream of their political faith and tendency for 200 years, belief in the factorship of the Hohenzollern, was arrested

its advance in prosperity and power seemed well-nigh irresistible. We, ourselves, were dazzled by it. The Armistice gave the German people a terrible awakening. Their dream of power and domination was gone. The great war must leave them indefinitely impoverished, their military history in the highest degree precarious, inasmuch as wealth is power. The greatest resources of Imperial Germany were its mineral riches. Half its coal will now fall to Poland—the bulk of its iron ore, potash, and other minerals to France. The war will leave the country without allies, without friends, without colonies, with vastly diminished resources (at sea more particularly), and with a gigantic war debt. In addition Germany will have to make good the colossal values which her soldiers and sailors and airmen destroyed in other countries. Her people are bound it would seem, to be crippled for

decades. Under the influence of poverty, despondency, emigration and ostracism, the population may well become stagnant, possibly even retrogressive. A nation, moreover, which has been herded and spoonfed mentally for generations does not readily or quickly learn the art of governing itself or helping to make the world safe for democracy. It is difficult to convert a servile race, however orderly and industrious, into a race of free men.

Regarded from another point of view, the Armistice is perhaps one of the greatest touchstones in history, and one of its salient moments. As in August, 1914, so in November, 1918, there was a sudden transference of interests and transmutation of values. The continuity of things to outward seeming, was abruptly severed not in one Continent merely. War at once began to be envisaged in an ordinary peace light. The war had instantaneously become one of the Great Wars of history, and we had fought for objects not dissimilar from those of 1588, 1713, and 1814. Again for England and Liberty, not without glory. A hundred controversies were automatically ended. Visions and aspirations not a few had lost their transcendence. The outline of Peace, though still in shadow, was vaguely delineated. The Great Opportunist (and cynic) Peace with

Victory, had shown its hand most clearly in the decision of Alsace's fate.

The Alsace problem was frequently spoken of as insoluble. Autonomy and complete independence, partition, boundary adjustment, federation with Germany or Switzerland, plebiscite—most were regarded as chimerical, most of all re-annexation to France with or without referendum. Now, upon the stricken field, the reabsorption of Alsace was assumed as indispensable. The Armistice achieved a miracle which seemed now to be regarded quite as a matter of course. Yet, in 1914, nothing seemed more incredible. The Germans, it was generally believed, were as willing to resign Berlin as Alsace. In answer to Mr. Asquith's question (Sept. 26, 1917, Leeds speech) as to whether Germany was prepared to restore what she stole from France in 1871, von Kühlmann, the Foreign Secretary, said in the Reichstag (Oct. 9, 1917): "There is but one answer to this question: Can Germany in any form make any concession with regard to Alsace-Lorraine? The answer is No, never. So long as a single German can hold a gun, the integrity of the territory handed down to us as a glorious inheritance by our forefathers can never be the object of any negotiations or concessions. I am sure



[French official photograph.]

PEOPLE OF METZ AWAITING GENERAL PÉTAINE AND THE FRENCH TROOPS.

that, whether on the Right or on the Left, you will stand for that with equal resoluteness and self-sacrifice." A little later, in Rumania, the Kaiser remarked in regard to M. Painlevé's speech in the French Chamber: "The maiden speech of the new French Premier has been brought to me. So M. Painlevé wants Alsace and Lorraine again. Good! He can fetch them!" In 1881, his grandfather had said Germany would rather leave her 18 army corps and her 42 million people on the battlefield than surrender a single stone of the territory won in 1870. To the same purpose Dr. Delbrück had said in 1913 Germany might as well surrender Prussia as give up the territory bought and paid for at Gravelotte, Mars-la-Tour, St. Privat and Sedan. "Restoration of Elsass-Lothringen is not debatable for us in any form whatever. . . . When we took Alsace Lorraine in 1871 we regained what was our own. Why did we retake it? Because the safety of German territory demanded it"; and Maximilian Harden confirmed this view when, writing in 1916, he said: "If people think in France that the re-establishment of peace is possible only through the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity compels us to sign such a peace, the 70 millions of Germans will soon tear it up."

It is unnecessary to enquire whether an ideal

solution was attained in regard to Alsace. The point is that what had been deemed by the French an inconceivable solution in 1914 was now generally regarded as the only solution practicable or, indeed, thinkable. The same thing happened in regard to Poland, North Schleswig, and even parts of Silesia adjoining Bohemia. Berlin had no effectually resisting power. Germany's claim to have a voice in every international settlement, her grasp of the trident, her passion to raise at every juncture the angry battle-cry of "Deutschland über Alles," to realize the dream of Berlin to Bagdad, or "from Sea to Sea" (Kamerun to German East) in Africa, thanks to her naval and military collapse, was now a thing of the past. Germany, for some time to come, could no longer be a first-class Power. For a very long time to come she would not be able to afford the luxury of militarism. Her main industry could no longer be war, or anything like it. The belligerents had suffered too much, they had all suffered a severe put-back, they were exasperated like a besieging army after a bitter and protracted siege. The Near East foreshadowed chaos. A hundred illusions had gone. None could credit during war that war was a great ameliorator. The notion of a peace based upon a common understanding had foundered



[French official photograph.]

ALSATIANS WELCOME THE RE-ENTRY OF THE FRENCH INTO COLMAR.



[Official photograph.]

BRITISH MACHINE-GUNNERS HOLDING THE BRIDGE AT COLOGNE.

owing to the protraction of the war. A policy of grab and materialism—let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die—seemed impending. Observers of the prevailing cynicism clamoured for another Swift. Europe might still be condemned to face Revolution. Might it be true that war was “Revenge by turns”? For the present it was enough to reflect—“No more air raids. Let there be light. No more submarine menace. No more trains of wounded.”

From one aspect November '11 was a complete arrest of ideals. The explanation is to be found in the simple fact that the nation which for two dozen years had been the most successfully self-assertive in the old world, if not in the new, after the completest test known perhaps since ancient times, had been manifestly, in the eyes of all, exhaustively defeated. Successful war had produced the *bouleversement*—the entire revolution of previously accepted values—that nothing else could produce. The great military nation, which had fought with splendid courage and superb skill to the last gasp, with singular inconsistency sought to evade the unalterable logic of circumstance, and by any and every means to mask the inevitable and plain conclusion that their colossal humiliation was due to the fact that in the second week

of November, 1918, Germany was on the eve of the biggest military and naval breakdown recorded in history. There is no stalemate



DR. DELBRUCK.

German Secretary of the Interior.

in war; and after four and a quarter years of combat, the issue was decided not by night fears, poverty, starvation, or anarchy, but by superior fighting force on the part of the Allies.

On March 21 the Germans had 264 divisions in the Western theatre (roughly 15,000 per

division at the least), 78 in reserve, all fresh. On November 21 there were 201 divisions (many reduced to less than 2,000 combatants), 17 in reserve, two fresh. Against this the Allies at the end had 80 divisions in reserve, all up to full strength, and thanks to the Americans, the number of divisions was increasing daily. With regard to artillery, the case was much the same. The German Higher Command was unable to replace unserviceable guns, apart from those lost; it had to break up units, diminish the number of batteries and the

and it was barely possible for the army to creep home even when unmolested by the enemy. The Armistice in consequence was an Act of Grace to an utterly defeated force, indicating a dictated peace to a nation reduced by compulsion to a posture of unconditional surrender. Hindenburg himself on November 20, 1918, in a telegram to the new German Government, frankly admitted that the German Army was helpless. "I must strongly emphasize," he said, "that the German Army is no longer in a position to resume



ARMISTICE DAY IN SYDNEY.

number of guns in batteries. Captured documents show that the numbers dropped between July and November from 3,100 field batteries and 2,150 heavy to 2,600 field and 1,605 heavy batteries respectively, and not only numbers but quality had fallen off. There was progressive decrease in supply of ammunition. A quarter of the machine-guns had disappeared. All means of transport, rail, motor and animal, were in a desperate condition. The Allies had uncontested command of the air. The German *matériel* was steadily dwindling. The Krupps had been out-Krupped. It was the same or worse at sea. The big ships could not be induced to come out. The submarines could not be provided or equipped. All power of manœuvre had been lost, the railways were congested in vain efforts to get material away,

the fight. Even a fight against the French Army alone would be impossible."

Expectation had amounted almost to an agony for over 70 hours. Early on the 11th we heard of the abdication and flight (attended by the virtual internment) of the Kaiser, and the renunciation of his hopeful eldest son. Bismarck and the "contemptible little army" were alike avenged. On Monday morning before noon the great news flashed and awoke a genial saturnalia. As it had been 52 months before, so now the world was in the streets, relapsing from tip-toe into a state of childish dementia. Many believed, as in 1814, that War had ended for all time. There was little beautiful or useful about the celebrations; all that can be said is that they were relatively harmless;



ARMISTICE DAY IN DOWNING STREET.
The crowd waiting to cheer the Premier at his official residence.



THE SCENE OUTSIDE BUCKINGHAM PALACE ON ARMISTICE DAY.
A great crowd gathered to cheer the King, who appeared on the balcony accompanied by the Queen, Princess Mary, the Duke of Connaught and Princess Patricia.



THE FLEET ILLUMINATED ON ARMISTICE NIGHT.

amusing they certainly were in their vivid spontaneity.

Nothing in this war, it was said, became the German rulers of the moment less than the manner they went out of it. Has any nation in history gone out of a war quite so unimpressively as this one, of which their C.-in-C. declared, "We can hold our heads high." At home *The Times* said, justly :

"The happy close of hostilities in this greatest and most terrible of all wars, fought for everything that we hold dear and sacred, led the Prime Minister yesterday to move the adjournment of the House of Commons to St. Margaret's, there to give humble and reverent thanks to the Almighty for this great deliverance."

"This is no time for words," said the Prime Minister, in a voice broken with emotion, after he had read the terms of the Armistice to the House of Commons to-day. "Our hearts are too full of gratitude, to which no tongue can give adequate expression." And the House straightway proceeded to St. Margaret's Church, Wes'minster, to return thanks to God.

Nothing in the war so became the House of Commons as its demeanour on the day of assured triumph. There was no note of exultation in the cheers that welled up from the great heart of the assembly. There was the joy of thanksgiving, and with it an overmastering sense of compassion which made the sitting almost a solemn act of consecration. It was eloquent of the spirit of the new time that the clause in the Armistice which drew the deepest and most sustained cheer from the House was not any, even the most stringent, for the exaction of territorial and material safeguards, but that which provided for the immediate repatriation of all Allied prisoners of war.

The veteran sage, Frederic Harrison, at 84, wrote in his *Obiter Scripta* for December, 1918, "The greatest of all our perils as a free people is over! The greatest of our triumphs as a stalwart nation is won. In the noble utterance of the Prime Minister in the Commons it was truly said: 'This is no time for words—our hearts are too full!' King, Parliament, People have never shown their true nature more honourably than in this end of Horror!" The crowded service in St. Paul's on Monday and the more formal thanksgiving on Tuesday, before the King, were evidence that the action of the House reflected the profounder thought of the nation at this solemn turning-point in the world's history.



THANKSGIVING AT ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL, NOVEMBER 12, 1918.

Among the elders there was an instantaneous move to religious expressions and emotion. "Thank God," was on every lip. At such an hour people need a rallying point. Instinctively, spontaneously, they found it in the Crown, and with one accord all within reach wended their way to Buckingham Palace, where enormous crowds acclaimed the King, who has been the true national sponsor and mouthpiece through all our vicissitudes, sorrows, and rejoicings. He alone attempted to express our gratitude and admiration to the fighting men who have won the war, the joy in the thought that our sacrifices had not been vain, our vivid regret for the noble unforgotten dead. The King so far forgot himself in the general delirium as to drive straight to the City without waiting to be presented with the key of an imaginary Temple Bar. Messages were sent to all our Allies, the longest, as was due, to France, the staunchest and most long suffering. It was a golden moment. A great peril was overpast, to every Englishman living it was perhaps the greatest unearned blessing, the greatest day of his life.

During the last week in October and the first week in November, 1918, the pressure of Sir Douglas Haig's armies in the centre of the



THE KING AND QUEEN LEAVING THE CATHEDRAL.

German front became more and more pronounced in spite of the increased opposition which the First, Third and Fourth Armies had to encounter. The Field-Marshal's attack was directed along the historic line which all armies have followed when invading Belgium from France or France from Belgium. His strategical object was Namur, the meeting-place of the Sambre and Meuse, to which Brialmont gave the name of strategic heart, and if the war had gone on for another week or ten days he would have got there. On November 9 the Third Army entered Maubeuge, and on the morning of the 11th, an hour



SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET.
The British light cruiser Cardiff leading the way, followed by the battle cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, Hindenburg, Derfflinger, Von der Tann and 9 battle ships



(Canadian War Records.)

CANADIANS MARCHING THROUGH THE STREETS OF MONS, NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

before the Armistice was signed, General Horne's troops by a dramatic coincidence entered Mons. Mons was the first name on the war medals and war records of the European War of 1914-1918, and the very last place to be inscribed at the eleventh hour upon the slowly unfolding roll of victory was Mons. By this time the German armies were "on the run" along the whole front. The persistent pressure of the British Armies down the Sambre caused a weakening of resistance on the flanks owing to the necessity of diverting troops to prevent the centre being pierced. On November 8 the French reached Mezières, and on November 10, after a last desperate struggle with the invaders, General Gouraud's troops crossed the Meuse near Vrigne. On the 9th the Americans crossed the river south of Stenay and seized the height on the right bank. The victory was complete. German resistance had been everywhere broken down, and the whole group of armies formerly commanded by the ex-Crown Prince of Prussia were in disorderly retreat to the Ardennes. The Armistice came in the nick of time to avert a German débâcle.

It was reported that during the discussions which took place at Spa (German G.H.Q.), when an Armistice was under consideration, Hindenburg was urged by the Junker die-hards about the ex-Kaiser to rally his troops and continue the struggle. It was represented to him that by retiring from the Scheldt he could hold the line of the Meuse throughout

the winter, gain time to recuperate the strength of the German Armies, and restore their *morale*. Mackensen might have listened, but the veteran was too sceptical or too wise to be taken in by the maudering ecstasies of moribund Majesty. The desperate political situation apart, such counsel was unacceptable from a military point of view—for the simple fact that the Meuse had ceased to be a tenable line of defence. The British Army was marching victoriously down the main line of German retreat to Cologne, while the alternative route into Belgium through the Gap of Chimay was in French hands. Communications with Metz were broken, and the two principal groups of German Armies were separated from each other. Hindenburg knew he was beaten, and did the best thing he could by admitting defeat, and suing for peace. Any other course of action would have led to unparalleled military disaster, and would have plunged Germany into the cauldron of the "Commune" or worse.

Ten days later (11 a.m., November 21) was transacted at Scapa Flow the much talked of "Tag," when Admiral Beatty issued the historic signal to our Fleet: "The German flag will be hauled down at sunset to-day, and will not be hoisted again without permission"—this proved the veritable truth so far as that German fleet was concerned. Thenceforth the Armistice persisted and held good from November 11, 1918, to June 28, 1919. Various German protests were made only to

be disregarded. But the Armistice had to be renewed monthly, and modifications were made from time to time by which various omissions were rectified (December 13, January 16, February 16, etc.). The most important was the convention prolonging the Armistice of January 16, when conditions were laid down for provisioning Germany with foodstuffs. The Allies undertook this. On the other hand, they demanded the services of what remained of the German fleet, they insisted upon the destruction of all U-boats still on the stocks, on the restitution of machinery looted from Belgium, on the delivery of Allied merchantmen still detained in German ports, the extension of the neutral zone, the transference of the gold reserve from Berlin to Frankfort, and the prompter execution of some other stipulations, including a large transference of agricultural machinery and implements to the Allies.

With these and similar modifications, the Armistice lasted until the end of June, 1919, and the ratification of Peace. During this time protests were made, but without much effect, and the Germans were made to feel that they were effectively tied and bound. During this necessary interval their Army was reduced and in great measure demobilized, the Navy was a total wreck and utterly helpless, the air forces were reduced to nullity. Yet there were people who asked: Why an Armistice? The Armistice was the indispensable preliminary of Peace. It saved untold bloodshed. It tided over a most difficult and incalculable period of transition. It habituated and attuned the Germans to the posture of uncomplaining submission, indispensable for the prisoner at the bar at the conclusion of the greatest of all recorded *causes célèbres*.

END OF VOLUME TWENTY .

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
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
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